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ABSTRACT
SECURITY IS LOCAL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF COMMUNITY-BASED
SECURITY FORCES DURING COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS
by Alexander Dulaney Stephenson
May 2018
Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are the most common type of military
operation conducted by the United States and other Western powers. In most cases,
conventional forces intervening in an insurgency are limited in personnel and turn to
local community-based security forces to mitigate this shortcoming after initial attempts
fail to defeat an insurgency with the conventional forces available. While the use of
community-based security forces is a common element of COIN operations, little
research has been conducted to determine the factors that contribute to their successful
employment. A synthesis of existing COIN and community-based policing theory
provides a model to evaluate the use of community-based security forces. Six factors
emerge as the most important for important for the successful employment of
community-based security forces; external support and oversight, limits to territorial
jurisdiction, incorporation of traditional justice system, local sustainability and
accountability, and voluntary participation by local elites. An analysis of eight uses of
community-based security forces during COIN operations indicates that external
oversight and support is the most critical element in the success of a community-based
security program, but also the balanced application of the other factors is a reliable
predicator of the program’s outcome and that there is a relationship among several of the
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factors themselves. These findings suggest this model is a useful planning tool for
military planners and commanders.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States (U.S.) military has
conducted significantly more counterinsurgency (COIN) and peacekeeping operations
than any other type of operation, to include the high-intensity warfare experienced during
both World Wars (Boot 2014). The diminishing possibility of large-scale conventional
warfare due to the threat of nuclear weapons and the Western preoccupation with
stabilizing weak and developing states suggests a continued proliferation of COIN
operations as the twenty-first century progresses. As recent U.S. operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan highlight, the cost in blood and treasure required to conduct COIN
operations using the current top-down, nation-building approach is often at odds with the
level of commitment possessed by intervening powers. This resource-commitment
mismatch and the failure of many COIN operations to produce decisive results have
sparked a debate among COIN theorists concerning the validity of the top-down, statecentered COIN model. A growing number of COIN theorists now advocate a bottom-up,
community-based approach to COIN (Jones 2010 and Kilcullen 2013). This dissertation
tests a theory, based in bottom-up COIN theory, for the use of community-based security
forces. The use of community-based security forces is one method promoted by bottomup COIN theorists as one way to overcome the shortcomings of current U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine. While the use of community-based security forces is touted
as a component of bottom-up COIN, in numerous cases the use of these irregular forces
has led to human rights abuses and other counterproductive effects. The theory proposed
in this dissertation presents variables that influence the success or failure of communitybased security programs.
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U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, encapsulated in Field Manual (FM) 3-24: The
United States Army and United States Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual
(Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014), draws its foundations from the statecentric development model prevalent in Western governments and aid organizations.
One flaw of the manual is that authors of FM 3-24 do not critically examine the
experiences of previous counterinsurgency operations using variables outside their
current model to determine what, if any, other variables influence the outcomes of COIN
operations. U.S. COIN doctrine and state-building both propose that population security
is one of the key elements of counterinsurgency or state-building and that states
experience widespread violence because of the extent of weakness of their central
governments. Therefore, these views propose that the only way to achieve security and
stability is for the host nation to be the “primary actor” in providing security, while donor
aid builds the structures of a modern state (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014,
Fukuyama 2004 and Dobbins, et al. 2007). This is the essence of the top-down COIN
approach; building a centralized state apparatus to assume the role of security guarantor.
The failure of the international community and the U.S. in particular to establish
functioning central governments or sustainable security in numerous post-conflict
societies exposes the issues with top-down COIN methods.
This research follows the trend in recent COIN literature that proposes the statebased counterinsurgency theory is incorrect or at best insufficient because of its reliance
on the unproven belief that building a traditional state-based security apparatus is the
only viable way to provide security (Dobbins, et al. 2007 and Fukuyama, 2004). This
view interprets Max Weber’s definition of a state as “a human community that
2

(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory,” to mean that the state must be the exclusive and not just predominant holder of
force in order to function (Weber 1958). This is a Western-based view of the roles and
functions of a state and presents an ideal or perfect case of societal organization and does
not reflect how late developing states function. As Douglass North (1981) notes, this
idealized vision of state control does not acknowledge that at best most states only enjoy
a comparative advantage in the use of force. Often the exercise of violence in a weak
state experiencing an insurgency is a cooperative and competitive interaction between the
state, insurgents, and other non-state practitioners of violence.
Detractors of state-building theory point to the numerous failures of state-building
projects to gain lasting security in many conflict prone states in Africa, Central Asia, and
the Middle East. These critics propose that such efforts fail because they use Western
state formation as the template and demand development of a central government,
democratization, and modernization at a pace that overwhelms the capacity of fragile
states and societies (Paris, 2004 and Ahram, 2011). While critiques of state-building
theory have led international development agencies and donors to focus on a dual
strategy of top-down and bottom-up development models, little rigorous and analytical
focus has been paid to applying these lessons to COIN doctrine (OECD, 2007).
The failure or inconclusive results of recent state-building projects attempted by
the international community in Somalia and several Sub-Saharan Africa states and of
state-centric counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan questions the
practicability of state formation in fragile or failed states contending with weak
institutions and non-state competitors. The alternative to establishing state monopoly of
3

power in countries where it never existed or where the state has traditionally been a
hindrance to stability and development is to accept the devolution of violence to non-state
actors and find practical ways to incorporate those non-state actors into
counterinsurgency efforts (Ahram 2011).
Authors such as Seth Jones (2010) and David Kilkullen (2013) point to the need
for the application of bottom-up COIN strategies, but offer models based on single cases.
Jones (2010) defines bottom-up counterinsurgency strategy as leveraging existing
grassroots resistance to insurgent movements to not only secure the population, but also
to gain the support of the population. By gaining the support of the local population,
“especially mobilizing locals to fight insurgents, providing information on their locations
and movements, and denying insurgent sanctuary in their areas,” the goal of bottom-up
COIN strategy is to “mobilize communities simultaneously across multiple areas” (Jones
2010, ix). Jones proposes that this method can create an unstoppable momentum against
an insurgent force until “a ‘cascade’ or tipping point is created and insurgent victory is
impossible” (Jones 2010, ix). This suggests a need for the establishment of the
relationship between the variables influencing bottom-up COIN strategies and the
outcome of the operation, as well as the relationship among the variables themselves.
One of the main foundations of this dissertation, derived from an exhaustive
literature review and recent U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is
that COIN forces often fail to establish population security because of inadequate
external security force manpower and resources. Military leaders asked to face the
daunting task of defeating an insurgency are left in a quandary imposed by the competing
factors of limited resources and time constraints and the requirements of speed, duration,
4

and resources necessary to build a strong central government and security sector
necessary to defeat an insurgency. Faced with these constraints and requirements,
commanders of COIN forces in most recent cases are forced violate COIN doctrine and
adopt bottom-up strategies to achieve population security. One such strategy is the use of
community-based security forces, which is the focus of this dissertation. These programs
have produced mixed results. In Iraq community-based, security forces produced rapid
gains in security in 2007 through the Sons of Iraq program, while in Afghanistan
community-based security forces in the period of 2002 to the present have produced few
security gains with little initial success (Human Rights Watch 2011). Earlier
counterinsurgency operations by the U.S., France, Britain and Peru have also used local
community security forces to overcome resource and information constraints as well as to
provide rapid and persistent security in contested zones, with varying degrees of success.
This practice contradicts current counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, which dictates
that only the state can provide security. Instead of addressing this deficiency in
counterinsurgency theory and doctrine, the use of community-based security forces has
been ignored or downplayed in the 2014 revision of FM 2-34 and therefore has not been
scrutinized as a necessary component of successful U.S. counterinsurgency strategies
(Gentile, 2008 and Amato, 2011).
Problem Statement
Community-based security is not without its critics. Detractors highlight
instances of predatory behavior by community-based security forces or their use by
nefarious local powerbrokers, which hinder the effectiveness of aid and the development
of state institutions (Human Rights Watch 2011). The frequency of the use of
5

community-based security forces and their mixed record in counterinsurgency operations,
coupled with the lack of attention placed on the factors necessary for their successful
implementation, demonstrates a need for further study. This problem lends itself to
asking which factors and combination of factors influence the outcome of communitybased security programs as a part of a larger COIN operation.
Statement of Purpose and Research Question
The impracticability of current top-down COIN doctrine and the near universal,
but mixed, use of community-based security forces points to an important area of
research relevant to academics and practitioners. For academics, this study refines one
facet of COIN theory, further challenging the concept of the state monopoly on the use of
force and providing an empirical theory for the successful use of community-based
security forces. For practitioners, this study seeks to provide selection criteria for the use
of community-based security forces and to set expectations for their effectiveness.
Therefore, this research seeks to address the research question, “How do the variables
associated with the relevant literature on community-based policing influence the
outcome of bottom-up COIN operations using non-state local security forces?”
Community-based policing theory proposed by Bruce Baker provides one source
of potential variables to apply to COIN community-based security programs. The
overlap between community-based security and community-based policing are evident
beyond the similarity in names. Community-based security programs seek to empower
local populations to establish security in ongoing internal conflicts that weaken the ability
of the state to secure a population, while community-based policing promotes the
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establishment of security after conflict termination when the institutions of a state cease
to exist or are degraded.
Community-based policing theory has been successfully tested in post-conflict
countries in Africa and adherence to the principles of the theory have been found to
promote accountability of security forces to the local populace and provide security and
judicial services that are congruent with local practices, while maintaining government
oversight (Baker 2004). Baker (2004) proposes that the critical variables required for the
success of a community-based security program are the incorporation of traditional
justice systems; local sustainability and accountability; voluntary participation by local
elites; and external oversight. While this theory has been proven effective in postconflict states in Africa, it has not been tested in other regions or as a component of
counterinsurgency operations.
This dissertation, guided by the relevant literature discussed in the literature
review, proposes that because of the higher level of violence and material capacity
associated with insurgent groups compared to other non-state actors such as gangs, the
most critical variable in community-security programs is sustained external oversight and
support. This is a divergence from Baker’s theory, which suggests some oversight by a
responsible state is necessary, but links to discredited or predatory government forces can
often act as a negative influence on the acceptance of community-based policing by the
local population (Baker 2010). The greater need for material and training support
required to confront a trained and well-equipped insurgent force should outweigh the
benefits of autonomy in cases of community-based security programs in
counterinsurgency operations. This is due to the greater threat posed by a well-armed
7

insurgent group as compared to the low-level crime and disorganized civil unrest faced
by the post-conflict community-based policing programs addressed in Baker’s research.
It is a reasonable assumption that community-based security forces must be armed at a
nearly equal level to the insurgent forces they confront, thus community-based security
forces would require a higher level of support from government forces.
The remaining variables are unchanged from Baker’s model. In addition to
oversight, limited territorial jurisdiction should also influence the ability of non-state
security forces to act as predatory agents outside their social and geographic
communities. Incorporation of traditional justice systems should influence the local
acceptance of community-based security forces by tapping into conflict resolution
mechanisms accepted by the population. This variable should also influence the ability
of local trusted agents to negotiate and reintegrate marginal members of the insurgency
under terms understood by the local actors in the conflict. The ability for local actors to
sustain the manpower requirements of the program and accountability mechanisms
should influence the long-term ownership of the program by local populations. Including
local power brokers and violence specialists into community-security programs should
influence the success of the program by co-opting existing power structures and
minimizing the creation of powerful spoilers.
Hypothesis
Therefore, the alternate hypothesis proposed is that the degree of adherence to the
factors described above and their interdependence determines the level of sustainable
security attained through community-based security programs. The hypothesis can be
illustrated by this formula:
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security (s)= amount of sustained external oversight and support (os) + limits to
territorial jurisdiction (t) + level of traditional justice systems incorporation (tj) + degree
of local sustainability and accountability (sa) + level of voluntary participation by local
elites (le) or s=os+t+tj+sa+le. The null hypothesis is that adherence to these factors does
not influence the level of security experienced by communities participating in
community-based security programs. The variables presented, based on communitybased policing theory and relevant COIN theory discussed later in this proposal,
addresses the unique issues and factors encountered in counterinsurgency operations and
those issues critics raise with the use of non-state actors in the provision of security.
Research Approach
The research objective of the dissertation is to conduct a disciplined configurative
case study of 11 counterinsurgency campaigns that include large-scale community based
security programs and then use the congruence case study method to test the ability of the
theory to explain the outcome of individual cases. In all military operations trade-offs
between competing requirements must be made and each of these factors must be
balanced to achieve success. Therefore, a model for the optimum balance between each
of the factors of the model must be created. To accomplish this, a Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA) will be conducted to determine which conditions are
necessary or sufficient for a specific outcome and the potential combination of conditions
that can produce an outcome. To further test the explanatory power of the model, an
additional case study will be examined after the QCA to determine if the combinations
and relative strength of each variable produced by the QCA provide adequate explanation
of the case.
9

Assumptions
Based on the researcher’s experience and the relevant historical accounts of the
use of local indigenous security forces during COIN operations, three primary
assumptions were made regarding this study. First, the used of community-based
security forces can be a critical component of bottom-up COIN operations. This
assumption is based on premise held by a growing number of military and COIN analysts
that the Sons of Iraq program was a key component in the reduction of violence in Iraq
during the so-called US military force “Surge” in 2007. This is a necessary assumption
because if other environmental conditions are the causal variables that cause specific
outcomes, the validity of this study comes into question. This dissertation continually
tests the validity of this assumption by accounting for other factors that influence the
outcome of all the cases studied.
Second, this study assumes that the desire for security is a universal motivation
and the inhabitants of a community have a stake in stability and security of that
community. Therefore, given the access to the proper resources, local actors will be
motivated to provide security for themselves. This assumption is guided by Maslow’s
hierarchy of needs that posits the desire for safety is one of the base human motivators. It
is also based on community policing principle of local ownership that proposes that given
a stake in the outcome of a program, the local population will desire a successful
outcome. This assumption is necessary because if local inhabitants caught in an active
insurgency are primarily motivated by other considerations, the principles of communitybased policing are not valid for COIN community-based security programs.
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Third, accounting for local differences in environmental and cultural conditions,
community-based security programs used in previous COIN operations share similar
characteristics. This is based on an initial review of the cases used in this dissertation and
others outside the scope of this study. This is a necessary assumption for this dissertation
because the purpose of this study is to measure the degree of membership of selected
attributes the cases selected for this study share. As with the others previously noted, this
assumption will be tested throughout this dissertation by accounting for other factors in
each of the cases that may have been causal influences on their outcomes.
Rationale and Significance
Most counterinsurgency theorists support the use of local security forces, but are
either vague in the requirements for effectiveness or provide case specific
recommendations. Community-based policing in Africa and Bruce Baker’s theories on
community-based policing provide an existing theoretic framework that Baker (2010)
notes has not been tested outside of Africa or applied to community-based security effort
during an insurgency. The model for this research intends to test the hypotheses that
local ownership, incorporation of traditional justice systems, sustainability, and voluntary
participation by the community and local security provider will resolve many of the
concerns that arise during the implementation of a community-based security program.
This dissertation and the model presented in it will provide two additions to the
existing literature. First, it will provide support for the general applicability of bottom-up
COIN, which up to this point has been developed and tested using single cases. Also, a
QCA of the model, which is explained in depth in the methodology chapter, will indicate
the relative importance of each variable and the necessary and sufficient combination of
11

variables needed to produce a required outcome; this type of analysis has not been
conducted before. Second, testing a modified community-based policing model will test
the variables of the model outside of Africa, which has not been done before. In each of
these areas this dissertation will provide a unique and necessary contribution to the
existing literature.
Definitions of Key Terminology Used in This Study
Bottom-Up Counterinsurgency – The use of social networks at the local level by a
national government or external force to secure the local population, isolate insurgents
from the population, and gain the support of the population as a key component of a
counterinsurgency campaign.
Community-Based Security – An organized activity centered at the local level
that seeks to maintain social order and peace through the prevention and deterrence of
internal or external armed groups seeking to displace government authority or fill gaps in
governance (Jones 2010).
Counterinsurgency (COIN) – “Comprehensive civilian and military efforts
designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes”
(Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014, 53).
Insurgency – “a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an
organized revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency.” (Merriam Webster)
Security – The “state or condition of (individuals) being protected from or not
exposed to danger” and the “protection of the interests” of a group “against some internal
or external threat” (Oxford English Dictionary 2015).
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Traditional Justice System – Customary structures based on social or religious
tradition that investigate and resolve conflicts and disputes (Baker 2010, 93). These
systems are typically outside the formal system of justice established by the state. The
ability of these systems to investigate and resolve disputes and conflict relies on their
informal social or religious authority.
Political Entrepreneur/Political Elite – Individuals or groups who specialize in
social brokerage to include creating, defining, and coordinating social connections and
representing social groups (Tilly 2003). These actors can derive their power from their
position in the state or their position in formal or informal social networks such as
religious or tribal leaders.
Violence Specialist – A political actor who “controls the means of inflicting
damage on persons and objects” (Tilly 2003, 35). These individuals and groups can be a
part of the state security apparatus such as the military or police. They can also be nonstate actors such as private security companies, criminal gangs, paramilitary groups and
private individuals with access to the means of force.
Research Overview
The structure for this dissertation consists of 16 parts. After this introductory
chapter, the second chapter reviews the literature relevant to this study and discusses how
this research is grounded in existing theory and furthers the study of counterinsurgency.
The next chapter discusses the case study and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
methodology selected for this dissertation. In the next chapters, 11 counterinsurgency
case studies involving community-based security programs are presented to build the
necessary information required to conduct the QCA. In the second part of each case
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study, a congruence analysis is conducted to assess the theory’s value in explaining the
outcome of each case (George and Bennett 2005, 181-204). This exercise is useful to
determine the relative importance of each variable and which variables work in concert to
produce an outcome. This results in a “fuzzy set,” or a data set whose elements have
varying degrees of membership in the variable in contrast to the conventional “crisp set”
whose objects are either “in” or “out.” (Ragin 2008)

The final section is a Qualitative

Comparative Analysis (QCA) of the fuzzy sets to test the necessary conditions within the
theory and conclusion. A similar methodology was used successfully by International
Development Program graduate Kevin Dougherty in his doctoral dissertation “Following
the Principles: Case Studies in Operations Other Than War, 1945-1999” (Dougherty
2011).
Chapter Outline
Chapter 1 provides an introduction of the topic, research question, and hypothesis.
This chapter also provides a synopsis of the research method. Finally, an overview of the
remainder of the dissertation is included.
Chapter 2 discusses the major relevant literature with the purpose of situating the
dissertation in COIN literature and defining the variables used in the dissertation. This
chapter outlines the major principles of COIN and community-based policing in postconflict countries. These principles are used to develop a proposed model for the
successful application of a community-based security program during counterinsurgency
operations.
Chapter 3 develops the methodology used in the dissertation. This chapter
defines how the complimentary use of the congruence case study method and Qualitative
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Comparative Analysis will be used to test the alternative hypothesis. Additionally, the
variables tested in the research are operationalized and data sources are determined.
Chapters 4 through 8 present the following case studies: the Philippine
constabulary used in the four military districts of the Philippine War, the Home Guard
force used during the Malayan Emergency, the Home Guard force used during the
Kenyan Emergency, the Combined Action Platoon Program during the Vietnam War, and
the Harkis force using in the Algerian War. Chapters 9 through 11 present the following
case studies: the local constabulary used in the Cyprus Emergency, Civilian Irregular
Defense Group program employed during the Vietnam War, and finally the Regional
Force/Popular Force program implemented during the Vietnam War. Each of these case
studies will include an examination of the program in question focused on the variables
proposed by the model. The explanatory power of the model in each case will be
determined as well as a determination of a degree of variable membership for subsequent
QCA analysis. Additionally, other intervening or causal variables present in each case
will be determined.
Chapter 16 presents the findings of the comparative case study analysis and the
QCA of cases. The data that the QCA is derived from will be presented in an
accompanying appendix. The purpose of this section is to determine the explanatory
power of the model as well as combinations of variables that are both sufficient and
necessary to cause a positive outcome.
The final part of this chapter restates the purpose and findings of the study and its
contribution to the existing body of knowledge. This section will also include concluding
remarks concerning issues encountered during the study and areas for follow-on research.
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To conclude and summarize this introduction, this dissertation seeks to make a
unique and critical contribution to existing COIN theory and research. The use of local
forces is becoming a preferred method in contemporary COIN operations. While bottomup COIN theory has proposed causal and intervening variables which contribute to the
success or failure of COIN operations, these theories are based on single case studies or
anecdotal evidence. The explanatory power of the community-based security model
presented in this dissertation needs to be tested.
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CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this literature review is to review the current state of the debate
surrounding the use of community-based security forces, ground this dissertation in the
existing counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, and provide a justification for the factors that
comprise the community-based security model proposed in this dissertation. The first
part of the review will explore existing literature that addresses the use of local
indigenous forces as a component of counterinsurgency operations. The purpose of this
discussion is twofold. First, it will uncover the diverse, but sometime overlapping casual
variables identified in existing studies. Second, it will identify several deficiencies in the
current literature that this research seeks to address.
The next segment of the review will explore general COIN literature to establish
the key principles of counterinsurgency theory that will inform the model used in this
dissertation and discuss the limitations of top-down COIN theory. The first topic
discussed in this section of the review is the importance of population control or as it is
referred to in U.S. COIN doctrine by the more benign term, population security. Next,
the constraints and requirements suggested by top-down counterinsurgency theory and
related nation-building theory to achieve population control will be discussed. This
discussion will bring out the impractical nature of existing top-down counterinsurgency
theory in providing the competing requirements for the rapid provision of security,
security force to population ratios, and resource requirements, local knowledge.
Next, this literature review will discuss the emergence of bottom-up
counterinsurgency theory as an answer to the difficulties encountered in applying
traditional counterinsurgency doctrine in recent COIN operations. This new perspective
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on COIN proposes a reappraisal of the role of non-state actors in the provision of security
and creating security at the local level. This new approach to counterinsurgency
promotes cooption of local institutions, leadership, and traditions in the pursuit of
population control and the provisioning of security. A review of the bottom-up COIN
literature reveals that the main factors or variables proposed by theorists correlate with
the principles of community-based policing developed in Africa. This literature review
will discuss the principles of community-based policing relevant to bottom-up COIN,
which will constitute the model proposed in this dissertation.
Existing Community-based Security COIN Research
In the period of 2005-2011, at the height of the U.S. involvement in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the concomitant stresses on the U.S. military to meet the manpower
needs required for both conflicts, several studies explored the use of irregular security
forces in COIN operations. The majority of these studies used exploratory case studies of
the use of irregular forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to derive lessons learned for current
and future U.S. COIN operations. None of these studies developed at testable theory or
model, nor do they utilize more than one or two studies to derive their results. While
these studies have a different purpose and methodology from this study several findings
from each supplement or strengthen the model presented in this dissertation.
Seth G. Jones presents one of the most fully articulated models of communitybased security in his 2010 Joint Forces Quarterly article, “Community Defense in
Afghanistan” and his 2010 book authored with Arturo Munoz, Afghanistan’s Local War:
Building Local Defense Forces. Based on his research and experience as a civilian
advisor to U.S. commanders in Afghanistan, Jones makes the case for the use of local
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defense forces as a supplement to traditional top-down COIN techniques such as creating
a central government led army and police force (Jones 2010, 61). Jones proposes that for
a community-based security force to be successful the COIN force must be guided by
several principles. These principles include developing a community security force that
is congruent with local principles and institutions, accountable to the local community,
and supported and supervised by an external force (Jones 2010, 61-64). The main
deficiency of Jones’ work is that it is based on the single case of Afghanistan. Several
aspects of Afghan culture, such as the historical use of the “Arbakai” self-defense force
to counter external threats, may make it a unique case with little applicability to COIN
operations in other regions. While there are potential deficiencies in the methodology
and data set for this study, the findings of Jones’ were included in the source material
used to develop the model used in this dissertation when they are supported by other
COIN literature.
Other studies exploring the use of community-based security forces are largely
similar to Jones’ work in that they focus on Iraq or Afghanistan, but they differ in
research focus. Two Command and General Staff College masters’ theses typify attempt
of these studies to gain lessons learned from these conflicts for application in those
conflicts.
The first, “Community Oriented Policing in Counterinsurgency: A Conceptual
Model,” by Jason H. Beers (2007) takes a similar approach to this dissertation in
traveling current civil police theory to COIN research. In this case, Beers uses
community-oriented policing theory that seeks to create formal police organizational
behavior and methods that are congruent with local practices. While Beers addresses the
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training and application of military and conventional police forces during COIN
operations and does not study the use of community-based security forces, his research
does show the applicability of using contemporary police theory in COIN studies.
The second study, “Closing the Gap: Building Irregular Security Forces,” by
Michael A. Gunther (2012) overlaps in some areas with this dissertation. In his research
Gunther focuses on determining the factors that contribute to the success or failure of the
employment of community-based security forces in Iraq and the Malayan Emergency.
Gunther finds that local accountability and oversight or as he terms it, support of the host
nation government and quality of an embedded advisor force are the causal variables that
determine the outcome of the use of an irregular security force. While the findings of this
study lend support for the variables used in this dissertation, this study includes several
issues. These issues include the limited number of cases and the inability of the
researcher using a comparative case study method to determine the relative importance of
each of the identified causal variables in producing an outcome.
One study that uses a different set of cases is the U.S. Army War College
monograph, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two
Insurgencies written by James S. Corum (2006). While Corum’s work focuses primarily
on the training of indigenous police forces in the Malaya and Cyprus Emergencies, he
does address the use of the use by the British of irregular Home Guard forces as a
component of British COIN strategy. Corum does not explore the use of the Home
Guards in enough detail to determine their impact in either of the conflicts, he does
propose that their use was successful because “the British did not demand too much from
part-time force” and the British instituted a degree of centralization and standardization in
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their training and employment (Corum 2006, 47-48). These two points loosely agree
with the variables of limited territorial jurisdiction and external support and oversight
presented and expanded later in this literature review as part of the community-based
security model.
This review of the existing community-based security literature uncovers a wide
array of potential causal variables drawn from a limited case study population. This
dissertation attempts to overcome both of these shortcomings. By using QCA this
dissertation will be able to include a larger number of variables and determine the relative
degree of membership each case possesses and combinations of causal variables that can
produce a given outcome. Additionally, while each insurgency produces a unique
mixture of conditions, using a larger number of cases drawn from widely different
cultural and geographical settings should produce findings that are, if not academically
transferable to other cases, more generalizable for practitioners. Given the wide array of
causal factors already encountered, the remainder of this literature review will review
existing general COIN literature to determine a more complete formula for the use of
community-based security forces.
Security
Unlike interstate warfare with conventional militaries seeking to control territory
or destroy the opposing government, in counterinsurgency warfare, control of the
population is the critical factor. According to John Paul Vann, a senior U.S. official
involved in pacification efforts in South Vietnam, “Security may be ten percent of the
problem, or it may be ninety percent, but whichever it is, it’s the first ten percent or the
first ninety percent. Without security, nothing else will last” (Sheehan 1988, 67). While
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protection of the population against violence is an important consideration, the existing
literature suggests that control of the population is the more important factor, which
allows the legitimate state government to establish its instructions and gain the support of
the population through aid and development programs. Government control of the
population in this context allows the government to administer development aid and
installation of institutions while denying insurgents access and preventing their parallel
attempts to establish their own institutions and legitimacy. To establish the critical
importance of population security in counterinsurgency, this literature review will begin
with a discussion of how current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and theory treats the
subject.
According to FM 3-24 The United States Army and United States Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2014) securing the population is the “cornerstone” of a
successful operation. This is echoed by French counterinsurgency theorist and
practitioner Roger Trinquier, who proposed that gaining support for the state requires the
unconditional support of the population (1964, 8). Trinquier argues that if the population
lives under the threat of reprisals from insurgents and the government proves impotent in
the face of insurgent attacks, the state will never gain legitimacy as the exerciser of force
within its boundaries (1964, 16-17).
David Galula in Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (2006) also
supports the view that security of the population is paramount, even more important than
other public services and development. In his opinion, “support from the population is
conditional as long as there is the threat of insurgent reprisals – no favorable minority
will emerge until this threat has been lifted” (Galula 2006, 54). Galula’s answer is to
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station troops among the people to allow a friendly leadership of the population to
emerge (Galula 2006, 57). At its core, the purpose of population security as discussed
by these three works is control of the population with the goal of providing the space and
time to allow other government efforts to build government legitimacy in the eyes of the
population. Therefore, ultimate success in an insurgency is the establishment of stability
and the acceptance by the populace of the rule of law administered by the state (Jones,
Wilson, et al. 2005, 7). As discussed in the introduction, this method requires a heavy
commitment of security forces and resources and assumes a binary contestation of power
between insurgents and the government. Other wielders of traditional or social sources of
power are treated as actors to be co-opted, if they are addressed at all.
The center of gravity of any insurgency and the source of power for both
insurgents and counterinsurgents is access to the population that is exercised by securing
them (Kilcullen 2010, 7). In an insurgency, the counterinsurgent forces usually have the
benefit of more manpower and resources compared to insurgent forces, but are faced with
the dilemma of having to provide a blanket of security for every population center. Due
to finite resources and manpower, total control of a region is usually not possible and
some areas must be defended less robustly. It is in these gaps of control or in the seams
of what Chinese communist guerilla leader Mao Tse Tung (2011) called the “jigsaw
pattern” of areas of strong and weak government control that insurgents are able to gain
access and exercise control over a population. It is in these areas where insurgents can
conduct “an unceasing watch over all inhabitants” that they can implement their own
system of government and security, supplanting the existing system (Trinquier 1964, 19).
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Finding a method to block complete insurgent access to the population becomes the task
for government forces.
Stathis Kalyvas in The Logic of Violence in Civil War (2006, 111) agrees with the
necessity of physical control of the population by proposing that possessing the military
power to control the population, above prewar political and social preferences or
grievances, is the critical factor in producing support from the population. According to
Kalyvas, violence and the threat of violence supplements physical control of the
population by acting as a coercive tool used to control the population, rather than a
byproduct of conflict (Kalyvas 2006, 27).
According to Kalyvas, “control lowers the cost of collaboration, produces
mechanical ascription, signals credibility, enables hearts and minds development,
facilitates direct monitoring of the population, and spawns a self-reinforcing dynamic” by
creating areas with the reputation for past government collaboration (Kalyvas 2006, 124129). Control in Kalyvas’ theory also provides access to information through informants,
which allows for the practice of “selective violence” the process of discriminatory
punishment of only those guilty of collaboration with insurgents. The exchange of
information between external forces and local actors, who possess information about
local allegiances, is an economic exchange. Local actors provide information to external
actors, which allow government or insurgent forces to practice selective violence. In
exchange, government or insurgent forces provide local actors the opportunity to increase
personal power within the community or settle old scores. This exchange between the
government security forces and locals can only occur when the benefit of informing
outweighs the cost of potential reprisals from insurgent groups. This favorable balance of
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control creates an incentive framework to support the government when compared to
indiscriminate violence such a mass arrests conducted when the government operates
without local information (Kalyvas 2006, 154).
Kalyvas’ theory highlights the importance of the largely independent role of local
inhabitants, who must be co-opted if an external actor is to gain control of a population.
His case study of the Greek civil war of 1945-1949 indicates the majority of civilians in
an insurgency is neutral and they will collaborate or be passively neutral to whichever
side controls the territory in which they live. Their loyalty can essentially be bought
through the implicit promise that selective violence will not target those that are not
actively supporting the insurgency. It also provides the potential for empowerment if the
controlling power allows groups to act as agents in the form of militias or local security
supplementing the control of the occupying power. This understanding of population
control works for both government forces and insurgent groups.
The existing literature is clear that control of the population, provided either by
professional security forces or non-state agents, is critical to the success of a
counterinsurgency effort. Providing security would be a straight forward proposition if
time and resources were unconstrained. Time and unlimited resources are not luxuries
counterinsurgency forces usually, if ever, enjoy. To overcome these shortcomings
security forces can use selective violence but they must utilize the knowledge and if
necessary, the manpower of trusted local agents to achieve control.
Time and the “Golden Hour” for Control
Another factor working against counterinsurgent forces is time. At the moment of
an external intervention or the commencement of counterinsurgency operations by the
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state, time is operating against them. In what is termed “the golden hour” in the
immediate aftermath of an intervention, the gap in security created by the lack or
ineptitude of local security forces must be closed while external forces enjoy local
popular support and international legitimacy and before insurgents organize and entrench
in the local population (Jones, Wilson, et al. 2005, 19-20 and Dobbins, Jones, et al. 2007,
20). The U.S. Army counterinsurgency manual advocates quickly “stopping the
bleeding” in the initial stages of a counterinsurgency campaign by rapidly establishing
security, but its authors barely mention how resource-constrained commanders can
accomplish this task with limited forces and local knowledge (Headquarters, Department
of the Army 2006, 5-2)
What is clear is that counterinsurgency commanders must quickly flood conflict
prone areas with large numbers of security forces. As David Galula put it, “insurgency is
cheap, but counterinsurgency is costly - because he has neither the responsibility nor the
concrete assets; the counterinsurgent is rigid because he has both” (Galula 2006, 6-7).
The number of forces required depends on the severity of the previous conflict and the
strength of existing state security forces. Most sources place the number of security
forces required between 10 to 25 counterinsurgent forces for every 1,000 inhabitants
(Headquarters, Department of the Army 2006, 1-13, Jones, Wilson, et al. 2005, 19,
Dobbins, Jones, et al. 2007, vvvi). To put this in perspective, Rand researcher Seth Jones
estimates that in Afghanistan this force ratio translates into the requirement of
approximately 660,000 security personnel to secure the country’s population of
approximately 33 million people (S. G. Jones, Community Defense in Afghanistan 2010).
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Security Force to Population Ratios
The number of security forces required to secure a population results in what
James Dobbins described as a “mismatch between ambitions and commitment” (Dobbins,
McGinn, et al. 2003, 150). Either intervening states must provide a quantity of troops
that is unsustainable by modern volunteer armies or the state facing an insurgency must
recruit, train, and field the required forces. Both options are costly and the latter option
runs the risk of turning loose quickly and inadequately trained security personnel on the
population or requires a generation or more to build an effective and professional force.
The almost complete disintegration of the Iraqi Army in 2014 after more than a decade of
training by the U.S. military and billions of dollars in funding is one example of the
difficulty in building a host nation Army during an active insurgency. As Dobbins, et al.
(2003) note, the only modern examples of counterinsurgency forces reaching the troop
levels required were in Bosnia and Kosovo.
The inability of intervening powers to provide adequate security forces to achieve
population control in most cases leads to the necessity of building indigenous capacity to
provide security. Two methods emerge to accomplish this task. One is the “top-down”
construction of a centralized state security apparatus and the other is a “bottom-up”
approach of building local capacity at the lowest levels of community. Taking the
Western, Weberian view that the state can be the only entity within its borders to ‘claim
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force' within that territory, the U.S. has
favored the approach of building local capacity through a process of state-building
(Weber 1958). According to the U.S. Army counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, all
efforts must support the host nation (HN) government with “U.S. forces committed to a
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COIN effort” (2014, 1-29). Although FM 3-24 does acknowledge that HN capacity and
level of commitment of resources may hinder accomplishing the objectives of a COIN
campaign, it makes no mention of other methods designed to achieve security (2014, 629). The manual also does not mention the reaction of the local population to the
creation of a new government and upending or ignoring traditional sources of power and
governance.
Issues with the Top-Down Approach
According to Starr (2006, 108), U.S. counterinsurgency and state-building efforts
are flawed because of the focus on building the sovereignty of a newly constituted
government at the expense of the legitimacy of the new government in the eyes of the
local population. The issue this raises is that by placing legitimacy in a secondary role,
the voluntary acceptance and support of the population for the government’s right to
govern and its enabling institutions as well as approval of the fairness of its institutions
especially security forces and judiciary is left in doubt (Starr 2006, 109). This focus on
building form over function and the emphasis on building western formal rule of law
systems over informal and traditional systems create the potential for the development of
a predatory central government with few ties to or support from the population (Samuels
2006).
Dobbins, et al. (2007, xx) also point out that most U.S.-led state-building efforts
favor deconstruction of existing state institutions as opposed to co-opting existing
indigenous institutions. While in many cases the dismantlement of predatory state
institutions is necessary to establish a lasting peace, much of the impetus behind these
efforts is adherence to modernization theory and the belief in the superiority of western28

style government, including centralized state security apparatus (Jones, et al. 2005, 10).
As Dobbins, et al. (2006) demonstrate, this approach often falls short because it does not
meet the needs or expectations of the local population and the resource intensity and time
required is beyond the means of intervening authorities. This is echoed by Samuels
(2009) who estimates a realistic timeframe in peaceful conditions for creating a new
functional central judicial and security system is twenty years and it may not even be
possible if foreign legal norms are introduced, or there is weak local support for the
reforms (Samuels 2006, 18). These authors highlight the importance of quickly building
a system at the outset of COIN operations that incorporates traditional forms of
governance that are seen as legitimate by the population.
Local Ownership as a Mitigation Method
To surmount the obstacles of manpower, time and legitimacy, Trinquier (1964,
29-30) recommends, “The inhabitant, as the focus of modern warfare, must participate in
his own defense with local leaders building security organizations with a minimum of
government assistance.” To enlist the support of the population the alternate method of
co-optive state-building works with “existing institutions and working with formal and
informal power centers to redirect competition for power from violent to peaceful means”
(Dobbins, et al. 2007, xx). A lesson that is often lost is that the reconstruction of
Germany after World War II, possibly the most successful state-building exercise the
U.S. has ever undertaken, used this bottom-up approach to build local governance and
security apparatuses (Dobbins, McGinn, et al. 2003, 15). While the post-World War II
German reconstruction was not a counterinsurgency, it does present a case where
adequate security and the cooption of local power structures denied residual extremist
29

forces the space to reorganize or access to traditional sources of power to challenge the
establishment of a new state.
The benefit of establishing congruence with local social and power institutions in
state building also extends to counterinsurgency. As other surveys of counterinsurgency
operations have found, counterinsurgency efforts mirror the nature of the state (Kilcullen
2010, 10). A counterinsurgency strategy that relies on a security force that is organized
and employed without the support of local social and political institutions is often
counterproductive because it is incongruent with the local ecosystem. Often the injection
of external forces has a negative effect because they disrupt the local balance of power
and act with nonexistent or imperfect information, what Kalyvas (2006) calls
“indiscriminate violence.” Trinquier called it “striking in a vacuum” and Kilcullen warns
that imposing external forces often creates new enemies from formerly neutral parties or
what he calls “accidental guerillas” (Trinquier 1964, 53-55, 61 and Kilcullen 2009).
Most counterinsurgency theorists propose some form of a grassroots approach to
establishing security using a “bottom-up” counterinsurgency strategy, while leveraging
local institutions linked to a developing central government (Kilcullen 2010, 4, Jones
2009, 335, Galula 2006, 47, Trinquier 1964, Thompson 1966). This bottom-up approach
should tie in with legitimate local institutions, including social and religious leaders and
empower them to provide security and rule of law using traditional institutions.
Disagreement exists on the method to accomplish this task, either through tapping into
existing social structures (Jones 2009, 339), existing leaders (Lawrence 2011) or through
holding local elections to promote leadership untainted by connection to past abuses and
links to the central government (Galula 2006, 47, 52-53). The purpose of either method
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is to build reliable local allies, establish the legitimacy of local leaders and security forces
with the population, and establish lasting post-conflict power structures that are
responsive to the needs of the local population (Kilcullen 2010, 4, 12)
Kalyvas (2006) also finds that the use of militias and public safety committees is
particularly effective in overcoming a state’s lack of local knowledge by tapping into
private information on insurgents and collaborators (Kalyvas 2006, 107). The danger of
these groups is that being armed with local knowledge; they can turn predatory or abusive
by fighting local or personal disputes and becoming “vehicle(s) for internal political
pressure” (Kalyvas 2006, 108 and Trinquier 1964, 34). To combat potential abuses
through the decentralization of authority in the hands of committees and militias, some
sort of appeals process and accountability measures must be established with oversight
exercised by the state security forces (Kalyvas 2006, 183-184). This indicates that some
sort of linkage to the state must be created when establishing a community-based security
force.
Aligned with Kalyvas (2006), Sir Roger Thompson, the architect of the successful
British counterinsurgency strategy in Malaysia in the 1950s, advocated physical control
of the rural population through local self-defense forces primarily to separate insurgents
from resources and to deny them the ability to conduct reprisals on pro-government
supporters (Thompson 1966, 56). To win the population to the side of the government,
he believed successful counterinsurgency must involve “the people in a small way in
national politics which both affect and benefit them, first in the defense of their
community” (Thompson 1966, 124-125). By empowering local supporters to provide
their own security and connecting them with the national government, incentive
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frameworks are created to gain the support of the population or at least neutrality from
the majority of the population. Thompson’s use of this method in Malaysia indicates that
development and reconstruction aid must be tied to the active support of the population
for counterinsurgent forces. Aid must be given and taken away dependent on the actions
of the local population and the behavior of the community-based security forces.
Coopting Local Power and Social Structures
The critical aspect of building local security forces is compatibility with local
power structures. Again, as Kilcullen (2010, 36, 42) notes, what is normal and accepted
in “Kandahar is not the same as Kansas” and Western intervening forces should not seek
to create local security forces that mirror Western models. Instead they should build off
of traditional or spontaneously created local security forces and methods. Although U.S.
counterinsurgency doctrine spends a significant amount of time discussing the
importance of understanding local social structure and sources of formal and informal
power within a society, it spends no time discussing what should be done with this
information except for the purpose of gaining “influence” within a social group
(Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014, 3-11). The failure to make the connection
between understanding local social and political power structures and designing
counterinsurgency strategy that conforms to and utilizes local norms and values leads
back to the tendency of U.S. counterinsurgency forces mirror-imaging themselves in the
creation of local security forces.
As Ronny Kristofferson notes in his unpublished Naval Postgraduate School
thesis, “Bleeding for the Village: Success or Failure in the Hands of Local Powerbrokers”
(2012), leaders of local cultural or religious power structures are critical to the success or
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failure of COIN security operations. Kristofferson proposes that security programs must
coopt local leaders by satisfying their needs for power, legitimacy, and status. The
balancing act he determined was that intervening force commanders must achieve is
balancing local leaders’ needs for these elements while coopting them in such a way that
they support the rule of the central government and work to achieve stability.
To address this problem, Kilcullen proposes his “Theory of Competitive Control,”
which advocates co-design of counterinsurgency efforts with the local population, “to
work with rather than against a community, to help people design security into the actual
fabric of the urban landscape” (2013, 21). This allows counterinsurgent forces to create a
locally supported “web of persuasive, administrative, and coercive structures that control
the populace because it creates a predictable environment that operates within accepted
cultural norms,” which negates insurgent efforts to do the same and provides a built-in
willingness in the populace to enforce and follow those structures (Kilcullen 2013, 117).
The problem with Kilcullen’s theory is that he does not provide the critical factors that
influence the success of these co-designed security forces.
The creation of locally supported, rule-based security feeds into Scott’s (1976, 1,
3-4) “Safety First Principle” of peasant populations who, living on the margin of
subsistence and in uncertain circumstances, tend to be risk averse and seek predictability.
Maintaining existing power structures is attractive to rural populations because they are
known. Utilizing these existing patron-client relationships and village political
organizations allows counterinsurgent forces to maintain internal stability through
preexisting structures that settle disputes and maintain internal law and order and to act as
the negotiator with outside forces (Migdal 1974, 80). As Migdal notes, community
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political structures continue to exist after destabilizing events but, “exert influence and
control in direct proportion to the nature and extent of the authority and responsibilities
delegated to it by the state” (Migdal 1974, 198). Acknowledging these structures and
empowering them is a quick and cost-effective way to establish security. One issue with
this approach is that in countries that have experienced long and highly disruptive
conflict the traditional governance structures may have been discredited or tainted with
complicity with previous predatory regimes. The traditional structures may have also
fractured and competing nodes of power may exist.
To balance power relationships within fragmented or multiethnic communities,
incentive structures must be created to compel local internal cooperation. As Kilcullen
notes, “no external aid is neutral and any external support benefits some at the expense of
conflict with others” (Kilcullen 2013, 14). Aiding one group over another in an
insurgency runs the risk of driving the losing group into the arms of insurgent groups or
creating additional conflict. Based on the neorealist school of international relations,
Fotini Christia (2012) theorizes that like states in the international system, actors in multiparty civil wars or insurgencies seek to guarantee their survival and maximize their share
of post-war political control. They seek to form alliances to power balance against the
most powerful rival (Christia 2012, 19). They do this without respect to ideology or
ethnic considerations. When the end of a conflict is perceived by participants, they will
bandwagon with the winning side, but seek to form a “minimum winning coalition” to
maximize their gains and guard against commitment problems by the hegemonic member
of the winning coalition (Christia 2012, 25). Therefore, counterinsurgency forces must
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also create community-based security forces that mitigate these forces by disincentivizing
defection of groups to the insurgent side.
In Christia’s model, religious and ethnic identity has no causal role in the
formation of alliances, but rather shared group identities and narratives are tools or
“identity repertoires” to gain the support of followers by elites because power
maximization strategies are too difficult to gain widespread support by rank and file
members of the group (Christia 2012, 47). Considering this, counterinsurgent forces
must understand the local balance of power between social groups and seek to create
local “minimum winning alliance” in a community security force or risk driving weaker
groups to join the insurgency to balance against a newly empowered local hegemonic
group.
Deficiencies in Current COIN Research
The relative importance the factors that contribute to a successful communitybased security program remain largely unstudied. While Kilcullen (2009, 2010 and
2013) and Jones (2006 and 2009) discuss the need to design community-based security
forces to be congruent with local practices to achieve local ownership, they remain vague
on the specifics and only provide anecdotal evidence to support their claims. A testable
set of variables is needed to develop a theory for community-based security in
counterinsurgency.
U.S. military counterinsurgency doctrine is also of little help with its strict statebuilding focus. Field Manual 3-24’s accompanying manual on tactics and techniques
required for counterinsurgency, FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency (2009, 8-12)
does mention the potential need to raise community-based or “paramilitary” forces when
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conventional forces are constrained in manpower, but again gives little guidance on the
factors that contribute to a successful program. FM 3-24.2 does stress that “citizen
leaders” should be selected to lead the force and paramilitary units should have standard
weapons and be employed locally. However, it does recommend the members should
receive salaries in contradiction to the previously discussed cases and the manual fails to
discuss any other considerations for selection of the members of the paramilitary unit or
their employment. Similarly, the often-quoted U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual
(1940) only addresses the tactical level organizing, training, and equipping of indigenous
constabulary forces and does not address the cultural and political factors required in
selecting and organizing a community-based security force (United States Marine Corps
1940, 12-1 – 12-5).
Building the Model – Additional Factors
This review has identified several potential causal factors in the implementation
of a successful community-based security programs. Local leadership, congruence with
local customs, limiting employment only to the defense of the local community, and
organic and uncompensated volunteerism with incentives tied to group compliance and
support appear to be critical factors in community-based security. To develop a more
complete theory, it is necessary to look outside counterinsurgency literature for cases
with similar requirements for local security and constraints on the central government to
provide that security.
The concept of community-based policing in developing countries provides one
avenue to “travel” a theory to address this uncovered aspect of counterinsurgency (Collier
and James E. Mahon 1993). While community policing in the West typically addresses
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improving relations between the police force and the local community, community
policing in developing countries involves the provision of security by non-state actors
that “essentially police by the strength of their internally limited informal social control
forces such as special interest groups, ethnic enclaves and occupational groups”
(Friedman 1992). While these models address the provision of security in states with
weak governments, they do not seem to provide a practical model for societies that face
an active insurgent threat (Friedman 1992, 16-17).
After more than 50 years of external efforts to create Western models of policing
in Africa, resource constraints and institutional fragility keep these forces from reaching
effectiveness. As Wulf (2006, 97) proposes, areas where the disruptive forces of
globalization have eroded the sovereignty of the state, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, the
Westphalian ideal of state sovereignty is no longer practical and a new model of multiple
layers of authority over the monopoly of force arises spontaneously. In some ways this is
a return to an earlier period of development in both the United States and Africa when all
policing was homegrown, volunteer, and discretionary (2002, 31). This aligns with the
new focus on Human Security defined by the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, which calls for a re-conceptualization of security that “moves
away from traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focuses primarily on the
safety of states from military aggression, to one that concentrates on the security of
individuals, their protection and empowerment” (Human Security Unit 2002, 6-7). This
approach, much like the bottom-up counterinsurgency approach proposed by Jones
(2010), combines a top-down effort to build the norms and institutions of the state with a
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bottom-up effort with local partners that support individuals and communities in defining
and providing their own vision of security (Human Security Unit 2002, 10)
In this line, Bruce Baker (2007) proposes a shift in perspective from the point of
view of creating government capacity to measuring the success of security sector reform
by the effectiveness of security provided, regardless of the provider, from the perspective
of the individual. Baker defines policing as “any organized activity that seeks to ensure
the maintenance of communal order, security and peace through elements of prevention,
deterrence, investigation of breaches, and punishment” (Baker 2004, 204 and Baker
2010).
During his field work in Africa, Baker finds that community-based security
organizations organically arise to fill the gap in security after civil war or social
disruption. In Uganda, Congo, and Sierra Leone, local security organizations offer
accessible justice, congruent with local customs, and are comprised of local leaders who
are accepted and known in the community. In many cases, these organizations are
effective despite a heterogeneous population because they are inclusive and multi-ethnic
(Baker 2007). Given the similar conditions of instability, violence, social disruption, and
limited government capacity to provide effective security in both insurgencies and the
conflict prone states of sub-Saharan Africa, the potential exists to appropriate the lessons
learned from community-based policing in Africa and utilize them in the creation of a
theory for the use of community-based security during counterinsurgency operations.
In Africa, non-state actors are estimated to provide up to 80 percent of security
services (OECD 2007, 11). With state security forces unable or unwilling to provide
adequate security services, Baker (2006) has found that other security organizations,
38

centered on existing communal organizations such as shop owners and taxi drivers, with
varying degrees of authorization by the state, have spontaneously arisen to fill the gap
(Baker, 2006). Since the Soviet invasion in 1979, religious and ethnic communities in
Afghanistan have organized similar community-based security organizations in refugee
camps and villages where the state was unwilling or unable to provide security to
individuals (Tariq 2008). This establishes at least an anecdotal link between communitybased policing and community-based security in counterinsurgency efforts. The
following paragraphs will explore critical variables for community-based policing that
can be appropriated for community-based security force development during a
counterinsurgency effort.
Oversight
Non-state security organizations are not usually autonomous groups, but often
seek to cooperate with state police forces to gain legitimacy, training, and resources
(Baker 2010). Baker (2010) finds the connection between state security organizations to
be critical to prevent both non-state and state security providers from being totally
autonomous and acting with impunity and without oversight. Also, the establishment of
an all-encompassing framework of policing standards for both state and non-state
security organizations to guide roles, performance, procedures, and jurisdictions is
critical for a successful community-based policing program (Baker 2010); this will
decrease friction between state security services and the community and establish clear
expectations of the roles expected by all parties. Also, an accreditation program is
critical, after which non-state actors agree to the framework standards and oversight
(Baker 2010).
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The Organization for Economic Co-operation (2007, 22) (OECD) also finds that
mutual oversight roles by the state and civil society, based on defined roles and standards
is critical for the success of community-based policing. The use of community oversight
councils, comprised of state security services and community leaders, could provide a
method for community-based counterinsurgent forces from becoming predatory or
exceeding their mandate as noted by Trinquier (1964), Human Rights Watch (2011) and
Kalyvas (2006) and as an opportunity for the state to penetrate local communities (Baker
2007, 27).
Local Ownership
The next critical factor in successful community-based policing is that non-state
groups providing security must have a stake in maintaining order in their area (Baker
2010). This means that members of the community-based policing effort are members of
the community with a social or monetary stake in the collective success of the
community. The nucleus of these community-based security organizations could be
tribal groups, religious organizations, ethnic associations, youth groups, or work-based
associations (Baker 2010, 10). Using members of marginal or disaffected groups within
a community as members of a community-based security force could result in those
individuals or groups using their new power to increase their position or status within the
community. The lesson learned for community-based security in counterinsurgency is
that existing legitimate power structures, leadership, and security networks should be
used to prevent abuses by security forces and avoid the perception that security forces are
domineering and paternalistic.
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Congruence with Local Justice Systems
Baker (2004) and the OECD (2007, 22) both find that the integration of
customary and traditional justice systems into community-based policing is critical for
the acceptance of the program by the populace. Baker (2004, 217) notes that the
conciliatory nature of traditional courts, which aim to restore social order and settle
disputes peacefully between individuals, often reduces the underlying causes for violence
within communities that state judicial services could not. This approach also recognizes
that perceptions of security are subjective and culturally defined. By integrating
traditional justice systems, which deal with issues not typically addressed by state judicial
systems, support of the populace for community-based policing is increased and provides
incentive structures for community participation (Baker 2007, 33). For current
counterinsurgency practices, this would again require a redirection of efforts aimed at
creating a western style justice system, but holds the benefit of increasing the support of
the populace for the government by providing them a style of justice they understand.
Sustainability and Local Accountability
The next critical factors in community-based policing are sustainability and
organizational attainability (Baker 2010, 21, 161-162). Short term efforts by donor states
often lead to unsustainable security structures, which places a heavy burden on the state,
engenders little ownership by the state, and is unresponsive to the community. The
strength of community-based policing is that it is “accessible, understandable, affordable,
and effective, and in accord with local view of justice” (Baker 2010, 39-42).
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Voluntary Membership
Connected with sustainability, is the necessity for volunteerism by both the
community authorizer and the security provider (Baker 2010, 99). The motive for both
cannot be financial or power-based. Community-based police members should be
engaged in security work part-time or available as needed. Baker (2010) provides several
cases, such as in Mozambique, where members of a local security force were recruited
and paid for their security work, resulting in leaders selecting individuals related to them
as a form of patronage and political power building. In the best case, community-based
security forces in counterinsurgency should already be providing security services to their
community before they are integrated into a state-sanctioned counterinsurgency program
and their participation in the program should be tied to community development aid and
not personal payment. In counterinsurgency, the additional requirement of promises of
development aid and the execution of support, in the form of equipment and assistance
from local military units, must be provided by the state to ensure communities are not
subjected to reprisals.
Summary
To summarize, the community-based policing in Africa presents five criteria that
can be transferred to community-based security in counterinsurgency. First, community
security should be accountable to both the community and the state. Second, local
ownership with customary leadership and structures incorporated into the security force
is critically important. Considerations for creating a sustainable balance of power
between factions within the community must also be factored into the creation of a
community-security force. Third, the integration of traditional judicial structures is
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critical to gain acceptance by the population and incentives for them to use it and it is
effective in meeting their needs. Fourth, long-term sustainability by the state and the
community must be built into the model. Finally, entry into a security program must be
voluntary with the promise of external support by the state tied to local cooperation with
counterinsurgent forces.
This review of relevant counterinsurgency literature has established several
competing factors in successful counterinsurgency operations. Counterinsurgency forces
must quickly establish control of the population that penetrates the entire region affected
by insurgency. To do so, states must provide levels of security forces that are rarely
achieved because of their cost and they often act as an external irritant that can
exacerbate local conflict and upset local balance of power. Compounding this is the
difficulty, time and expense of raising state security forces in a country experiencing an
insurgency. While maintaining the desire to conduct state-building, to balance these
factors, counterinsurgent forces typically rely on raising community security forces to
exploit their local knowledge and staying power in local communities.
Most counterinsurgency theorists support the use of local security forces, but are
either vague in the requirements for effectiveness or provide case specific
recommendations. Community-based policing in Africa and Bruce Baker’s theories on
community-based policing provide an existing theoretic framework that Baker (2010)
notes has not been tested outside of Africa or applied to community-based security effort
during an insurgency. The model this research intends to test proposes that local
ownership, incorporation of traditional justice systems, sustainability, and voluntary
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participation by the community and local security provider may address many of the
concerns that arise during the implementation of a community-based security program.
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CHAPTER III - METHODOLOGY
This dissertation addresses the question “How do the variables associated with
community-based security influence the outcome of bottom-up COIN operations using
non-state local security forces?” The complexity and number of intervening variables
and the limited number of cases of large scale counterinsurgency operations lends this
research project to a qualitative methodology. Use of comparative case studies will allow
for an initial conclusion of the presence of a measurable consistency between adherence
to the principles of community-based security and the outcomes among the cases (George
and Bennett, 2005). However, a finding of consistency cannot establish a causal
relationship (George and Bennett 2005).
The first method used in this dissertation is the congruence method. According to
George and Bennett (2005, 181-204), the main purpose of the congruence method is to
allow a researcher to test a theory within a single case or cases “to assess its ability to
explain or predict the outcome in a particular case.” This allows for the determination of
the importance of each independent variable in determining the outcome of the dependent
variable.
The congruence method also allows for the determination of spuriousness, causal
priority and causal depth (George and Bennett 2005, 185). This dissertation will test for
potential spuriousness of correlation between variables by identifying the presence of
variables unaccounted for by the model that could have caused the observed effect.
Causal priority and causal depth are established by assessing the relative importance of
each variable in determining an outcome and if each variable is necessary and sufficient
to bring about an outcome.
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Rationale for Case Study and Qualitative Comparative Analysis Methodologies
Using the congruence method to account for the different conditions and
application of the variables in question presented by the 11 case studies, a variance in the
application of the factors of community-based security can be observed. The result is a
“fuzzy set,” or a group of cases whose relevant data have varying degrees of membership
in the variable set in contrast to the conventional “crisp set” whose objects are either “in”
or “out, see Table 1 for the proposed fuzzy set for this dissertation” (Ragin, Redesigning
Social Inquiry: Sets and Beyond 2008). Fuzzy set analysis is applicable in this research
because the sample size is small- to medium-sized (over 6 cases and under 50 cases) and
the purpose of this dissertation is to test a modified existing theory rather than generate a
new theory (Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Sets and Beyond 2008). Thus, after the
comparative case study analysis, this dissertation will conduct a Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA) to test the validity of the model and tie the variables to theoretical
concepts and substantive thresholds. A QCA will determine if different combinations of
causal conditions or what Ragin (2008) calls “causal recipes” results in similar outcomes.
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Table 1.
Membership of (Case Study) with Community-Based Security Variables.
Variable/Membership Fully
Mostly More
More
Mostly
In
In
In Than Out
Out
Out
Than In
External Support and
Oversight
Limits to territorial
jurisdiction
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System
Local sustainability
and accountability
Voluntary
participation by local
elites

Fully
Out

The use of QCA allows not only for the examination of sets of conditions
necessary or sufficient for an outcome, but also for an assessment of equifinality or the
principle that in open systems a given end state can be reached by many potential means
and complex causality with multiple combinations of variables which result in a
particular outcome. The other strengths of QCA is that it allows for the examination of
“coverage” or the relative importance of different combinations of variables and
“consistency” or the proportion of cases that are consistent with an observed pattern
(Ragin, 2008). Because of these attributes, QCA will provide the findings of this
dissertation’s applicability to a wider variety of conditions encountered by future
researchers and practitioners.
The congruence case study method and QCA are not without their weaknesses.
The congruence method provides within-case analysis of a theory but does not provide
controlled comparison. As with other forms of qualitative research, both the congruence
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method and QCA seek to impose a theory in the examination of imperfect data. Thus,
QCA experiences the same difficulties in causal inference as other qualitative and
quantitative methods that use non-experimental data (Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry:
Sets and Beyond 2008). Additionally, QCA can suffer from spurious correlation between
variables by excluding other potential causal variables not included in the theory.
Therefore, Ragin cautions that adherence to the “principle that ‘context matters’ is
central” to the QCA method (Ragin 2000, 66). He warns “it would very hazardous to
equate” two cases that have identical scores “without looking at each score’s context”
(Ragin 2000, 65). For example, the application of two community-based security
programs might produce a reduction in levels of violence and reduction in conventional
security forces. In the one case, the program may have resulted in the displacement or
dismemberment of an insurgent force, resulting in a reduction in violence and alleviating
the need for external security force support. In the other case, the community-based
security program may have had no discernable reduction in insurgent strength and the
reduction in violence is a result of conventional forces ceding the territory to insurgents
and reallocating forces to more tenable areas. To treat the two cases the same would be
faulty analysis.
The combination of a congruence method case-oriented approach and QCA
should mitigate the weaknesses of both methods. The congruence case study method will
allow for the testing of the explanatory value of the model within individual cases while
minimizing misrepresenting the conditions of the cases and allowing for the introduction
of other causal variables not included in the model that could be overlooked by QCA.
QCA will allow for the identification of patterns among the cases that are not apparent in
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the individual cases and minimize any deceptive data present in individual cases. Taken
together these two methods should provide a better understanding of the complex
causality operating in counterinsurgency operations.
The Research Sample
The three main selection criteria were used to select the cases for this research.
The first selection criteria is the use of a large-scale community-based security program
that comprised a significant portion of the counterinsurgency effort. The main purpose of
this criteria is to facilitate the measurement of impact of the community-based security
program on the insurgency. The other purpose of this criteria is to improve the likelihood
the cases selected for analysis have sufficient primary and secondary sources of data. Put
simply, larger programs should have a better chance of being well documented and to
demonstrate system-wide and not local effects.
The second selection criterion is the counterinsurgency operation must be
conducted by a foreign force. This criterion was added for two reasons. First, studying
cases involving external occupying forces increases the applicability of the findings of
this research to future counterinsurgency operations conducted by the United States and
other major powers. The majority of counterinsurgency literature is oriented to this
audience and this research fills a major gap in this body of knowledge. The second
reason for this selection criteria is to provide cases for analysis of the role of local actors
in community-based security programs. It is a reasonable assumption that it would be
more difficult to measure the influence of informal local actors in cases involving
indigenous governments that are intermingled in the social and political fabric of local
communities.
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The third selection criterion is the exclusion of the recent use of community-based
security programs in conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan. While these cases will
provide fruitful avenues for future research, the outcomes of the insurgencies, let alone
the community-based security programs are far from settled. Fuzzy Set QCA requires
settled cases with adequate primary and secondary sources to make informed judgments
on the degree of membership cases demonstrate with a model. In the cases of Iraq and
Afghanistan, much of the relevant data remains classified and scholars have not reached
consensus. This makes their usefulness for this research limited.
Using this criterion, paramilitary forces programs in counterinsurgency operations
such as the French Indochina War were not selected. This is because these irregular force
programs were either short duration, local experiments of limited impact to the overall
counterinsurgency efforts or were not used as local self-defense forces, but rather paid
guards for commercial enterprises or as with the “Maquis” in the French Indochina War,
offensive behind the lines militias (Fall 1964). Other cases such as the Rondas civil
defense program in Peru or the local auxiliary in Rhodesia were excluded because they
were implemented by a local government and not an external occupying force.
Attention was paid to selecting cases that are like current counterinsurgencies in
that they were conducted by external powers, but with as much variation as possible in
other characteristics. This will facilitate external validity and generalizability of the
findings while highlighting the relevance to current COIN practitioners (Gibbert, Ruigrok
and Wicki 2008). The wide range of cases covers over a century of counterinsurgency
operations occurring in varied geographical, social and political settings, and involving
insurgent and counterinsurgent forces, which will assist in controlling for intervening
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variables such as time, culture, and political system (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999). See
table 2 for a depiction of similarities and differences among the selected cases using
COIN operational environment characteristics outlined in FM 3-24 (2014). Current or
recently ended counterinsurgency operations such as the recent U.S. operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq were not selected because of their undecided nature and because
relevant data will remain classified for the foreseeable future.
Table 2.
Characteristics of sample case studies.
Case /
Characteristics

1st District DNL,
Philippines

Time
Frame

Counterinsurgent Force
Type

Insurgency
Type

Geographic
Conditions

Ethnic
Groups

Political
Setting

External
Insurgent
Support

18981902

U.S.
Conventional
Forces

Nationalist

Island Jungle

Llocano
ethnic group

Colonial

None

18981903

U.S.
Conventional
Forces

Nationalist

Island Jungle

Mixed ethic
groups

Colonial

None

18981904

U.S.
Conventional
Forces

Nationalist

Island Jungle

Tagalog
Ethnic
Group

Colonial

None

18981904

U.S.
Conventional
Forces

Nationalist

Island Jungle

Llocano
ethnic group

Colonial

High

19641975

U.S.
Conventional
Forces

Communist

Varied

Ethnic
Vietnamese

Cold
War

High

19651971

U.S. Marines

Communist

Coastal

Ethnic
Vietnamese

Cold
War

High

19631971

U.S. Special
Forces

Communist

Mountain
Jungle

Indigenous
Highland
Tribes

Cold
War

High

Home Guard
Malaya

19521960

British Police

Communist

Jungle

Chinese
Squatters

Cold
War

None

Kikuyu Guard
Kenya

19521960

British Police

Religious
Nationalist

Grassland
Forrest

Kikuyu
Tribes

PostColonial

None

19541962

French
Conventional
Forces

Nationalist

Arid

Berber
Tribes

PostColonial

Low

19551959

British Police

EthnoNationalist

Mountain

Greek and
Turkish

PostColonial

Low

4th District
DNL, Philippines
2nd District
DSL, Philippines

3rd District DSL,
Philippines

Territorial
Forces, Vietnam

Combined
Action Program,
Vietnam
CIDG Program,
Vietnam

Harkis Algeria

Cyprus
Emergency

.
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The cases selected for this research are 11 large-scale community-based security
programs employed by external forces during counterinsurgency operations. The size of
the sample was based on an initial review of major counterinsurgency operations from
the 20th century. All available cases were included in the sample. As mentioned earlier,
Ragin recommends a sample size of at least six be used for Fuzzy Set QCA. The
inclusion of more cases than was needed to meet the minimum requirement was done
improve the generalizability of the findings and to ensure that an adequate sample was
available for analysis if one or more of the cases needed to exclude if adequate data was
not available or upon in-depth analysis a case did not meet the selection criteria.
The first four cases are drawn from the separate application of the constabulary
program in the four U.S. military departments during the Philippines Insurrection of
1899-1903. While these cases occurred during the same conflict and period, each of
these cases is separate and distinct due to geographic separation, different social and
ethnic conditions, and divergent application of the general security program by local
commanders. This is important to note so questions do not arise about conducting the
same analysis on three nearly identical cases, thereby skewing the overall findings of the
research. Having noted the differences in the cases, they all meet the selection criteria for
inclusion in the study because according to Linn (2000), civilian auxiliaries were used in
each of the cases.
The fifth case is the successful British use of an auxiliary local guard force as part
of the Protected Village program during the Malayan Emergency of 1950-1960 (Hoffman
and Taw 1991). The next case is the failed French use of the Harkis security force during
the Algerian War of 1952-1962 (Horne 1977). Harki (based on the Arabic word for a
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volunteer "war party") was the term used by the French government for Muslim Algerian
loyalists who served as auxiliaries in the French Army during the Algerian War. The
seventh case is the British application of a local auxiliary security force as part of the
Protected Village program during the Kenya Emergency 1952-1960 (Hoffman and Taw
1991). The eighth case is the failed employment of a local constabulary by the British
during the Cyprus Emergency 1955-1959 (Hoffman and Taw 1991), The next three cases
are the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program, the Regional Force/Popular Force
program, and the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program, employed by the U.S.
during the U.S.-Vietnam War from 1963 to 1973 (Krepinevich 1986).
These selected cases represent six successful cases of the use of communitysecurity forces (three military departments in the Philippines, Malaya, Kenya, and the
aforementioned CAP program examples in Vietnam) and five unsuccessful cases
(Algeria, Cyprus, Rhodesia, one department in the Philippines, and CIDG and RF/PF
programs in Vietnam.) The criteria for successful and unsuccessful cases are defined on
pages 51-53. The difference in outcomes provides the control and variation required to
address the research problem and lends itself to a comparative case study method and
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (Yin 2009 and Ragin 2008). These cases provide
numerous within-case comparisons with application of the same program, but these cases
are all differentiated by method of application, location, social conditions, and leadership.
Data Collection Methods
Data collection for this dissertation will rely on archival sources for primary
source documents and existing scholarly work on each the case studies for secondary
sources. Primary source documents will include military reports and orders and captured
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insurgent records. These documents will be obtained from archival sources such as, but
not limited to, the United States and United Kingdom National Archives, personal papers
donated to universities and historical societies, and archives maintained by military
services. The inclusion of primary source research will mitigate the selectivity and
hindsight bias inherent in historical works and fill in data gaps missing from secondary
sources (Thies 2002). Additionally, the use of multiple secondary sources from the
historiography of the case studies will reduce the selection effects of using one source at
the expense of other viewpoints (Thies 2002). Each of the selected cases has a large
archival and historical record associated with it, thereby aiding in making an in-depth
data collection effort possible. Existing research by other scholars will be used as a guide
to locate pertinent records. This will also serve as a check on the potential bias of
secondary sources used in this research. If gaps in exist in both primary archival sources
and secondary sources and if there are living participants to the events, semi-structured
interviews will be conducted. The interview questions will be designed around collecting
data on the specific gap in the existing written record and to control for personal bias.
Again, interviews will only be conducted if primary and secondary sources are not
available, but it is not in the scope of this research or research method to collect date
through interviews unless multiple other sources do not exist. Whenever possible
multiple primary and secondary sources will be used to collect a redundancy of data to
clarify and meaning and mitigate individual source bias.
Methods for Data Analysis and Synthesis
To aid in the collection, analysis and presentation of the data needed for this
study, it is necessary to operationalize the variables used in the model. Alexander George
54

(1979) recommends constructing a case “codebook” to structure the collection of data by
“using a standardized set of questions in a controlled comparison to assure acquisition of
comparable data from the several cases.” According to Yin, this will assist not only in
organizing data, but also assist in identifying potential sources of evidence (Yin 2009).
The following section will establish some initial structured questions to address each of
the variables.
In the dissertation the data collected will be first presented and addressed in a
narrative case study approach to present the variables in their proper contexts. Each
variable will also be discussed separately in each case study to provide measurement and
comparison of those variables across cases (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999). Ragin asserts
that the “principle that ‘context matters’ is central to the configurational approach to
cases” (Ragin 2000, 66). He cautions that “it would very hazardous to equate” two cases
that have identically “high” or identically “low” scores “without looking at each score’s
context” (Ragin 2000, 65). This makes set criteria for degrees of membership
problematic at best. Therefore, decisions on degrees of membership with each variable in
the model for each individual case will be made by the researcher after presenting the
data for each case. A full discussion of the reasoning for selections of degree of
membership with each variable will be conducted after the presentation of each case
study.
Security: The Dependent Variable
As discussed in the literature review, security is the cornerstone of any COIN
effort. Without the ability to provide security to the populace other efforts to build public
support for the national government, such as government reforms or economic
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development, will be ineffective. Therefore, the dependent variable used in this
dissertation to determine the “success” or “failure” of community-based security
programs is the level of security provided to the population. David Kilkullen in
Counterinsurgency (2010) advocates abandoning common metrics used by military
commanders to measure security levels in counterinsurgencies, such as body counts,
number of enemy attacks or military access to an area. As he notes, these metrics do not
accurately measure the experience of the population or their level of perceived security.
Kilkullen defines security in COIN as being comprised of three components; military
security, legal security, and population security (Kilkullen 2006). According to
Kilkullen, military security involves the protection of the population from armed attacks
and predations by insurgents, terrorists or other violent organized groups. The provision
of legal security is the protection of the population under a framework of human rights,
civil institutions and individual and group legal protections. Finally, population security
involves the separation of the population from the insurgent groups, depriving insurgents
of a base of support from sympathetic members of the population. Following traditional
COIN theory, the provision of security should enable the other pillars of
counterinsurgency, economic development and political reform.
Therefore, in addition to measuring the level of security by discussing the number
of insurgent attacks and other associated violence such as murder and kidnapping, this
dissertation will adopt Kilcullen’s method of using reports of the physical safety,
political, and economic status of the local population to measure the dependent variable,
security. The baseline measurement for each of these variables will be taken from the
period just prior or at the start of the community-based security program.
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In addition to measuring the number of violent attacks conducted by insurgents
against community members, security force personnel or property in the military or
civilian defined boundaries of the community, physical safety is measured by insurgent
activity. Insurgent activity is defined as fund raising, recruitment, and political activity
(Headquarters, Department of the Army 2014). Another measure of physical safety is the
number of external security forces left in the area by COIN commanders to maintain
security after the program is established. The reasoning behind using this metric is that
conventional security forces may be responsible for reductions in other measurements of
security and it a gauge of the perception of local commanders about the insurgent threat
and the reliability of the local security force.
This dissertation measures the effectiveness of community-based security
programs in the political sphere using two metrics. First, a measurement of the number
of inhabitants participating in local governance, judicial, and security programs will
gauge the population’s perceptions of the risk of aligning themselves with the
government. Second, the ability of the local government to accomplish tasks such as tax
collection and education will measure the ability of insurgents to interfere with these
tasks and the population’s perceived risk of participating in these activities.
The level of security will also be gauged by economic activity, which can be
measured through expansion of trade and local markets, construction, and participation in
government sponsored education and training programs. Economic growth or
contraction is intended to measure the level of perceived risk held by the local population
and acceptance of government control displayed through willingness to participate in
government sponsored programs.
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Incorporation of multiple data points from these three areas provides a rich
indication of the level of acceptance of government control, levels of risk perceived by
the population, and the overall level of security before and after the application of a
community-based security program. Also by measuring security from multiple
approaches, this method minimizes the risk of biased reporting and skewed data from one
source.
Causal Conditions of Community-based Security
This dissertation seeks to test the effects of five causal conditions on the security
outcomes of community-based security programs. These causal conditions are external
support and oversight, limited territorial jurisdiction, incorporation of traditional justice
systems, local sustainability and accountability, and participation of local elites. In
keeping with the QCA method, the following sections use existing definitions to describe
each casual condition and establish attributes for each for use in assigning degrees of
membership for each of the cases with the causal conditions. The intent of this process is
not to establish specific cut points between each gradation in degree of membership, but
to establish characteristics of each factor that assists the research in assigning the degree
of membership of each case with the causal factor while taking into consideration the
within-case context of each case that influenced the individual degree of membership.
External Support and Oversight
The first variable identified is external support and oversight by the intervening
power. As Baker notes, with community-based policing, there must be some connection
with the state for locally provided security to function (Baker 2010). This linkage to the
state prevents or mitigates abuses by state and non-state actors and provides the
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community-based security force with the tools and knowledge necessary to provide
adequate security to the population.
External support and oversight can take many forms dependent on the context of
each situation. Support can include direct provisioning of advisors, arms and equipment
to security forces, but also sponsorship by local conventional units, information sharing,
collaboration and training (Baker 2010). Expanding the community-based policing
model to counterinsurgency support can also be expanded to include the provisioning of
quick reaction forces and air and artillery support by conventional military units near the
community-based security force. Additionally, oversight can take the form of reporting
mechanisms and supervision external forces impose on community-based security forces.
For each of these measures, the level of assistance and provisioning of tools necessary to
counter insurgent actions in the area around the community and the level of supervision
given by an external force determines the membership of each case with the causal factor
of support and oversight.
In his “theory of competitive control” David Kilcullen (2013) highlights another
aspect of external support and oversight. In his theory each side in an insurgency offers a
range of incentives and disincentives to compel compliance and cooperation from the
local population. These measures not only attract individuals into aligning themselves
with a particular group, but they also include measures that also incentivizes continued
membership and disincentives defection. Incentives can include connecting participation
to individual cash payments, collective development aid or allowing degrees of selfgovernance or participation in the formal political process. Disincentives can include
collective punishments such as the removal of government aid, removal of government
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support in favor or other groups, or individual sanctions such as detention or removal of
cash payments. Each of these actions provides a method to assist in the recruitment of
individuals or groups for the program and as methods to ensure continued good behavior
by members of the program or social groups which contribute members to the program.
This variable can be addressed by asking the question,
1. How did the military commander prioritize community-based security
programs in relation to other requirements for material and manpower?
2. What level of material support, in the form of arms and equipment, was
provided to community-based security forces?
3. What was the duration of initial training, amount of specialty training in fields
such as intelligence, communications, and medicine and periods of skill-sustainment
training can all be used to measure the level of support given to these programs.
4. To what extent were conventional security forces available to support
community-based security forces when in contact with insurgent forces?
5. What degree of oversight was provided by conventional security force units or
dedicated advisor units collocated with community-based security forces?
6. If there were dedicated advisor personnel, to what was the extent of their
reporting requirement and what level of importance were those reports given by security
force commanders?
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction
In their study of Afghan community defense programs, Jones and Munoz
(2010,55) determined that self-defense programs are more effective in achieving security
with a minimum of human rights abuses if the local security forces are defensive in
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nature. This means they are used to provide security only for their social group within
their territorial limits and are not used as auxiliaries to conventional forces in offensive
combat operations. The defensive or offensive orientation of a community-based security
program can be determined by the degree local conventional force commanders equip
and employ local security forces. Equipping security forces with weapons such as
mortars, artillery and heavy machine guns indicate an ability to conduct offensive
operations and to strike targets outside of the boundaries of a community. Additionally,
if conventional force commanders use community-based security forces to augment
conventional in offensive operations outside community boundaries in roles outside of
guides knowledgeable in local terrain, indicates an offensive orientation of a local
security force.
Limits to territorial jurisdiction, can be addressed by examining the following
questions:
1. How did military commanders employ these forces, as local security forces or
as augmentees to conventional security forces?
2. What territorial or operational boundaries did COIN commanders place on
community-based security forces?
3. What standing orders, rules, and procedures were established to limit
community-based security forces operations?
4. To what extent were community-based security force weapons limited to
defensive arms such as shotguns or rifles and prohibited from using offensive weapons
such as mortars, machine guns and anti-tank weapons?
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Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems
‘Traditional’ refers to customs and usages that derive their popular authority from
practices and beliefs that pre-date the arrival of the modern state. ‘Traditional’ justice
systems are as varied as the local societies they derive from. Their primary role is to
maintain peace and harmony in local, usually village, communities. ‘Traditional’ justice
systems play a major role in the everyday resolution of disputes and maintenance of order
in communities throughout the Pacific. Legal scholars use the term ‘legal pluralism’ to
describe a situation where multiple forms of law co-exist within a single environment or
setting. In many post-colonial countries, including each of those discussed in this paper,
state laws and institutions (such as courts, lawyers, justice ministries, police and prisons)
operate alongside ‘customary’ or ‘traditional’ justice mechanisms that have been integral
parts of indigenous social orders since long before the arrival of the modern state.
‘Traditional’ justice actors would include community leaders, religious leaders and
organizations, government officials, NGOs and a range of community-based
organizations (Dinnen 2009). Additionally, status reports by military and civilian
administrators would likely discuss the functioning of the local judiciary system and if
external judicial support was brought in from outside the local area. The exercise of
military justice systems and reports of vigilantism and insurgent courts operating in the
area of operations would also give an indication of a lack of a functioning local judicial
system. Incorporation of traditional justice systems can be addressed by asking the
questions:
1. To what extent did the intervening power organize a local judicial system?”
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2. To what degree were traditional justice systems incorporated into the
community-based security program?
3. To what extent were the prevention and punishment of non-insurgency related
criminal and social infractions included in the jurisdiction of community-based security
forces?
4. What level of autonomy were local leaders given to punish infractions of
traditional social and criminal codes?
5. To what extent did commanders allow local leaders to negotiate with insurgent
leaders in matters such as disarmament and reintegration of insurgent forces?
Local Sustainability and Accountability
This dissertation defines local sustainability as the degree to which a community
can maintain or continue a program with little or no application of external resources or
support. This definition focuses mainly on personnel requirements and not the provision
of material by accepting that in a counterinsurgency a degree of support from the national
government or external intervening force is necessary to provide arms and training.
Sustainability in this context seeks to determine local support for a program by
the ability of a community to recruit and maintain the membership of individual members
of a security force. Rewards provided by the government such as salaries for security
force members and development programs tied community participation in security
programs will provide a measure of the local acceptance and support of the program.
Additionally, coercive measures such as forced recruitment and punitive measures levied
against communities in response to insurgent activity will indicate the level of
spontaneous local support.
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Linked with sustainability is accountability of security programs to local
communities, which can serve as a method to promote ownership in a program and
prevent abuses by security force members. The OECD (2007) defines local
accountability as mechanisms that provide an “internal system of review; proactive
monitoring; internal complaints mechanisms” and can include “code(s) of conduct;
disciplinary system; review of performance and control of assignments; human resources:
selection, retention and promotion system; freedom of information.” Additionally,
inclusion of local leadership in the security force as well as mechanisms for local redress
of grievances committed by a security force can be used as a measurement of security
force accountability to the community. The degree to which organizers of communitybased security forces incorporate any of the aforementioned methods of accountability
are used in this dissertation to measure the degree of membership a community-based
security program possesses.
Determining the degree of membership of the cases to the factors of
sustainability and accountability are determined by asking the questions:
1. To what extent did military commanders equip the community-based security
force to a level that could be sustained without external support?
2. To what degree did security force duty become the primary source of income
for community-based security members?
3. To what degree were mechanism of ownership and oversight integrated into the
program?”
4. To what extent was sustainment of community economic viability balanced
with recruitment into community-based security forces?
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5. To what degree were limits placed on the time requirements of security duties
so community-based security members could maintain their livelihoods and social
obligations?
Voluntary Participation by Local Elites
Charles Tilly (2003, 34) defines political entrepreneurs as individuals who
“engage in various forms of brokerage: creating new connections between previously
inter-connected social sites” and “specialize in activation, connection, coordination, and
representation.” For this dissertation, local political entrepreneurs will be defined as
individuals in positions of social power who can connect organizers of communitysecurity programs with their target audiences and can mobilize social groups into action
through application of their informal social power. Closely aligned with Tilly, Joel
Migdal (1988, 33) in Strong Societies and Weak States, identifies local political
entrepreneurs as individuals acting outside of the formal state apparatus who can enforce
social control through the participation of citizens in social organizations that local
political entrepreneurs control and locals see as legitimate. These leaders can be tribal
chiefs, clan leaders, landlords, business owners or religious leaders.
For this dissertation, a local political entrepreneur is any individual who can
enforce compliance of individuals in a social group through their control of any
autonomous social institution. Their level of participation is determined by how
organizers integrate them into the program. Integration can range from the extreme of
direct command and control of the security force by local leaders to lower levels of
participation in the form of advisory or oversight bodies. Different degrees of
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membership of a case with this factor will be determined by the level of control afforded
to local leaders.
Voluntary participation by local elites can be gauged by asking:
1. What steps did commanders take to co-opt existing local leadership into the
program?”
2. To what extent did commanders negotiate with local leaders prior to starting a
community security program?
3. To what degree did commanders dictate to subordinates the inclusion of local
leaders would indicate the level of participation by local leaders?
4. Additionally, to what degree do insurgents target violence or intimidation
against local leaders, indicating the inclusion of these individuals into the local security
structure constitutes a threat to insurgent power?
Issues of Trustworthiness
One of the challenges of this study is ensuring it produces good and convincing
research from imperfect and often incomplete sources and accurately portraying the
experiences of participants (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012, 112). In many cases the most
readily available sources of data are in the archives of the former occupying force. These
records do not often capture the perceptions and experiences of the local populace and
provide the biased view of a culture foreign to the local population. This raises potential
validity issues with the findings of this study. To mitigate potential issues of
trustworthiness, every effort was made in the data collection phase to incorporate written
accounts of local participants in the community-based security program.
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Validity
This dissertation includes controls to address potential issues in reliability,
confirmability, and transferability to improve the validity of its findings.1 Reliability in
the context of this qualitative dissertation is the ability of subsequent studies to replicate
the findings of this research (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012, 113). This dissertation
attempts to achieve this goal by utilizing two methods. First, linkages between the
findings of this dissertation and the data will be documented and consistent data
collection and analysis methods will be employed throughout the process. Additionally,
inconsistencies in among the sources of data will be highlighted so follow-on researchers
will be aware of their occurrence.
Confirmability in qualitative research resembles the concept of objectivity in
quantitative research (Bloomberg and Volpe 2012, 114). As mentioned earlier, the
researcher controlled for bias and subjectivity by conducting a continual appraisal of
personal and professional biases that may influence the analysis of data. Additionally,
the researcher also sought out multiple perspectives of the cases using as many sources
data as possible from the available data.
Transferability or generalization to other cases is not the purpose of this
dissertation. This dissertation will attempt to provide a thick description of each case to
enable the reader with the context of each case, so determinations about the extent the
findings of this study can be applied to comparable, but not identical, cases. The degree

1

Outside of the design of the research, the underlying method to strengthen the validity of this dissertation is to identify the personal
bias I bring to the study. As a serving U.S. Army officer who has participated in several COIN campaigns, I have strongly held views
on the soundness of bottom-up COIN as a method to combat insurgencies. To mitigate this bias, I will continually monitor my
subjective perspectives and biases and seek to incorporate conflicting accounts of the community-based security programs used in this
dissertation.

67

to which this dissertation provides and detailed and comprehensive descriptions of each
case determines the relevance of this dissertation’s findings to the broader context of the
use of community-based security forces in other cases.
Limitations of the Study
This dissertation contains several limitations inherent in qualitative research that
relies heavily on historical records for data collection. The most critical limitation of this
dissertation is potential gaps in the historical record of the cases. This could lead to
potential bias by using a limited number of sources to determine the degree of
membership the cases have with the factors of the model. Additionally, personal bias and
subjectivity of the research could bias the analysis of data and formulation of findings.
Finally, the limited number of cases used in this dissertation may limit the possibility of
generalizing the findings of this dissertation to the analysis of other community-based
security programs.
In recognition of these limitations, the researcher took the following measures to
address them. First, where a gap in the historical record exists, the researcher conducted
interviews with participants or subject matter experts in the individual cases. This limited
potential bias by including as many perspectives and sources of data as possible. Second,
the researcher omitted from the case study sample potential cases the researcher
participated in or had direct knowledge. This mitigates possible bias or subjectivity by
the researcher. Finally, the researcher provided the most detailed descriptions as possible
and included as many influencing factors not considered by the model for each case.
This will inform the reader of the context for each case and the potential for generalizing
the findings of this dissertation to other cases.
68

Chapter Summary
In summary, this chapter provided a detailed description of the research
methodology of this dissertation. The qualitative methodologies of congruence case
study analysis and QCA was employed to determine the influence of the factors
identified in the model used in this dissertation in the outcomes produced by communitybased security programs conducted during counterinsurgency operations. The case study
sample of eleven community-based security programs conducted was selected because
they met the criteria of having been implemented by external intervening forces during
major COIN operations. Data collection primarily relied on archival sources, but
interviews were conducted when gapes existed in the archival record or sources were
potentially biased. Credibility and dependability were addressed by mitigating potential
researcher bias and by using multiple sources of data. The intent of this dissertation is to
contribute to the understanding of the use of community-based security forces in COIN
operations. Generalizable findings from this dissertation may be possible, but readers
must acknowledge the context of each case used in this study when attempting to
extrapolate the findings of this dissertation to other cases or to determine the context of
these findings in the broader phenomenon of community-based security organizations in
COIN.
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CHAPTER IV – GUARDIAS AND INSURECTOS
The First District, Department of Northern Luzon, 1899-1902
Introduction
This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces in the First
District, Department of Northern Luzon during the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902.
This case study will start with a brief overview of the aftermath of the Spanish American
War in the Philippines and the initial occupation by American forces. To set further the
stage for a discussion of the role of community-based security forces, this chapter will
discuss the nature of the Filipino insurgency in the First District and the efforts of
American commanders to quell it. After discussing the overall conduct of the
counterinsurgency campaign and how American forces used local security forces defeat
the insurgency, this case study will conduct a detailed discussion of the degree of
membership this case demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s model.
Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings and an application of
the findings into the degree of membership matrix.
After the rapid defeat of the Spanish Army and Navy by U.S. military forces and
their erstwhile Filipino revolutionary allies in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the
U.S. Army settled into an occupation of the Philippine Islands. This occupation force
settled into its mission of incorporating the former Spanish colony into the American
system through a process of “benevolent assimilation” and assuming the “white man’s
burden” of civilizing the Filipinos. The First District of the Department of Northern
Luzon was held up as a success in the early months of the occupation with U.S. forces
quickly establishing local civil government and security forces. This early success turned
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into a potential failure in the summer of 1900 as insurgent attacks increased and U.S.
commanders realized that the majority of the new local government officials were either
members of the insurgency or actively facilitating the insurgents. By September of 1900,
the commander of the district, Brigadier General (BG) Samuel B. M. Young realized that
he did not possess the number of soldiers required to pacify the district and the district
might be lost (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 3, 30). The dire situation in the First
District quickly turned around and by May 1901 the insurgency had been broken and new
civil government and security forces loyal to Manila and the U.S. was in place throughout
the district.
The rapid improvement in security can be attributed to several factors. Within
three months of Young’s report, U.S. troop levels doubled by November 1900 and a new
and dynamic commander, BG J. Franklin Bell, assumed command in February 1901,
instituting several changes in strategy. The defeat of the anti-imperialist platform of
William Jennings Bryant in the American presidential election of November 1900 and the
capture of the insurgencies’ national leader Emilio Aguinaldo also reduced the morale of
the insurgents. Additionally, indigenous scout units drawn from the local Ilocano ethnic
group were expanded at the same time as more U.S. forces arrived in the district.
Possibly the most dramatic improvements in security occurred after Bell
permitted his subordinates to expand their cooperation with Crispulo Patajo and his
Guardia de Honor forces. These irregular auxiliaries provided security in towns,
allowing U.S. forces to patrol aggressively in the countryside for insurgent groups. More
importantly, Patajo and his followers identified the majority of the insurgent support
networks in the district and either guided U.S. forces to them or captured insurgents
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themselves. As Colonel William P. Duval noted years later, “in short, without this man’s
(Patajo) devoted aid, no such success could possibly have been achieved in anything like
so short of a time at all.”2
This case study highlights the importance of external oversight and support as
well as the need to limit the territorial jurisdiction of indigenous security forces.
Additionally, the different levels of external oversight and support provided by the
United States to several local security forces, including the Philippine Scouts, local
constabulary, and Guardia de Honor forces appears to be in inverse proportion to the
level of local accountability and sustainability experienced by each of these groups. In
several instances during the early part of the insurgency, community-based security
forces committed abuses against the local population and competing social groups.
American commanders quickly addressed these issues by improving oversight and
limited independent operations of indigenous security forces outside of their own villages
or neighborhoods. This case also demonstrated some influence of incorporating local
elites into the security program through the cooption of the Guardia de Honor leadership
and the formation of the Federal Party by Filipino elites.
While this case illustrates the importance of the previously mentioned factors of
the model, the case of the First District does not demonstrate the significance of
incorporating traditional justice systems or the necessity of local accountability or
sustainability. The short duration of the Philippine Insurrection may be one mitigating
factor in the relative unimportance of these factors in influencing the success of
American commanders’ use of community-based security forces to defeat the insurgency.

2

U.S. Army Heritage Museum and Archives, B.M. Young Papers 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence
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Although there is little evidence in the historical record to measure security levels
through economic, political and social development, the rapid defeat of the insurgency
and the inability of the insurgents to recover from their defeat indicate that the United
States was successful in its efforts to pacify the First District.
Background
The American involvement began on May 1, 1898 with Commodore George
Dewey’s destruction of the Spanish Pacific Squadron in Manila Bay. As a stopgap
measure before U.S. Army forces arrived in the Philippines, Commodore Dewey
promoted the creation of a Filipino Army. Formed around the resistance leader Emilio
Aguinaldo, the Filipino Republican Army quickly gained control of Luzon, minus the
capital and the naval base at Cavite, which the Spanish held until surrendering to U.S.
forces. While serving the purpose of maintaining the U.S. initiative against the Spanish
in the Philippines, the Filipino Army soon became a major concern for U.S. forces in the
Philippines. By August 1898, U.S. forced defeated the main body of the Spanish Army
and seized Manila. In addition to taking the honor of capturing, the capital and receiving
the surrender of their former colonial overlords away from the Filipinos, the U.S. also
further enraged Filipino nationalists by making it clear that the U.S. intended to annex the
islands, not give them independence. An uneasy truce between the two armies was
broken in February 1899 and the Philippine Insurrection began.
The armed and organize Filipinos under Aguinaldo first sought to defeat the
United States in conventional open warfare. Set piece battles occurred throughout the
remainder of 1899 with the better-trained and equipped U.S. forces usually prevailing
against the Republican Army. By November 1899 U.S., forces had trapped the
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Republican Army in the central plains of Luzon. Faced with annihilation or surrender,
Aguinaldo choose to disperse his force throughout the Philippines with his subordinate
commanders returning to their native regions with their remaining forces and the task to
conduct guerrilla warfare (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 3, 88). At this point, the
most challenging portion of the Philippine Insurrection faced the American forces as the
Filipinos created a decentralized insurgency with Aguinaldo serving as a figurehead
leader and each American commander encountering a different threat influenced by local
culture and conditions.
The Philippines that the U.S. occupied in 1899 contained formidable terrain and a
factionalized and hierarchical society. The main island of Luzon held half of the
Philippines 1899 population of seven million. The formidable terrain and jungles on
Luzon separated the five major ethno-linguistic groups of the island with the Ilocano
forming the majority of the estimated 531,000 inhabitants of the First District of the
Department of Northern Luzon. Comprised of seven provinces and a total area of 8,000
square miles, 80 percent of which was mountainous, the First District presented guerrilla
forces with rugged terrain to hide in and U.S. forces a daunting environment to control
(Linn 1989, 3, 30 and Ochosa 1989, 109).
The population of the First District of the Department of Northern Luzon in 1899
also presented challenges for U.S. forces. The population of the district was rigidly
divided into classes because of the Spanish colonial system. Two groups, the principales
and the illustrados, comprised the elite of Filipino society. The principales, native-born
land-owning Filipinos, comprised the political and economic elite of the Philippines. The
illustrados, composed of western educated Filipinos and exposed to the ideas of the
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Enlightenment and 19th century nationalism, formed the other component of the Filipino
elite (Linn 1989, 3-4).
The Filipino revolt against the Spanish in the 1890s and the subsequent war with
the United States created numerous political and religious factions seeking control in the
First District. The first group, the Katipunan was a secret society created in 1892 by
Andres Bonifacio (Miller 1982, 33). Originally an organization with quasi-religious
foundations and appeal to the working and lower classes, the group was transformed into
a secular and nationalist revolutionary movement by Emilio Aguinaldo, who seized
control of the group from Bonifacio in 1896 (Miller 1982, 34). Aguinaldo created an
uneasy coalition within the group to include conservative and liberal illustrados looking
to maintain differing levels of the status quo without Spanish rule and radical lower and
middle urban and rural Filipinos who wanted to create a new political and economic
system (Silbey 2007, 13). When the Filipino Republican Army dispersed and formed
guerrilla units, Aguinaldo used the Katipunan society to form the shadow government of
the insurgency. Katipunan committees formed in pueblos and barrios with all duties that
included all the functions of government to include the collection of taxes and the
additional responsibilities of assisting guerillas in the field and forming local militias to
augment the operations of the regular guerilla force. The Katipunan committees also
ensured the loyalty of the population through the administering of secret oaths and rights
and secret police to enforce adherence to those oaths (Gates 1973, 160). This function of
ensuring the support of the local population was the most important task undertaken by
the Katipunan committees and possibly had an impact larger than any influence exercised
by the regular guerrilla force.
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The other major group operating in the First District was the Guardia de Honor.
Formed in the mid-nineteenth century by Dominican friars with the name Guardia de
Honor de Maria and the purpose, as the name implies, to instill devotion for the Virgin
Mary, the group grew throughout the First District area. The political and social turmoil
in the 1890s, culminating in the revolution against Spain, transformed the group into a
conservative movement tinged with millennialism oriented against external authority and
devoted to charismatic quasi-religious leaders (Sturtevant 1966). Once the Katipunan
Committees formed the local governments of the short-lived Philippine Republic after the
defeat of the Spanish in 1899, conflict between the Guardia de Honor members and the
Katipunan dominated republican government broke out. After rejecting the leadership of
the new local governments, several groups of the Guardia de Honor were roughly treated
by the guerilla groups (Ochosa 1989, 55). This led to open conflict between the groups
from starting in October 1898 and continued after the U.S. Army occupied the region in
December 1898 (Sturtevant 1966).
After the defeat of the Filipino Republican Army, one American observer in the
region estimated there were approximately 3,500 Filipino soldiers in the district in
addition to an unknown number of local defense forces raised by the majority of villages
(Linn 1989, 31). Upon receiving the order to conduct guerilla warfare from Aguinaldo,
the local commander of the Filipino force, General Manuel Tinio, divided his regular
forces into detachments of twenty men with local and regional commanders to coordinate
the actions of the detachments (Ochosa 1989, 108-109).
This was the situation Brigadier General (BG) Samuel B. M. Young received on
December 20, 1899 when Major General (MG) Elwell S. Otis, Military Governor of the
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Philippines, placed him in command of the newly formed First District of the Department
of Northern Luzon. To assist him in establishing security and the conditions necessary to
transition to a civil government, MG Otis allocated BG Young a force of approximately
4,000 soldiers divided between two regiments and two separate battalions (War
Department 1901, Vol 1. Part 3, 31). If not allowing for soldiers not available due to
illness or injury, this force provided BG Young with a security force to population ratio
of approximately 1:132.
In the early months of 1900, Young rapidly dispersed his force into small
detachments to secure as many population centers as possible. In keeping with the
“Benevolent Assimilation” policies advocated by MG Elwell S. Otis, commander of the
U.S. Army pacification force, Young embraced the development of local government and
security forces by ordering General Order (G.O.) 43. G.O. 43 ordered the establishment
of civil governments by mandating that officers spend at least one day a week organizing
governing councils and impressing on the population the need to form security forces to
capture insurgents and criminal bands. This order also reminded the officers of the First
District the need to impress on local leaders the necessity for towns to provide their own
security with the U.S. Army forces providing a supporting role (Linn 1989, 35).
The results of Young’s efforts were seemingly impressive with local governments
and police forces established in 63 towns by the end of March 1900. Development
projects also expanded public education with 203 schools established by June 1900,
enrolling a quarter of the 44,716 school-age population in the district. Even with the fast
pace of development, reports from the first half of 1900 indicated the population was
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pleased with the American occupation (Department of Northern Luzon 1900, 395/2180).3
This progress proved illusory, based on incorrect reporting by officers hampered by a
lack of manpower to collect accurate information coupled with a limited ability to
understand the local languages (Linn 1989, 36-37). In a rush to organize local
governments, American officers failed to identify insurgent leaders operating in the
district and local officials sympathetic to the insurgent cause. By maintaining the links to
these local officials, the guerrilla force in the district was able to exercise control over
large numbers of local governments. Coupled with the credible threat of assassination,
one quarter of assassinations recorded by the district command in 1900 were of local
officials, one commander estimated that the insurgents controlled every town in his
province (U.S. Senate 1902 and (U.S. Senate 1902, 100 and Letter Sent LTC Robert L.
Howze to CPT John G. Balance, 20 May 1900, 395/4043). While Washington could still
muster overwhelming force, and succeeded in killing over five hundred insurgents in
numerous small unit engagements during period between April and August 1900, the
insurgent control of the civil government and the frequency of small unit attacks showed
the U.S. was not in control of the First District (Wheaton 1900, 1).
After a short lull in fighting during the monsoon season in July and August 1900,
fighting in the First District spiked. This was a concerted effort by the insurgents to
influence the U.S. presidential election in favor of the anti-imperialist platform of
William Jennings Bryan, who it was hoped would end the American occupation and grant
Philippine sovereignty. Spurred on through correspondence with members of the U.S.
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Anti-Imperialist Society violence and resistance against U.S. occupation erupted in areas
previously considered pacified by the Army (Sexton 1939, 254-255).
In a report submitted to the War Department by BG Young in September 1900,
the general described the situation in the First District as dire and the reversal a complete
surprise by reporting that,
On the 1st of August affairs seemed so promising in Bangued that the
commanding officer recommended that the form of civil government provided by
General Order 40, Office Military Governor, be put into force. An election was called for
August 30. In the meantime, the insurgent leaders so intimidated the voters that only 26
registered and 21 voted out of a population of 13,000.
Young further described the security situation throughout the First District as so
perilous that “it would be dangerous to place a detachment smaller than a company in a
pueblo” and that the area was so insecure that he did not send out patrols “with less than a
hundred rifles.” Young closed the report predicting an imminent collapse of American
control in the district and the “delivering up to the insurgents all natives that have shown
themselves friendly to us” if he did not receive an additional two regiments of U.S. troops
as soon as possible (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 3, 31).
Alarmed by BG Young’s report and taking advantage of new U.S. volunteer
regiments arriving in the Philippines to replace the state volunteer regiments ending their
enlistments in the summer of 1900, Major General Arthur MacArthur, who replaced MG
Otis as Governor General in June 1900, doubled the troop strength in the district. In
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August, Young had 3,985 U.S. troops under his command with 10 percent bedridden by
sickness. By October the number increased to 4,897 and peaked in November at 5,866.4
Additionally, subordinate commanders in the district were allowed to double the
number of Filipino auxiliaries. The Native Scouts expanded from 245 men in September
to a peak of 568 by March 1901, expanding the Native Scouts’ existing companies to
six.5 Young also appointed Crispulo Patajo as chief of detectives for the First District
and tasked him to stop two particularly violent insurgent bands and then to recruit and
lead local auxiliaries in Ilocos Sur and Abra, two of the most violent provinces in the
district. Young and his subordinate commander for Ilocos Sur and Abra, Colonel
William P. Duvall reported later that Patajo could muster between 500 and 800 local
fighters for his auxiliary force in his home district of La Union. The members of this
force, including Patajo until his appointment as district detective, were not paid a salary;
instead, they were paid bounties for each rifle or insurgent leader they turned over to the
Americans.6
By December 1900 the tide had turned in the First District against the insurgents.
A number of factors contributed to this turn of events. The 50 percent increase in
American forces undoubtedly improved the ability of the United States to provide
security by carrying out more offensive operations and securing previously ignored
population centers. From October 1900 until the end of the insurgency in May 1901,
Army forces were on a constant offensive. In addition to more patrolling by local
garrisons that limited civilian travel between provinces, mobile forces conducted sweeps
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of border areas and suspected guerilla bases (War Department 1901, 33-36). These
operations limited ability of guerilla forces to move and to mass in large numbers and
reduced guerilla access to their local support networks and the food and supplies they
provided.
McKinley’s defeat of William Jennings Bryan in the presidential election of
November 1900 sapped the morale from the insurgent forces, who had pinned their hopes
on influencing a political solution to the U.S. occupation (Ochosa 1989, 198). As BG
Young noted, the “result of the presidential election has had a reassuring effect in
convincing both sides of the probable permanency of the policy of the United States”
(War Department 1901, 33). As Young identified, in addition to disheartening the
insurgents, the McKinley victory also emboldened pro-American Filipinos and provided
a final push for undecided Filipino elites into the American camp. This shift in support
expanded the Filipino Federalist Party, which had languished since its formation by
conservative Filipino elites in early 1900 (Miller 1982, 157). The Federalist Party rapidly
expanded from Manila into the First District and by February 1901 all of the provinces in
the district had one or more Federalist Party committees. By March, the committees were
had gained enough support among the populace to negotiate with insurgent groups for
their surrender. By March, this strategy started to bear fruit with five insurgent officers
surrendering to the Ilocos Sur Federalist committee on March 11, 1900.
Finally, a new commander, BG J. Franklin Bell replaced BG Young as the
commander of the district in February 1901. BG Bell proved to be an enthusiastic
supporter of recruiting native irregular auxiliary forces. Bell’s operations in Ilocos Sur
provide a good example of this expansion of the Guardia de Honor auxiliary force that
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had been so effective in La Union into other provinces of the district. After U.S.
intelligence determined the organization of the insurgents and their support network in
Ilocos Sur, Patajo brought 50 of his Guardia de Honor force into the province and
proceeded to recruit an additional security force of 150 men from the Igorrote ethnic
group that had a history of bad relations with the insurgents (Linn 1989, 59). Bell
garrisoned the Igorrote villages to provide protection and support, allowing the Igorrote
auxiliary groups to pursue the insurgents in the mountains (War Department 1901, Vol 1,
Part 5, 38-39). After five weeks of operations, the main insurgent leader and his group
surrendered in 15 April, ending insurgent operations in Ilocos Sur. Bell admitted that
U.S. forces could not have hunted down the insurgents in Ilocos Sur without the
assistance of the Igorrote, likening searching for insurgents in the mountains to “hunting
for a needle in a haystack” (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 5, 37).
Bell utilized native auxiliary forces in neighboring Abra province immediately
following the successful operations in Ilocos Sur. In the last two weeks of April 1901,
six U.S. infantry companies, three native scout companies and “a lot” of native auxiliaries
trapped General Tinio’s command in the mountains east of Ilocos Sur (War Department
1901, Vol 1, Part 5, 39-40.) On April 30, 1901, General Tinio surrendered at Siniat,
citing a lack of food, the garrisoning of all the towns, and the Igorrote support for the
Americans as reasons for their surrender (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 5, 40). In the
space of four months, over five thousand insurgents and members of their part time
support infrastructure had been killed, captured or surrendered, breaking the back of the
insurgency in the First District. After May 1, 1901, the First District forces reported no
further engagements with insurgent forces (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 5, 41). In
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recognition of the improved security, Major General Adna R. Chaffee, Military Governor
of the Philippines turned over two of the six provinces, Benguet and Pangasinan July
1901, to full local civilian control and local constabularies, which were under local civil
control, were in the lead role for security in all six provinces (Philippine Commission
1902, 13, 33). Further information corroborating the improved security in the First
District does not appear to be available. As reported by the Philippine Commission, as
Brian McAllister Linn (1989, 92) notes, the pacification of the First District was the most
complete in all of the Philippines with generally peaceful conditions after April 1901 and
a successful reintegration of former insurgents after their defeat.
External Oversight and Support
The United States created a bifurcated system for the use of indigenous forces in
the First District, which resulted in a mixed record for oversight and support. In the case
of the Philippine Scouts, the U.S. Army provided substantial oversight and material and
operational support. The U.S. Army provided similar oversight and operational support
to the Philippine Constabulary, but provided far less material assistance. In the case of
the volunteer forces provided by Crispulo Patajo, the U.S. provided almost no oversight
or support.
From their inception, the first category of the Filipino auxiliary forces, the
Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary were under close supervision by American
forces. The first and most numerous of this category, the Philippine Scouts, are better
thought of as having been an adjunct to the regular forces of the U.S. Army. They were
organized along the lines of American units had at least one American officer, seconded
from the U.S. Army, in direct command of each company of a hundred men (Wollard
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1975, 10). The American officers were with their Filipino units during operations and
garrison duty and were required to submit frequent reports on their status and operations.
The level of oversight of these units was considerable, especially after of
unsupervised Macabebe Scouts terrorized several villages in the early stages of the U.S.
occupation in November 1898. This included one case that resulted in the conviction by
court martial of Scout members for rape, robbery, and assault (Wollard 1975, 40). In all
the reported actions for 1900 and 1901, all actions by Philippine Scouts were under the
supervision of an American officer.
The second organization in this group, the Philippine Constabulary, did not play
an important role in the dismantling of the insurgent force. The expansion of this force
occurred after the defeat of BG Tinio in April 1901 when the U.S. Army forces and
Philippine Scouts pulled back into a supporting role in providing security the district.
The expansion of this force was rapid and is another indication of the defeat of the
insurgents. The constabulary increased from 87 Filipino enlisted constabulary in July
1901 to 683 in July 1902, indicating a growing support for the program and the increased
security in the district (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 10, 387 and Philippine
Commission 1902, 192).
The Philippine Constabulary was also closely supervised by the U.S. All of the
officers and inspectors of the force were U.S. citizens, usually former U.S. Soldiers who
had been mustered out of service in the Philippines (Wollard 1975, 90-91). Although
Filipinos would earn commissions after a time, U.S. citizens formed the bulk of the
leadership of the constabulary into the 1930s (Wollard 1975, 197-245).

84

The material and operational support for the constabulary was much less than that
given to the scout units. In 1900 and 1901 the quantity and quality of the arms carried by
the constabulary were inadequate. The 1901 report by the Philippine Commission
described they weapons given to the constabulary as “a motley collection or Remington
shotguns, captured Remington rifles, and old .45 caliber revolvers” (War Department
1901, Vol 1, Part 10, 184). While BG Young sought to increase the number of
constabulary in the First District starting in February 1901, obtaining arms from the
military government in Manila consistently hindered the expansion of local police forces
(Linn 1989, 50).
Operational support of the constabulary was somewhat better. The manpower
added by the increase of U.S. forces and Philippine Scouts in the summer of 1900
allowed the district commander to establish more outposts in important occupation
centers. This increased the proximity of Army detachments to constabulary headquarters
and by the fall of 1900 reports of police forces abandoning their posts in the face of
insurgent attacks ceased to occur (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 3, 30-41). The
Philippine Scouts slowly took over more of the support of the constabulary as U.S. forces
drew down in late 1901 and 1902. The Constabulary Act of January 30, 1903, passed by
the U.S. Congress, formalized this support by allowing civil authorities to use the Scouts
whenever they needed more personnel to address an emergency (Wollard 1975, 98-99).
The other category of indigenous security forces, irregular auxiliaries, received
little oversight or support. Formed around Crispulo Patajo and his Guardia de Honor
followers in the spring of 1900, the local auxiliaries enjoyed a largely free hand in
conducting their operations after establishing their pro-American sentiments. Numerous
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allegations of “every kind of excess and abuse, robbing and maltreating the peaceful
inhabitants” were lodged against the Guardias de Honor, culminating in the Philippine
Commission’s representative in the district, Otto Scheerer requesting an investigation by
the military governor.7 The U.S. Army officers in the district actively defended Patajo
during the investigation and downplayed the excesses of the Guardia de Honor as either
untrue or lodged by those who were sympathetic to the insurgent cause (Linn 1989, 4445).8
The Guardia de Honor also received little support from U.S. forces. As a
volunteer force with no official backing, Patajo’s forces received little training or support
from the U.S. They were not given arms and according to Colonel William Duvall, the
commander at La Union, had to be loaned five rifles from U.S. forces to be able to
conduct an operation against an insurgent group (Young 1900, Box 1, Personal
Correspondence). It is possible that Guardia forces received assistance from the U.S.
when their members joined the constabulary and formed pro-American police forces, but
Army officers in the district did not report this information.
Overall, the level of oversight and support provided by the U.S. forces in the first
district was not strong, but there was an attempt at oversight of the more formal
indigenous forces in the district. The high level of supervision and adequate material
support given to the Philippine Scouts and Constabulary, who outnumbered the irregular
forces in the district, mitigated the lack of oversight and support give to Patajo’s forces.
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Therefore, the degree of membership of this case for the variable of oversight and support
can be judged to be more in than out.
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction
The degree of limits to territorial jurisdiction is also mixed for this case and is to
some extent inverse to the level of oversight and support provided by U.S. forces. In the
case of the Philippine Scouts, U.S. commanders made some effort to limit where the
scouts were employed, but as an adjunct to regular U.S. forces, they were subject to being
sent wherever needed. In contrast, U.S. commanders took more steps to limit employing
the Philippine Constabulary and local auxiliaries to areas near their local communities.
After losing control of Scouts from the Macabebe scouts in November and
December 1900, BG Young concluded that part of the problem had been that the
Macabebe scouts were not operating within their own ethnic community (Wollard 1975).
All the companies created after this incident were drawn from local ethnic groups and
employed in regions dominated by those ethnic groups (Wollard 1975). The ethnicity of
the scout companies is easy to determine after February 1901 when a formal program for
the scouts was established (Fritz 1977, 526). After February 1901, all scout companies
were referred to by their ethnic composition and not named after their commanding
officer as was the case of the initial scout companies. In the case of the First District, all
the scout companies operating in the district after February 1901 were comprised of
members of the Ilocano ethnic group, which formed the majority of the population in the
First District (War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 3, 30-41). So, while the Philippine
Scouts operated as a mobile force anywhere within the First District and theoretically
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anywhere in the Philippines, there was an effort to limit their operations to areas
inhabited by their ethnic group.
The Philippine Constabulary was even more restricted than the Philippine Scouts.
During the planning for the constabulary, the Philippine Commission studied and rejected
the concepts underpinning the Spanish Guardia Civil police force. The Spanish colonial
government had purposefully assigned police of one ethnic group to control other ethnic
groups in an attempt to “divide and rule” by playing on tribal and ethnic tensions to
maintain order (Wollard 1975, 101). Instead, constabulary personnel were to be assigned
to duties as close as possible to the community where they enlisted.
In the first district, BG Young and then BG Bell took the additional step and
defined areas of responsibility for local leadership and the constabulary. Issued in May
1900, BG Young issued Circular Letter No. 1, which required all inhabitants to be
registered and issued travel documents if they left their community. The letter also held
the police force and the presidente or mayor, liable for all infractions within their
jurisdiction and for damage to infrastructure caused by the insurgents (Linn 1989, 49). In
addition to establishing accountability, it also defined the territorial limits of each
community.
The local auxiliaries controlled by Patajo were also restricted in their territorial
jurisdiction. This limitation was more due to the extent of local support for the Guardia
de Honor and not constraints placed on Patajo by Army commanders. Although BG
Young installed Patajo as the Chief of Detectives for the entire district, the Guardia de
Honor did not operate outside of the areas of their greatest support; La Union, Benguet,
Ilocos Sur, and Pangasinan (Sturtevant 1966 and War Department 1901, Vol 1, Part 5,
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30-41). In the areas Patajo maintained active networks, he was able to generate popular
support and install Guardia de Honor infrastructure and leadership in formerly insurgent
controlled towns. In the operations in Ilocos Sur in January through May 1901, Patajo
brought a small cadre of fifty supporters from La Union, but recruited the bulk of his
auxiliary force, 150 men, from local villages (Linn 1989, 59). While Young’s reports
indicate the use of local guides in the other provinces of the district, there is no indication
of attempts to use the Guardia de Honor followers outside the areas of their base of
support.
Overall the use of community-based security forces in the First District are “more
in than out” concerning their degree of membership with limits to territorial jurisdiction.
The Philippine Scouts were deployed only with the boundaries of their ethnic
communities, but could technically be sent anywhere they were needed by U.S.
commanders. The Philippine Commission designed the Philippine Constabulary to be
employed within defined boundaries and their Filipino police officers were to be used as
close to their own village as was practical. Coupled with the boundaries defined by BG
Young for the area of responsibility for each village, the Philippine Constabulary was
even more constrained by territorial boundaries. The Guardia de Honor forces were not
limited by predetermined boundaries, but were limited to areas where they enjoyed
popular support.
Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems
The community-based security forces used in the First District were “more in than
out” in their degree of membership with the incorporation of traditional justice systems.
BG Young and BG Bell did make some attempts to utilize traditional justice systems, but
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these attempts were largely stopgap measures in the pursuit of achieving the ultimate goal
of the adoption of a U.S. style justice system. Two areas indicate the preferences of the
First District commanders concerning the use of traditional justice. The first is the
reestablishment of the judicial system in 1900 and the second are the measures taken to
limit misbehavior by the security forces.
While the Spanish justice system was not the traditional justice system of the
inhabitants of the First District, it was the predominant judicial system in the Philippines
for over 370 years. In a letter to President McKinley, BG Young expressed his opinion
that it was best to keep the Spanish law code in place as, “the Spanish laws for the
government of these people are very complete and if they had been honestly administered
would have, with a few changes, given them and excellent government.”9 Young
established civil courts based on Spanish law in two provinces by March of 1900 and
allowed local mayors to act as arbiters in towns that did not have courts. Ultimately,
Young sought to replace the Spanish criminal code with one derived from the U.S.
criminal code, but was hesitant to move to swiftly because of a lack of local lawyers
capable of interpreting and applying the U.S. system. Young’s opinions about the
superiority of the U.S. legal code and the inability of Filipinos to operate effectively
operate a legal system seem to be based mostly in his racist view that “many of these
people are half savage and commit many violations of the laws and usages of civilized
warfare, which render them liable to the extreme penalty prescribed.”10 This view led
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Young to believe that the Filipinos would have to be limited in their ability to operate a
system of justice without oversight and tutoring by the U.S.
Local Sustainability and Accountability
The degree of membership for the First District with the condition of local
sustainability and accountability is more in than out. The local police and scouts were
reliant on funding outside of the district, while the auxiliary groups under Patajo were
voluntary and did not receive external support. BG Young and BG Bell both stressed the
importance of local sustainability and accountability through their written orders and by
the control mechanisms; they implemented to achieve these goals.
On the same day, the First District command was created, General Young issued
G.O. 43, which authorized the creation of civil governments and police forces. He
stressed the importance of local sustainability to his officers and urged them to convince
the populace that the burden of self-protection lay upon the individual towns. Between
January and March1900, Young supervised the election and installation of a presidente
(mayor), town council and police forces in 63 towns (Linn 1989, 35). While the speed of
creating local governments and the ignorance of local language and social dynamics
hindered the creation of control mechanisms loyal to the central government and allowed
the insurgents were able to install individuals sympathetic to their cause in many local
governments, the importance of local sustainability is evident.
The local police forces in the First District were a mixed case of local
sustainability. Young realized that many of the towns in the First District were too small
or poor to bear the burden of fielding a police force large enough to confront a
determined guerrilla force and therefore they needed outside support. In his
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correspondence to President McKinley and other officials, he stressed the need to
supplement local efforts with external support.11 The Philippine Commission echoed
Young’s reservations by noting in its annual report to Congress,
The towns, many of them, are so poor that it is impossible for them to
support a large or even adequate police force. In order that the municipal
police force should be effective against ladrones it is necessary that they
be properly armed with rifles. In a town, however, which can only afford
five or six municipal policemen, the distribution of rifles to the police only
offers a temptation to large bands of ladrones to capture the police and
take their rifles, this increasing the number of arms held by the ladrones
(Philippine Commission 1902, 33).
This issue of needing police forces to be able to defend themselves against
insurgent threats created the quandary of how to create a constabulary larger than local
economy could sustain, but to minimize the cost to the American taxpayer. The solution
the Philippine Commission implemented was that while the supplemental funds for the
police forces did come from outside the district, the funds were provided by the Filipino
treasury, which the commission managed. So, while not sustainable by the local
economy, the constabulary was limited by what the national economy could bear
(Wollard 1975).
The forces under Patajo showed the greatest local sustainability. They received
no outside support or even sanction from officials above the district level. Patajo, in his
role as chief of detectives, received a monthly salary; his Guardia de Honor forces
received no salary and therefore had to maintain independent means of generating
income.12 While the Guardia de Honor members did receive a 30-peso bounty on all
insurgent weapons and the advertised rate on all insurgents they captured, they did not
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receive a salary for their efforts (Linn 1989, 43). Beyond these unpredictable sources of
income, the only motivations for the Guardia de Honor members were their personal
motivations to settle grudges against insurgents and their loyalty to their organization.
The case of the first district did not exhibit strong accountability to the local
population. Of the three forces, the constabulary was most accountable to the local
population. On May 22, 1900, BG Young issued Circular Letter Number 1, which
mandated that local government register all of their male inhabitants and required all
males traveling within the district to possess a travel card issued by the town mayor. The
letter also delineated what constituted insurgent acts and held the local government
responsible for enforcing the compliance with the instructions in the letter and for the
actions of the local police force. This allowed local Army commanders to punish not
only those who violated the law, but also local government officials (Linn 1989, 49).
While not a formal mechanism for local civil oversight of the constabulary, it did provide
the local inhabitants to report abuse by the constabulary to the local Army forces.
The Philippine scouts and the Guardia de Honor forces did not have any
accountability to the local population. Beyond local ties, the Philippine Scouts, who
worked directly for the U.S. Army had no mechanisms for local accountability. This led
to the reports mentioned earlier of Macabebe scouts raping and pillaging towns in the
first district when their U.S. Army commanders lost direct control of them.
The Guardia de Honor forces had even less controls over their actions. Although
they also had local ties in the district, their first loyalty was to the Guardia de Honor
society. This led to numerous abuses by Guardia forces after they assumed control of
local government and sought to settle scores with insurgent sympathizers. This led to
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several complaints by Philippine Commission representatives, Phelps Whitmarsh and
Otto Scheerer, to their superiors in Manila.13 These complaints led William H. Taft, the
head of the Philippine Commission to report to Secretary of War Elihu Root that U.S.
commanders in the district had created “a system of terrorism by using a secret society”
(Linn 1989, 45). While BG Bell did not head these warnings, and expanded the use of
the Guardia de Honor, he did warn his subordinates in his Circular Letters Number 19
and 22 to investigate alleged abuses and to be wary of false denunciations of insurgent
activity by those looking to settle old scores (Bell 1902).
Voluntary by Local Elites
The degree of membership of this case to the voluntary participation of local
political leaders and violence specialists is mostly in. While there was some voluntary
participation by local leaders, U.S. commanders used mostly coercive measures to gain
the support of local elites. This reliance on coercive measures can be explained in part by
the cultural racism held by most of the U.S. commanders. BG Young described the
Filipinos as “suspicious people by nature” with inadequate education and native
leadership (Young 1900, Box 1, Personal Correspondence).14 In Young’s estimation,
this required the use of the coercive methods used by “Spanish and other European
nations” to “inspire rebellious Asiatics, individually and collectively, with a greater fear
of the reigning government than they had of the rebels” (War Department 1901, Vol 1,
Part 3, 32).
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The one case of voluntary participation of by a local elite was Crispulo Patajo. In
March 1900, the presidente of Bauang turned Patajo over to the Americans under the
pretense that he was a ladrone or bandit. Motivated by a desire for retribution against the
insurgents, Patajo denounced the presidente as an insurgent and then offered to reveal all
the insurgent leaders and infrastructure in the area (Linn 1989, 42). Reports from Young
and his subordinates demonstrate that Patajo was an elite with considerable influence
among the Guardia de Honor by his ability to rapidly raise hundreds of his supporters for
no compensation beyond a small reward for captured insurgents and leaders (Ochosa
1989, 133).
Patajo appears to be the only elite of note who collaborated with U.S. forces
without coercion. Coercion remained the main instrument used by U.S. commanders to
gain the support of local leaders. BG Young believed that due to the hierarchical
structure of Filipino society the elites were the key to winning the support of the
population. He told his officers,
To successfully deal with the common people, the headman, the leaders,
the principales are the ones we need to influence. The common hombre is
dominated body and soul by his master. He is simply a blind tool, a poor
downtrodden ignoramus, who does not know what is good for him and
cannot believe an American. We cannot appeal to him direct. You can no
more influence him by benevolent persuasion than you can fly. He is
going to do whatever he is told to do by his master or his leaders, because
he is incapable of doing anything else. Therefore, to succeed in our
purpose, we must make it to the interest of his leaders to order and counsel
him to do that which we want him to do. To bring this effort we must
make the principale the object of our special study and effort (Bell 1902).
In the spirit of this guidance, the efforts by BG Bell revolved around making in it
in the interest of local leaders to turn against the insurgency by punishing neutrality as
heavily as active participation in the insurgency. Local leaders would be punished as
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active members of the insurgency unless they demonstrated their support of the American
cause. Bell ordered that, “the only acceptable and convincing evidence of the real
sentiments of either individuals or town councils should be acts publicly performed as
must inevitably commit them irrevocably to the side of the Americans by arousing the
animosity and opposition of the insurgent element” (Bell 1902).
While this was the main strategy to compel the support of the local elites for the
American effort, there were some other cases like that of Patajo. One such case was the
use of the Filipino catholic clergy, who were opposed to the insurgent dominated
Katipunan secret society. Through an Army chaplain, BG Young persuaded the local
clergy to oversee a series of mass meetings in the spring of 1900. The priests led those
who attended the meetings in taking the Oath of Allegiance to the U.S. and renunciation
of the Katipunans. While the effectiveness of the oath taking ceremonies on decreasing
the support for the insurgency is debatable, the act of presiding over the ceremonies
forced the priests, a powerful force in Filipino society, to come off the fence on the side
of the Americans (Linn 1989, 55).
Overall, U.S. commanders did not actively seek the voluntary participation of
local elites in security efforts. Crispulo Patajo is the one exception to this trend and the
efforts of his group were significant in dismantling the insurgency. Besides Patajo the
efforts of the U.S. commanders in the district centered around coercing local elites into
positions where they would have to support Washington or risk severe punishment at the
hands of the Americans.
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Conclusion
The case of the defeat of the insurgency in the First District, Department of
Northern Luzon is a clear victory for the counterinsurgency forces that relied heavily on
community-based security forces to overcome shortages in conventional forces. While
some of the other cases examined in this dissertation will require more careful analysis to
determine the overall contribution and effectiveness of community-based security forces,
the contributions of the Guardia de Honor forces, along with the locally recruited scouts
and constabulary, had distinct positive effects on the outcome. As the American
commanders admitted, without the use of local forces, the United States would have been
unable to locate, let alone defeat the insurgent forces. Other factors such as the outcome
the 1900 U.S. presidential election and the capture of rebel leaders did reduce the strength
of the insurgents, the rapid defeat of the insurgency in a three-month period can be linked
to an expansion of the Guardia de Honor forces under BG Bell.
An interesting finding in this case is the apparent link between the level of
external oversight and the limits to territorial jurisdiction. As noted in Table 3, American
forces provided uneven, but high levels of oversight to local security forces, in particular
forces that were used outside of their ethnic or social boundaries. It is somewhat intuitive
that auxiliary or irregular forces without the discipline of regular forces either need to be
controlled by ties to their local population or have direct supervision by regular forces.
The Philippine scouts misbehaved when their supervision by their U.S. Army leaders
broke down and subsequently were not allowed to operate without American leaders.
Constabulary forces had American leaders and were limited in their operations outside
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their communities, while the Guardia de Honor forces did not have American officers
assigned to them, but were not employed outside of their areas of support.
As noted in Table 3, American commanders had little interest in incorporating
traditional justice systems, except as a stopgap measure until an American style of justice
could be introduced to the Philippines. It is unclear if this had any negative effect on
security operations or if local leaders continued to implement traditional justice systems
and American officers did not record these practices in their reports. A disdain for the
Filipino justice system and Filipino elites led to U.S. efforts to coerce compliance rather
than coopt existing systems or gain voluntary cooperation from elites.
Additionally, American commanders paid some attention to local sustainability
and accountability at least on the national scale. The Philippine Scouts and Constabulary
were both eventually paid from national revenues and were limited in size and equipment
to levels that could be sustained by the national budget. The Guardia de Honor was
sustained by local economies and local commanders supplemented the pay of members
with performance based rewards such as bounties on captured insurgents and weapons.
These groups were also accountable to the local population in an inverse proportion to the
level of oversight provided by the American Army. This indicates a connection between
external oversight and local accountability as dual methods to achieve control over
security forces and mitigate abuse of the population.
This case also demonstrated some attributes of the voluntary participation of local
leaders in security efforts. While the effectiveness of the Scouts and Constabulary were
not tied to enlisting the efforts of local leaders, the cooption of the leader of the Guardia
de Honor and the promotion of the Federal Party did assist in the effectiveness of security
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operations conducted by the American Army. In the case of the Guardia de Honor, the
benefits of possessing local knowledge and a pool of motivated and dedicated manpower
proved to be an important factor in the final operations against insurgent forces.
Although there is little evidence in the historical record to measure security levels
through economic, political and social development, the rapid defeat of the insurgency
and the inability of the insurgents to recover from their defeat indicate that the United
States was successful in its efforts to pacify the First District. In addition to providing an
example of the relative importance of community-based security forces in the outcome of
a counterinsurgency campaign, the case of the First District does demonstrate the relative
importance of each factor presented in this dissertation’s model. In the following case
studies, the connection established between external oversight and support and local
sustainability and accountability will be explored as a potential modification of the
existing model.
Table 3. Membership of First District, DNL with Community-Based Security Variables.

Variable/Membership

External Support and
Oversight
Limits to territorial
jurisdiction
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System
Local sustainability
and accountability
Voluntary
participation by local
elites

Fully
In

Mostly More In
In
Than
Out
X
X
X

X
X
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More
Out
Than In

Mostly
Out

Fully
Out

CHAPTER V - SCOUTS AND AUXILIARIES
The Fourth District, Department of Northern Luzon
Introduction
This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces in the
Fourth District, Department of Northern Luzon during the Philippine Insurrection 0f
1899-1902. This case study will start with a brief overview of the aftermath of the
Spanish American War in the Fourth District and the initial occupation by American
forces. To set further the stage for a discussion of the role of community-based security
forces, this chapter will discuss the nature of the Filipino insurgency in the Fourth
District and the efforts of American commanders to quell it. After discussing the overall
conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign and how American forces incorporated local
security forces to defeat the insurgency, this case study will conduct a detailed discussion
of the degree of membership this case demonstrates for each factor presented in this
dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings
and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix.
The following examination of the Fourth District will show it demonstrated a high
level of membership to the factors of external oversight and support as well as the
cooption of local elites. Formed in April 1900, the Fourth District, Department of
Northern Luzon experienced a low-level insurgency characterized by extreme acts of
violence perpetrated by both sides of the conflict against each other and the civilian
population. Faced with a shortage in American soldiers to provide security, the district
commander, Brigadier General Frederick Funston, implemented a counterinsurgency plan
that relied on leveraging the influence of elites in the district and the extensive use of
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indigenous scout companies and irregular auxiliaries. This plan succeeded in defeating
the insurgency in the district by the spring of 1901 and facilitated the capture of the
national insurgent leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, by Funston.
While this case illustrates the importance of the previously mentioned factors of
the model, the case of the Fourth District does not demonstrate adherence to
incorporating traditional justice systems, but does demonstrate adherence to local
accountability or sustainability through Funston’s reliance on community leaders
providing locally equipped security forces and collective punishments for insurgent
activity. The short duration of the Philippine Insurrection may be one reason why the
other factors of the model played little part in the success of the American commanders’
use of community-based security forces to defeat the insurgency. Although there is little
evidence in the historical record to measure security levels through economic, political
and social development, the rapid defeat of the insurgency and the inability of the
insurgents to recover from their defeat indicate that the United States was successful in its
efforts to pacify the Fourth District
One important fact to note in the presentation of this case study was the difficulty
encountered in uncovering the extent and details of the use of indigenous forces from the
archival record. Part of the difficulty lay in the reporting requirements established by the
U.S. War Department. Having not been in a large-scale conflict since the Civil War, the
systems and structure of reporting by commanders to civilian authorities was an ad hoc
affair. The Congress required annual reports and periodic reports to oversight
committees from each of the district commanders, but the format and content was left
largely to the discretion of the commanders in the field.
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Having entered the military at the start of hostilities with Spain, Frederick
Funston was one of the best know combat leaders of the period, having earned the Medal
of Honor for his actions against the Spanish in Cuba and for his early actions in the
Philippines. In addition to being a brilliant and self-taught combat commander, Funston
was a somewhat shameless self-promoter (S. C. Miller 1982, 168-169). This penchant
for self-promotion colored much of the reporting that emanated from the Fourth District
and his memoirs. While a large community-based security program comprised of both
Ilocano Scouts and auxiliary forces existed in the Fourth District, Funston’s reporting
focused on his more dramatic exploits. For example, in Funston’s annual report to
Congress for the period July 1900 to June 1901, Funston mentioned no other activity
other than his successful operation in March 1901 to capture the national insurgent leader
Emilio Aguinaldo. During this period, Funston’s forces raised 15 companies of
indigenous fighters, dismantled insurgent support networks, and defeated the main
insurgent units in the district. None of these are mentioned in his reports and receive
scant attention in his memoirs.
While Funston did not record his plan or its results as thoroughly as other
professionally trained commanders during Philippine Insurrection, the data that is
available shows that community-based security forces were critical in Funston’s
operations. The use of local security forces to secure the population allowed Funston to
use his regular forces as mobile raiding elements that could attack guerrilla forces
wherever they concentrated. Community-based security units and sympathetic local
elites prevented the insurgents from establishing shadow governments and support
networks in population centers. Additionally, Funston’s cooption of local elites and use
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of community security organizations facilitated his most daring operation, the capture of
the national insurgency leader, Emilio Aguinaldo. While Funston ignored some elements
of the community-based security model, such as establishing local governments or police
forces, Funston’s use of Filipino auxiliaries demonstrated adherence to several of the
conditions presented by the model.
Background
The Fourth District was comprised of the provinces of Nueva Ecija and Principe
in the northeastern section of the island of Luzon and held a population of 130,000 in an
area of 2,040 miles. The area had been a center of revolutionary activity against the
Spanish in the 1890s and produced many of the top leaders and soldiers in the Republican
Army. The population was divided among three ethnic groups; the Tagalogs and
Papangans in the south and Ilocanos in the north. Of these three groups, the Tagalogs
were the most active supporters of the insurgency, although their support was tepid at
best and they were divided among several competing factions (Linn 1989, 66).
Of the two provinces, Nueva Ecija was the more important of the two, with 95
percent of the population. In addition, the province produced a large amount of the rice
consumed throughout the Island of Luzon making it critical for the overall economy
(Linn 1989, 64-65). Therefore, control of Nueva Ecija became a key objective for both
the U.S. and insurgent leaders and most of the fighting occurred in this province.
In December 1899, when BG Funston took command of the newly formed Fourth District
he had 2,400 soldiers and one company of Macabebe Scouts spread out across the district
(U.S. War Department 1899-1902, I:4:263, 217-38, 262-288). This gave Funston a
security force to population ratio of 18:1000 during the height of the insurgency. While
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this is close to the minimum 20:1,000 ratio suggested by COIN literature, these ratios are
deceptive. The force was spread out over a large area in small garrison outposts without
the ability to provide mutual support between garrisons or an offensive force to strike into
insurgent strongholds. The majority of his force could not speak the local language
adequately to communicate with the population and at any given time during this period,
approximately 12 percent of his force was medically unfit for duty at any given time due
to infection by tropical disease and injury (United States Army 1899-1902, 2263, LS BK
1, LS 398).15 Additionally, Funston was forced to send a quarter of his force to the
neighboring Fifth District in May and June 1900 to assist in efforts to recover American
prisoners captured during an insurgent ambush of an American patrol (Funston 1911,
348-354). Throughout Funston’s tenure of command in 1900 to June 1901, he was faced
with the conundrum of possessing too few troops to secure population centers and the
need to take the offensive against insurgent bands in the mountainous regions of the
district.
Unlike the intense fighting occurring throughout the First District of the
Department of Northern Luzon after the dissolution the Filipino Republican Army during
the period from November 1900 to June 1901, the insurgency in Fourth District took on
different and deceiving characteristics. According to the district commander, Brigadier
General (BG) Frederick Funston,
The country was so quiet that it was deemed safe to make the trip without
escort, though we took the precaution to carry carbines in addition to our
revolvers…The condition of the country seemed perfectly normal, the
towns being full of people and the usual work going on in the field. There
was not a sign of the war to be seen, though there had been brisk
campaigning through this region… If anyone imagines that this was a
15

U.S. National Archives, RG 395/2263, United States Army 1899-1902, Letters Sent (LS) Book 1, LS 398
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desolated country, with the inhabitants fleeing to the woods and mountains
for shelter, he is entitled to imagine again. The tendency of the people
was to flock to the garrisoned towns for shelter from their own ruthless
countrymen, they have no fear of the troops. I have no doubt that in the
year 1900 Nueva Ecija raised as much rice as it ever did; at least all
suitable land was in suitable cultivation. And yet there was a nasty little
war going on all of the time. It was certainly an odd state of affairs
(Funston 1911, 314-315).
What Funston observed was a weak guerrilla army that struggled to create the shadow
government and civilian support network needed to sustain a viable insurgent movement.
Between the months of December 1899 to March 1900, the insurgent leaders attempted to
establish these support structures using acts of terror and intimidation of local leaders and
the population as an expedient to gain acquiescence of the population, if not their support.
The insurgency was initially led by General Panteleon Garcia who was ill and hid
for most of 1900 and his subordinate Colonel Pablo Padilla. According to Funston,
“neither of these men were of much force and energy and both were soon captured” but
they were succeeded in the fall of 1900 by Brigadier General Urbano Lacuna, “a man
much more capable than either of them” (Funston 1911, 318). While Lacuna was more
dynamic than his predecessors, he had to spend much of his time building the combat
strength and support systems necessary to fight American forces on a large scale.
Therefore, insurgent actions were mainly comprised of ambushes and sniping throughout
the majority of the hostilities.
Part of the reason for the weakness of the insurgency in Nueva Ecija was that the
province had produced several of the national leaders of the insurgency who focused their
efforts at the national level and fought with the Republican Army during the 1899 to
1900 campaigns. As Linn (1989, 66) notes it is possible that because the strongest and
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most charismatic local leaders were absent during the brief Philippine Republic
government of 1899, a strong insurgent infrastructure and shadow government were not
established before the occupation by the U.S. Army. Additionally, national leaders such
as Manuel Tinio took their supporters to fight in the battles for control of the more
strategically important population centers in the First District during the guerrilla actions
of 1900 and 1901 (Linn 1989, 66).
While the insurgent force was weak during the first few months of 1900, it was
still able to continue a harassment campaign against small and isolated U.S. forces and
intimidation and assassination against pro-U.S. local leaders (Linn 1989, 64). During this
period, Funston admitted the difficulty of “exterminating the enemy,” because “when
pursued too closely, they hid (sic) their rifles and scatter to their homes, and no longer
wear uniforms or a distinctive insignia but use the dress of noncombatants of the country”
(S. C. Miller 1982, 143). A stalemate emerged during this period, with U.S. forces
incapable of identifying insurgents because of cultural and linguistic barriers and neither
side powerful enough to hold lasting control over the population or strike a decisive blow
against the other side.
This stalemate during the winter of 1900 broke in March when the regular
insurgent forces attempted to stage several large conventional attacks against U.S. forces
requiring him to abandon several population centers to concentrate his forces to blunt the
attacks. While Funston was successful in defeating or spoiling the insurgent attacks,
these actions took his forces away from securing the population and allowed the
insurgents space to organize and launch attacks (Linn 1989, 70-71). Despite the respite
brought by the monsoon season in the summer of 1900, Funston faced an invigorated
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guerrilla force under a new more competent insurgent leader, Lacuna, with a force that
was too small to conduct major operations against insurgent strongholds while
maintaining control of population centers.
While the introduction of Lacuna and 200 insurgent fighters from outside the
district invigorated insurgent forces enough for several large-scale attacks, the insurgency
still faced the hurdles of a weak support system and shadow governments (Funston 1911,
318). Lacuna was a native of Nueva Ecija and set out upon his arrival in the district to
remedy these deficiencies. He was largely unsuccessful in these attempts because of
Funston’s intelligence network and local auxiliaries who dismantled the networks before
they could embed themselves in the population (Linn 1989, 72). During this period, he
also changed the military strategy of the guerrillas by abandoning further direct
confrontation with U.S. Army forces and adopting an expanded hit and run strategy of
ambushes and sniping that would build insurgent morale while his agents built local
support networks (U.S. War Department 1899-1902, 19 May, I: 7:120). While Lacuna
struggled to overcome initial shortcomings, he was successful in coalescing the
insurgency into a unified command that could coordinate operations within the
framework of a sustainable strategy and wait until an opportunity to strike arose (Linn
1989, 72).
This opportunity occurred in the late summer of 1900 when Funston’s forces that
had been temporarily assigned to other districts had yet to return and the monsoon limited
the maneuverability of American heavy infantry. Lacuna launched several large attacks
on population centers during this period, but these attacks were defeated. Funston
credited his success to the district’s indigenous intelligence network, the support of local
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elites and local auxiliary forces who Funston noted functioned better than U.S. forced in
the monsoon and knew the terrain (Funston 1911, 318). This operational defeat and the
resulting loss of insurgent manpower and weapons in the district forced Lacuna to fall
back on terrorist campaigns to force local leaders to support the insurgency. In
November, insurgent leaders extended this strategy to the entire population and guerrilla
forces conducted large-scale reprisals on entire towns not supporting the insurgency.
This strategy backfired on the insurgents, losing them the support of the
population and inducing the population to seek refuge in towns garrisoned by the
Americans and creating a humanitarian crisis that Funston called “pitiable” (Funston
1911, 373). Funston was quick to capitalize on the extreme measures of the insurgents
and used the dissatisfaction of local elites and segments of the population to enlist the
population in the fight against the insurgents.
Under BG Funston, a self-taught soldier with only three years in uniform, U.S.
forces in the district developed a counterinsurgency strategy of pitting the local elites
against the insurgents and using local auxiliary forces to secure population centers and to
use local knowledge to locate and destroy insurgent units. This strategy overcame
shortages in American security force personnel and allowed Funston to use American and
local scouts as mobile strike groups to destroy guerrilla units outside of population
centers. While Funston lacked the staff training necessary to produce an articulated
counterinsurgency strategy, he did intuitively seize upon several of the conditions present
in the district to apply several of the factors in the community-based security model to his
advantage.
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One of those opportunities was an existing tension between ethnic groups within
the district. The most significant ethnic rift existed between the Tagalog, who dominated
the insurgency and Ilocano, who were immigrants to the province. Socioeconomic
tensions between the groups had been simmering across Luzon and were enflamed when
the national insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo executed the Ilocano insurgent leader and
Commander in Chief of the Republican Army, Antonio Luna, in June 1900. This rift
between the Tagalog and Ilocano provided a large segment of the population ready to
turn against the insurgency (Sexton 1939, 166 and Funston 1911).
Colonel Lyman W. V. Kennon, commander of the Thirty-fourth Infantry,
spearheaded the efforts to raise local scout and auxiliary units from the Ilocano
population in the district. The self-titled “Father of the Ilocanos,” Kennon forged a
relationship with the Ilocano community early in 1899 when he used Ilocano prisoners of
war as a labor force to build a local transportation network. Kennon’s humane treatment
of the Ilocanos helped him build close ties with the local Ilocano leader, Francisco
Madrid, who was assassinated in January 1900 by insurgents (Congress 1902, 1001).
The death of Madrid and then Luna in June 1900 dissolved any remaining support the
Ilocano in the district had for the insurgency. In the subsequent months, Kennon
succeeded in leveraging these grievances and his personal relationship with Ilocano to
raise a significant local security force.
In addition to Kennon’s relationship with the Ilocanos, one of the other probable
reasons for the success in raising local security forces was Funston’s treatment of the
local population. In contrast to the insurgent practice of individual and collective
reprisals, Funston employed relatively humane practices designed to win the support of
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the population, especially local elites. As the insurgency wore on, Funston continued to
soften his treatment of the population in areas contested by the insurgents. For example,
in 1900, Funston ordered the arrest of the local chief and the burning of houses near an
insurgent attack, but by January 1901, Funston threatened reprisals only if attacks
repeated after a warning. As a result, Funston reported that attacks on telegraph wires
had reduced and were down to
probably three or four times a month, which is not bad considering the
district was in a state of war. It is always done by a small band and
usually in an uninhabited locality. It is improbable that they remain
anywhere in the vicinity and hunting down the three or four men who
have probably done it is a very futile performance. I cannot see the
expediency of burning the barrios in the vicinity of where a wire has been
cut as the damage is almost invariably done by people from elsewhere. I
think the unarmed and defenseless people in the barrios could not prevent
wire cutting if they were so disposed.16
Compared to the insurgent commander’s “most relentless policy” of group
retribution and assassination for those who aided the Americans, whose savagery Funston
said caused “cold chills” to creep over him and resulted in the burning of several towns,
Funston’s policy of humane treatment drew the population toward active conflict with the
insurgency in early 1901 (Funston 1911, 356, 374).
At the urging of Kennon, Funston received permission in June 1900 to raise a
company of fifty scouts as a stopgap to mitigate impending U.S. troop reductions due to
pending expiration of enlistments that summer. Once Kennon had demonstrated to
Funston that the Ilocano were reliable allies in early 1900, Funston became a strong
supporter of the Ilocano Scouts calling them “splendid marchers and fighters were as
trustworthy as the Macabebes, and that is saying a great deal” (Funston 1911, 319).

16

U.S. National Archives RG 395/2263, box 4, 3 Jan 1901, Department of Northern Luzon.
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Funston again received permission to increase the number of scouts in the district to 150
by July 1900, and 240 by October 1900. By December 1900 they were increased to 480,
and the Department of Northern Luzon authorized them to be divided into four
companies of 120 in February 1901 by Special Order 19. (U.S. Army 1901, Part 1, Vol 3,
312).
While Funston obtained permission for a large increase in the number of scouts
over a six-month period, Kennon continued to push Funston throughout 1900 to increase
the number and often exceeded the scope of his orders in his use of the Ilocano (Linn
1989, 81). By January 1901, Kennon had raised 15 companies of native scouts, each
with between 100 and 120 members (U.S. Army 1901, Part 2, Vol I, 74 and Part 1, Vol 3,
74). It is not clear from official correspondence how Kennon paid or equipped these
additional scout companies or why he was not questioned about the discrepancy between
the authorized number of scouts and the number of companies listed on Fourth District
unit lists. Linn (1989, 81), assumes Kennon financed some of these forces by accounting
for them as laborers or guides and interpreters to U.S. units. What is clear is that the
Fourth District raised almost half of the 31 native scout companies in the four districts
Department of Northern Luzon and a third more than the next closest district. By doing
this Kennon increased the overall strength of the security forces available to Funston by
60 percent. The scout’s effectiveness was not only numerical. Their ability to identify
insurgents among the population and knowledge of the local terrain increased the
effectiveness of security operations to the point that in December 1900 Funston reported
that the scouts had captured more insurgent weapons than his regular forces (Linn 1989,
82).
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Another aspect of Funston’s COIN strategy was the cooption of the elites within
the district. While he did not articulate this as part of his plan, he was aware of the
benefit the support of local elites afforded his efforts in defeating the insurgents, stating
in his memoirs;
One of the unique features of this period of the war (1901), at least so far
in the Fourth District was concerned was the pleasant social relations
between the officers of the American garrisons and the better class of the
people in the towns. We would often come back to San Isidro from a raid
into the bosque, and that same evening attend a baile or other social
function given at the home of some prominent resident (Funston 1911,
355).
In addition to building social relations with the local elites of the district, he also
made great efforts to maintain elites in their positions and incorporate them into the new
American organized government, even if they had served in the insurgent government.
These efforts included forgiving or overlooking coerced and reluctant support of the
insurgents by elites, often inviting a local leader to his headquarters and telling him “the
amount of his latest contribution and the date thereof, and then allowed to go, it being
known that most of the people were acting under compulsion” (Funston 1911, 373). In
addition to indicating the penetration of the insurgent network by Funston’s intelligence
service, Funston’s lenient treatment of local elites demonstrated his willingness to bring
them into the new political order without their having to fear a loss of stature or power.
Funston’s building of relationships with the elite and trusting them to guide their
people in the defense of their communities started to produce results by 1901.
Representative of several similar cases, the elite of Nueva Ecija grew tired of the fighting
in January 1901 and formally supported the Americans, declaring to the insurgents that
local auxiliaries would fight them if they entered the village. Funston reported to the
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Department of Northern Luzon commander that elites were shifting their allegiance and a
“very decided tendency to actively aid us” was developing in the district.17 By February
1901, at least ten towns, including the major population centers, had formed vigilante
groups that killed or captured several insurgents and turned their weapons over to
American forces (Linn 1989, 75). As demonstrated by these examples, Funston was not
interested in developing local governance during the height of the insurgency, but he did
use existing elites and power structures to control community-based security forces in his
district.
In addition to securing population centers, Funston relied heavily on his
indigenous scouts during his offensive operations in 1901. In addition to knowledge of
the local terrain and local contacts, the scouts could maneuver in the dense and swampy
terrain of the district better than American forces (Funston 1911, 318). Funston
leveraged these qualities and their ability to blend in with the population and the
insurgents in several covert missions designed to surprise insurgent forces, including his
most successful mission, which resulted in the capture of the overall insurgent leader,
Emilio Aguinaldo.
Funston’s capture of Emilio Aguinaldo is instructive of not only Funston’s daring
and flare for the dramatic, but also key aspects of the community-based security
apparatus that he created in 1900. On February 8, 1901, a small group of insurgents
carrying dispatches for Aguinaldo was presented to an American garrison by the mayor
of a Pantabagan. A local auxiliary force that detained the group had turned them over to
the mayor who had switched his allegiance to the Americans. The mayor convinced the
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leader of the insurgent group of the hopelessness of his cause and to turn himself over to
the Americans (Funston 1911, 384-386; Sexton 1939, 233 and 260; and MacArthur 1901,
57-58).
The leader of the insurgents, an Ilocano named Cecilio Segismundo, assisted
Funston and his staff to decipher the letters and divulged the location of the guerilla
leader’s base. After deciphering the letters that directed four insurgent leaders in Nueva
Ecija to each send him 100 men, Funston developed a plan to capture Aguinaldo.
Funston devised a plan to infiltrate Aguinaldo’s base with 80 indigenous scouts acting as
guerillas and four American officers, including himself, acting as prisoners. He
convinced Segismundo to accompany the group to act as a guide and to provide the
necessary signals and passwords to infiltrate the rings of security around the base
(Funston 1911, 391-392 and Sexton 1939, 261).
On March 6, 1901, after a month of planning, the group embarked on a Navy
gunboat to infiltrate closer to the insurgent base and bypass several layers of insurgent
security. The group was comprised of four Americans, 80 scouts dressed as insurgents,
the insurgent Segismundo, and three other insurgent leaders who had switched their
allegiance to the Americans. Over the course of two weeks, the group bluffed its way
through insurgent checkpoints using forged letters and passwords provided by the former
insurgents. On March 23, 1901, the group infiltrated Aguinaldo’s camp and the former
insurgents, not the Americans, seized Aguinaldo and took him prisoner (Funston 1911;
Sexton 1939, 262-264 and U.S. Army 1901, Part 1, Vol IV, Appendix D, 130).
The mission that captured Aguinaldo demonstrates several aspects of Funston’s
counterinsurgency plan for the Fourth District. The capture of Aguinaldo’s messages by
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a local auxiliary force, coupled with other anecdotal evidence of local security forces
capturing and executing insurgents, gives some idea of the level of mobilization of the
population to provide their own security.18 The second aspect the raid illustrates is the
cooption of local elites in the fight against the insurgency. The mayor of the town where
the insurgents had been captured had served in that position for the insurgency and had
changed his allegiance after the American occupation (Funston 1911, 387). Finally, the
raid would never have been possible unless Funston had a high degree of faith in the
allegiance of the local scouts and the former insurgents who had been incorporated into
the American-backed system.
By July 1901, the main insurgent groups and leaders had all been captured or had
surrendered and the Philippine Commission and BG Funston deemed the key province of
Nueva Ecija sufficiently free of violence and organized to be declared pacified and pass
under the control of a civil governor (Philippine Commission 1902, 13). Funston had
ignored the establishment of civil governments or police forces until after the insurgency
had been defeated. The removal of U.S. Army forces and rapid expansion of the
Philippine Constabulary in Nueva Ecija from 36 in June 1901 to 159 provides some
evidence of the success of pacification efforts (Philippine Commission 1901, 387 and
Philippine Commission 1902, Vol X, Part 1, 190). The activities of the constabulary,
which patrolled 19,586 miles and encountered no insurgent activity while capturing from
individuals 23 rifles, four pistols, and stolen livestock and property is indicative of the
overall reduction of violence and the level of security existing in the district. (Philippine
Commission 1902, Vol X, Part 1, 193)
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External Support and Oversight
General Funston and Colonel Kennon provided considerable support and
oversight for the Native Scout companies raised in the Fourth District. Colonel Kennon
learned early in 1899 of the value of using local security forces to combat the insurgency
and the reliability of the Ilocanos in northern Nueva Ecija. As an early advocate for
raising companies of scouts from the Ilocano, Kennon earned the nickname, “Father of
the Ilocanos” and created friction between himself and his superiors who were more
skeptical of using local security forces (Linn 1989, 81). The scouts in the district were
equipped almost at the level of a U.S. soldier. Each member of the scouts was provided
with a somewhat antiquated Springfield rifle, a .45 caliber pistol and ammunition
(Wollard 1975, 68). Additionally, each member of the scouts was paid $40 a month and
provided with standard U.S. Army rations (Wollard 1975, 67). The provision of this
material support in a district that maintained tenuous lines of supply, demonstrates a
desire by Kennon and Funston to maintain the operational effectiveness and morale of the
Scouts.
Another demonstration of the commitment of Kennon and Funston to the scout
program was in the area of manpower support, which also provided a high level of
oversight. For each of the Native Scout companies two officers had to be detailed from
their normal duties in Army units to command them. This was a burden for a district that
was shorthanded at the start of the insurgency and had U.S. companies assigned to the
district with regimental headquarters in other districts (Linn 1989, 70). This meant that
officers in direct command of soldiers conducting counterinsurgency operations had to be
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taken away from Kennon’s combat units and not culled from officers engaged in staff
work in headquarters units (Funston 1911, 319).
It is difficult to determine the extent of support of oversight and support beyond
these basic measures, but there are indications it was extensive. Kennon exceeded the
250 scouts authorized by General MacArthur, the commander of the Division of the
Philippines in January 1901 by at least a thousand if the number of companies formed
during this period were manned to the prescribed levels. Also, Kennon formed several
auxiliary forces comprised of Ilocanos to augment American garrisons and as local
militias. Kennon does not mention any indigenous leadership or organizational structure
for these forces and only mentions the use of auxiliary forces obliquely in reports of
operations in his area, so their organization and reporting mechanisms are unclear.
However, in these dispatches, Kennon refers to “Ilocanos” (auxiliaries), who conducted
combined combat operations with U.S. forces that killed or captured insurgents, so it is
not unreasonable to assume that Kennon provided these forces with some sort of
weaponry without the permission of his superiors.19
Another indication of the level of oversight provided by U.S. forces is that while
scouts and auxiliary forces were used throughout the district, no complaints were
recorded against these forces in either military or civil records. This is in direct contrast
with the level and number of complaints lodged against the scout and the Guardia Civil
forces in the First District.20 This indicates that unlike in the First District, U.S. officers
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assigned to scout units or to oversee auxiliary units did not lose contact with their
indigenous forces or allow them to harass the population.
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction
Funston displayed little inclination to limit the operational areas of the indigenous
forces that were under his direct control and this case demonstrated a “mostly out” degree
of membership with this factor. In his memoirs, he relates numerous instances of using
Ilocano Scouts throughout the district on quick striking raids to destroy enemy forces, but
usually with American soldiers supervising them. In fact, Funston regularly used the
scouts outside the boundaries of their communities in covert operations. In these
operations, the scouts were used in areas where their identities would be unknown and
they could pass as insurgents to enter guerrilla strongholds (Funston 1911). This also
appears to be the case for auxiliary forces with the only restraint on their employment or
area of operations being the extent of their knowledge of the local terrain (Congress
1902, 1001).
Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems
During his command of the Fourth District, Funston showed little interest in
developing local governance or judicial structures. Until the summer of 1901, Funston
did not attempt to establish any civil government and only later as one of the steps to turn
control over to the Philippine Commission (Philippine Commission 1902, Vol X, Part 1,
193). In contrast to attempting to allow local justice systems to exercise control, Funston
steadfastly employed the military justice system in the district. One case that occurred in
March 1900 demonstrated Funston’s desire to keep the judiciary in the hands of military
officials.
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After capturing two officers from the insurgent army who were suspected of
torturing and killing several local scouts, Funston ordered an immediate execution under
the authority of General Order 100 that authorized martial law and the administration of
military justice. His response that although “this recital will cause cold chills to chase
themselves up and down the spinal columns of a good number of people…so that it might
be as well to state that this execution was absolutely legal as any that ever-followed trial
by jury. If I had taken the two men to San Isidro, I could not have legally executed them
and they would have to await the results of a trial…The moral effect of this summary
action was most beneficial” (Funston 1911, 333). This case and the previously
mentioned episodes of town leaders turning over insurgents to military officials indicates
that little effort was made to incorporate traditional justice systems into indigenous
security organizations.
Local Sustainability and Accountability
The Filipino forces raised by the U.S. in the first district can be divided into two
groups, the Native Scouts and local auxiliaries. These groups had different sources of
funding and levels of accountability to the populace. This produced a mixed result in the
case of the Fourth district with membership in this category being more out than in.
The Native Scouts raised in the district were not sustainable by the local economy and
external funding sources were necessary. During the height of the insurgency from the
fall of 1900 to the spring of 1901, the funding for the scouts came exclusively from
external sources. By January 1901, U.S. commanders in the district raised 15 Native
Scout companies, which were all paid and equipped by the U.S. Army using U.S. Army
funds and weapons shipped from the United States until July 1901 when insular funds
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were used to pay salaries and (Wollard 1975, 66-68). It is unlikely that the largely
agrarian economy the district could have fielded and supported a force of this size
without outside assistance.
The Native Scouts were also largely unaccountable to the local population.
Commanded by U.S. Army officers, the scouts reported to the military chain of command
to the district commander. However, there was a check to the behavior of individual
scout members. At the time of enlistment, each enlistee had to present the
recommendation of the presidente of his home barrio and the local official was held
responsible for guaranteeing the character and reputation of the enlistee.21 This
recommendation also carried the potential threat that if a scout deserted or committed a
crime, his local leader would bear some of the responsibility and the community would
lose face.
For the local auxiliaries, nothing is recorded discussing accountability to the local
populace or considerations of local sustainability. It can be assumed that since these
forces were organic to the towns that organized them and they received no regular pay
from American forces, auxiliary forces were sized to a level that would permit the normal
functioning of the local economy. Additionally, since these forces were organized as a
popular response to excesses by the insurgents, it is reasonable to assume they were
attuned to the needs of the local population, even if it is unclear what type of
accountability mechanisms constrained their actions. This assumption is supported by
General Funston’s reliance on local elites to maintain order and his punishment of elites
and collective punishments of communities where insurgent activities occurred. This use
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of collective policing of communities indicates a reliance on collective acceptance of
local security forces and security measures. This indicates a “more out than in” degree of
membership with this factor.
Voluntary Participation by Local Elites
This case possesses full degree of membership with the factors of involvement of
local elites and oversight and support. Funston carefully cultivated his relationship with
local elites. In addition to developing social relationships with local leaders, he was
successful in coopting them into the security framework of the district. By overlooking
coerced contributions to the insurgency, he allowed the existing elites to remain in power.
The elites of the district responded to this treatment and the violent repression of the
insurgents by forming community security forces and actively turning against the
insurgents.
The effect of elite collaboration was ruinous for the insurgency. In June 1900, a
captured report from an insurgent leader decried, “the disastrous moral effect produced in
the situation of the country by the innumerable voluntary and other surrenders of
prominent persons who filled important offices under the revolution” (Philippine
Insurgent Records 1900). In addition to preventing the insurgents from establishing a
shadow government or support network, elites loyal to the Americans prevented
insurgent movement within the towns of the district and actively sought to turn insurgents
away from their cause as in the case of the insurgent courier who participated in the
capture of Aguinaldo.
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Conclusion
While Brigadier General Frederick Funston did not articulate a coherent
counterinsurgency plan, perhaps because of his lack of military training, the case of the
3rd District, DSL was successful. Funston established local security with community
security forces, freeing American forces from static defensive duties and enabling them
to conduct raids deep into enemy territory. Indigenous forces produced improved local
security, allowing communities to recover from the conflict, but without concerted
assistance from the Americans. This produced a “Mostly In” degree of success. The
counterinsurgency strategy that grew out of his instinctual assessment of the situation in
the Fourth District evolved as a definable course of action. Reflected in Table 4, his plan
relied on coopting elites in the district to organize their constituents in their own defense
and to use existing ethnic rifts to raise indigenous scout companies and irregular
auxiliaries. Prone to daring action, Funston focused on bold offensive action, in the
course of which he relied heavily on indigenous forces. Funston’s gamble to allow his
forces to expand the use of indigenous forces beyond the scope of his authority,
demonstrates his reliance on indigenous security forces to defeat the insurgency and
establish security in the district. To undertake his mobile operations with his regular
forces he relied on auxiliaries and local elites to secure population centers and disrupt
guerrilla support activities. This plan succeeded in defeating the insurgency in the district
by the spring of 1901 and facilitated the capture of the national insurgent leader, Emilio
Aguinaldo, by Funston.
While the details of how Funston organized and managed community-based
security forces are not as well documented as other cases, the available data does show
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that community-based security forces were critical in the success of Funston’s operations.
As shown in Table 4, this case demonstrated mixed adherence to the factors presented in
the community-based security model. Funston and his subordinate Colonel Kennon
raised many more local security force units than other districts. As reflected in Table 4,
they provided high levels of support and oversight to the forces they raised, especially to
Ilocano scout companies. This case demonstrates mixed adherence to limits to territorial
jurisdictions as Funston used the scouts and auxiliary forces throughout the district and
did not place territorial boundaries on their operations, while there is no indication that
other local security forces operated outside their ethnic or community boundaries. While
using scout units outside of their communities was often a critical aspect in Funston’s
covert operations to infiltrate insurgent strongholds, as seen in other cases, high levels of
oversight by regular security forces offset any potential issues encountered by using
indigenous security forces outside of their traditional territorial boundaries.
While he supported and monitored indigenous forces, Funston paid little attention
to the long- term development of security structures. He was an ambitious officer who
carefully cultivated his public persona as a dashing commander by focusing his attention
on daring offensive operations to defeat the insurgency and as noted in Table 4, he paid
little attention to linking local security forces to local governance structures. Other than
the scout units funded by the national military command, Funston and his subordinates
were forced to make local security forces sustainable by communities beyond providing
them with weapons and ammunition. This provides a mixed case of sustainability and
accountability with scout units operating completely independent of their local
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communities and local elites responsible for the sustainment and accountability of the
remainder of the indigenous security forces.
As the chart in Table 4 indicates, and alluded to above, Funston assiduously
cultivate his relationship with local elites and sought incorporate them into the security
apparatus of the district as an expedient to defeating the insurgents. These efforts
rewarded him with allies in the Filipino elite, especially among the Ilocanos, who
organized their constituents into local security forces that prevented the insurgents from
developing an effective support network in the district. While his efforts were critical in
defeating the insurgency, he also benefitted from the weakness of the insurgent groups he
was fortunate that the insurgency was weak in manpower and organization in the district
and lacked the support structures necessary for maintaining a long-term struggle. This
weakness led the insurgents to resort to intimidation of the population, which further
accelerated popular disaffection with the insurgent cause and drove the elites and
minority Ilocano to support the American cause.
Although there is little evidence in the historical record to measure security levels
through economic, political and social development, the rapid defeat of the insurgency
and the inability of the insurgents to recover from their defeat indicate that the United
States was successful in its efforts to pacify the Fourth District. In addition to providing
an example of the relative importance of community-based security forces in the outcome
of a counterinsurgency campaign, the case of the First District also demonstrates the
relative importance of each factor presented in this dissertation’s model.
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Table 4.
Membership of Fourth District, DNL with Community-Based Security Variables.
Variable/Membership Fully
Mostly More
More
Mostly
Fully
In
In
In Than Out
Out
Out
Out
Than In
External Support and
Oversight
Limits to territorial
jurisdiction
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System
Local sustainability
and accountability
Voluntary
participation by local
elites

X
X
X

X
X
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CHAPTER VI - COUNTERINSURGENCY ON A SHOESTRING:
The Third District, Department of Southern Luzon, the Philippine War 1899-1903
Introduction
This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces in the Third
District, Department of Southern Luzon during the Philippine Insurrection 0f 1899-1902.
This case study will start with a brief overview of the aftermath of the Spanish American
War in the Philippines and the initial occupation by American forces in the Bicol region
of Southern Luzon. This chapter will discuss the nature of the Filipino insurgency in the
Third District and the efforts of American commanders to quell it. After providing an
overview of the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign and the use of local security
forces to defeat the insurgency, this case study will include a detailed discussion of the
degree of membership this case demonstrates for each factor presented in this
dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings
and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix. As this case
study will demonstrate, while efforts to field local security forces were hampered by a
lack of material support from higher commands, the use of community-based security
forces proved essential to defeating the insurgency by 1903.
This case study highlights the importance of external support and oversight and
gaining the voluntary support of local elites when attempting to use community-based
security forces. Throughout the period covered in this case study, the Department of
Southern Luzon and the national command failed to support efforts of local commanders
to field community-based security forces by withholding the arms and funds. The limited
supply of arms and equipment prevented American commanders from using indigenous
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forces to augment the limited number of American troops in an offensive role or to free
up American forces from static defensive roles. This case study will show that this
failure lengthened the duration of the insurgency, which lasted a year longer than it did in
other districts.
Despite limited external support, American commanders in the Third District
were successful in coopting local elites and using the influence of elites to raise and
regulate local security forces. Due to limited sources of supply and funding, American
leaders relied on the use of intangible sources of power such as building the prestige of
local elites to co-opt them. The use of intangible sources of power coupled with granting
local elites with a high level of decision making authority to regulate their communities
and dispense available resources, American commanders provided elites with the tools
necessary to recruit community-based security forces. Using these methods, American
commanders expanded their control over the population while expending small amounts
of resources.
By necessity American commanders also demonstrated high levels of adherence
to the factors of local accountability and traditional justice systems. American
commanders granted local leaders and clergy wide latitude in organizing their
communities and regulating the lives of the population.

American commanders also

adhered by necessity with the factor of limits to territorial jurisdiction as they did not
have the means to raise independent scout companies able to conduct independent
operations outside local community support networks.
This case also demonstrates a high degree of membership in the areas of
traditional systems of justice and local sustainability. Due to limited manpower and
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resources, American commanders chose to leave the existing legal codes in place as a
means of gaining popular support for the new local governments and because it required
the least amount of oversight by American forces. Additionally, limited external funding
required all functions of local government, including the provisioning of security, to be
sustainable by the local tax base. Throughout the district, American commanders
allowed local leaders to decide the level of taxation their communities could bear and the
number of security personnel was based off of that calculation and the local security
threat.
While the conclusion of the insurrection in the Third District was not marked
with a defeat of insurgents in a climactic battle, the piecemeal surrender of insurgents in
the period of 1901-1902 and the end of insurgent activity by 1903 marks this case as a
successful counterinsurgency operation. Unlike the other Philippine Insurrection cases
used in this dissertation, the effect of community-based security forces can be seen as the
decisive element in defeating the insurgency. Outside events such as the surrender of
national insurgent leaders had little effect on the intensity of the insurgency and
organized resistance ended only after the population was organized to defend against
insurgent influence.
Background
After the rapid defeat of the Spanish Army and Navy by U.S. military forces and
their erstwhile Filipino revolutionary allies in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the
U.S. Army settled into an occupation of the Philippine Islands. The occupation force was
tasked with the mission of incorporating the former Spanish colony into the American
economic and political system through a process of “benevolent assimilation.” The Third
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District of the Department of Southern Luzon was a critical region in this overall process
of pacifying the Philippines. The Bicol region of Luzon, which encompassed the
boundaries of the Third District, was a major production center for hemp fiber and was a
major source of raw materials for the American rope industry (Sibley 2007, 135). The
supply of hemp was seen by American leaders such as Secretary of War Elihu Root as
vital for paying for the occupation of the Philippines and the wellbeing and growth of the
American rope industry (Lynn 1989, 96, 103). To sustain the flow of hemp the main
missions of the American forces in the region were to secure hemp production and
shipping areas while establishing civil government to ensure a long-term flow of hemp to
American manufacturers.
Brigadier General William Kobbè led the American forces during the initial
occupation of the region in January 1900 with orders directing him only to “render a
sufficient quantity of hemp available for the American market as soon as possible” (War
Department 1901, 1:7:15). Kobbè and his forces succeeded in occupying the main ports
of the region by the end of January 1900 and set about reestablishing the hemp trade in
the region. However, Kobbè was hindered by an insufficient number of soldiers and was
unable to pursue the insurgents or establish an effective buffer to allow the inhabitants of
the region to bring their hemp into the ports without being harassed by the insurgents
(Lynn 1989, 99-101). This characterized much of the insurgency in Bicol with the
Americans unable to pursue the insurgents or secure the population outside major towns
because of a lack of forces and the insurgents unable to eject the Americans from the
towns due to the superior American firepower.
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In the summer of 1900 Kobbè was ordered out of the Third District to command
pacification efforts in Mindanao and Jolo. He was replaced by Brigadier General James
M. Bell (no relation to BG James Franklin Bell) (War Department 1901, 207). Bell’s
efforts to pacify the region were hampered by the same problems that faced Kobbè.
During the remainder of the insurgency from July 1900 to the summer of 1902, Bell had
approximately 2,600 American soldiers to secure a population of over 600,000 and an
area of over 5,600 square miles. Added to this, American troops were ravaged by disease
and many units were reduced to a point that made it “almost impossible to conduct
normal security operations.”22
Compounding the lack of personnel, Bell also faced severe shortages in riverine
transportation and communications equipment (Lynn 2000, 282). The situation became
so bad by the May of 1900 that BG Bell reported to the Commander of the Department of
Southern Luzon that shortages in manpower compared to the size of the pacification
requirements made it, “impossible to comply” with the demands of securing towns while
conducting operations in the field against the insurgents.23 By March 1900 American
forces in the Third District were stretched so thin that BG Bell reported that “the troops
of this command have now reached the point beyond which it will be almost impossible
to get supplies to them from this point.”24
This lack of manpower and resources forced Bell to decentralize control of
American efforts in the district and experiment with arming local security forces using
the limited means available. Bell determined by conducting experiments with arming
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limited numbers of police in May 1900 that for a limited amount of money ($25
Mexican) per policeman, he could field an effective police force across the province and
overcome his lack of American troops.25 As early as July 1900 Bell requested arms and
ammunition to begin equipping local security forces.26
Confronting the American forces, the insurgent forces commanded by Major
General Vito Belaramino faced equal challenges. Treating the region as a secondary
effort in the overall conflict, national insurgent leaders sent few supplies to the region and
only 200 rifles (Taylor 1971, 5:180-181). Faced with these shortages and a reduced
income from the American control of hemp exports, Belaramino chose a Fabian strategy
of attrition and exhaustion. To accomplish this strategy, he ordered his forces to move
the inhabitants of the region into the hills where “the Americans cannot reach us and we
can have our own government.”27 Belaramino hoped this would allow the insurgents to
maintain control of the population while denying American forces the same ability until
the Americans were forced to leave due to exhaustion and lack of progress (Lynn 2000,
279). While this strategy eventually worked against the insurgents by denying them the
ability to establish support networks and shadow governments in towns and villages, it
initially hindered American pacification efforts by denying them access to the majority of
the population.
This stalemate between the Americans and the insurgents characterized much of
the fighting during 1900. The insurgent strategy worked for the most part to deny the
Americans the ability to gain the support of the population through development

25

U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, BG Bell to AAG 27 May 1900.
U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Bell to Quarter Master, 1 Jul 1900.
27
U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, MAJ Hugh D. Wise to AG 47 INF, 5 May 1900,
1:5:340-42
26

131

programs and reducing the flow of much needed hemp and the revenues it provided.
However, the strategy began to break down in the summer of 1900 due to several
developments. The most important development was that the population, forced to leave
their homes and fields for the hills and without the revenue from the hemp trade, could
not produce enough food to sustain themselves and the insurgents. This loss of crops was
coupled with a rinderpest outbreak that killed much of the livestock in the region. In
addition, this destruction of most of the cultivated fields and storehouses outside zones of
occupation by American forces reduced the food supply. All these factors led the
population to abandon the insurgents and return to the towns (Lynn 2000, 281)
The final factor that broke the stalemate occurred during the fall of 1900 when
American forces co-opted aid of the aid of local elites and clergy who had remained in
towns. Through loyal local leaders and the clergy, American forces established local
security forces and negotiate the return of most of the population. Faced with a
diminished population and tax base, Bell had amended Kobbè’s initial order to create
civil governments with full civil services and ordered his subordinate commanders to
appoint only mayors or presidentes and police forces sufficient to maintain order28.
According to Lynn (2000, 283) the village presidente became the focal point for
defeating the insurgency. “In return for business contracts, patronage, and considerable
autonomy, he encouraged people to return to the town, recruited guides and local
auxiliary and identified insurgents” (Lynn 2000, 283). Local American commanders
armed local security forces recruited by presidentes, but were limited in their efforts
because the district and national commanders refused to authorize the official creation or
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arming of militias until the summer of 1901.29 When General Arthur MacArthur did
authorize the arming of militias, the quartermaster in Manila sent inadequate number and
kinds of weapons.30
While the use of community-based security forces produced remarkable results in
1900 and the first half of 1901, its full potential was not realized because of this lack of
external support. Higher echelon commanders continued to resist the growth of
indigenous security forces because of a mistrust of the local population’s loyalty. This
hindered efforts to create local scout units that were used in other districts as mobile
strike forces to destroy insurgent groups in their wilderness camps. By the end of 1901,
the strength of the insurgency had been broken with most of the population living in
government controlled villages. However, personnel and equipment shortages continued
to plague the Americans and prevented them from completely stamping out the last
pockets of insurgents until 1903 (Lynn 1989, 117).
While American forces and their local allies were unable to stamp out the
insurgency for several years, the counterinsurgency effort was successful measured by
several external sources. By July 1901 external examinations by the Philippine
Commission and the Army determined the two provinces of the district, Albay and
Sorsogon, to be pacified to an extent necessary to warrant transition to full civil control.
The establishment of local chapters of the Filipino Federalist Party in 1901 was also seen
as another positive development that would facilitate further defections from the
insurgent cause (United States Philippine Commission 1901, 12, 14).
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Economic and human security also increased during this period, indicating a
diminishment of the insurgency and an overall increase in security. By May 1901
security had improved to the point where U.S. Forestry officials were in place in both
districts to manage the development of the timber industry (United States Philippine
Commission 1901, 42). This led to the first harvesting and export of lumber and guttapercha rubber since the outset of hostilities (United States Philippine Commission 1901,
45). This allowed local planters to realize a return of $150-$200 per acre of rubber
plantation, up from no income generated from exports during 1899-1900 (United States
Philippine Commission 1901, 47). Improvements in security also allowed for an
expansion of modern health care in the region. Health clinics were opened in all towns
and cities and a leprosy hospital was opened in Ambos Camarines with 500 patients
admitted for treatment (United States Philippine Commission 1901, 53).
The marginalization of the insurgency by the summer of 1901, the transition to
civil government, and improvements in economic development and health care indicate
the counterinsurgency efforts in the Third District were effective. Faced with a lack of
manpower and resources, the commanders of the Third District had no other course of
action than the indigenous security forces to defeat the insurgency. In the following
sections, this case study will explore the degree this case conformed to the model
presented in this dissertation.
External Support and Oversight
As mentioned in the background discussion of the case, external support and
oversight for the community-based security efforts in the Third District were low
throughout the insurgency due to a lack of weapons and manpower. This lack of support
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is most evident in an external inspector general report that investigated the status of
efforts to raise local police and militias submitted by Major William Johnson in
November 1900.31 In his report Major Johnson found that out of the 23 towns he
inspected “In only one police post, Tabaca, Albay Province, did I find the municipal
police armed with revolvers.” Johnson found that in some other towns local
commanders had provided police officers with captured insurgent rifles or loaned arms
from their unit armories, but “the majority of the police are armed only with bolos, clubs,
daggers, or spears; some without even those useless toys.”32
Major Williams also found that while the local police had served effectively in
most areas when they were employed as guides to American Army forces or undercover
intelligence agents; many had been “wounded, some killed, by bolo men, where a
revolver would have saved them.”33 Johnson found that the police had been effective in
keeping order within the towns of the district and by doing so, made "themselves
obnoxious to the insurgents and their sympathizers to such a degree that it is unsafe for
them to be without some means of self-defense.”34 To overcome this dangerous
deficiency he reported to Army Headquarters in Manila that a minimum of 339 revolvers
were needed to make up the shortfall to equip the 366 policemen employed in the Third
District.

31

U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Inspector General (IG) report to Commander,
U.S. Forces.
32
U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Inspector General (IG) report to Commander,
U.S. Forces.
33
U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Inspector General (IG) report to Commander,
U.S. Forces.
34
U.S. National Archives, RG 395/5376, Box 2, Department of the Army 1900-1904, Inspector General (IG) report to Commander,
U.S. Forces.

135

In response to this report and repeated requests from BG Bell, the commander of
the Department of Southern Luzon relented and authorized weapons to arm the local
police. However, Bell complained that the weapons that had been promised by the
command were not delivered or in such small numbers or of the wrong type. Instead of
sending rifles or pistols as requested by Bell and recommended by Johnson, the
quartermaster sent 200 antiquated black powder shotguns. On November 27, 1900, Bell
complained in a report that these weapons were not only ineffective, but also dangerous
for the user because they were slow to load and wreathed the firer in a cloud of white
smoke that identified his firing position.35
This lack of suitable weapons severely hampered the efforts of American forces to
establish local civil governments and the efforts of presidentes to maintain control of
their communities. Colonel Joseph Dorst, one of Bell’s subordinate regimental
commanders, reported three instances in July 1900 of presidentes being threatened or
killed by insurgents because of a lack of arms and ammunition provided to the police He
further reported several cases in August 1900 of police running away from their posts
because they had no have no firearms This trend continued into the fall of 1900 with
American forces unable to secure local leaders and unable to give them sufficient arms to
defend themselves. Several reports during this period recount presidentes complaining to
American officers of insurgents threatening to kill or abduct presidentes or other
officials.36
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Conditions in the other Third District sector commanded by Colonel James
Lockett were similar to those in Colonel Dorst’s sector. Supplies were so limited that in
response to one presidente’s request for arms, COL Lockett recommended to a mayor
that he organize a police force and “turn out his people armed with bolos and go after
these marauders."37 It is unclear if the presidentes took Lockett’s advice, but facing an
enemy armed with repeating rifles with a population armed with machetes could not have
been a heartening prospect.
To make up for the lack of weapons provided by higher headquarters, several
commanders in the Third District issued captured weapons to police forces in the spring
and summer of 1900.38 The quantity of weapons lent to local police is not reported but,
according to the report submitted by Major Johnson in November 1900, the number and
quality of the weapons were deficient to adequately arm the local police forces.
To add insult to the injury of failing to provide arms for the local police, the
national command in Manila prohibited the practice of loaning weapons to local police.
The reason for this order was a fear of losing weapons to the insurgents through loss or
black-market sales. No reports of lost weapons were submitted by American forces in
the Third District, so it seems likely that this was a blanket order based off incidents in
other districts and did not reflect conditions in the Third District.
Oversight in the Third district was also very low. This was due to the limited
number of American forces in the district and conscious actions by higher headquarters.
A lack of forces was the factor that most crippled oversight. On November 8, 1900
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Colonel Lockett complained to Bell about his inability to supervise presidentes in his
sector. His ability to provide oversight was so limited that several of the presidentes in
outlying areas had to report conditions in their towns by letter and he did not have the
ability to verify their reports.39 In several cases this lack of oversight resulted in abuses
of power and criminal behavior by police forces in towns not garrisoned with US troops.
In several outlying villages police were charged with making illegal arrests and highway
robbery for either political or monetary gain.40
Unlike the Department of Northern Luzon, the Department of Southern Luzon did
not embrace the Native Scouts program, which as in other districts could have facilitated
oversight. The commander of the Department of Southern Luzon did not authorize the
Native Scout program until January 1901 and when he did it took on a form much
different from the program in Northern Luzon. Unlike the companies raised in the north
that were comprised entirely with native forces with a small cadre of American officers
and sergeants, the Native Scout program in the south was limited to one squad comprised
of one corporal and seven privates that were integrated into existing American
companies.41 This prevented the rapid expansion of security forces and the economy of
using a few American soldiers to oversee a large indigenous unit.
Overall this case demonstrates “mostly out” adherence to external oversight and
support. There was some oversight provided by commanders and even the District
Provost Judge to local judges, but there was little oversight provided to local leaders and
security forces. However, General Kobbè established a requirement for town councils to
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provide to local commanders a monthly report on collections and expenditures to prevent
misappropriations and corruption.42
This case provides an interesting example of external commands actively seeking
to limit the ability of local commanders to support indigenous security forces with arms
and equipment. While the efforts to raise local security forces was ultimately successful,
the frustrated reports of local commanders make it evident that more progress would have
been made sooner with higher levels of external support.
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction
The local security forces raised in the Third district were restricted to their
communities unless accompanied by American forces. According to Major Johnson in
his inspector general report, the authority of local police across the district was limited.
They could only operate in their jurisdiction “with authority to patrol or make arrests only
within their barrio or neighborhood.”43 While there were incidents of local security
forces abusing their power by making politically motivated arrests or robbing travelers
crossing their jurisdiction, there were no reports of them conducting extralegal activities
outside their jurisdiction. This is in stark contrast with other districts that experienced
scout units abusing populations outside of their ethnic or community boundaries.
When American forces did use local police as guides and informal scout units to
infiltrate insurgent strongholds they operated as a part of a larger American force that
could monitor their activities.44 This practice continued into 1901 with the limited use of
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Native Scouts that were integrated into larger American units and were not used as
independent elements.45
Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems
American commanders in the Third District demonstrated a high degree of
sensitivity to the use of traditional justice systems as a method to gain the trust and
compliance of the local population. This theme started with the publishing of General
Kobbè’s General Order Number 2 published in July 1899. Through this order, Kobbè
required his subordinate commanders to establish municipal councils in each town with
an elected President and “as many representatives or headmen as there may be wards or
barrios in the town.” Kobbè charged the President and town council to maintain “public
order and regulation of municipal affairs” and to “formulate rules to govern.”46 The
municipal council was also charged with establishing a police force, regulating markets
and the transfer of property.
Kobbè insisted the traditional justice systems remain in place during American
occupation. He stressed to his subordinates in a message clarifying his Order Number 2
that while he did “not wish to interfere with the methods you employ to carry out the
provisions of the order. The community under your command and entrusted to your care
has different interests and a different language from some of the others, and it may be
that the people prefer rules to which they have been accustomed and which are more or
less peculiar to their town.”47 In the version of Kobbè’s order that was posted
throughout the command the reliance on existing law was expanded to give the town
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Presidente and council “all those which in the administrative and governmental
departments were granted to him by Spanish laws in force here before August 13, 1898:
Provided always that these attributes are not incompatible with the sovereignty of the
United States and do not conflict with the orders of the military authority.”48 Perhaps out
of the necessity created by manpower shortages which prevented the enforcement of a
new legal system, Kobbè chose to incorporate the existing legal system that had been in
place for over three hundred years and was therefore familiar to the population.
Due to the removal of Spanish judges after the defeat of the Spanish, Kobbè’s
order expanded the role of the local councils by giving them judicial authority using
Spanish law as a framework for civil cases and limited authority for criminal cases with
military oversight (Kobbè 1899). Kobbè allowed mayors to act as justices of the peace to
execute civil legal matters and administer fines and punishments for minor crimes in
accordance with local customs.49 “In accordance with local custom” Presidentes were
also allowed to establish the price of fines and levy fines for minor offenses such a failure
to maintain adhere to local sanitation codes.50
The Third District case demonstrated a high degree of membership with the
incorporation of traditional justice factor. It is unclear if this was done out of a desire to
preserve local traditions or because a lack of manpower prevented the imposition of a
new justice system in the district. In either case, the decision to maintain the existing
legal code allowed local leaders to quickly establish control with a minimum of
confusion or conflict with the local population.
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Local Sustainability and Accountability
The Third District also exhibited a high degree of membership with the factor of
local sustainability and accountability. In addition to maintaining traditional justice
systems, Kobbè’s Order Number 2 also stressed that local government and security forces
should be funded by local sources such as “the proceeds of taxes, license fees, market
rents, etc.” and that salaries and the size of government could only expand with the
“increase with the prosperity of the population of the place.”51
After a local government was established in a village, Kobbè and Bell dictated
that their subordinates allow the presidente and council to set rates for taxation and
salaries for municipal employees and approving other expenditures. Under the
supervision of American commanders, the town councils adjusted prescribed salary for
mayors to fit local budget and established number of police desired to maintain security
in areas not garrisoned by American soldiers.52 In areas that could not raise funds
sufficient to pay for a security force did not get one.53
The American leaders increased local accountability by requiring the inclusion of
community social and religious leaders in decision making. To prevent Presidentes and
town councils from abusing their positions and setting up an unsustainable taxation
regime, “the Presidente of each town had to call together the head men of the barrios and
with such a council to consider the subject of taxation.”54 These community leaders also
had input on setting taxation levels and setting the pay of mayors, police, and teachers
and setting the number and rank of local police forces.
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The final measure of local control and accountability was inadvertent. Since the
commanders of the Department of Southern Luzon and National commanders resisted the
creation of Native Scout units until June of 1901 and then limited them to a subordinate
role within American units, the potential to use indigenous security units outside their
social or ethnic boundaries were severely limited (War Department 1901, 75). By not
creating mobile units that were funded and commanded by external entities, American
forces created indigenous forces that were limited to operating within their traditional
boundaries.
In summary, the Third District exhibited a high degree of adherence to local
control and sustainability. This was due to external and internal factors. Local
commanders were unable to oversee and sustain community-based security forces due to
limited manpower and other resources. Village presidentes and councils were forced to
create security forces that could be sustained by local economies. Lacking external
support, local security forces were obligated to gain the trust and support of local
communities that paid their salaries. The determination of the size and composition of
local security forces were determined by a bottom up process that included not only
elected officials, but also local religious and social community leaders. This created a
security system that while suffering from some abuses of power did not experience the
more frequent and serious depredations that occurred in other districts.
Voluntary Participation by Local Elites
The Third District demonstrated a high degree of adherence to the factor of
voluntary participation of local elites. The degree of adherence to this factor was
determined in the most part by the lack of manpower and resources as with this case’s
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adherence to the other factors in the model. Due to the inability of American
commanders to supervise each village or directly incentivize cooperation with the
American occupation forces, they were forced to incentivize participation of local elites
by indirect methods. American commanders did this in several ways.
American commanders gave local leaders wide latitude in governing their
communities. Local leaders could set the terms of local trading contracts for hemp and
other goods that were the source of external funds in their communities. They were also
able to establish reward for their supporters with government contracts and other forms of
political patronage. This process was a double-edged sword. Local leaders were able to
provide direct economic and political benefit for themselves and their supporters, but
were then directly accountable for the behavior of their communities. Once they had
enjoyed the benefits of collaboration with the Americans, they were forced to assist in the
defeat of insurgent forces.
American commanders also increased the prestige of local leaders in the eyes of
the population using the limited means they had available. In many cases this involved
bringing district and national commanders and political elites to meet with local elites to
increase the perception among the populace of the patronage afforded to their local
leaders. In other cases, it involved providing passes for travel outside village boundaries
to supports or local politicians and clergy.
The final technique used to gain the support of local elites was the suppression of
their rivals through coercive means. In several cases local leaders arrested and jailed
individuals and groups in opposition to local elites. In other instances, contracts and
trade agreements were denied to opposition leaders to weaken them financially.
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Early in the American occupation of the Third District, American commanders
delegated the issuance of passes to move outside of communities to Presidents and
Priests. Mayors were empowered to issue passes to inhabitants that allowed them to
move between communities. COL Dorst, one of the two regimental commanders in the
district realized that this increased the prestige of the mayors, but also “made them
responsible for the good conduct of their citizens.” 55 If local leaders vouched for
inhabitants who abused the privilege of their travel pass, the local leaders would be held
accountable and possibly lose their privileged position in the new Filipino government.
General Bell increased this codependent relationship by requiring each member of
local councils to maintain order within their neighborhood and allowed them to hire
assistants to assist in these duties. In most cases the local tribal headman of the town or
some other powerful local would be designated by the local leaders of the town council
as the vice-president of the town and the Lieutenant of Police.56 The powers of the
lieutenant of police were based on existing Spanish law, but were also bolstered by the
informal social power possessed by the individual.
This not only shifted responsibility for compliance to the local headmen, but them
complicit because they were to enforce American imposed laws, which forced them to
punish citizens found to be in violation. As one officer in the Third District, James
Parker, noted this practice also had the secondary effect of promoting the compliance
with American edicts by the population (Parker, 352). This occurred because citizens
could give insurgents the excuse that they would be punished by their presidente if they
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did not follow American imposed laws. This shifted the blame off them and onto local
leaders who could rely on some degree of protect by American forces or the local police.
American commanders worked diligently to co-opt the informal power of the
Roman Catholic clergy of the region. As General Bell noted, “If the priest can be made
to come back to his house and live the natives will follow and remain quiet.”57 At the
start of the insurgency the local clergy supported the insurgency and in most cases fled to
the hills with their parishioners. As the hardships of living outside of villages increased
in 1900 many clergy returned to their churches as the population trickled back to their
communities. Local commanders sought to co-opt the power of the priests by including
them into the process of establishing civil governments. The most concrete of these
methods included allowing the priests veto power in the selection of members of the
security forces.58 Providing them with this power offered them some ownership in the
process, but also made them complicit in the use of the local security forces to maintain
order and combat the insurgency.
Local commanders also afforded the clergy privileges that they could use to lure
the remainder of their followers back to their villages.59 In return for medical support,
passes for parishioners, and interceding on the behalf of parishioners in legal matters, the
clergy preached accommodation to American policies, verification of reliable inhabitants,
and building relationships between the Americans and the local population. According to
John Schumacher, while at the outset of the insurgency there was widespread support of
the insurgent cause, as American resolve to remain in the Philippines and the fruits of
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collaboration became apparent, the clergy in Albay and Sorsogon largely switched sides
and accommodated American occupation (Schumacher 1982, 174).
In several cases American commanders also played the civil government against
the local clergy to increase the power of one of the groups depending on which side could
benefit the American cause the most. According to Colonel Dorst, he often transferred
powers between groups to increase the power of the local Presidente. These practices
included giving local Presidentes the power to marry couples in civil ceremonies and
officiate at other ceremonies usually reserved for the recalcitrant clergy in his area of
operations.60
Local commanders also used other methods to undercut the power of local
governments through economic and judicial means. In several cases local commanders
denied lucrative contracts to individuals seen to be potential supporters of the insurgency.
Local commanders also used their power of arrest and military trial to remove individuals
who attempted to undercut the power of local mayors by imprisoning them or
confiscating their property.61 While this practice does not seem to have been widespread,
the example provided by the imprisonment of a few rival local elites would have had
chilling effect on others who may have opposed American occupation.
One of the more creative, cost effective, and widespread practices used to co-opt
local elites was the use of official visits and the conferring symbols of official power.
Local commanders frequently used inexpensive methods such as arranging visits with
national military and political leaders like the head of the Philippine Commission,
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William Howard Taft, to build the prestige of local leaders. Local commanders also
boosted the prestige of local leaders by providing them with American security escorts
while they travelled between towns (Parker 1929, 356). This practice also created a
visible link between the powers of local leaders to their relationship with the American
occupation (Parker 1929, 354). This method was also employed by BG Bell who used
his visits to increase local leaders “prestige and influence among the natives.”62 In each
of these visits Bell would make a conscious effort to identify local leaders and extoll their
virtues to the gathered villagers. Bell also bestowed local mayors with batons and badges
of honor and blessings from the local priest to enhance their power and prestige among
the local population.63
American commanders also used economic incentives to gain the support of local
elites. In some cases, this meant empowering local leaders to organize public works
projects and supporting these efforts with material and logistical support (Parker 1929,
357). In other cases, the economic support to local elites was more direct. By controlling
the major ports in the district, American forces controlled the export of hemp, the main
export crop of the region. MG Otis, the overall commander in the Philippines in 1900,
allowed elites with ties with the insurgency to trade their hemp because of political
pressure from America to maintain the hemp supply. He also allowed this trade to
continue not only because of political pressure from home, but because it tied elites to the
U.S. government. He credited this with a shift in sentiment from local elites in support of
the American (Sibley 2007, 135).
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This practice was also extended to the local level. American commanders
allowed Presidentes to restrict the hemp trade to benefit their followers by barring certain
buyers and allowing their followers to set prices for hemp and rice. In 1901, members of
the nascent Federal party accused, who in many cases were in opposition to the sitting
local councils, accused the Presidentes of several cities of recommending to American
forces that they blockade villages that opposed the local Presidente by claiming they
were insurgents.64
Empowering local presidentes also appears to have retarded the growth of party
politics in the district. In 1901 the Federal party established eight local committees in
Albay, eight in Ambios Camarines, and two in Sorsogon in the first six months of 1901,
but these local party committees did not seem to have much power over the population
(United States Philippine Commission 1901, 165). Unlike in other districts the Federal
party was not able to broker the surrender of insurgents or arms during entire period to
Federal Party committees in 1901 (United States Philippine Commission 1901, 166-167).
This suggests that most local elites did not join the party because they were already in
positions of power and did not need the party to gain access to power as elites in other
districts did.
Conclusion
While the case of the Third District, Department of Southern Luzon did not
demonstrate a decisive defeat of insurgent forces because American forces could never
gain the manpower necessary to root out the insurgents in their jungle hideouts, it was a
success and does demonstrate the importance of using community-based security forces
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in counterinsurgency. Much of the use of these forces was out of necessity. BG Kobbè
and his successor BG Bell could barely sustain the forces they had in the district and were
denied the resources they needed to expand their offensive operations, so they were
forced to rely on local elites to raise local security forces. Additionally, this case was not
influenced to the degree of other Philippine Insurrection cases by outside events such as
the surrender of national insurgent leaders which had little effect on the intensity of the
insurgency.
As depicted in Table 5, this case study highlights the inverse relationship between
the factor of external support and oversight and the factor of gaining the voluntary
support of local elites when attempting to use community-based security forces.
Throughout the period covered in this case study, the Department of Southern Luzon and
the national command failed to support efforts of local commanders to field communitybased security forces by withholding the arms and funds. The limited supply of arms and
equipment prevented American commanders from using indigenous forces to augment
the limited number of American troops in an offensive role or to free up American forces
from static defensive roles. This lengthened the duration of the insurgency, but also
created community-based security forces that relied on popular local support.
Despite limited external support, American commanders in the Third District
were successful in coopting local elites and using the influence of elites to raise and
regulate local security forces as shown in Table 5. Due to limited sources of supply and
funding, American leaders relied on the use of intangible and indirect sources of power
such as building the prestige of local elites and providing them the ability to control local
economic activity to co-opt local elites. The use of intangible sources of power coupled
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with granting local elites with a high level of decision making authority to regulate their
communities and dispense available resources, American commanders provided elites
with the tools necessary to recruit community-based security forces. Using these
methods, American commanders expanded their control over the population while
expending small amounts of resources.
As shown in Table 5, by necessity American commanders also demonstrated high
levels of adherence to the factors of local accountability and traditional justice systems.
American commanders granted local leaders and clergy wide latitude in organizing their
communities and regulating the lives of the population. Again, out of necessity,
American commanders also retained traditional justice systems and included mechanisms
to ensure a security forces a level of accountability to the local populace by including
local social leaders and allowing clergy the ability to veto the membership of police
recruits. Due to limited manpower and resources, American commanders chose to leave
the existing legal codes in place as a means of gaining popular support for the new local
governments because retaining those exiting legal systems required the least amount of
oversight by American forces. Additionally, limited external funding required all
functions of local government, including the provisioning of security, to be sustainable by
the local tax base. Throughout the district, American commanders allowed local leaders
to decide the level of taxation their communities could bear and the number of security
personnel based off that calculation and the local security threat.
American commanders demonstrated a high degree of adherence to the factor of
limited territorial jurisdiction (see Table 5). First, out of a lack of resources they could
not equip most mobile Native Scouts. Second, they were prevented from raising majority
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indigenous scout companies by their higher headquarters that insisted on integrating
small numbers of scouts into existing Army units. The effect of both constraints was the
limiting of community-based security forces within their communal boundaries.
While the conclusion of the insurrection in the Third District was not marked with
a defeat of insurgents in a climactic battle, the piecemeal surrender of insurgents in the
period of 1901-1902 and the end of insurgent activity by 1903 marks this case as a
successful counterinsurgency operation. Additionally, the increase in economic activity
and improvement in healthcare across the district indicates an improvement in security.
In addition to providing an example of the relative importance of community-based
security forces in the outcome of a counterinsurgency campaign, the case of the Third
District also demonstrates a possible inverse relationship between levels of external
support and oversight and the other factors in presented in the model.
Table 5.
Membership of Third District, DSL with Community-Based Security Variables.
Variable/Membership Fully In Mostly
More In
More Out
Mostly Out
In
Than Out Than In
External Support and
Oversight
Limits to territorial
jurisdiction
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System
Local sustainability
and accountability
Voluntary
participation by local
elites

X
X
X

X
X
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Fully Out

CHAPTER VII - BEFRIEND AND DEFEND:
The U.S. Marine Combined Action Program Vietnam, 1965-1971
Introduction
This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces by the
United States (U.S.) Marines in Vietnam from August 1965 until May 1971. Following a
brief overview of the entry of the U.S Marines into the Vietnam War, then this chapter
will provide a chronological overview of the establishment and evolution of the
Combined Action Program. During this overview of the program, this chapter will
include a discussion the organization of the program, the training provided to Marine
participants in the program, and the internal and external factors that influenced it. Next,
after the pertinent details of the Combined Action Program are presented, this case study
will include a detailed discussion of the degree of membership the case demonstrates for
each factor presented in this dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with
a summation of the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of
membership matrix. This case study will demonstrate that the Combined Action Program
was highly successful given its limited scope and demonstrated high degrees of
membership with several of the model’s factors
To avoid confusion, this case study uses several terms and acronyms that need to
be defined before proceeding. The Combined Action Program, the program employed
by the U.S. Marines in Vietnam to secure the Vietnamese population by partnering
Marine squads with local militias, will be referred to either by its full name or as “the
program.” The main component of the program, the Combined Action Platoon, will be
referred to as CAP. The Third Marine Expeditionary Force or III MEF was the overall
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command for Marine Forces in the northern section of the Republic of South Vietnam
that was designated as the I Corps Tactical Zone or I Corps. I Corps comprised the
provinces of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai (Hemingway 1994, 2).
A Marine Lieutenant General commanded III MEF and shared joint responsibility for
security in I Corps with an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Major General.
The III MEF Commander controlled all U.S. Marine forces in I Corps and the ARVN I
Corps commander controlled all South Vietnamese security forces in I Corps including
irregular forces such as the Popular Force (PF) village militias that partnered with the
Marines in CAPs.
While this case demonstrates a degree of membership with all the factors in this
dissertation’s model, this case also highlights the importance of external oversight
support and oversight and local sustainability when attempting to use community-based
security forces. Throughout the existence of the Combined Action Program, the Marines
operated the program using manpower and equipment available to them, but had no
additional support from the U.S. Military Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV). The
Marines of III MEF also were forced to limit the scope of the program because of their
requirement by MACV to conduct large conventional unit actions in support of General
William C. Westmoreland’s attrition strategy. This lack of external support diminished
the overall effectiveness of the program because manpower shortages limited the combat
power of individual CAPs and prevented Marine commanders from establishing a large
network of interconnected CAP protected villages in I Corps.
While limited external resources hindered expansion of the program, the sustained
and intensive oversight by Marine squads produced an impressive increase in overall
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security and development in villages participating in the program. While controlling for
inflation in the U.S. reporting systems, PF platoons participating in the program
improved at a higher rate than un-partnered PF platoons and were able to provide security
for their villages after the Marines moved to another village.
The Marines participating in the program also demonstrated high levels of
adherence to the factors of local accountability and voluntary participation by local
leaders. Due to the dual command structure in I Corps, the Marines did not command the
PF platoons in the program. This required Marine leaders to cooperate and share
leadership responsibilities with PF and village leadership to conduct any operations.
While the overall U.S. strategy in Vietnam ended in failure, the Combined Action
Program was a success. Given the limited scope of the program, it brought sustained
security to 20 percent of the villages and over 400,000 inhabitants in the I Corps region
(Southard 2014, 10). Over 93 PF platoons assumed sole security for their villages and
none of the villages defended by these platoons reverted back to Viet Cong control during
the duration of the program (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970).
Background
In 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered the 1st Marine Expeditionary
Brigade to Vietnam with the mission of defending airbases at Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu
Lai, which were being used to fly bombing missions in North Vietnam and in support of
ARVN forces (Walt 1970, 25). In August 1965, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Taylor,
the Marine battalion commander was charged with securing ten square miles surrounding
Phu Bai Air Base (Kopets 2002). Taylor, with a battalion of approximately 900 Marines
and without knowledge of the local population or terrain, had to provide a defensive
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perimeter deep enough to prevent indirect fires from mortars in a heavily populated area.
The population of the area lived in six villages, each comprised of a main village and
several satellite villages. In response to the battalion’s manpower and intelligence
limitations, Taylor and his staff looked to an underutilized source of manpower, the six
Popular Forces (PF) platoons that ostensibly defended each village (Gortzak 2014, 138;
Thomas C. Thayer 1977, 33; and Walt 1970, 105).
The PF, founded by the Saigon government in 1955 as a civil guard and
integrated into the regular security force command structure in 1964, were charged with
securing the area around their village and if needed to assist regular Army of South
Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers to combat larger Viet Cong or North Vietnam Army (NVA)
formations (Zappia 2004). While PFs comprised as much as half of the reported
manpower of ARVN, they were at the bottom of the hierarchy of prestige in the South
Vietnamese security forces. They were poorly equipped, trained and led (Walt 1970,
105). PF’s organization was simple. The largest PF formation was a 35-man platoon.
Each platoon was led by a sergeant and all other members of the platoon were privates.
PF members were paid a small monthly stipend by the government, but were part time
soldiers with normal village jobs (Peterson 1989, 23).
Seen by most South Vietnamese as a way to avoid conscription in the army and
stay at home, the PF avoided combat with the Viet Cong if possible. However, PF units
suffered from casualty rates twice as high as regular ARVN units and a corresponding
high desertion rate (Corson 1968, 178 and Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 5, 14).
Their level of effectiveness was so low that in 1969 the MACV commander General
Creighton Abrams complained that PF platoons “couldn’t fight their way out of a paper
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sack!” (Gortzak 2014, 142). Despite these shortcomings, Lt. Col. Taylor and his staff
recognized that what PF did possess, knowledge of the local human and geographical
terrain, was what the Marines lacked.
Lt. Col. Taylor envisioned that Marines could teach the PF combat skills and
improve their aggressiveness by example and with Marines access to firepower and
medical evacuation if a PF member was wounded. The pairing of units was relatively
easy. The 36-man PF platoons were organized into three squads of eleven men and a
three-man headquarters element and 15-man Marine squads were divided into three, fourman fire teams with a three-man headquarters element. This allowed each Marine fire
team to pair with a PF squad. (Walt 1970, 106).
Taylor integrated six of his rifle squads with the six PF platoons over the month
of August 1965 (Kopets 2002 and Klyman 1986). In the plan devised by Captain John J.
Mullin, Taylor’s civil affairs officer and local liaison officer, a Marine squad would live
full time with the PF platoon in a village complex (Peterson 1989, 23). This would allow
the Marines to provide constant mentorship of the PF platoon and to become familiar
with the social structure of the village. The initial experiment using three Marine squads
near the Phu Bai Air Base was a success and Taylor expanded to the planned six
combined platoons. Attacks on the air base originating from those villages ceased and
Viet Cong influence in the villages decreased to undetectable levels (Corson 1968, 178)
The senior Marine commander of III Marine Amphibious Force and I Corps,
Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Lewis Walt, along with Fleet Marine Force Pacific
Commander, Lieutenant General Victor “Brute” Krulak, believed that securing the
population and denying the Viet Cong access to villages was the only realistic method to
157

achieve victory in Vietnam. Based on their study of Marine operations building local
security forces in Central America prior to World War II and apprised of the experiment
at Phu Bai, Walt and Krulak saw Combined Action with the PF as an economical method
to achieve population security while continuing to follow General William
Westmoreland's large unit “search and destroy” strategy (Walt 1970, 29 and Corson
1968, 175). They also believed that raising the effectiveness of the PF would provide a
credible local security force that could provide sustainable security after the Marines had
left. In essence, the Marines sought to “work themselves out of a job” by clearing an area
of communist influence and leaving behind a competent security force that would allow
for the phased withdrawal of U.S forces in Vietnam (Gortzak 2014 and Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific 1967, 7).
After studying the initial successful test of the Combined Action Platoon concept
in late 1965, General Walt moved forward with a plan to expand the program. The first
step of this plan was to establish Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) for each of the
Marine infantry units in I Corps. The unit responsible for a TAOR was tasked with
securing the population in these areas, dismantling the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI),
and expanding the reach of the South Vietnamese government. As U.S. involvement in
Vietnam expanded, these TAORs enlarged to include over half of the 2.7 million people
living in the I Corps area of responsibility (Corson 1968, 175). Marine units in each of
these TAORs would be responsible for providing Marine squads to partner with local PF
forces while maintaining adequate forces available to combat large VC and NVA units.
Lt. Gen. Walt expanded the program in 1966 from Phu Bai to the other two
original air base enclaves. In January 1966, Walt reached an agreement with the ARVN
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I Corps Commander, Major General Nguyen Chanh Thi, to release six PF platoons near
the Da Nang Airbase for the program (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 33-34).
According to the agreement, Marines would not command PF units and employment and
unit operations would be taken only as cooperative actions.
Despite the initial success, General William Westmoreland, the overall
commander of U.S. military forces in Vietnam refused to support the program as it did
not fit into his attritional warfare strategy. This meant that Marine commanders in the
period of 1965 to 1968 would have to man CAP squads from their own units without
receiving replacements to keep their regular units at full strength (Corson 1968, 178).
Despite the cost, the program continued to expand in 1966 with forty-nine platoons
operating around the three airbases (Corson 1968, 179).
Another impediment to the program occurred in the first half of 1966 when
ARVN commanders temporarily suspended expansion of the program. To relieve regular
ARVN forces from static security duties and combatting Viet Cong units, ARVN
commanders moved PF platoons out of their villages and used them to provide security
for district headquarters and as assault troops to attack Viet Cong strongholds. The
decision proved disastrous with over 40,000 PF members or 25 percent of the force
deserting in 1966. In comparison, no desertions were recorded for CAP PF units during
this timeframe (Klyman 1986, 6). Internal South Vietnamese government power
struggles and a resulting ARVN command changes coupled with pressure from Lt. Gen.
Walt reversed the decision and PF forces were no longer used outside of their villages by
June 1966 (Corson 1968, 178). During the period after this agreement was reached the
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program continued to expand on a provisional basis with 41 CAPs established in the
remainder of 1966 (Peterson 1989, 32).
In February 1967, Walt and Krulak were unhappy with the uncoordinated nature
of the program, but pleased with the performance of the platoons (Peterson 1989, 32).
They directed Walt’s subordinate, Major General Nickerson, the 1st Marine Division
commander, to appoint Lieutenant Colonel William R. Corson as the first director of the
provisional Combined Action Group to coordinate the employment and support of CAPs
for the entire I Corps (Corson 1968, 180).
To further ensure the survival of the program after he relinquished command at
the end of 1967, on May 4, 1967 General Walt routed a memorandum through General
Krulak to the Commandant of the Marine Corps requesting a formal adoption of the
Combined Action Program. This resulted in the official incorporation of the program
into the Marine Corps force structure and allowed the program to have its own Table of
Organization, allowing it to be formally allocated personnel and equipment (Peterson
1989, 39). It is interesting to note that this request travelled through Marine Corps
administrative channels and not MACV, which was commanded by General
Westmoreland who continued withhold support for the program. Through the remainder
of the program all personnel and equipment allocations came from the Marine Corps
budget and not from MACV (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 25)
The second half of 1967 saw further expansion and organization of the program.
Corson formalized the “CAP school” at Da Nang that provided Marines selected for the
program with two weeks of training on cultural awareness, language training, and small
unit combat skills (Peterson 1989 and Southard 2014, 24). While the program expanded
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to 75 platoons in 1967 and became more of a drain on Marine battalions, III MEF
assumed formal command of the program in October 1967, removing command and
support requirements from subordinate units, and placing the program under the direct
supervision of the III MAF deputy commanding general (Thomas C. Thayer 1977, 33 and
Peterson 1989, 47).
During this period, a CAP chain of command was created that assisted in control
of the platoons, but also coordination with the parallel Vietnamese chain of command.
The Combined Action Force (CAF) command, headed by a colonel was created to
oversee the entire program. Under the CAF, four Combined Action Groups (CAGs) were
created to synchronize Marine CAP actions with ARVN provincial-level management of
the PF platoons. Beneath the CAGs were Combined Action Companies (CACOs).
CACOs would coordinate with district chiefs. Since district chiefs exercised direct
control of PF platoons, CACOs allowed sustained U.S. input in the employment and
management of PF platoons (Peterson 1989, 69). This organizational model would
remain largely unchanged for the rest of the war.
1968 marked a year of extreme trial and change for the program. While the CAPs
performed a peripheral role in largely urban fighting of the Tet offensive of 1968, CAPs
caused several delays in the movement of NVA units into their attack positions and
correspondingly suffered proportionally heavy casualties (Southard 2014, 13). The losses
caused by the Tet offensive caused Marine leaders to order a shift in tactics for all the
CAPs. To reduce the vulnerability of CAPs to attack from large communist formations,
the CAF commander, Colonel Byron Brady dictated that all CAPs would be “mobile”
(Peterson 1989, 60 and III Marine Amphibious Force 1970). Instead of being tied to
161

fixed defenses in the village, CAPs would have no fixed base and would continually
move between satellite villages in the hamlet system. The intent of this change would be
not only to reduce the vulnerability of the platoons by creating a moving target, but also
to prevent Viet Cong access to villages by making a moving screen of ambushes around
the villages.
This change of tactics proved to be controversial among CAP veterans. The
debate over this change revolved around the purpose of the program, to kill the enemy or
to provide security for the population. Corson, who had rotated back to the United States
in late 1967, believed it undercut one of the purposes of the platoons, to create a visible
symbol of pacification and government control as well as providing a location of refuge
for local leaders (Peterson 1989, 60-61). The military results of the mobile CAP concept
were convincing. According to III MEF briefings the number of CAP casualties went
down while the number of enemy killed increased (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970).
While destruction of the enemy increased, population security and connection with the
local population demonstrated by civic action programs decreased after 1968 (Peterson
1989, 62). The reduction of civic action was mitigated somewhat by an increased
interaction with more villagers because the platoon rested in different villages when not
patrolling during the day (Klyman 1986, 10).
While the Tet offensive was a temporary shock to the U.S. military, Marine
commanders continued to support the program. By the end of 1968 III MEF had
expanded the program to 114 CAPs. At its high-water mark, CAPs provided security for
over 400,000 villagers or almost 15 percent of the population in I Corps (Brush 1994).
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1969 saw the sustainment of the program at 114 CAPs and a high operational
tempo with almost 145,000 patrols and ambushes reported for the year (Peterson 1989,
67). However, 1969 also brought the Nixon Administration’s plan of “Vietnamization”
of the conflict and a corresponding reduction of U.S. forces. In 1970 and 1971 the
Marine contributions to CAPs were reduced in proportion to reductions in conventional
forces (Southard 2014, 29-30).
Several inter-service conflicts arose during this period as the U.S. Army focused
its efforts on pacification, sought to unify command and reduce duplication of effort. In
March 1970 the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), an
agency subordinate to MACV sought to gain control of the CAPs by arguing that they
duplicated other CORDS efforts (Hemingway 1994, 11). While the CAPs were reduced,
the Marines sought to stave off outside control of the program by using existing Marine
unites to fill the gaps created by troop reductions. In 1970 the Marines created the
Infantry Company Intensified Pacification Program, later renamed Combined Unit
Pacification Program that paired conventional Marine squads with PF platoons
(Hemingway 1994, 13). While it is unclear how effective these units were, they did not
receive any special training prior to partnering with PF platoons. By 11 May 1971 the
final CAG and all its subordinate units were deactivated and one month later the final
Marine brigade left Vietnam.
While the U.S. lost the Vietnam War and failed to implement an effective overall
strategy to defeat the communist insurgency in Vietnam, the Combined Action Program
was successful. The Marines documented the program and subsequent historical analysis
and interviews with participants makes the task of measuring the effectiveness of the
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program relatively easy. To attempt to measure the effectiveness of the program, this
case study will focus on the ability of the CAPs to provide physical security to the
population participating in the program as the main measure of effectiveness. Other
measures of effectiveness this case study uses are the ability for the Viet Cong to recruit
in program villages, numbers of Viet Cong killed by CAPs compared to un-partnered PF
platoons, and improvements in the quality of life in villages under the protection of
CAPs.
One of the most important successes of the program came in the form of sustained
population control. The first stage of this process for the Marines was to gain an
understanding of the number and location of the population. Marine CAP squads were
able to conduct accurate censuses of their villages and monitor the movement of people
faster than PF platoons not in the program. This practice proved to be effective in
reducing the ability of the Viet Cong to recruit from the population. Corson (1968, 185)
reported that in 1967 that only one tenth of one percent or approximately 170 of the
170,000-people living in CAP villages could not be accounted for by the Marines. If
enemy strength estimates of nearly 40,000 in I Corps during this period were correct,
Corson proposed that CAP efforts must have put a strain on their recruiting efforts
(Corson 1968, 185)
The program allowed the Marines to secure a large portion of the population with
little expenditure of Marine manpower. At the height of the program in March 1970,
over 425,000 people or 85% of the population in I Corps living in 810 hamlets were
protected by CAPs or PF platoons formerly paired with Marine squads (III Marine
Amphibious Force 1970, 6 and Southard 2014, 27). This was accomplished by a force of
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approximately 2000 Marines and Navy Corpsmen and 3000 PF soldiers (III Marine
Amphibious Force 1970, 1).
While estimating the number of Viet Cong killed is relatively easy to calculate, it
is more difficult to determine the effectiveness of the CAPs in removing Viet Cong
Infrastructure (VCI) or the support structures and “shadow government” installed by the
communists in most contested villages. In many areas, the VCI had operated since at
least the founding of the National Liberation Front in 1960 and many villages PF leaders
reached informal non-aggression agreements with local VC commanders. Kopets (2002)
and Peterson (1989) argue that the program was less effective than advertised by the
Marines. Interviews with CAP veterans support this thesis (Peterson 1989, 89).
The CAPs were highly effective in neutralizing armed Viet Cong presence in
villages. According to III MEF reporting in 1969, CAPs comprised thirteen percent of
the PF platoons in the I Corps Area of Operation, but accounted for 36 percent of the
enemy killed and 49 percent of weapons captured by PF platoons. Combined Action
Platoons accounted for 17 percent of the total communist casualties claimed by all units
in III MEF from 1966 to 1970, while comprising less than 2 percent of Marine personnel
assigned to III MEF. Additionally, the CAP kill ratio (enemy killed compared to friendly
dead) was 14:1 and the PF average in I Corps was 3:1(III Marine Amphibious Force
1970, 10 and Thayer 1977, 31).
While Kopets and Peterson are probably correct that the CAPs were unable to
completely dismantle the VCI in their villages, the CAPs did make it difficult for Viet
Cong agents in the VCI to conduct their operations. This assertion is supported from
several sources. In 1969, independent South Vietnamese public opinion surveys in 30
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CAP villages reported that the people in these villages felt more secure with a CAP
operating in their area. (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 13). Also, anecdotal
evidence from several CAP reports of local officials moving back to their homes in
villages and hamlets and of local elections and censuses being conducted by the
government of South Vietnam without interference from the Viet Cong indicate that the
population had less fear of VCI activities after the implementation of the program (III
Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 4). Finally, there are several instances of entire hamlets
moving into areas protected by CAPs that suggest villagers sought to escape areas where
the VCI was able to operate with impunity (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 16 and
Klyman 1986).
In addition to improving physical security in the participating villages, CAPs also
improved local governance, another measure of overall human security. In January 1967,
MACV instituted the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), an automated program designed
to compile and analyze the state of pacification efforts in rural South Vietnam (The
Simulmatics Company 1968, 9) The HES compiled 140 monthly and quarterly indicators
that measured the status of areas of security and governance ranging from the presence
and activity of friendly and enemy security forces, police, and civil administration,
education, and local economic activity (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009, 340). The HES rated
hamlets in these categories on a scale of 1 through 5 with five being the highest rating of
full government control or economic development (Sorely 1999, 71). While not a perfect
measure of security, governance, and economic activity, it provides a method to compare
hamlets participating the Combined Action Program with those that were not.
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In 1967, after only a year of participating in the program, the average security
score for CAP hamlets was nearly twice that of the average security score in I Corps.
The CAP hamlet score on the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was 2.95 out of 5 and the
I Corps average was 1.6. CAP PF forces improved twice as fast as un-partnered platoons
and local governance also improved (Thayer 1977, 33). Also in 1967, 93 percent of
villages with CAPs had elected village councils compared to 29 percent in non-CAP
villages. Over 80 of village chiefs in CAP villages felt secure enough to sleep in their
homes, while less than 20 of village chiefs in non-CAP villages felt safe enough to do so.
Even after the Tet offensive of 1968 disrupted security across I Corps, CAP hamlets
continued to outperform other hamlets in most indicators with CAP hamlet HES scores
increasing by an average of .17 and non-CAP hamlets decreasing by an average of .34
points after the communist attacks (Corson 1968, 186).
The program also facilitated an improvement in other aspects of human security,
including access to healthcare and sanitary sources of water. During the duration of the
program, CAP Navy corpsmen provided over four million medical treatments and trained
over 9,000 villagers in basic medical care (Brush 1994). Additionally, the Marine squads
assigned to the program provided access to U.S. development aid and facilitated
development projects generated and undertaken by the population of the hamlets. This
not only increased ownership of the programs, but also directed aid toward areas of need
identified by the inhabitants.
Another indicator of the success of the program is the view of the Viet Cong
about the program. In several captured documents VC leaders indicated to their superiors
and adjacent commanders that they were frustrated by how CAPs limited their
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movements with captured documents warning other VC units that “You could not move
anywhere because the Marines were always in the way” (Schwartz 1999, 66). To remove
the threat posed by the CAPs to their freedom of movement and access to the population
VC and NVA commanders attacked several CAPs with battalions to remove the threat
(Klyman 1986). If the program had been ineffective, it is doubtful the VC would have
warned their commanders about the problem or expended the resources to destroy them.
The final measure of the success of the program comes from military commanders
and counterinsurgency experts. Most of these military professionals supported the
program and lauded its benefits. According to General Walt, the commander of III MEF
from 1965 to 1968 and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1968 to 1971,
claimed in his memoirs that “no other US program in the Vietnam War as successful, as
lasting in effect, or as useful a tool for the future” (Walt 1970, 105). This sentiment is
echoed by noted counterinsurgency expert Sir Roger Thompson who studied the program
as an advisor to MACV in the mid-1960s and commented that, “the use of CAPs is quite
the best idea I have seen in Vietnam, and it worked superbly” (Andrew F. Krepinevich
1986, 174). In addition to these positive evaluations of the program the most positive
endorsement of the value of the program came from ARVN commanders in I Corps.
During the American troop reductions in 1970, the ARVN I Corps commander told the
III MEF Chief of Staff, “I don’t care what else you do, but please don’t take the CAPs”
(Klyman 1986, 15).
The Combined Action Program was not without problems. All the available
literature and interviews with CAP participants negatively critique the limited training
CAP Marines received upon entering the program, the limited Vietnamese language skills
168

of the Marines, and an uneven selection process. A survey of Marine participants in the
CAP reported that they felt training was weakest teaching Marines Vietnamese culture
and how to gain the acceptance of villagers and their participation in the program
(Campbell 1968, 37). Additionally, the overall CAP program suffered from a lack of a
unified plan to place CAPs in an interlocking and mutually supporting network of
villages to create the “oil spot” effect described in classic counterinsurgency theory
(Krepinevich 1986, 173 and Brush 1994). Despite these limitations and a lack of support
from MACV throughout the life of the program, the program was successful my all
objective measures. In the following section, this case study will examine the level of
adherence to the factors of the model the Combined Action Program exhibited.
External Support and Oversight
The Combined Action Program demonstrated a high degree of external oversight
and support in the form of the embedded Marine squads at the village level and oversight
from III MEF leadership. Embedding Marines with the PF platoons allowed for
sustained and intensive interaction with the PF. Oversight by the III MEF leadership
provided the program with the attention that ensured the program received the manpower
and material necessary to be effective and shielded the program from outside influences.
Oversight by the III MEF leadership also ensured ownership of the program by
not only the Marines, but also their ARVN counterparts. From the inception of the
program a CAP platoon could not be constituted and the Marine CAP squad in that
platoon could not relocate to another village to partner with a new PF platoon until
criteria set by III MEF had been met and the Commanding Generals of III MEF, later the
U.S. Army XXIV Corps that replaced III MEF and the ARVN I Corps granted their
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approval (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 2). This indicates continuous monitoring
by both the Americans and their Vietnamese counterparts.
The oversight by Marines was not perfect. Gortzak (2014, 138) asserts that the
effectiveness of the Combined Action Program was influenced by leadership quality,
operational control, and recruiting of the members of the Marine CAP squads. Although
Marine commanders required CAP Marines to be volunteers, have excellent service
records and combat experience, these requirements were often ignored by subordinate
Marine commanders. Marine commanders were required to provide a quota of Marines
from their units for CAP duty, but they would not receive replacements for those
Marines. In many cases Marine commanders would “volunteer” misfits and substandard
performers from their units for CAP duty. In other cases, Marines volunteered for CAP
duty to get away from their units and into duty that they hoped was easier than serving in
an infantry company. As the program expanded in 1969 and selection for the program
was moved to replacement depots in the United States, the selection criteria were relaxed
and the overall quality of CAP Marines declined (Gortzak 2014, 146). Cursory or poor
training also hindered the effectiveness of Marine oversight of the program. A universal
theme in CAP literature and participant’s accounts is that poor language and cultural
training prevented CAP Marines from effectively doing their jobs (Southard 2014, 4969).
Lack of full support by MACV hindered the full effectiveness of the program.
Marine battalions that were responsible for material and personnel support for the CAPs
often were faced with the prospect of doing without key personnel and equipment since
they were not guaranteed replacements. Often when units moved they would take all
170

their equipment with them, leaving a CAP without key equipment such as radios and
machineguns (Peterson 1989, 36). Often CAP Marines were forced to conduct “midnight
requisitions” or steal equipment necessary to conduct their mission (Corson 1968).
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction
From the inception of the program, limiting the area of operations of the
combined platoons to the traditional boundaries of the village complex became a guiding
principle. As the III report on the program stressed, the CAP is “wedded to the people
and the governmental structure of a particular geographical locality. The CAP is only
concerned with only the enemy who enter (sic) or live in the CAP Tactical Area of
Operation. The CAP’s geographical locality is thus fixed” (III Marine Amphibious Force
1970, 7). This focus on village defense and building local governance, not destruction of
the enemy demonstrated a high degree of membership with the factor of limits to
territorial jurisdiction (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 2).
Additionally, the members of the Popular Force platoon were all recruited and
lived in the villages they protected. In one case, the members of the PF platoon were
“related to 160 of the 200 families in our hamlet” (Corson 1968, 193). Except for the
brief period of mismanagement by ARVN commanders in 1966 where PF platoons were
removed from the program and used outside their villages with disastrous results, CAPs
were never used outside their villages.
Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems
The CAP program demonstrated a “Mostly In” membership to this characteristic.
Of the limited amount of training CAP personnel received, much of it involved how to
integrate themselves into the social fabric of village life. First Lieutenant Paul Ek, the
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commander of the first CACO and an officer with training in counterinsurgency and
Vietnamese, spend time to instruct the CAP Marines in their place in the social structure
of the village and how to interact in social settings so, they would be seen “not as an
occupational force, but as members of the village, while at the same time carrying out
their primary mission” of providing security (Klyman 1986, 4). This sensitivity to
maintaining the traditional social structure and observing local customs can be interpreted
as the most basic form of observing traditional justice structures.
The Marines also did not usurp the authority of the village chief and all nonsecurity matters were deferred to him for decision (Corum, 1968, 165). As one CAP
Marine recalled, a PF stated that “when we (Marines) came we didn’t try to impose a new
way of doing something on them; we took their old ways and tried to show them how
they could do it better” (Klyman 1986, 5). In the realm of local justice mechanisms, the
Marines in the program did not introduce new structures or leaders, but maintained
existing structures and leadership to minimize the disruptive nature of introducing the
Marine squads into village life.
Local Sustainability and Accountability
The Combined Action Program demonstrated “mostly in” degree of membership
with local sustainability and accountability. While there were mechanisms designed to
give the local population and leaders a say in the conduct of the Combined Action
Platoons, ultimate authority lay with the district chiefs who were appointed by the central
government. While this is true, the ability of the Marine squad leaders depended to get
the PF platoons to do anything and to get intelligence from the local population depended
on being responsive to the local population. Additionally, since the program was not
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fully supported by MACV and was taken from the finite resources of the Marines, the
program had to rely on manpower and resources available in the villages making it
sustainable.
At the inception of the program in August 1965 local accountability was a central
feature when Lt Col. Taylor August established a “Civilian Military Advisory Council”
composed of village representatives and military commanders to discuss problems of
mutual interest (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 29). Through this council and regular
coordination meeting with local leaders, all non-military CAP actions were conducted
with the approval of village chiefs and all military actions were conducted after
consultation with the village chief (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 30). This
consultation with local leadership engendered ownership of all projects that were
approved by the councils and were also designed to ensure sustainability by relying on
agreed upon local labor to construct the project and use as little outside assistance as
possible. Captain R. E. Williamson described the philosophy of the CAP program as a
“do it yourself attitude” towards village defense (Williamson March 1968, 42).
In addition to being locally planned and executed, most CAP civic action
programs were conducted outside of normal U.S. pacification programs, which the
Marines found to be too slow and cumbersome to quickly respond to the needs of the
population (Corson 1968, 189). This also meant that most of the CAP development aid
and security operations were sustainable by the local population because they required
little external inputs.
To operate outside of formal development channels and to foster local ownership
of the CAPs, Corson implemented a program of sponsoring local co thoung, Vietnamese
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chess matches and other fundraisers, that provided collective community budgets for
development. These funds were used for community development projects and village
defenses. This maintained Vietnamese pride by allowing them to buy needed materials
and giving them ownership in the projects (Peterson 1989, 40). Community funds were
managed by public councils and the amounts collected and disbursed were advertised in
the community to demonstrate community ownership and official accountability
(Peterson 1989, 108).
Other mechanisms also fostered accountability and sustainability. In addition to
recruiting all PF personnel from local villages and requiring them to keep other
employment to supplement their income, other elements of the program fostered
accountability and sustainability. A high degree of local accountability was achieved
through on of the program’s biggest tactical weaknesses, a lack of unity of command. In
the program Marine and PF leaders only commanded the personnel assigned to their
respective units, so the Marine squad leader only commanded the Marines and the PF
platoon leader only commanded PF personnel; no one was in overall command. While
the lack of unity of command in the platoons caused problems with coordinating the
actions of the Marines and PFs, it fostered leadership within the PF that would eventually
lead to the turn over security responsibilities to independent PF platoons and required
Marines to gain the cooperation of their Vietnamese counterparts (Peterson 1989, 26).
Coupled with the small U.S. footprint that Minimum U.S. footprint that was designed to
be “small enough not to be an abrasive factor in the life of the hamlet” shared command
meant that to get anything done they had to gain the support of local leaders, which
provided an accountability mechanism into the program (Corson 1968, 190).
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Finally, the overall cost of the program was much more sustainable not only for
the villagers, but also the South Vietnamese and U.S. governments. According to Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific briefing materials (1967, 24) the annual costs of a popular force
platoon was approximately $12,000 a year and a Marine squad cost $52,000. In
comparison to the annual cost of $173,000 for a full Marine platoon, the program was
clearly much more sustainable than full U.S. involvement.
Voluntary Participation by Local Elites
The Combined Action Program demonstrated a “more in than out” membership
with the factor of voluntary participation. As mentioned in the previous section, the
platoons adhered to a dual command structure with the PF Platoon leader. In turn, the PF
platoon leader was directly responsible to the PF platoon under the operational control of
the local District Chief (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 1). Additionally, district
leaders had veto power over the program because Combined Action Platoons were
formed only on the joint agreement of the district chief and the senior Marine commander
in the area (Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1967, 18). While this was an attempt to gain
Vietnamese buy-in for the program it did not extend control of the program down to the
lowest level, the village. Finally, the PF platoon leader had no disciplinary authority over
the members of the platoon; this authority being withheld at the district level. All
authority rested with the district chief and to a lesser extent the village chief (Corson
1968, 181). These examples show there was an attempt at voluntary participation, but it
only extended down to the district level chief whose appointment was approved by the
central government.
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The Marines were aware of the imperfect command structure that marginalized
leadership at the lowest level. In 1970 a Marine study of the program found that the
program’s PF chain of command was not in harmony with the spirit of political reforms
in enacted in 1966 and 1967 that were intended to give village chiefs more autonomy and
power (III Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 15). In practice, the reform laws were
watered down in security matters and did not give village chiefs control of PF units, but
only allowed a village chief to request PF support in his village (Thayer 1977, 39). Due to
the U.S. troop withdrawals at the time it appears that the report’s recommendation to fix
this shortcoming was not acted upon by Marine leadership in Vietnam.
While official control lay with the district chief, day to day, informal leadership
lay with the PF platoon leader and the village chief. While CAP Marine squad leaders
often assumed tactical command of combined platoons, this was a temporary condition.
The CAP units spent most of their time not in direct combat and the PF platoon leader
exercised operational control of his men. Negatively, this led to instances of the PF
commander ignoring the counsel of his Marine counterpart or refusing to participate in
combined operations or training sessions, but it does indicate a level control by local
leadership (Gortzak 2014).
This assertion is supported by the program’s first director, Lt. Col. Corson, who
insisted that for the program to work, CAPs required the voluntary participation of local
leaders. As Corson (1968, 181) notes, “By most of the accepted criteria for an effective
military organization a CAP cannot exist, for a number of reasons: there is not unity of
command; discipline is chaotic and arbitrary; (and) the PF is torn between two masters.”
The program worked because “outside of combat the Marine sergeant and the PF platoon
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leader share responsibility for the well-being of the entire platoon and operate on a basis
of mutually agreed-to courses of action with respect to training, administration and
allocation of housekeeping work” (Corson 1968, 181-182). This philosophy of joint
control indicates that while there was no formal empowerment of local leadership in
command of the PF platoon, there was de facto control agreed to on the ground.
Conclusion
The Combined Action Platoon can be considered an imperfect success. The
program was never expanded to include more than 20 percent of the villages in I Corps
and was periodically disrupted by the large unit war being waged between the U.S.
Marines and the North Vietnamese Army, especially during the Tet offensive of 1968.
The program also never gained the support of the overall American command, MACV.
This limited the scope of the program and the resources available to it, including the
quality of the Marines participating in the program and the amount of training they
received. This made the program uneven in its effectiveness. Overall, the program was
successful in increasing human security in the areas it applied with increases in physical
security, governance and economic development.
The Combined Action program also demonstrated strong adherence to the model
presented in this dissertation (see Table 6). The program highlighted the importance of
external oversight with the rapid improvement of PF platoons in the program compared
to those operating independently. Also, this case demonstrated a compelling case for
limiting territorial jurisdiction with the near collapse of PF units when they were used
outside of their villages in 1966, while
PF platoons in CAPs maintained their cohesion and had no desertions.
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This case also demonstrated a “mostly in” degree of membership with
incorporating traditional justice systems and local accountability and sustainability.
While the program was hindered by having to work within the existing system that gave
most power to the district chief who was appointed by the central government, the
program sought to cause as little disruption as possible in the lives of villagers and did
not seek to introduce new forms of governance or justice systems. Throughout the
existence of the Combined Action Program, the Marines operated the program using
manpower and equipment available to them with little support from the U.S. Military
Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV). This limitation coupled with mechanisms
designed to gain local support such as Civilian Military Advisory Councils and
community development funds fostered local accountability and sustainability.
The limitation of operating within the existing governance structure established
by the Saigon government also limited the program’s adherence to the factor of voluntary
participation by local elites to a “mostly in” degree of membership. While real power lay
with the Saigon appointed district chief, the Marine squad leaders had to gain the support
of the PF platoon leaders and village chiefs to conduct operations and train the PF
members due to the parallel chains of command. The need to gain the cooperation of
local leaders mitigated the overt chain of command.
Limited external resources hindered expansion of the program, but the sustained
and intensive oversight by Marine squads produced an impressive increase in overall
security and development in villages participating in the program. Controlling for
inflation in the U.S. reporting systems, PF platoons participating in the program
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improved at a higher rate than unpartnered PF platoons and provided security for their
villages after the Marines moved to another village.
While the overall U.S. strategy in Vietnam ended in failure, the Combined Action
Program was a success. Given the limited scope of the program, it brought sustained
security to 20 percent of the villages and over 400,000 inhabitants in the I Corps region
(Southard 2014, 10). Over 93 PF platoons assumed sole security for their villages and no
former CAP village reverted to Viet Cong control during the duration of the program (III
Marine Amphibious Force 1970, 2).
Table 6.
Membership of CAP Program with Community-Based Security Variables.

Variable/Membership

Fully In

External Support and
Oversight
Limits to territorial
jurisdiction
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System
Local sustainability
and accountability
Voluntary
participation by local
elites

X

Mostly
In

More In
More Out
Than Out Than In

X
X

X
X
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Mostly Out

Fully Out

CHAPTER VIII - MISSION CREEP
The Civilian Irregular Defense Group Program in Vietnam: 1961-1970
Introduction
This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces by the
United States (U.S.) Army Special Forces in Vietnam from October 1961 until December
1970. Following a brief overview of the Montagnard ethnic groups in the Central
Highlands of Vietnam and the entry of the U.S Army Special Force Vietnam War, then
this chapter will provide a chronological overview of the establishment and evolution of
the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program.

During this overview of the

program, this chapter will include a discussion the organization of the program and the
internal and external factors that influenced the program’s development. Next, after the
pertinent details of the CIDG program are presented, this case study will include a
detailed discussion of the degree of membership the case demonstrates for each factor
presented in this dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a
summation of the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of
membership matrix. This case study will demonstrate that the CIDG program started with
high degrees of membership with all the factors of the model and was highly successful
in providing security to the indigenous peoples of the Central Highlands of Vietnam.
However, the program ultimately failed because as the program evolved after 1963,
supporting conventional military requirements resulted in a failure to adhere to most of
the factors in the model and population security was lost in the Central Highlands.
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As American involvement increased in Vietnam during the period of 1964 to
1968, the CIDG program moved away from being a means to provide the Montagnards
with the means to defend themselves from the communist Viet Cong (VC) in their
traditional homeland. Instead the program became an instrument designed to provide
intelligence to conventional U.S. units and provide security on South Vietnam’s border
with Laos and Cambodia to prevent communist infiltration from North Vietnam. This
translated into a program that relied on paid semiprofessional paramilitary forces to
instead of voluntary membership or local sustainability. CIDG forces were sent far
outside their traditional homelands to wherever planners from the U.S. Military Advisory
Command – Vietnam (MACV) felt large communist units might infiltrate across the
border. While the Special Forces continued to conform superficially to Montagnard
culture and traditional justice systems, after 1964 the CIDG took on the organization and
other characteristics of a military force.
One of the largest shortcomings of the program was the failure of the South
Vietnamese government to provide adequate oversight and support of the CIDG program,
especially when CIDG village complexes were deemed secure and the U.S. turned them
over to the government for incorporation into existing security programs. This was due
to several factors. First, the lowland ethnic Vietnamese typically treated the Montagnards
as racial inferiors and were loath to provide them with adequate resources. Second, the
successive South Vietnamese governments starting with the Diem regime were concerned
about arming thousands of disaffected ethnic minorities in a region where government
control was tenuous.

181

Coupled with USMACV directing the program away from population centers and
into sparsely populated border areas to contribute to the conventional war effort, South
Vietnamese distrust of the program meant that after the rapid success of the program in
1963 to 1964, the program failed. In spite of having over 40,000 men under arms in the
CIDG program by 1967, the program failed to provide security to the Montagnard
population and failed to close the border, a mission CIDG forces were not equipped or
trained to accomplish (Kelly 1973, 82).
Background
The Central Highlands of Vietnam had been avoided by the lowland Vietnamese
throughout most of their history, considering it an untamed frontier rife with disease and
inhabited by ethnically distinct Austronesian-Malayo-Polynesian tribal peoples whom
they considered to be moi or savages (Hickey 1982). Much like Native Americans
inhabiting the Great Plains before the mid-nineteenth century, lowland Vietnamese
considered the region and its inhabitants to be “politically unimportant peoples” because
of the ruggedness of the mountainous and jungle terrain in the region that was unsuitable
to agriculture (Michaud 2000, 336-337). This afforded the Montagnards a degree of
autonomy until the French entered the region to exploit it to produce rubber, tea, and
coffee. The inhabitants of this area were called Montagnard by the French after the name
they gave to region of the Central Highlands, Plateaux Montagnards du Sud. (Prados
1995, 72).
In the 1960s Montagnards constituted the largest ethnic minority in South
Vietnam with 600,000 to a one million people divided into 29 major tribes (Rheault 1977,
247). As depicted in Figure 1, while they comprised only 14 percent of the population,
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they inhabited 75 percent of the territory of South Vietnam with the majority ethnic
lowland Vietnamese clustered along the coastline (Kelly 1973, 20). Prior to their exit
from Vietnam in 1954, the French had allowed the Montagnard tribes to govern their
districts and villages under French provincial administrators.
Figure 1.
Distribution of Ethnic Groups in South Vietnam (Kelly 1973, 21)
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The majority of Montagnard tribes practice unilateral decent based on matrilineal
or patrilineal decent and adhered to a form of animism that required them to situate their
homes and fields in harmony with the spirits they believe inhabit their surroundings
(Benge 2010, 3). Of the major tribes participating in the CIDG program, the Rhadé,
Mnong, Jarai practice matrilineal descent, while the Bru practice patrilineal decent.
These practices dictate a strict prescription for married children to live with either the
mother or father’s family. This results in married daughters living with their mother or
“matrilocal” residence (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 22). This results in the
Montagnards living in carefully placed longhouses housing an extended family of a
dozen or more and the extended families conducting around slash and burn agriculture
supplemented with hunting and gathering in congruence with natural signs that indicate
the wishes of local spirits (Hickey, Sons of the Mountains 1982, 27)
Decent systems and animism also dictate specific leadership roles for the
Montagnards. One such specialized role is the “water chief” who is responsible for
organizing villagers to build canals or repair rice paddy dikes prior to the planting season
and coordinating with other water chiefs in other hamlets for overall resource allocation
(Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 28 and Hickey, Sons of the Mountains 1982, 31).
According to Gerald Hickey village leaders are selected by adult villagers by virtue of
age, wealth, or experience and most leadership roles stayed within select lineages
(Hickey, Sons of the Mountains 1982, 37-40)
Animism permeates the lives of the Montagnards with individuals and tribes
consulting supernatural forces in all aspects of their lives (Hickey, Sons of the Mountains
1982, 23). This empowers other important figures in Montagnard leadership including
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shamans and sorcerers. These individuals or in some cases village leaders and heads of
households officiate over the rituals that punctuate every phase of Montagnard life
(Hickey, Free in the Forest1982, 25).
After years of benign neglect by the French and then the lowland Vietnamese, the
Central Highlands became important to both the governments of North and South
Vietnam after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in the highlands of North Vietnam
in1954. According to one South Vietnamese general the similarities between the Central
Highlands and the region surrounding Dien Bien Phu in North Vietnam led leaders on
both sides of the conflict to believe that “those that control the Tay Nguyen (Central
Highlands) hold the key to all of South Vietnam” (Benge, 2010, 4), This sentiment was
echoed by General Vo Nguyen Giap, the victor of Dien Bien Phu and key strategist in the
communist war effort, who said that "to seize and control the highlands is to solve the
whole problem of South Vietnam" (5th Special Forces Group 2000, Annex 2, 23).
The North Vietnamese needed routes to infiltrate men and supplies into South
Vietnam and base areas close to South Vietnamese population centers to support the
efforts of the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong or VC) to overthrow the government
of South Vietnam. The mountainous area of the Central Highlands provided them with a
rugged and sparsely populated area to do this (Harris 2013, 3). Starting in the mid-1950s
North Vietnamese communists infiltrated the Central Highlands to gain Montagnard
support. The Viet Cong promised highlanders political autonomy in return for their
support against the government of South Vietnam and would take Montagnard leaders
north to show them tribal autonomous zones in North Vietnam and the benefits of
supporting the communist cause (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 70)
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By 1962 the Viet Cong had failed to recruit the Montagnard tribes into the
National Liberation Front using their promises of regional autonomy. The Viet Cong
leadership felt their soft approach had not gained expected results and in 1962 they took a
firmer approach, using intimidation and violence to force Montagnard support. Coupled
with friction caused by most of the Viet Cong cadre being lowland Vietnamese, Viet
Cong demands for food and manpower heightened Montagnard animosity against the
communists which created the opportunity for the CIDG program in late 1962 (Pike
1968, 251).
The government of President Ngo Dinh Diem not only wanted to block an
obvious route for communist infiltration into the lowlands, but also wanted to integrate
this undeveloped are into the nation and as space to relieve overpopulation in coastal
areas (Harris 2013, 7). The Diem government relocated refugees from the North into the
highlands. They distributed the best lands to the refugees and started collect taxes and
banned the Montagnards from using crossbows, their traditional tool for supplementing
their diet with game (Rheault 1977, 247).
The Diem regime installed lowland Vietnamese provincial governors to facilitate
assimilation, but also replaced the Montagnard district chiefs with lowland Vietnamese
the regime deemed more reliable (Prados 1995, 73). The lowland Vietnamese who
moved into the Central Highlands were typically received the bulk of government aid and
were overtly racist toward the Montagnards who they considered backward at best or at
worst less than human. This opinion was typified by one Vietnamese woman explaining
to an American official that Montagnards had tails like monkeys (Prados 1995, 73). As
Gerald Hickey (Free in the Forest 1982, 48) learned in his extensive research in the
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region, the lowland Vietnamese were tone deaf to the possibility that the Montagnards
might be hostile to attempts to assimilate them into Vietnamese culture. In fact, Hickey
noted that most government officials thought the Montagnards should be grateful to learn
what they perceived as superior Vietnamese culture and political systems.
Coupled with the systemic and individual racism displayed by the lowland
Vietnamese towards the Montagnards, the Diem government’s official policy of
assimilation of relocating lowland Vietnamese to the highland fueled Montagnard fears
that they were being subjugated by the government in Saigon (Prados 1995, 73). The
Vietnamese resisted integrating Montagnard officials into the formal government
structure because they spoke French, but not Vietnamese and were typically thought of as
less capable than ethnic Vietnamese. As one province chief commented, “One
Vietnamese clerk is worth three highland clerks.” (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 34)
The hostility of the South Vietnamese government drove the Montagnards into
the communist camp by the 1960. While for the most part the Montagnards desired to be
left alone by both sides, by early 1961, U.S. embassy reports estimated that over 50% of
the rural population in the highlands were VC sympathizers." (5th Special Forces Group
2000, 12). In September 1961, a report from the U.S. Embassy estimated there were two
VC battalions and several hundred irregular guerrillas operating near Darlac province, the
Central highland province with the largest Montagnard tribe, the Rhadé (Harris 2013, 9).
As part of the Kennedy administration’s plan to assist the government of South
Vietnam by isolating the Viet Cong from their source of support in North Vietnam, the
Central Intelligence Agency began developing plans to train small groups of tribesmen in
the Central Highlands to conduct surveillance operations along North Vietnamese
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infiltration routes (Prados 1995, 72). As part of this effort, the first U.S. Army Special
Forces teams deployed to Vietnam in May 1960 to train Army of South Vietnam
(ARVN) ranger units to conduct surveillance and commando raids in border areas
(Prados 1995, 71).
In 1961 David A. Norwood and aid worker with the International Voluntary
Services organization became concerned with the growing strength of the Viet Cong
among the Rhadé tribe in the Central Highlands. He also observed that Viet Cong
demands for food and manpower alienated that Montagnards (Harris 2013, 8). He
approached U.S. Army Colonel Gilbert Layton, an officer on attached to the Central
Intelligence Agency station in Saigon. The two came up with a plan to establish village
defense groups among the Rhadé. The CIA Station Chief, William Colby embraced the
concept and thought that after a proof of concept test could be applied outside of the
Rhadé tribes (Prados 1995, 75).
Colby obtained approval for the program from the Diem regime during the same
month, but with several caveats. Diem was wary of arming a population that was
potentially antagonistic to his government. In order to maintain control of the program
and to have it fit within his overall strategy of assimilating the highland populations,
Diem required ARVN participation in the program. This came in the form of ARVN
Special Forces (LLBD) being in overall command of the individual Village Defense
Program camps (Prados 1995, 77).
In October 1961 a Special Forces medical sergeant, Layton, and Nuttle, who
signed on as a contractor for the CIA, travelled to the Central Highlands to convince the
Rhadé tribal leaders to adopt the program. Nuttle and Layton negotiated with the Rhadé
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leaders that in return for weapons to defend themselves from the VC and aid from the
South Vietnamese government, they would also claim nominal allegiance to the
government while in reality they would really be fighting for their family and land
(Harris 2013, 12-13 and Prados 1995, 77). The Rhadé leaders agreed to participate in the
program and the village of Buon Enao was selected as the test for the program, which the
CIA named the Village Defense Program (Prados 1995, 75).
As the CIA readied the weapons and other logistical requirements for the
experiment, the inhabitants installed a perimeter fence around the village and dug
bunkers for protection and as a symbol of the new allegiance to U.S. and South
Vietnamese governments (Prados 1995, 75). As designed by Layton and Nuttle, the
Village Defense Program had three goals. The first was to increase the security of
minority populations. The second was to improve the relationship between the Saigon
government and minority populations. The third was to promote sustainable economic
development (Ahern 2010, 98). By January 1964, the CIA gained the support of the U.S.
Army that provided Special Forces Operational Detachment A-113, commanded by
Captain Ronald Shackelton to train and advise the tribesmen. On February 14, 1962, the
Special Forces team ascended into the Central Highlands and started to train the
inhabitants of Buon Enao (Prados 1995, 75). The operation was controlled, funded, and
supplied by the agency separately from the Military Assistance Program and conducted
on the Saigon government side by Diem’s Presidential Survey Office, his personal
clandestine-activity agency, which commanded the South Vietnamese Special Forces
(Cosmas 2006, 78).
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The centerpiece of the Village Defense Program was the Area Development
Center (Ahern 2001, 53). This center served as the village complex hub for the
management of all political and economic development programs as well as the
headquarters for the village defense system (Ahern 2010, 54). Through the Area Defense
Center, the villagers the planners of the early CIDG program not only sought to promote
security, but also sustainable economic development to show the benefits of allying with
the government (Kelly 1973, 11-12).
Except for a small stipend provided for members of the strike force companies
and a food allowance for CIDG members participating in training, the CIDG program did
not provide direct monetary aid. Instead the program sought to spur economic
development by providing materials such as scrap metal from Army salvage dumps to
promote a blacksmith trade and foot powered sewing machines to develop a sewing
industry (Ahern 2010, 57). The program was designed to be defensive with stationary
hamlet militias and a company size mobile reaction force focused on defending the
villager’s homes and land. Colonel Layton’s guiding principle for the program was to
motivate the Montagnard by “Giv(ing) them something to fight for and something to
fight with” (Ahern 2010, 54 and Moore 2007, 73).
The early CIDG program also focused on improving the health of the
Montagnards. In addition to programs to improve sanitation and prevent chronic
diseases, Special Forces medics trained health workers for each village and managed a
central dispensary for treating serious cases. By the third month of the program, the
Special Forces medics had trained medics for 88 villages and over 5,000 patients received
medical care that month (Ahern 2010, 56).
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The centerpiece of the program was providing the Montagnards with the ability to
defend themselves against communist incursions into their territory. The military
organization of the security plan contained two parts. The first element, the village
defenders, later called the hamlet militia, formed the bulk of the personnel in the
program. They were given two weeks of training and then organized into village security
units with the size of the unit depending on available manpower and the local VC threat.
The village defenders were part time and not paid for their services beyond a food stipend
during their initial training period (Moore 2007, 45).
The second element in the program was the strike force. This was a company size
(approximately 100-150 personnel) element that provided security for the Special Forces
camp and Area Development Center. This force would also have acted as a quick
reaction force in the case of a large-scale attack against any of the village defense units.
The members of the strike force were full time members of the program and were given
extra training and paid a salary (Moore 2007, 45).
The typical CIDG camp contained one U.S. Special Forces team, one South
Vietnamese Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB) Special Forces team, four CIDG companies,
and a reconnaissance platoon. CIDG companies were organized by tribe and each
company was responsible for security of the villages corresponding to their tribal
affiliation (Prados 1995, 77). To coopt the Rhadé leadership and to prevent Viet Cong
infiltration, tribal leaders were required to vouch for the loyalty of each person
volunteering for the program (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 76).
As depicted in Figure 3, the program rapidly expanded and by April 1962 the
village defense program included forty villages with 14,000 inhabitants defended by 975
191

tribesmen (Prados 1995, 75). The pilot program was deemed a success with most roads in
the district considered secure and the number of refugees leaving the district lower than
in other surrounding districts (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 79). By October 1962
five additional Area Development centers were established. By this time over 60,000
villagers were protected by 10,600 village defenders and 1,500 strike force personnel
(Harris 2013, 25).
Figure 2.
Buon Enao December 1961-April 1962 (Sherman 2000, 14)

The CIA station in Saigon and U.S. military deemed the pilot program a success
with as shown in Figure 2, the entire Dar Lac province and it’s 140,000 inhabitants
assessed as secure and village forces killing over 200 VC and capturing 460 (Ahern 2010,
59). CIA officials in Saigon proposed enlarging the U.S. Special Forces contingent to
thirty-nine detachments and a establishing a group headquarters and to train, arm, and
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equip a projected 100,000 irregulars.65 The U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group
agreed and by December 1963 the program was expanded to all four tactical zones in
South Vietnam and the Special Forces rapidly trained over 43,300 village militia and
18,000 strike force members from Montagnard tribes and other religious and ethnic
minority groups (Prados 1995, 76).
While a success in securing large territories and thousands of disaffected minority
groups from communist influence, the rapid expansion of the program began to raise
concerns among American and Vietnamese officials. On June 28, 1962, the Kennedy
Administration’s “Special Group” interagency committee for covert action decided the
CIDG program had grown too large for the CIA to manage. The committee decided that
the CIA and Department of Defense roles would switch with the Department of Defense
becoming the lead agency and the CIA would assume a supporting role (Ahern 2010, 9192). This was in response to perceptions in the Kennedy Administration that one of the
causes of the failed paramilitary operation at the Bay of Pigs the year earlier had been
caused partly because the size of the operation was beyond the capabilities of the CIA to
manage. The Bay of Pigs prompted the creation of National Security Action
Memorandum 57 that directed that whenever a paramilitary program became too large to
be considered covert, the Department of Defense would be the responsible agency for the
program (Bundy 1961). In keeping with this memorandum, the CIDG program as it was
now called would be transferred over to the Army (Prados 1995, 77).
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Figure 3.
Buon Enao April-October 1962 (Sherman 2000, 16)

This transfer was strongly supported by the Department of Defense, in particular
the Army Staff. The Army Staff, which had a bias toward conventional operations and a
distrust of the CIA and paramilitary operations wanted to regain control of the Special
Forces in Vietnam. According to General William Depuy, the Army Staff “thought the
Special Forces had a role to play, but we didn’t want them to play it under the CIA” and
the Army “wanted to play its own game (Krepinevich 1986, 72). Henceforth the Special
Forces and the CIDG program would be a component of the overall conventional strategy
to defeat the communist insurgency.
The decision to shift responsibility of the program also coincided with the first
large American military expansion in Vietnam in 1963. As conventional military
considerations took on greater importance, John Richardson, who replaced Colby as
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station chief and had less involvement in the program, shifted the focus of all CIA
paramilitary operations in December 1962 from undermining the communist influence in
South Vietnam to supporting conventional military operations. This guided all new
expansion of the CIDG program towards the Laotian and Cambodian borders. The
primary mission of the CIDG in these new areas would not be population security, but to
act as early warning for communist forces crossing the border into South Vietnam.66
The CIDG program would reduce the number of hamlet militia and focus the
majority of effort on fielding and employing reconnaissance platoons to monitor the
border and strike companies. These companies would be used to attack VC base camps
and interdict men and material being infiltrated from North Vietnam and to support
regular ARVN units (Krepinevich 1986, 73-74). All existing Village Defense Program
camps that did not contribute to this mission would be transferred into other population
security programs (Ahern 2010, 106-107). As Thomas L. Ahren Jr. notes, this was the
point when the Village Defense Program began to shift from community defense to
mobile conventional operations designed to destroy communist forces (Ahern 2010, 95).
The CIA and the Army agreed on the changeover and instituted Operation
Switchback in the fall of 1962 to shift responsibility for the program. As part of the
operation, the Village Defense Program was renamed the Civilian Irregular Defense
Group (CIDG) program the Special Forces activated the 5th Special Forces Group
(Airborne) in Vietnam to manage all Special Forces activities in Vietnam. As the unique
logistical requirements of the program did not fit within traditional Army funding
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programs, the CIA did not completely end its involvement in the program and continued
to purchase weapons and equipment to arm CIDG members.67
The Diem government was also becoming alarmed at the rapid expansion of the
program and high officials were unaware of the how large the program had grown in only
a few months. The Diem regime became aware of the size of the program in February
1962 at a celebration held in Buon Enao to celebrate the success of the pilot program and
turn it over to the South Vietnamese government. General Ton That Dinh, the II Corps
commander and Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president’s brother attended the ceremony. During
the celebration Dinh informed Nhu that the Americans had armed 18,000 Montagnards
and had “put an army at my back” (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 80). This alarmed
Nhu who was concerned that the Montagnards, who had resisted assimilation into the
South Vietnamese state, now had the means to resist and could possibly fight for
autonomy.
Because of this growing concern and a fear that the program was creating
allegiances to forces other than the government, the South Vietnamese government
attempted to end the village defense portion of the CIDG program and reclaim the
weapons issued to the village militias.68 As part of the reorganization of the program
only the CIDG companies located on Special Forces/LLBD compounds would be the
only forces allowed to retain their arms (Prados 1995, 82).
Throughout the spring of 1963 139 of the 214 villages in the CIDG program were
folded into the Strategic Hamlet program which was controlled by the province chiefs
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installed by the central government.69 According to Hickey, the province chiefs were
unable to support the villages and attempted to repossess the weapons issued to CIDG
members with only approximately 2,000 of the over 20,000 weapons recovered.
Additionally, ARVN support for the CIDG villages was slow and grudging and
development projects such as health clinics were moved to areas dominated by ethnic
Vietnamese.70 As these villages were converted into strategic hamlets, the strike force
companies were removed from their villages and sent to border surveillance camps on the
Cambodian border without notifying the strike force members in advance (Hickey, Free
in the Forest 1982, 87).
During the period of 1963 to 1965 the South Vietnamese government continued
to inflame Montagnard bitterness though it’s continued unofficial policy of assimilation
and resettlement of ethnic Vietnamese to the highlands. Gerald Hickey, an
anthropologist and preeminent expert on the Montagnards witnessed several land title
distribution ceremonies during this period and saw that two-thirds of the titles were given
to ethnic Vietnamese (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 137).
While there had been several Montagnard autonomy movements in the 1950s and
early 1960s, Montagnard dissatisfaction came to a head in 1964 due to the botched
turnover of the CIDG program (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 47-89 and Ahern 2001,
114). This led several tribal groups to form the United Front for the Liberation of
Oppressed Peoples (FULRO). This movement was led by a highland elite that coalesced
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due to the assimilation policies of the South Vietnamese government (Hickey, Sons of the
Mountains 1982, 413-418).
On August 1, 1964 FULRO issued a manifesto promising to end the domination
of the Montagnard by the Vietnamese and demanding the adoption of the Statute
Particulier or policy of self-determination and regional autonomy which had been
proposed by the French in 1951 (Hickey, Free in the Forest1982, 95). The growing
frustration of the Montagnard and the growing unification of the tribal groups under
FULRO led to a CIDG mutiny in five CIDG camps in the vicinity of Buon Enao on
September 19 and 20, 1964. In each of the camps the CIDG soldiers detained their U.S.
Special Forces advisors and captured or killed the LLDB teams in the camps (Prados
1995, 80-81).
The mutiny ended eight days later when an ARVN regiment surrounded the
FULRO headquarters and General Nguyen Khanh, the leader of the military junta
controlling South Vietnam in 1964, negotiated a settlement with the FULRO leaders. He
rejected their demand for regional autonomy, but promised other reforms such as
reinstating the Montagnard tribal courts, increasing the number of Montagnard officers in
ARVN, and putting LLDB officers of Montagnard descent in command of several CIDG
camps. These concessions were seen as superficial by most of the FULRO leadership,
which proved to be correct and friction between CIDG units and the South Vietnamese
government continued with uprisings occurring in July and December 1965 (Prados
1995, 81-82). Additionally, several FULRO leaders crossed the border into Cambodia to
continue the fight against the central government with 1,000 to 2,000 strike force
members and their weapons (Moore 2007, 76).
198

1965 marked the beginning of the US conventional unit build-up in South
Vietnam, which caused a further shift in the priorities of the CIDG program. According
to the 5th Special Forces Group report on the CIDG program published in 1971, the
conventional American units arriving in Vietnam knew little about the regions they
operated in. This ignorance of the operational environment led U.S. units to become
dependent on intelligence collected by CIDG units. Operational control of all Special
Forces units had already been transferred to the senior American military advisor in each
Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) and in 1965 control was again transferred to the senior
American commander in each CTZ (5th Special Forces Group 2000, 22). This ensured
that CIDG units would fit into the operational plan for each zone and focus on the
priorities of the conventional force.
The pressure to generate intelligence for the growing number of American
divisions and corps forced the U.S. Special Forces to focus almost exclusively on
collecting intelligence at the expense of population security. Intelligence collection on the
borders and other communist infiltration routes became the primary mission for the
CIDG program from 1965 to 1970.71 The CIDG program and its covert offshoots in the
MACV Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG) were successful in this mission
and they produced over 40% of all MACV ground combat intelligence, but at the expense
of population security (5th Special Forces Group 2000, 29 and Kelly 1973, 87).
The end of the CIDG program started in 1969 with the adoption by the Nixon
administration of “Vietnamization” or the turnover of all war fighting responsibilities to
the South Vietnamese and a drawdown of American ground forces. The drawdown
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directed that by the beginning of 1970 envisioned the discontinuance of the entire CIDG
program. A combined Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) and MACV planning
committee was convened on 20 March 1970 to affect a smooth and orderly termination of
the CIDG program. The committee recommended that the CIDG forces be reduces from
over 32,000 to 24,000 and that all remaining CIDG camps be converted to ARVN units
between the months of August and December 1970.72 The border security mission
would continue to be the main focus of the program and the mission would be assumed
by CIDG units converted into ARVN Ranger Battalions.73 After these conversions were
completed in December 1970, the CIDG program ended and all U.S. Special Forces
returned to the United States. (5th Special Forces Group 2000, 30).
The CIDG program can be viewed as an overall failure. While the initial CIA
program was successful in securing the population of the Central Highlands, after
Operation Switchback any security gains were lost and the region returned to being
contested territory (Kelly 1973, 41). Hickey recounts substantial bitterness among CIA
officials he interviewed in the 1970s. Most complained that all the political and
economic elements of the program were dropped in favor of a purely military operation
and the entire purpose of the program was ignored. In their words, the focus of the
program turned from a defense of the population and the U.S. military “turned them all
into ‘kill operations” (Hickey, Free in the Forest 1982, 81).

72

Free World Assistance Directorate, Conversion of CIDG to Main Forces and reorganization of Army of the Republic of Vietnam
Rangers, May 22, 1970; http://hv.proquest.com/historyvault/docview.jsp?folderId=003209-037-0798&q=&position=1&numResults=0&numTotalResults and U.S. National Archives, RG 472, Box 142. MACV Plan for Reduction of CIDG, 16 March
1969, Page132.
73
U.S. National Archives, RG 472, Box 141. Extract from AB-144, May 1969, Page132

200

The program’s success in border surveillance and interdiction is questionable. By
1966 the Special Forces had established 25 camps spaced approximately twenty-seven
kilometers apart along the Cambodian and Laotian border (Hickey, Free in the Forest
1982, 157). According to Krepinevich, the effective distance each base could support
was twenty kilometers so communist units could effectively skirt the areas covered by
CIDG companies and infiltrate South Vietnam unimpeded (Krepinevich 1986, 74). To
cover these gaps, CIDG units conducted long range patrols that were ineffective because
CIDG units were too poorly trained to operate without intense oversight by their U.S.
advisors (Kelly 1973, 52). CIDG killed 90% of the enemy killed by Vietnamese forces.74
Even though CIDG forces claimed 90% of the enemy killed by Vietnamese security
forces, a dubious statistic given the inflated body counts in Vietnam, the additional longrange patrols had no noticeable effect on communist infiltration with numerous VC and
North Vietnamese Army units skirting the areas patrolled by the CIDG forces.75
After Operation Switchback, CIDG companies were moved to locations outside
of their homelands to meet military considerations and frequently had no connection with
the local population. This allowed the Viet Cong to infiltrate villages in CIDG areas,
coerce support from the population, and mass several large-scale attacks against CIDG
camps with no warning from the local population (Kelly 1973, 54-55). The attack on
Nam Dong on July 6, 1964 where Captain Roger Donlon won the first Medal of Honor
earned during the Vietnam War is an example of this with two VC battalions infiltrating
through a nearby village with no warning from the villagers. By moving CIDG members
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outside of their homelands, they prevented the collection of intelligence on local
communist efforts and they also created new hardships among the Montagnards.
Arguably the CIDG program harmed the Montagnard population. According to
Hickey (1993, 41) the CIDG program removed the most able-bodied males from the
villages, resulting in most of the food production work to shift to women and the elderly.
This caused a drop-in food production and lengthening the time required to harvest crops
that caused food insecurity among the Montagnards. Additionally, the CIDG program
caused large dislocations among the Montagnards. No CIDG program was successfully
converted into other existing security programs, leaving a security vacuum in their
wake.76 When the population of areas not protected by CIDG units were coerced by
communist cadres, they were faced with two options. If they did not want to follow their
men to remote border camps, they were forced to move to refugee camps. In these
camps, they received little support from the government and were often discriminated
against in favor of ethnic Vietnamese refugees (Hickey 1993, 103).
In the next section of this case study, the adherence of this case to this
dissertation’s model will be analyzed. In keeping with Fuzzy Set QCA methodology, the
assessments of other researchers, corroborated with primary sources, will be used to
determine the case’s adherence to the model. The use of the assessments of others will
mitigate bias in the assignment of degrees of membership.

U.S. National Archives, RG 472, 5th SFG Records. “Resume of the Conversion of CIDG to Regional Forces Status” November
1968.
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External Support and Oversight
The CIDG program demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership with the
factor of external support and oversight. While the program was run by the U.S. and the
Special Forces equipped and paid the CIDG members, the intent of the program
throughout its existence was to be a joint venture between the U.S. and the South
Vietnamese (Rheault 1977, 247). As Kelly (1973, 17-18) notes, the major problem during
the entire history of the program was a lack of commitment by the government of
Vietnam. For the most part South Vietnamese participation in the program was a
detriment either through a lack of initiative, ineptness, or outright displays of antagonism
towards the Montagnards.
The South Vietnamese Army’s lack of support manifested itself most glaringly in
the frequent refusal of ARVN commanders to assist CIDG forces that were attacked by
large Viet Cong or NVA units. During the first three years of the program, CIDG camps
at Plei Mrong, Nam Dong, and Dong Xoai were surrounded by VC regiments and nearly
wiped out while the ARVN unit assigned to provide a quick reaction force either refused
to relieve the camps or arrived well after the battle was over (Prados 1995, 79). In
response to this problem, 5th Special Forces Group established company size strike
forces in each CIDG camp and battalion sized Mobile Strike Forces at larger
headquarters areas each comprised of ethnic Chinese Nung mercenaries who received
specialized ranger training (Prados 1995, 79).
In addition to failing to support existing CIDG camps, the South Vietnamese
hindered the expansion of the program and the transition of existing CIDG villages out of
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the program and into other security programs. As Colonel Gilbert Layton, the original
architect of the program, commented,
each new offshoot was plagued by the ineptness, inefficiency, jealousness,
corruptness, or subversiveness (sic) of civilian bureaucrats and military
commanders…When the average Vietnamese civilian or military official
moves into an area that has been restored to the sovereignty of Vietnam he
ordinarily manages to antagonize the population and restore Viet Cong
prestige. In short, the Viet Cong as an opponent is a secondary problem.
The Vietnamese official is the real obstacle to success (Ahern 2010, 60).
More fearful of the enabling a Montagnard separatist movement and infected with a
racial bias against the Montagnards, the South Vietnamese actively undermined the
program when the Americans turned over oversight to them.
The example of this behavior by the Vietnamese occurred at Buon Enao, the pilot
of the CIDG program. After achieving almost complete security of the region in less than
a year, the turnover of Buon Enao was a complete failure. According to the 5th Special
Forces Group after action report of the program (2000), by 1963 any gains in security
made by the program in 1961 and 1962 were lost in the first months of 1963. As
mentioned earlier, part of the original agreement with the South Vietnamese, the U.S.
would turn over administration of secured villages to the provincial and district chiefs.
As soon the transfer was enacted, problems arose. As the Army assumed control of the
CIDG program, one of the unintended consequences was a breakdown of coordination
between CIDG camps and district and province leadership. Previously, CIA case officers
acted as the liaison between the Special Forces teams advising the CIDG forces and
South Vietnamese government officials (Ahern 2010, 105-106). As part of Operation
Switchback, the CIA reassigned their case officers, removing the direct oversight over
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how the South Vietnamese officials administered the program. Problems arose almost at
once.
A MACV study in December 1963 found that Vietnamese support for
development projects in Montagnard areas was “non-existent” (Kelly 1973, 62). The
province chief, Colonel Le Quang Tung, diverted funds to areas inhabited by Vietnamese
settlers and stopped paying the CIDG strike force (Kelly 1973, 42 and Hickey 1993,
103). Noted to be openly hostile to the program, Colonel Tung also arbitrarily limited the
number of Montagnard personnel on any CIDG camp to 300 without regard to the local
threat (Ahern 2010, 97). Additionally, the province chief attempted to reclaim most of
the weapons distributed to the Montagnards and moved CIDG strike force members out
of their villages and divided up the companies to other areas he deemed more important.
Kelly (1973, 41-42). These actions drove the Montagnards back into neutrality or at
worst active opposition to the government as demonstrated by the widespread FULRO
uprising in 1963.
In addition to a failure to support the program, the South Vietnamese failed to
provide adequate oversight. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. designed the CIDG program
to be a joint venture between the U.S. Special Forces and the Vietnamese LLDB with the
ARVN Special Forces team leader in command of all Vietnamese forces to include CIDG
members. In reality, the LLDB soldiers were of poor quality with most lacking the
initiative or leadership qualities necessary to make the program effective.
In the Buon Enao pilot, the Vietnamese LLDB teams assigned to the CIDG
program manned with Montagnards making up at least half the team, but after the
expansion of the program, no attention was paid to the ethnic makeup of the LLDB teams
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(Kelly 1973, 24 and Harris 2013, 16). Overt racism by the Vietnamese LLDB team
members towards the Montagnards diminished their ability to lead the CIDG members.
One Special Forces officer noted that, “unless an American is present when the
Vietnamese camp commander is issuing any type of order to the Montagnard
commander, the latter will not obey” (Ahern 2010, 60).
As these examples have shown, the South Vietnamese not only provided poor
support and oversight of the program, but in many cases actively undermined it. This
was due mostly to the justifiable fear that Montagnards would use their newly acquired
ability to defend themselves to challenge the authority of the repressive South
Vietnamese government. Additionally, the poor quality of South Vietnamese officials
and soldiers hindered their ability to manage the CIDG program.
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction
The CIDG program demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership with the
limits to territorial jurisdiction factor of the model. The initial concept of the CIDG
program was defensive and was as its original name the “Village Defense Program”
implies, it was intended to provide the means for villagers to defend themselves and their
land (Rheault 1977, 247-248). However, with Operation Switchback the focus of the
program shifted to border surveillance and offensive operations that sometimes took the
CIDG members far from their villages and into areas dominated by other ethnic groups or
well outside the Central Highlands (Moore 2007, 73 and Rheault 1977, 252). In many
cases new CIDG camps resembled “frontier forts,” placed in areas with no local
population, but along likely communist infiltration routes (Rheault 1977, 250).
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MACV made the shift in focus to mobile, offensive operations official by
directing as part of Operation Switchback that Special Forces teams end the training of
hamlet militia by April 1964 (5th Special Forces Group 2000, Annex 2, 18). The end of
the hamlet militia signaled the transition of the CIDG into a mercenary force that could
be sent anywhere military necessity required. While the stated guideline for the program
was to use CIDG forces only within their local area, this did not happen in practice.77 As
Figure 4 illustrates, 1963 forty camps were opened in border areas or along communist
infiltration routes and eight camps were closed that did not fit into the U.S. conventional
battle plan. During this expansion and reorganization, strike companies were regularly
moved out of their home areas to man new camps (Kelly 1973, 37). At the height of the
Vietnam War in 1968-1969, the practice of moving CIDG companies into different ethnic
regions became so widespread that over fifty percent of CIDG companies were assigned
outside their tribal regions (5th Special Forces Group 2000, Annex 2, 75-77).
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Figure 4.
CIDG Camp Locations October 1962 and June 1963 (Kelly 1973, 31, 38)

Moving CIDG companies to areas without considering the ethnic makeup of
strike companies or the impact on security in villages left without security had a negative
impact on the morale of the CIDG members (Thompson and Frizzell 1977, 250 and
Rheault 1977, 250). In 1962 and early 1963, no members of the strike force companies
left the program. As companies moved to new locations after Operation Switchback,
Montagnard desertions increased and recruitment efforts fell, so that from a strength of
38,000 in January 1963 the number of CIDG members fell to 19,000 in January 1964.
(Ahern 2010, 109). For those who did join the CIDG, moving CIDG companies outside
their tribal regions forced their families to become refugees and move into urban centers
or refugee camps (Hickey 1993, 103, 168).
Gerald Hickey’s fieldwork among the Montagnards in the 1960s provides several
examples of the lack of limits to territorial boundaries in the CIDG program. One
example, although anecdotal was the popularity of a female singer from the Jarai tribe
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that sang sad ballads about Montagnard forces being helicoptered to distant place to fight
(Hickey 2002, 194). Hickey also witnessed several examples of the negative impact of
the employing CIDG members outside their traditional homelands.
Two examples were the CIDG camps at Nam Dong and An Diem at both camps
there were not enough of the local Katu tribe to man strike companies or they were not
interested in the program. Therefore, the Special Forces brought in lowland Vietnamese
from the coastal city of Danang (Hickey 1993, 137). In both cases, the CIDG leadership
was antagonistic to the local population and the local population in turn allowed the VC
to stage their forces in adjacent villages for attacks that overran both camps (Hickey
2002, 121-139).
Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems
The CIDG program demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership with the
incorporation of traditional justice systems. As with the other factors in the model, there
is a stark shift in degree of membership after Operation Switchback. When the CIA
administered the program, there was a strict observance of local customs and traditional
justice systems. In several cases CIA case officers modified security plans to adhere with
local customs and left discipline and punishments to local leaders. Local leaders were
responsible for selecting and disciplining the CIDG members and during training each
member had to vouch for the loyalty of his neighbor (Kelly 1973, 26 and Harris 2013,
17).
This focus on local customs and operating the program within traditional justice
systems motivated most of Special Forces soldiers in the program to undergo tribal
initiation rights and officially joining the tribes they were advising (Prados, 1995, 78).
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Ahern (2010, 58) provides one anecdote to illustrate the strict adherence to local justice
systems in the early program. At one village participating in the Buon Enao pilot, the
Special Forces team in the village ignored the execution of a Rhadé tribesman by village
elders. The villagers beat the man to death with a shovel in retribution for his murder of
another man’s wife, who he had beaten to death with a shovel (Ahern 2010, 58).
After Operation Switchback, the CIDG became a predominantly military
organization with little regard for local justice systems. Special Forces soldiers continued
to be inducted into the dominant tribes represented in their CIDG companies to gain their
trust (Sochurek 1965). In several cases Special Forces soldiers leveraged local justice
and systems to defuse tensions between the Montagnards and Vietnamese officials. In
one case Hickey (2002, 185) observed Special Forces soldiers compelling a local shaman,
the King of Fire, to pass a negative judgment on the FULRO rebellion to persuade CIDG
members to lay down their arms. Despite these isolated or superficial attempts to utilize
traditional justice systems, there was no overt attempts to incorporate traditional justice
systems into the CIDG program.
Local Sustainability and Accountability
The CIDG program demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership with the
factor of local sustainability and accountability. In keeping with this case’s degree of
membership with the other factors of this model, the CIDG program started with a high
degree of membership with this factor and then reversed after Operation Switchback.
One element of the early program designed to promote sustainability that was
abandoned after Operation Switchback was the Truong Son Cadre Program. Through
this program the CIA train Montagnards in basic medical care, intelligence collection,
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administration, education, and agriculture and to act as liaisons with provincial
governments. The purpose of this program was to build an indigenous force of
administrators, security, and medical personnel who could sustain the subordinate
programs of the overall CIDG program after the U.S. advisors moved on to another area
(Benge 2010, 6). After Operation Switchback, CIA case officers administering this part
of the program were withdrawn and U.S. Special Forces and Vietnamese officials did not
attempt to replace them (Kelly 1973, 63). While the Special Forces continued to provide
medical aid to the inhabitants around their camps, no attempt was made build a locally
sustainable system (Kelly 1973, 155).
The early program also demonstrated a high degree of accountability, but the
focus on local ownership was abandoned after Operation Switchback. An integral part of
the program was the “village defense leadership team” the included Special Forces
advisors, district officials, and tribal leadership. This group met weekly to discuss the
status of the program and address any issues the villagers had with the security forces or
development programs (Harris 2013, 19). After Operation Switchback and the
curtailment of the hamlet militia and development programs, the village defense team and
the Area Development concepts were abandoned (5th Special Forces Group 2000, Annex
2, 17).
The most critical element of sustainability, matching the size of the security force
to a level sustainable by the local population was also abandoned after Operation
Switchback. In the early CIDG program, hamlet militia and strike force companies were
sized to levels sustainable by local manpower and appropriate to the local threat (Kelly
1973, 27). When the priority of the program shifted from population security to border
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security, local sustainability was ignored. CIDG companies were standardized along the
lines of conventional infantry companies and no regard was given to the number of
personnel an area could provide or sustain. Also, the village militia became a secondary
priority and few were trained after the summer of 1963 (Moore 2007, 74) (5th Special
Forces Group 2000, Annex 1, 5)
In the early CIDG program, each CIDG force differed in size depending on the
local population and the security threat. To make CIDG units interchangeable and
similar in capability, in March 1964 5th Special Forces Group published a table of
organization and equipment (TO&E) that standardized the size and equipment of CIDG
strike force companies (Kelly 1973, 47). When local resources could not supply the
needed manpower for a standard CIDG camp Special Forces commanders recruited strike
force members from other regions and transported them along with their families to
camps along the border (Hickey 1993, 137, 139).
To induce recruits to join the CIDG and move away from their homes, the Special
Forces were forced to offer pay and incentives higher than offered by the ARVN (Kelly
1973, 34 and 5th Special Forces Group 2000, 28). The need for CIDG manpower only
increased as the war progressed. Seen as a cost-effective alternative to American or
ARVN units, in mid-1965 the CIDG program was expanded to include Mobile Strike
Force or “Mike” force battalions designed to act as quick reaction and exploitation forces
for CIDG camps (5th Special Forces Group 2000, 27). At the height of the CIDG
program in 1968 there were nineteen Mike force battalions operating throughout
Vietnam, with the majority operating in and around the Central Highlands. Each of these
battalions had three companies with approximately 600 CIDG members (Benge 2010, 5).
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The establishment of Mike force battalions were the final evolution of the CIDG
program away from a locally sustainable security force to a conventionally equipped
paramilitary force that required total support from external sources. The leadership of the
5th Special Forces Group admitted in their after-action report that this had been a mistake
and “that commitment to the border surveillance presented a serious departure from
Special Forces doctrine and methods the program came to rely on financial remuneration
rather than desire of locals to defend their village against the VC” (5th Special Forces
Group 2000, 24).
Voluntary Participation by Local Elites
The CIDG program displayed “mostly out” membership with voluntary
participation by local elites. As with all the factors in the model, the CIDG program
displayed a high degree of membership until Operation Switchback in 1963. During the
initial experiment at Buon Enao, David Nuttle, an American aid worker and later a CIA
contractor, befriended the Buon Enao village chief Y-Ju who became part of the overall
leadership team for the program (Harris 2013, 15). Rhadé leaders, many of whom had
learned English from protestant missionaries and saw the benefits of participating in the
program, were enthusiastic to join the program and served as key members of the village
defense leadership teams (Hickey 1993, 40; Harris 2013, 25 and Moore 2007, 46).
According to Master Sergeant L.R. Fisher, one of the Special Forces soldiers assigned to
the Buon Enao project, “Within the first week, they (Rhadé Tribesmen) were lining up at
the front gate to get into the program. This kicked off the recruiting program, and we
didn't have to do much recruiting. The word went pretty fast from village to village" (5th
Special Forces Group 2000, 13).
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The completion of Operation Switchback ended most of the non-military elements
of the program and this resulted in a diminishment of relationships with local leaders
(Ahern 2010, 107). Moore (2007, 86) did find that the traditional governance structure in
villages participating in the CIDG program remained largely unchanged throughout the
existence of the program because of benign neglect by American and Vietnamese forces.
Unlike the VC, U.S. forces did not attempt to install replacement ruling structures or
coopt local leaders. He found that in most cases the power and prestige of local leaders
was increased with the addition of the armed force provided by the program if the CIDG
companies remained in their village (Moore 2007, 98). However local leadership was not
formally integrated into the structure of the CIDG units unless the local leader joined the
CIDG program and were selected to lead by the Vietnamese.78
After Operation Switchback, all expansion and overall management of the
program stating in late1963 went through district or province chiefs rather than through
tribal leaders (5th Special Forces Group 2000, Annex 2, 14). By failing to incorporate
local leaders into the security structure, the CIDG program provided competing
leadership organizations the opportunity to mobilize the newly armed CIDG members for
their own purposes, often under the noses of U.S. and Vietnamese advisors. The FULRO
uprising is the best example of this phenomenon. FULRO members created a parallel
leadership structure within the CIDG units, collected taxes on CIDG members, and
extorted potential recruits for bribes to join the force. The Special Forces assigned to the
camps infiltrated by FULRO were caught unaware of the problem and seven of the eight
camps in the Buon Enao were taken over by FULRO (Hickey 1982, 165-166, 169-170).
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The CIDG program demonstrated that failing to incorporate local leaders into the
program presents numerous dangers for a community-based security program. The
program started with a strong commitment to coopting local leadership. By shifting to a
purely military focus the program excluded local leaders and forced them to seek
alternative avenues to maintain their power and mitigate abuses by the government of
South Vietnam.
Conclusion
As the previous section has demonstrated and as shown in Table 7, the CIDG
program demonstrated little adherence to any of the factors in the model and was also an
overall failure in protecting the population and territory in the Central Highlands from
communist influence. The program exhibited stark contrast between the initial success of
the program that also adhered closely to the model and the failures of the program after
Operation Switchback.
While the U.S. Special Forces provided adequate arms and other supplies, the
CIDG program failed to demonstrate adequate external oversight and support.
Vietnamese racism and fears of Montagnard separatist movements hindered the
government of South Vietnam from supporting CIDG villages during or after their
partition in the program. This resulted in any gains won during the establishment of the
program in an area being lost after American forces moved to another area.
After Operation Switchback, any attempt to keep CIDG forces operating in their
home areas was abandoned. During the American buildup in 1965, the CIDG forces
were subordinated to the attrition strategy practiced by American forces. CIDG forces
were sent to border areas far outside their homelands, often with disastrous results.
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Sending CIDG companies outside their home areas negatively impacted adherence to
other elements of the model such as local accountability and sustainability and voluntary
participation by local political entrepreneurs.
While Special Forces soldiers adhered to a superficial observance of traditional
justice systems by following Montagnard cultural practices, the CIDG program ignored
any meaningful incorporation of traditional justice systems. Coupled with a failure to
coopt local elites, the CIDG exacerbated Montagnard-Vietnamese relations, resulting in
the FULRO rebellion. Additionally, by excluding Montagnard leadership, the Viet Cong
were able in many cases to operate freely in CIDG camps because CIDG forces had little
connection to the villagers they were nominally protecting.
The CIDG program demonstrated a tragic opportunity lost. The program started
with a strong adherence to the factor of the model and enjoyed a rapid success in securing
large portions of the Central Highlands. By abandoning the mission of population
security in favor of supporting conventional forces, the CIDG program ultimately failed.
Table 7.
Membership of the CIDG Program with Community-Based Security Variables.
Variable/Membership Fully Mostly
More In
More Out
Mostly
In
In
Than Out Than In
Out
External Support and
Oversight
Limits to territorial
jurisdiction
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System
Local sustainability
and accountability
Voluntary
participation by local
elites

Fully
Out

X
X
X

X
X
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CHAPTER IX - TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE
South Vietnam’s Territorial Forces
Introduction
This chapter will explore the use of community-based security forces or territorial
forces by the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) and the United States (U.S.) during
the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1975. During this overview of the program, this chapter
will include a discussion of the organization of the program and the internal and external
factors that influenced the program’s development. Next, after the history of the
territorial forces is presented, this case study will include a detailed discussion of the
degree of membership the case demonstrates for each factor presented in this
dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings
and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix. This case study
will demonstrate that the territorial forces varied in degrees in membership with the
factors in the model, but failed to adhere consistently with any of the factors and failed to
provide adequate population security.
The Territorial Forces, comprise of Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF)
respectively were formed in 1963 from the existing paramilitary Civil Guard and
People’s Militia that were formed in 1956 by the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem
(Cao Van Vien; Ngo Quang Truong; et al. 1980, 139). The RF were organized as
volunteer, locally recruited company-sized units that provided security in the provinces
that they were recruited. The PF forces were comprised of volunteers operating as
platoon sized units intended to provide security for villages against squad sized Viet
Cong (VC) units and VC political infrastructure (VCI). Both forces were originally
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designed to be locally recruited and employed in the area where they were recruited.
During the first year of the program’s existence in 1963, the RF was a fulltime paid force,
but the PF was a part time, unpaid force.
As will be discussed in the following sections of this case study, both forces never
received adequate support and supervision during their existence. During the early
existence of the program from 1963 to 1968 the territorial forces received inadequate
arms and equipment from the U.S. in order to create a large and modern Army of South
Vietnam (ARVN). This period of inattention by the U.S. and GVN allowed the VCI to
insinuate itself into the fabric of rural South Vietnam. Starting in 1968 after the Tet
Offensive, U.S. military and civilian official realized that securing the countryside was
the key to defeating the communist insurgency. Unfortunately, while the U.S.
exponentially increased material and training support for the RF and PF, they never
established a system that would provide sustained oversight over the program by the
GVN or U.S. forces. The result was a local security force that depended on the hit or
miss quality of local leadership.
The territorial force program did not to adhere to the other elements of the model.
The territorial forces and local civilian leadership were not authorized by the GVN to
enforce traditional justice systems, except for the period between 1969 and 1971. Even
during this period, the GVN watered down this authority in an attempt to maintain the
power of the central government.
In addition to limiting the ability of local security forces from exercising local
justice systems, throughout the history of the program, RF and PF units were frequently
deployed outside of their territorial jurisdictions by GVN officials. Throughout the
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Vietnam War territorial forces were increasingly turned into regular military forces and
expected to assist ARVN and U.S. forces in large scale conventional operations as the
war shifted from a guerrilla war into a conventional conflict. This negated their greatest
strength, knowledge of the local environment, and reduced the morale of their personnel
due to extended absence from their families.
The territorial forces also exhibited little adherence to local sustainability. Village
and Hamlet leaders had no authority over the RF and PF units in their sector. Even after
reforms in 1968 granting them tactical control over those forces, the legislation that
provided them with this authority diluted this power by allowing them only the ability to
recommend individuals to district and province chiefs, but the power to appoint and
discipline territorial forces was reserved at the district and province level. Coupled with
the frequent deployment of RF and PF forces outside their home areas resulted in a
division between the populace and the territorial forces.
Additionally, the program lacked local sustainability. While the PF were
designed to be a part time force with the members of the force being volunteers who
made the bulk of their income from their previous employment, as the security situation
in South Vietnam deteriorated, the PF forces became a full time military force that relied
on external funding to maintain the program. This conflicted with centuries old
Vietnamese practices for raising militias that severed another link between the populace
and the territorial forces and caused the territorial forces to collapse when American
funding was withdrawn.
Finally, the territorial force program failed to win the voluntary participation of
local elites. Throughout the program, RF and PF leaders were either military officers
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assigned from other areas or elected by officials outside the community they served. This
process was contrary to the traditional rural Vietnamese methods for leadership selection
and created considerable discontent in the RF and PF units and created leaders that were
beholden to the central government and not the local populace.
Throughout the history of the territorial forces, RF and PF units were universally
regarded as poorly supervised, led, motivated, and equipped. While the U.S. improved
the training and equipment of the RF and PF, they were never able to overcome the
deficiencies in supervision and leadership. This resulted in local security forces that were
more interested in self-preservation than defending their communities. The majority
literature on the territorial forces agree that the opportunity to turn the territorial forces
into an effective local security force was in 1963 to 1964. This was the period before the
VCI became firmly entrenched in village life and the evolution of the conflict into a
pseudo-conventional war with the introduction of large U.S. and North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) conventional units.
As this case study will demonstrate the territorial forces were on the whole an
ineffective force in the fight to secure the rural areas of South Vietnam. RF and PF
forces demonstrated little adherence to the elements of the model and failed to provide an
effective counter to the VC, VCI, and NVA. While some of the deficiencies were
addressed in the period after 1968, the fundamental flaws of a lack of supervision and the
other elements of the model that promote a connection to the local populace were never
adequately addressed. In the following section this case study will provide an overview
of the evolution of the territorial forces and the political and military factors that
influenced the program.
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Background
The use of community-based militias dates to the eleventh century and was based
on the provision of collective provision of manpower by the village and not individual
conscription (Jenkins 1971, 35-37). This system was first disrupted by the French in
1950 when they formed the Vietnamese Armed Forces as a conventional military based
on the Western model. The French also formed South Vietnamese auxiliaries in the
1950s to man static defenses around villages and critical infrastructure, but the main
focus was on building a large conventional army to prevent invasion by conventional
Viet Minh units (Hoang 1980, 13-14).
The auxiliaries received varying degrees of support from the French in the period
of 1950-1955 dependent on the perceived loyalty of the ethnic or religious group
comprising each auxiliary unit (Hoang 1980, 16). After the exit of the French from
Indochina in 1955, the South Vietnamese government organized the existing auxiliary
regiments into the Civil Guard (CG), later the RF and the Self Defense Corps (SDC), late
the PF (Collins 1975, 8). Under this program the civilian province chiefs were
responsible for recruiting and commanding Civil Guard units and the Interior Ministry
was in administrative control and support of the overall program (Hoang 1980, 19).
The focus on developing a large conventional South Vietnamese Army resumed
in 1956 when the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG) took over
military assistance to South Vietnam from the French. Influenced by the Korean War,
the American military leaders of USMAAG, agreed to expand the CG and SDC to 59,000
and 60,000 respectively, but were primarily concerned with preparing the South
Vietnamese military for a conventional attack by the North Vietnamese (Hoang, 1980, 7
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and Collins 1975, 8). This conflicted with the desires of South Vietnam’s president, Ngo
Dinh Diem who wanted to organize a large paramilitary army comprised of professional
officers and manned with territorial units drawn from rural areas. As a condition for
continued U.S. aid, the Vietnamese were persuaded to adopt a plan the directed majority
of resources towards building a small, well equipped professional army filled with
fulltime draftees and designed for mobile warfare (Hoang 1980, 64 and Brigham 2006,
5).
Diem continued to advocate for strengthening the Civil Guard into the early
1960s, but his concern was not population security. Always concerned about challenges
to his regime, especially from the army, Diem wanted to equip the Civil Guard to the
same level as the army to create a counterbalance against a coup (Nag 2002, 122).
USMAAG continued to resist GVN requests to turn the CG and SDC into a fulltime
paramilitary, citing a 1960 study conducted by Michigan State University that
recommended USMAAG train and equip the CG into a rural constabulary force that
focused on policing duties (Ngo 1981, 188 and Hoang 1980, 66).
The security situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate in 1960 and 1961
after the communist National Liberation or Viet Cong (VC) launched their armed
struggle for control of South Vietnam. It became apparent to U.S. leaders that increased
support of the GVN would be needed to prevent a communist takeover of the country. In
response, the Kennedy administration in early 1961 approved a counterinsurgency plan
developed by the U.S. embassy in South Vietnam. The counterinsurgency plan
authorized an increase in the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and to improve rural security
$12.7 million to increase in the Civil Guard to 68,000 and reduce and convert the SDC
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into a 40,000-man People’s Militia (PM) (Hunt 1995, 14). This plan was agreed to by the
Diem regime and subsequently formalized in the Treaty of Amity and Economic
Relations (Cao, et al 1980, 139).
Problems arose immediately because under constraints of U.S. legal code
restricting military aid to non-military forces, the U.S. military could not train or equip
the Civil Guard because it fell under the Ministry of Interior. Prior to 1961 United States
Operations Mission (USOM), the field agency for United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) provided aid to the Civil Guard. Since USOM and USAID were
not legally allowed to distribute lethal military aid, the Civil Guard languished as secondclass citizens behind the army and were supplied with abandoned or captured French and
Japanese weapons (Hunt 1995, 13 and Krepinevich 1986, 219).
Diem yielded to U.S. demands and in 1961 transferred the Civil Guard to the
Ministry of Defense, however province chiefs still commanded the units (Hoang 1980,
66-68). This arrangement remained in effect from 1960 to the end of 1964 with province
and district chiefs maintaining operational control of the territorial units and the Army
responsible for training and supplying the units (Collins 1975, 41).
In addition to the CG and PM, the Diem regime’s ill-fated Strategic Hamlet
program also formed self-defense units by lending weapons to villagers who would then
have to capture weapons to sustain their defenses. The Strategic Hamlet program
collapsed by 1963 because the government lacked the capacity to support the its rapid
expansion and villagers resented being forced to move out of their ancestral lands into
new and usually poor accommodations in Strategic Hamlets. This resulted in poorly
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trained and motivated self-defense units that were easily cowed by superior VC units
(Hoang 1980, 27-28).
In 1963, after a military coup overthrew the Diem regime, the Strategic Hamlet
program was abandoned and the Civil Guard and People’s Militia were renamed
Territorial Forces with two components, the Regional Forces (RF) and the Popular Forces
(PF). The PF organized into platoon size units whose members were drawn from the
village/hamlet complex where a PF platoon operated. The mission of the PF was to
defend villages from small VC forces, to prevent the agents of the VC political
infrastructure (VCI) from establishing themselves in villages, and defend critical
infrastructure. The RF operated as companies within a single district with its full-time
members drawn from the district. The purpose of the RF was to create a buffer around
villages, keeping communist units large enough to overwhelm PF platoons away from the
villages in the province. (Hoang 1980, 36-38).
In 1964 with the security situation rapidly deteriorating and the GVN debilitated
by purges as the military government consolidated its power, the GVN launched the
“Victory Plan” to pacify the countryside (Ngo 1981, 7). The plan was designed to
expand and improve the quality of the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) and to a lesser
extent, the territorial forces. Prior to 1964, there was no training program for territorial
units that according to General James Collins (Collins 1975, 42) resembled “armed gangs
of young men” or “private armies” that had been rapidly pressed into national service.
As part of the Victory Plan all territorial forces would receive a standardized basic
training program with RF receiving four weeks of annual refresher training and PF
platoons receiving two weeks (Collins 1975, 42).
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Between 1964 and 1966, the territorial forces continued to increase in size with
the RF growing from 92,000 to 141,000 and the PF expanding from 159,000 to 176,000
(Hunt 1995, 39). During this period territorial forces were integrated into the South
Vietnamese Armed Forces and the staff of the territorial force program were integrated
into provincial headquarters and staffed with ARVN personnel to improve coordination.
Additionally, RF and PF logistics units were integrated into ARVN units to improve
territorial force supply issues (Ngo 2010, 189). While these reorganizations were
designed to address dire problems in the territorial units, they coincided with the
“Americanization” of the war with the introduction of American ground combat units and
the shift in the war from an insurgency to a quasi-conventional war. This shift in focus
drew the attention of American and South Vietnamese leaders away from overseeing the
reforms to fighting the conventional war. As a result, the territorial units continued to
languish into 1967 with poor leadership, ineffective organization, and resource scarcities
(Krepinevich 1986, 215).
As U.S. units increasingly took over the mission of attacking large communist
units, the ARVN was given the mission of pacification with over 60 percent of ARVN
infantry battalions assigned to pacification support. In October 1966 Manila Conference,
U.S. and South Vietnamese agreed to the Combined Campaign Plan for 1967 that
formalized this division of labor (Cao et al 1980, 141). This left the RF and PF without a
clearly defined role and reduced expectations for performance (Ngo 2010, 196). An
attempt was made in 1967 to improve the employment of the territorial forces through the
creation of RF and PF commands. These command elements did not command territorial
forces, but rather managed logistics and training. The district and province chiefs
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employed the forces in the field. After the coup against the Diem regime, all civilian
province and district chiefs had been replaced with ARVN officers to ensure regime
loyalty (Collins 1975, 72). This created a bifurcated system where the territorial force
commands had no interest in their effectiveness, the province and district chiefs had no
interest in properly equipping them and both organizations were staffed with individuals
interested in maintaining the favor of their ARVN superiors.
In addition to these less than effective organizational changes, a shift in South
Vietnamese military thinking about the relative worth of the territorial forces occurred
during the conflict due to the pressure exerted by the Americans to adopt a western style
of warfare. This led ARVN leaders to press for the expansion of the conventional
conflict and the modernization of the ARVN at the expense of the territorial forces,
according to South Vietnamese General Hoang Ngoc Lung (1980, 1985). By 1967 the
South Vietnamese had adopted all American field manuals as their own doctrine and
ARVN officers resented being relegated to pacification missions. This led them to give
grudging, if any support to support of territorial units while they enviously watched the
American fight the “real war” against the NVA and Viet Cong main force units (Hunt
1995, 75). This is ironic because throughout the war, except during the 1972 communist
Easter Offensive, territorial forces suffered more casualties and inflicted more enemy
casualties than the ARVN between 1965 and 1972 (Thayer 1985, 106). In spite of the
territorial forces fighting the brunt of the war in rural villages, ARVN support remained
poor throughout the war. On average territorial forces in contact receiving artillery
support or ARVN ground unit support after waiting over an hour and up to a day
respectively (Hoang 1980, 53).
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In 1967, as control of the countryside shifted in favor of the VC, American
civilian and military leaders began to shift their thinking about the importance of the
“other war” of pacifying the communist insurgency in the rural areas of South Vietnam.
American leadership in Washington and Saigon recognized that one of the problems of
the pacification program was there was no overall control of the numerous pacification
programs with each agency administered their own programs with little coordination. In
1967 President Lyndon Johnson appointed Robert Komer as Special Assistant to the
President for Pacification in an attempt to gain cabinet level coordination over the
pacification effort in Vietnam. During his first visit to Vietnam in 1967 Komer found
that the majority of territorial units were poorly led and equipped with RF and PF units
using second or third hand WWII-era weapons handed down from ARVN units (Colby
1989, 241).
After an aborted attempt to coordinate all civilian pacification programs through
the Office of Civil Operations under the State Department in the first part of 1967,
MACV formed the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development program (CORDS)
in May 1967 with US military and civilian organizations melded into a single entity at the
province and district level under the direction of Komer. (Jones 2013, 118-119 and Cao,
et al 1980, 131).
As the first director of CORDS, Komer realized that the territorial forces were an
underdeveloped asset in providing the security necessary to allow political and economic
development programs to take hold. In May 1967, he successfully lobbied General
William Westmorland, the MACV commander, to have responsibility for advising and
assisting the RF/PF shifted from the MACV Operations section to CORDS. According to
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Hunt (1995, 91) this decision was critical for the temporary improvement of the RF/PF
between 1968 and 1970.
Under his rapid pacification plan, titled “Operation Takeoff,” Komer planned to
improve the equipment and training of the territorial forces as quickly as possible.
Komer first gained the approval of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and MACV
Commander General William Westmorland to deploy an additional 2,243 American
advisors to train the territorial forces. To put this increase in perspective, in 1967 the
advisor to territorial force member ratio was 1 to 929 and the ARVN ratio was 1 to 23.
This increase constituted a 2,076 percent increase in territorial force advisors (Hunt 1995,
106-108).
The 2,243 advisors would be formed into 353 Military Advisory Teams (MAT)
whose mission was to train territorial units. MATs were made up of two company grade
officers and three noncommissioned officers and an interpreter. Each team was assigned
three to six RF companies or an unspecified number of PF platoons (Cao, et. al 1980,
131). To maximize the number of RF companies or PF platoons a MAT could advise in
their tour of duty, the teams would advise RF and PF units from their formation in basic
training and accompany them until they reached an acceptable level of proficiency and
then move to another unit (Hunt 1995, 108-109).
CORDS also focused on expanding and modernizing territorial units. RF/PF units
received a higher priority for weapons than ARVN units. In 1968 territorial units
received a higher priority for weapons over the ARVN and received over 200,000
weapons of which 100,000 were modern M16 rifles (L. Sorley 1999, 72 and Colby and
McCargar 1989, 254).
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At the urging of Komer, in March 1968 South Vietnam’s President Nguyen Van
Thieu suspended all discharges from the army, recalled all reservists younger than 38
with less than five years of service and lowered the draft age to sixteen to facilitate an
expansion of the ARVN and territorial forces and to recover from losses incurred during
the communist Tet Offensive (Hunt 1995, 152). To formalize and expand President
Thieu’s decree, the national legislature passed the General Mobilization Law in June
1968 that widened the ages of males available for conscription into the security forces.
The law also favored enlistment into the RF and PF by allowing men over the age of 31
to volunteer for the territorial forces in lieu of service in the ARVN (Sorley 1999, 15).
The effect of these to actions was to increase the attractiveness of the territorial forces as
an alternative to compulsory service the ARVN. As a result, the RF grew from 98,000 in
1967 to 196,000 in 1970 and the PF grew from 134,000 to 226,000 during the same
period (Thayer 1985, 97). The territorial forces were further expanded to include a new
unpaid reserve militia, the People’s Self-Defense Force. This force was comprised of all
able-bodied males not serving in the regular or territorial forces. The government
planned to have over four hundred thousand members trained by the end of 1968 (Hunt
1995, 152). The expansion was so large that territorial units comprised over half of
South Vietnamese armed forces by 1969, but they still received less than five percent of
the total war costs (Cao, et al 1980, 142 and Sorley 1999, 73).
Another focus of Operation Takeoff was the improvement of GVN support for the
territorial forces. One attempt was to increase the rank of officer in charge of the
territorial program with the intent of raising the visibility of the program within the
Ministry of Defense. Bowing to Komer’s request, South Vietnam’s President Thieu
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expanded the RF/PF staff and upgraded the RF/PF commander from a colonel to a
lieutenant general (Blaufarb1977, 244).
Unfortunately, the officer assigned to lead the territorial forces, Lieutenant
General Nguyen Duc Thang, an officer held in high regard by the Americans for his
motivation and integrity, resigned in disgust in January 1968 over the incompetence,
corruption, and lack of leadership demonstrated by GVN officials at all levels who were
involved with the program. (Hunt 1995, 131-132). Thang’s resignation provided a highlevel demonstration of the inability of the GVN to overcome embedded institutional
corruption and incompetence needed to adequately support the territorial forces.
The final element Komer introduced as the head of CORDS was an attempt to
measure the level of training and effectiveness of the territorial forces. This was due in
part because he found that the performance of territorial units varied so widely that
MACV staff officers had difficulty establishing population and area security trends
(Daddis 2011, 116). In response MACV introduced the Territorial Forces Evaluation
System (TFES) in 1968.
The TFES collected quantitative data about territorial forces from American
district advisors. The monthly reports included data such as the total number of combat
operations RF and PF units conducted, friendly and enemy casualties, and weapons lost
and captured. The report also asked advisors for subjective rankings of unit leadership,
aggressiveness, and morale. The early versions of the TFEs through 1970 proved to be
ineffective because American advisors judged RF/PF units by American military
standards and improvement in unit effectiveness was equated with increased enemy body
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counts not in improvements in population security or reductions in the VCI. (Daddis
2011, 172).
The other tool Komer used to indicate the effectiveness of the territorial forces
and the overall pacification effort was the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). The HES
rated villages and their satellite hamlets by rating them using six alphabetic rankings
based off dozens of separate data inputs provided by district chiefs and, in parallel, their
American advisors. The top three rankings (A, B, and C) indicated a village was totally
secure to mostly secure, D and E indicated “contested” villages, and V denoted villages
under communist control. Komer’s goal for Operation Takeoff was to improve security
in 1,000 contested villages and bring them up to at least a C ranking (Colby 1989, 254).
The HES experienced issues with reliability and accuracy from its inception
because it was essentially a report card on district and province chiefs. In order to
maintain favor with the central government it was in their interest to minimize reporting
of enemy activity and inflate the effectiveness of territorial units. HES reports that
included reductions in security or increases in communist influence would often result in
the GVN firing district chiefs (Herrington 1982, 193-195).
Coupled with the inherent bias of those collecting HES data, the HES also had
structural defects. As ARVN Brigadier General Tran Dinh Truong (1980, 14) notes, the
HES and other reporting mechanisms did not accurately measure the presence of VC
infrastructure. Instead it collected data on quantifiable occurrences such and the number
of acts of violence, the presence of territorial forces, elections and the presence of local
government. These could correlate with the absence of communist influence or complete
communist control and the complicity of the local population. As subsequent evidence
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presented in this case study, when coupled with a reluctance of local officials to submit
negative data, the latter was more likely in many cases.
In early 1969 General William Westmorland was replace as MACV commander
by his deputy, General Creighton Abrams. Abrams realized that pacification was the key
to defeating the communists, not destroying enemy formations. He instituted the “one
war” concept. The one war concept was intended to give the pacification effort an equal
emphasis with the conventional war that had garnered the majority of the US and GVN
effort from 1965 to 1968. A major part of the one war concept was to increase efforts to
improve and expand the territorial units (Daddis 2011, 174).
At the urging of Komer and Abrams, the GVN continued to institute a series of
reforms in 1969 designed to improve the rural population’s support for the government.
In addition to allowing the popular election of village governing councils and
empowering those councils to disperse development funds, the central government gave
village chiefs operational control of PF platoons for the first time (Colby 1989, 279). In
spite of the increased infiltration of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units in to South
Vietnam, the pacification efforts of the GVN and CORDS seemed have an effect on rural
security. By January 1969 the government had raised the HES scores of over 1,000
hamlets into relatively secure status from contested or enemy controlled, so that only 195
remained contested or enemy controlled (Hunt 1995, 197). However, the HES scores
were illusory. In 730 of the hamlets territorial force commanders had to serve as village
chiefs because the security situation would not permit elections or the population could
not be convinced to participate in government sponsored elections could not find local
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officials. In 61 hamlets that were considered secure there was no government aligned
leadership at all (Hunt 1995, 199).
Unfortunately for the efforts to improve the territorial forces, the implementation
of the One War concept overlapped in late 1969 with Nixon administration’s plan for
“Vietnamization,” the withdrawal of U.S. forces and turnover of responsibility for
fighting communist forces to the ARVN. As part of Vietnamization, the RF/PF assumed
the tasks of pacification and development from the ARVN to give the army the ability to
take over from American units in the mobile mission of attacking large communist
formations. The territorial forces also had to take over defending critical infrastructure
like power plants construction facilities and food production plants (Hoang 1980, 50).
This increasingly took the territorial forces away from their primary mission of village
security.
This shift away from the villages is demonstrated by the TFES which reported
that the PF were the primary security for 47 percent of the population in 1969, but only
39 percent in 1972. During the same time period, the RF were primary security for 16
percent in 1969 and 7 percent in 1972 (Thayer 1985, 156-157). Instead the territorial
forces increasingly conducted offensive operations away from their home areas. During
the 1969 to 1972 period, the percentage of RF offensive operations rose from 57 percent
to 76 percent of total operations and PF offensive operations rose from 23 percent to 40
percent (Thayer 1985, 160). This shift in focus was direct result of PF platoons taking
over district security missions from the RF because RF companies had to conduct
missions against larger VC and NVA units outside their areas of operation that had
previously been the responsibility of the ARVN (Hoang 1980, 52). The practice of
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sending territorial units outside their home areas reached its height when RF units
deployed with ARVN units into Cambodia during the invasion of that country in 1970
(Hoang 1980, 53).
This approach seemed to bring results with HES reports promoted by US and
GVN officials indicating that more than 90 percent of the population lived in hamlets
secured or mostly secured by government forces by that start of 1970 (Daddis 2011, 174).
The security situation was more precarious. While 90 percent of the population lived in
villages with a C rating or higher, only half the population lived in villages rated “B” or
mostly secure and less than 10 percent were in “A” or fully secure villages (Colby 1989,
278 and Komer 1970, 13).
In addition to the 50 percent of the population living under marginal government
control or total communist control, the reporting began to display that most territorial
forces were probably not contesting communist control in favor of tacit cease fires to
ensure their own survival. The most damning evidence of the ineffectiveness of the
territorial forces was reported in 1970 when MACV analysts found that territorial force
activity did not correlate to improvements in population security (Daddis 2011, 174). In
fact, improvements in security increased at the same rate among hamlets without
territorial forces as those with them (Thayer 1975a, 169 and Tran 1980, 171-172). Rand
researcher Mai Elliot (2010, 386) found that security improvement reported in South
Vietnam reported by the HES bore less of a correlation to GVN security force operations
than to lulls in communist activity due to preparations for future attacks or recovery from
previous attacks.
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There are several other factors unrelated to the territorial forces that could have
influenced the indications that security had improved while in reality security had
deteriorated in rural areas. The most important was that by 1969 the conflict had shifted
into a quasi-conventional war fought mostly by North Vietnamese forces (Elliott 2010,
386 and Tran 1980, 17). The communists by this point in the war had shifted to large
scale conventional attacks in their final push for control and the insurgency became less
of a priority. This shift to large scale operations also meant that the territorial forces were
forced to operate only in areas where large ARVN formations could shield them from
large scale NVA and VC attacks.
In areas where ARVN was ineffective or nonexistent, the territorial forces were
forced to acquiesce to communist influence and turn a blind eye to VC units operating in
their territory. This is supported by numerous anecdotal accounts from numerous
locations throughout South Vietnam during the latter years of the war. For example, in
1970 CORDS official John Paul Vann found from numerous field visits that in the II
Corps region in northern South Vietnam, most local officials and RF and PF leaders paid
“insurance” to the local VC to be left alone (Sheehan 1988 and Hunt 1995, 259).
This pattern of territorial forces acting in the interest of self-preservation occurred
in other areas of South Vietnam. In Long An province west of Saigon, American
advisors reported that RF and PF units had reached a “tacit ceasefire” with the VC and
only patrolled at times and places where they knew the VC would not be (Herrington
1982, 46). Jeffrey Race in his in-depth study of the province confirmed this behavior
when he noted that RF and PF platoons “were often placed to protect themselves, but not
the population” (Race 2010, 231) Advisors in Hu Nghia Province, adjacent to Long An,
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observed similar instances of tacit ceasefires with most PF units intentionally avoided
contact with the enemy. One advisor reported that PF platoons would make “slow
gradual sweeps through the assigned area. Occasionally we came across something just
as a blind hog would stumble on an acorn in the forest sometimes.” (Bergerud 1991,
265). In the Hau Nghia province, advisors attributed the reluctance of territorial forces to
confront the VC was the removal of the “security umbrella” of U.S. forces in 1969 and
1970 that shielded them from reprisals from larger communist forces (Faugstad 2010,
36).
Another problem that plagued the effectiveness of territorial forces throughout
their history was the corruption endemic to the GVN political system. Province and
District chiefs had to purchase their positions with bribes to officials in the central
government. Pay for government employees was kept at such low levels that they were
forced to be corrupt in order to survive, while they had to continue to pay bribes to their
superiors to keep their positions. One prime area for district chiefs to skim resources was
the territorial forces. The main method the officials used was to keep “Ghost Soldiers” or
fictitious soldiers kept on the roles so they could take money from the payrolls (Hunt
1995, 39). According to Neil Sheehan (1988, 514) it was a poorly kept secret in Vietnam
during the period of 1969 to 1972 that the most territorial units had far fewer personnel
than they kept on their payrolls, in some cases less than fifty present of their reported
strength.
The result of the territorial forces being thrust into new roles often left with
support and endemic corruption was their continued poor performance in the latter four
years of the war. The March 1971 TFES rated half of the RF/PF units unsatisfactory,
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forcing CORDS to keep its advisor teams training the territorial units for six months after
its planned withdrawal of the teams in June 1972 (Hunt 19995, 258). Territorial units
continued to perform poorly throughout 1971 prompting one CORDS officer to quip,
“there has been no deterioration in the quality of RF/PF, but the quality is so low that this
statement if somewhat irrelevant” (Hunt 1995, 259).
In 1972, the security situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate as the
last American combat troops withdrew. To fill the security vacuum left by American
forces, territorial forces increasingly had to support ARVN units in battle or combat large
enemy formations on their own. RF companies were merged into battalion sized units
and deployed outside their province leaving PF forces the only units available to confront
VC and NVA units main force units in battle. An analysis at the close of 1972 found that
on average territorial force offensive operations outside their home areas increased 50
percent on average from 1971 levels (Thayer 1975a, 221). Territorial forces, especially
the PF platoons continued to deteriorate with the increasingly dire security situation with
CORDS report indicating that a “general pessimism and defensive attitude” had taken
over most territorial forces (Thayer 1975b, 253).
In spite of the poor performance of the territorial forces and the continued
inadequate support for RF and PF forces by the ARVN, MACV urged the South
Vietnamese to expand the territorial forces at the expense of the regular forces. The main
reason behind this push was because regional forces were less expensive for field and
maintain (Hoang 1980, 75). As the U.S. continued to disentangle itself from Vietnam,
the U.S. Congress progressively reduced funding to the GVN. This culminated in 1973
when the congress cut all funding for the South Vietnamese Armed Forces and CORDS
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terminated its oversight of the territorial forces when it ceased operation in January
1973(Cao, et. al 1980, 137). This resulted in severe shortages among the territorial forces
as the ARVN reserved most war stocks for their own use (Hoang 1980, 59). In last
period of the war until the fall of the GVN in April 1975, the territorial units had “lost
their place” as the war shifted to conventional operations with progressively larger NVA
forces invading from the north (Thayer 1975a, 227).
The territorial force program in South Vietnam can be considered a failure. In
spite of the large amounts of resources the U.S. invested in the program in the later stages
of the Vietnam War and marginal improvements in performance, the program never
achieved widespread security in the rural areas of South Vietnam. Most analysts and
historians agree that in addition to numerous shortcomings that will be discussed in
subsequent sections, the main failing of the program was timing. Support for the
program came too late to make a difference. Before 1965 and the shift in the conflict to
large scale conventional operations, the territorial forces could have combatted the
growing communist influence in the countryside. By 1965, communist cadres had over
five years to insinuate themselves into the fabric of rural society (W. E. Crouch 1971,
30). In addition, the destruction of rural infrastructure and social fabric also destroyed
the motivation for rural South Vietnamese to defend their villages against the
communists. As South Vietnamese General Ngo Quang Trung (2010, 206) observed,
once “their houses, gardens, and rice fields - most of which had been inherited through
generations of hard toil - had been destroyed, there was absolutely nothing that could
attract the people to a new village, much less cause them to defend it.” The war became a
struggle for individual and family survival and not the defense of the community.
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ARVN Brigadier General Tran Dinh Tho (1980, 158) agreed that the territorial
force concept only worked where the “motivation and self-interest” of villagers to protect
their communities existed. In a 1967 survey of PF members by the Simulmatics
Corporation, the researchers reported that once there was no motivation to defend their
community against attack, the primary motivation for a majority of PF members became
avoiding service in the ARVN and protection of their family. The report further
indicated that for the majority of PF members, reaching an accommodation for peaceful
coexistence with the VC was an acceptable option to protect their families (Worchel, et
al. 1967, 19). With no reason to fight for the central government or their communist, the
average PF soldier never progressed to being “little more than a gate guard” defending
their armed camps outside of villages (W. E. Crouch 1971, 27).
After 1965, the RF and PF were never capable of dismantling the VC
infrastructure, especially when saddled with the endemic corruption of GVN officials and
poor support from the ARVN (Andrade 1990, 49). Viet Cong acts of terrorism against
the GVN at the village level continued to undermine any stability gained by the
expansion of the territorial forces. Between 1966 and 1969 the Viet Cong assassinated
1,153 officials, 1,863 government employees and 15,015 civilians in villages providing
further disincentive for territorial forces to support the government in the fight against the
communists (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009, 338). This was a conscious effort by the VC
who did not want to kill the territorial forces, rather to keep them trapped in their outposts
and away from the population (Bergerud 1991, 210, 215, 264).
The program was further hobbled because U.S. officials in MACV and CORDS
never had a clear picture of the security situation in rural areas or of the performance of
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the territorial forces. The tools they used to analyze the war such as the HES reported
unrealistically high percentages of the population living in secure areas. According to
Robert Komer, the first director of CORDS, the HES could measure observable data that
may or may not have correlated with levels of security, but “the HES could not measure
the perceptions of the population” (Komer, Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South
Vietnam 1970, 10). Subsequent analysis of HES data found that areas recorded as
controlled by the government could also have been controlled by the Viet Cong and the
apparent improvements in the territorial forces were illusory (Kalyvas and Kocher 2009,
352). Having established that the territorial forces can be considered a failed case, this
case study will now examine the degree of membership the program had with each of the
factors of the model.
External Support and Oversight
Throughout the existence of the territorial forces the U.S. and GVN provided
inconsistent and inadequate support and oversight. While the American leaders
attempted later in the war to improve material support to the territorial forces it came too
little, too late. Both the Americans and ARVN leaders never provided adequate oversight
of the program, even in the later stages of the war. The problem of inadequate oversight
and support was well known among policymakers early in the conflict and was identified
as one of the main causes for the poor performance of the territorial forces and one of the
biggest mistakes of the war (1972, 44, 146). The lack of support fatally crippled the
territorial forces because as one declassified report from 1965 put it, “No man who
constantly feels aggravated at receiving lower pay while doing most of the fighting who
knows that if wounded in action he will have to fend for himself, and who knows that if
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he is killed his family will have no income, is likely to fight wholeheartedly, whatever his
commitment to a cause” (W. E. Crouch 1971, 40). As the preceding quote and the
following discussion will demonstrate, the territorial force program displayed a “mostly
out” degree of membership with the external support and oversight factor of the model.
In the early stages of the conflict the U.S. and GVN provided the least amount of
external support for the territorial forces. From 1956 to 1960 the United States
Operations Mission (USOM), the field agency for United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) at the U.S. Embassy in South Vietnam provided external aid to
the territorial forces. This was because the territorial forces fell under the GVN Interior
Ministry and not the Defense Ministry (Hunt 1995, 13). Due to this administrative
arrangement USOM was not legally allowed to distribute military aid. This forced the
GVN to arm the territorial forces with discarded Japanese or French weapons leaving
them outmatched by the better equipped VC forces (Krepinevich 1986, 219). According
to the official Army history of the training of the South Vietnamese armed forces, the
territorial forces were “unprepared, untrained, and unequipped” during the critical period
when the communist insurgency was gaining strength and embedding itself in rural South
Vietnam (Hunt 1995, 13).
After 1964, neglect of the material needs of the territorial forces increased as the
U.S. focused on building the ARVN into a large conventional force. According to Robert
Komer (1972, 31) during the period of 1964 to 1967, MACV “scrupulously avoided”
diverting resources to territorial forces “regardless of circumstances” in order to build
ARVN forces. Several small-scale operations to improve the effectiveness of the
territorial forces were undertaken during this period, but according to Hunt (1995, 14)
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they were half-hearted and quickly abandoned. Additionally, American military leaders
did not want to expend effort or resources on pacification or the territorials because they
considered them to be a constabulary force and not a paramilitary, therefore the territorial
forces were “civilian business” (Komer 1972, 137).
When Robert Komer assumed the role as Special Assistant to the President for
Pacification and later CORDS chief 1967, he found that the majority of territorial units
were still being equipped with second or third hand WWII era weapons handed down
from ARVN units (Colby 1989, 241). This enraged Komer who noted that the U.S. spent
over $14 billion for bombing and conventional operations and $850 million the entire
pacification program of which the territorial forces were only a part (Komer 1972, 40).
While support for the territorial forces improved under Komer’s “Operation Takeoff,”
discussed earlier, the damage from the initial years of neglect had been done. Komer
admitted later in his analysis of American pacification efforts that efforts to improve the
territorial forces were too late and a similar effort before 1965 could have produced
successful results (Komer 1972, xi).
The neglect of the territorial forces was mirrored by the GVN which from 1964 to
1968 spent less than 5 percent of its defense budget on territorial forces (Thayer 1985,
167). Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen (Dong 2010, 77), the last chief of staff of
the South Vietnamese Armed Forces Joint Staff, admits that the territorial forces never
received the support they needed. This was especially true in the early years of the
conflict when the focus was on building the conventional army and that what support
they did give to the territorial forces was “completely trial and error” (Dong 2010, 77).
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The GVN also starved the territorial forces of manpower until reforms were
enacted in 1968, which proved to be too little, too late to provide the manpower
necessary to reverse the gains of the communist insurgency. The most intense weakening
of RF and PF manpower occurred during the period on conventionalization of the conflict
during the period of 1964 to 1966. During this period American and GVN leaders gave a
higher priority for manpower to the ARVN that prevented planned increases in the
territorial forces (Krepinevich 1986, 219). The diversion of manpower during this period
also extended to trained leaders. From 1964 to 1967 RF companies had on average only
42 percent of the officers required to lead RF companies (Komer 1972, 155).
Robert Komer also complained that the district and province administrative
apparatus, which was staffed exclusively by military personnel, was also allowed to
atrophy in favor of expanding the ARVN during this period (Komer 1972, 20). This
proved to be detrimental to the effectiveness of the territorial forces because in 1963
province and district chiefs were given control of RF and PF units in their areas in
addition to administering all civil matters. In many cases province chiefs were tasked
with controlling territorial forces equaling up to two divisions with no additional staff
(Ngo 1981, 184-185).
Attempts to improve the material support for the territorial forces had the opposite
result in many cases when ARVN units were tasked with supporting them in addition to
their internal support requirements. The most acute shortfalls came in the form of
support for territorial units in contact with communist forces. In 1964, ARVN units
assumed responsibility for medical evacuation for injured RF and PF members. The
additional requirement without corresponding increases in capabilities taxed medical
243

units “to the limit of their capabilities according to ARVN Lieutenant General Dong Van
Khuyen (2010, 55). The ARVN also failed to provide other forms of support to territorial
units. In 1966 to 1967 ARVN units provided artillery support to RF and PF units in
contact in only 17 to 45 percent of cases and with ground forces in only eleven percent of
cases (Thayer 1985, 164 and Krepinevich 1986, 221)... Even after 1968 ARVN units
were frequently unable to provide an effective screen to keep large communist units from
threatening smaller RF and PF units because they were overburdened with pacification
missions as well as conducting conventional attacks against large NVA formations (Hunt
1995, 48).
The lack of material support proved to be one the most influential factors in the
demoralization of the territorial factors (Bergerud 1991, 167). In a survey conducted in
1967 of 1300 PF members in nine provinces, 60 percent of PF members reported that
their pay and equipment were unsatisfactory, impacting unit morale and effectiveness and
98 percent responded that their unit “needed help” (Williams 1967). While CORDS
under Robert Komer addressed many of the material needs of the territorial forces
including pay and equipment, most experts, including Komer agree that the damage to
the program caused by a lack of resources was done by 1967 (Collins 1975, 93; L. Sorley
1999, 72; and Colby and McCargar 1989, 254). The qualitative inferiority of territorial
forces in the early years of the conflict created a psychological inferiority among
territorial forces that they were never able to overcome (Ngo 2010, 202).
The larger failing of both the American and South Vietnamese governments was
the inability of either to provide adequate oversight to the territorial force program. This
was due to several factors including the relationship established between both nations,
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institutional inertia in both governments and the pervasive corruption existing in the
GVN. As a result of all these factors, territorial forces never received sustained oversight
and their performance suffered because of it.
One of the enduring conditions that prevented adequate oversight of the territorial
forces was the relationship between the U.S. and the GVN. Throughout the war, U.S.
leaders were careful to give the appearance of a partnership between the US and South
Vietnam with the U.S. in strictly an advisory role (Komer 1972, 34). Throughout the
war, regardless of the level of U.S. involvement, this partnership and advisory
relationship prevented the U.S. from forcing GVN officials to perform in return for U.S.
aid.
According to the Pentagon Papers, American leaders identified oversight of the
territorial forces as a major problem impacting their effectiveness as early as 1965 (US
Department of Defense 2010, 17631-17633). Several proposals were presented to
American leaders in Saigon and Washington. These included the “encadrement” or
integration of U.S. and South Vietnamese security forces that was favored by President
Lyndon B. Johnson. General Westmoreland, the MACV commander, opposed this
proposal because in addition to language and logistics problems, it would give the
appearance that the U.S. had taken control of the war effort, (US Department of Defense
2010, 16531-16533).
In a desire to keep the appearance of the GVN as the lead actor in the conflict,
Westmorland chose to increase the training advisory effort. This also played into the
institutional inertial of the U.S. military. According to The Pentagon Papers,
Westmorland chose to treat the problems with RF and PF unit effectiveness as a problem
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of technical proficiency and not operational oversight because he thought operational
advisors were not an effective use of U.S. personnel (US Department of Defense 2010,
17759-17761). Although previous studies had shown that training of territorial forces
without sustained operational oversight was ineffective as early as 1965, Westmorland
chose to ignore this information (US Department of Defense 2010, 17631-17633). His
thinking was that the American Army was already advising the training of territorial
forces, so increasing that effort should bring results (US Department of Defense 2010,
17595-17596).
The initial American advisory effort for the territorial forces was modest. In 1963
five U.S. advisors were assigned to oversee RF/PF training centers. By 1965 MACV had
increased to the number to 150, but this was small portion of the 1,820 advisors that were
assigned to every ARVN unit down to battalion level (Hunt 1995 18). The shift in focus
by American leaders to pacification in 1968 resulted in improving the effectiveness of
territorial forces becoming a main priority. Prior to 1968 American advisors had only
overseen the territorial force training centers and not operational RF and PF units. To
improve existing territorial units, MACV created Military Advisory Teams (MAT)
(Collins 1975, 120). MATs would meet their RF or PF units in training, following them
through their training and then back to their villages for a period up to two months when
they would be deemed operationally effective (Ngo 1981, 205). This temporary
oversight was implemented because MACV did not believe there was the manpower
available to station U.S. advisors permanently with each RF company and PF platoon.
Westmoreland wanted 354 teams fielded in 1968. In spite of test in 1967 that showed
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this method of temporary oversight brought “no significant improvement in the territorial
forces” the plan was implemented in 1968 (Krepinevich 1986, 220).
MAT teams were marginally effective when they were with RF and PF units. In
spite of limited language training and translators, short tours of duty that gave advisors
only cursory knowledge of local conditions, the teams improved the effectiveness of the
units they advised (Cao et al 1980, 155). Once problem was that the program as designed
could not provide consistent and enduring oversight of territorial forces. In 1968 to 1971,
U.S. advisors to territorial units comprised only one percent of the overall advisory effort
and never exceed a ratio of 1 advisor for every 100 territorial force members (Ngo 2010,
210 and Komer 1972, 125-126). This was during the period when Territorial forces grew
by 58 percent to eventually comprise over half of the South Vietnamese security forces
(Thayer 1985, 166). The 350 advisory teams could not provide any sustained oversight
of a force of over half a million (Collins 1975, 91)
Territorial units performed well when provided advisors and working under the
supervision of ARVN or U.S. units (Thayer 1985, 167). As long as U.S. or ARVN units
provided an adequate shield from large communist units and oversaw the territorial units,
RF and PF units performed adequately (Bergerud 1991, 222, 225, 267). According to
Bergerud (1991, 296 and Worchel, et al. 1967, 26-27) HES data and individual
observations indicated that effective RP and PF security operations was usually
concentrated with units that received the most support and oversight. However, the gains
in effectiveness were in most cases temporary. When U.S. units moved to secure new
areas or advisors moved to their next unit, territorial units lost all motivation to conduct
operations against the communists within a few months (Andrade 1990, 92-94, 197).
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According to one American colonel, RF and PF operations devolved into “a charade with
everyone playing his part” with territorial unit entering into non-aggression pacts with the
communists and pretending to patrol. (Bergerud 1991, 296).
Institutional inertia in the form of U.S. military units focusing on the missions
they had trained for, namely large scale conventional combat also impacted the
effectiveness of the territorial forces. After CORDS was established in 1968, the plan for
pacification was for the U.S. forces would destroy communist main force units, the
ARVN would clear areas of enemy forces and oversee pacification efforts to provide
space for territorial units to dismantle local Viet Cong political infrastructure and
guerrilla units. In theory this seemed like a logical plan, but by adding non-military
pacification duties, a mission they were not trained for, overtasked ARVN units and
distracted them from securing territory and supporting territorial units (Cao, et al 1980,
149 and Daddis 2011, 116). This also left RF and PF units with a mission they were not
trained to execute and with reduced expectations for performance (Ngo 2010, 196).
Finally, the territorial units continued to demonstrate consistent and sustained
effectiveness because of the systemic corruption and ineptitude in the GVN. According
to Robert Komer, the inability of the U.S. to force reform within the GVN or to adopt
performance based accountability measures was the most important factor in the U.S.
failure in Vietnam and was never adequately addressed throughout the war (Komer 1972,
vii-ix, 26) (Ngo 1981, 19-22). Effectiveness was seen as a problem of technical
competence in administration, logistics, and training, but not operational effectiveness.
According to Komer, this focus on competence and not effectiveness resulted in a lack of
“leverage” by U.S. advisors who could not force results (Komer 1972, 122-124). This
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was especially true with the territorial forces after 1968 when they became a key element
in pacification and Vietnamization (Komer 1972, 29 and Vietnam Task Force 1969, Part
IV.3, p. 45)
The U.S. continually asked the ARVN to assume responsibilities and did not
institute the controls needed to monitor and ensure results. Each new administrative
restructuring of the territorial force program was beyond the abilities of ARVN leaders.
This started in 1964 when district chiefs, who were politically appointed junior officers
that were often reassigned due to power struggles in the GVN, were given control of the
territorial forces and were overwhelmed (Komer 1972, 111). These junior officers, who
were usually not from the area, without additional staff, and also administering all civil
programs in their district, were responsible for controlling three to six RF companies, 40
PF platoons and coordinate operations with hundreds of village and hamlet officials (Cao
et al 1980, 152). Overtasking and often a lack in initiative resulted in little interaction
between district officials and territorial units and as much as a year would elapse between
visits by district officials (Ngo 2010, 195 and Worchel, et al. 1967, 25). This resulted in
the status of territorial units reported to U.S. and GVN officials was usually based off
reports that were usually “matters of faith” rather than observable fact (Ngo 2010, 198
and Tran 1980, 107-108, 164).
The ability of the ARVN to provide oversight did not improve with
Vietnamization in 1969. To bolster the strength of the ARVN and improve oversight,
territorial forces were formally merged into the Army in 1969. The burden of controlling
the territorials was somewhat mitigated by creating RF battalion headquarters capable of
controlling two to five RF companies (Ngo 2010, 190). However, ARVN field
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commanders were still responsible for managing civil and military pacification programs
in addition to managing ARVN and territorial forces, which according to one ARVN
general, “placed and unmanageable administrative burden on the ARVN and control was
impossible” (Dong 2010, 79). As U.S. forces withdrew the burden on the ARVN only
increased as ARVN battalions had to focus 60 to 70 percent of their time on offensive
operations against NVA units (Thayer 1985, 63). The new territorial force headquarters
then became responsible for managing pacification programs that they were not trained or
equipped to do and had previously taken up to 80 percent of ARVN capacity (Tran 1980,
37). This resulted in the territorial forces executing the pacification to become “like most
things in Vietnam, it has been cumbersome, wasteful, poorly executed, only spottily
effective in many respects” (Komer, Impact of Pacification on Insurgency in South
Vietnam 1970, 7). By 1973 the situation had deteriorated to the point that the ARVN had
no strategic reserve and was unable to conduct supervision of the RF and PF (Komer
1972, 140). The RF lost their ability to support PF units that resulted in a reduction in the
aggressiveness of the territorial forces (Joes 2001)
While territorial forces took over 60 percent of casualties and inflicted 33 percent
of enemy casualties caused by South Vietnamese security forces between 1967 and 1972
they were never given adequate support or oversight during the entire Vietnam conflict.
(Thayer 1985, 164). In the initial phase of the war from 1964 to 1967 the qualitative
inferiority of territorial forces and the failure of ARVN forces to come to their aid left RF
and PF forces no option but “to defend themselves and their families by retreating into
their fortified camps outside of villages” (Thayer 1975a, 145). American efforts after
1968 did improve their material inferiority, but the institutional inability for the
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Americans or GVN to provide sustained oversight doomed the territorial forces to
ultimate failure.
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction
During the initial phases of the Vietnam War until 1964, territorial forces were
restricted to their village complex for the Popular Forces and district for Regional Forces.
As the conflict escalated, Regional Forces were increasingly sent outside their districts to
support ARVN forces. This practice had a cascading effect that forced to the Popular
Forces to operate outside their village boundaries to assume the district duties left by the
RF. This practice continued to expand as GVN turned the RF companies into
conventional forces and expanded their use outside their province. Additionally, district
officials routinely employed PF platoons outside their villages to secure infrastructure
and placed PF camps away from villages. As the following section will demonstrate, the
territorial force program displayed a “mostly out” adherence to the principle of limits to
territorial jurisdiction.
Assignments away from their homes remained a chronic issue for the territorial
forces throughout their existence. One of the finding 1967 Simulmatics Corporation
survey of PF members found that in addition to complaints of low pay and poor
equipment, the other main complaint from PF members was that PF platoons were
misused by province and district chiefs. According to the report, the majority of PF
members complained that they were routinely sent out of their villages to defend bridges
and government buildings or on offensive operations. The report concluded this was the
result of a lack of motivation by ARVN officers and their desire to avoid onerous or
dangerous tasks. As one USOM official reported ARVN battalions often preferred to “sit
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on its collective duff, while using the Regional and Popular Forces for search and clear
operations (Worchel, et al. 1967).
Frequent assignments away from their homes was cited as one of the main
reasons for the high level of desertions among territorial forces. Desertion rates in March
1967 were 12.5 and 17.7 per thousand for the RF and PF. When interviewed deserters
reported that separation from their families, low pay, and poor leaders as the main
reasons for leaving their units. Assignments away from home remained a main cause for
desertions after reforms in 1968 addressed pay and equipment shortcomings. While
reforms reduced desertions, they remained high into 1971 with rates for RF at 11.7 and
PF at 9.1 per thousand. (Hunt 1995, 258).
As American forces withdrew from Vietnam, the practice of sending Regional
Force companies outside their district increased as they were expected to assume a more
offensive role against large NVA formations (Hunt 1995, 259). To combat large
communist forces, the Regional Forces were organized into battalions in 1969 with the
mission to act as mobile reserve forces and deployed for up to two months away from
their provinces to include accompanying ARVN units during the 1970 invasion of
Cambodia (Thayer 1985, 34-35, Ngo 2010, 197 and Tran 1980, 47). By 1973 all RF
companies were formed into 360 battalions and those battalions were further grouped into
RF mobile groups of two or three battalions for use outside of their province. According
to ARVN Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong (2010, 190-191) by the last years of the
war the RF were a fully conventional force and “had lost all of their local character.” The
removal of RF companies from districts required PF platoons to operate outside their
villages for extended periods. To address the additional stress placed on PF members to
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provide for their families, the GVN created a system to provide them with additional
rations while they were deployed (Tran 2010, 231-232).
The deployment of territorial forces proved to be a continuing problem for moral
and also decreased their operational effectiveness. According to ARVN Lieutenant
General Ngo, sending the RF and PF out of home territories deprived them of their
greatest advantage, knowledge of the local terrain and populace and they performed
poorly because of it (Ngo 2010, 197). The territorial forces demonstrated “mostly out”
adherence to territorial limits. First this was caused by misuse by ARVN officers and
later because of the exigencies of the American withdrawal and escalation of the conflict.
Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems
The territorial force program demonstrated a “fully out” adherence to the
principle of incorporation of traditional justice systems. While reforms in 1968 increased
self-rule and increased the freedom of villages to regulate themselves, overall justice
system and methods used to regulate the territorial forces were externally imposed and
traditional systems were suppressed for much of the conflict. While reforms devolved
some power to the population, no attempt was made to return the underlying foundations
for the sustainment of the territorial forces or justice system.
The imposition of an individual-based western style of raising and maintaining
the territorial forces proved to be a major source of friction between the GVN and the
rural populace. The traditional Vietnamese system for military service traced its roots
back to the Ly Dynasty in the eleventh century. Under this system the raising of security
forces was the collective responsibility of villages. Under this system villages provided
forces dependent on population and population density and families were not expected to
253

bear a disproportional burden. Villages were responsible the conduct and were
collectively punished for the desertion of their recruits. This established collective
responsibility and the ability of the village to discipline the soldiers they provided
(Jenkins 1971, 35-37).
Under the Diem regime, the traditional system of village self-regulation was
discarded and replaced with an alien village election process (Tran 1980, 155). This was
most evident with the territorial units that became a tool for the politically connected to
avoid military service and their duty for collective defense. The 1967 Simulmatics report
found that a majority of PF members resented that the rich members of the PF used it as a
method to escape military service and that while they did not pull their duties there was
no internal method to discipline them (Worchel, et al. 1967, 6).
The 1968 reforms by the GVN that were mentioned earlier and will be addressed
in the following section addressed accountability, but there is no record of any attempts
by the GVN to reform the basis for military service on traditional customs. There was
also not attempt to empower local officials or the territorial forces to enforce customary
law. Therefore, the territorial forces demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership
with the principle of incorporation of traditional justice systems.
Local Sustainability and Accountability
Throughout the conflict in Vietnam, the territorial forces lacked mechanisms to
promote local sustainability and accountability. As mentioned in the previous section
recruiting for the territorial forces departed from the traditional methods for recruiting.
The western model for individual recruiting placed heavy and unequal burdens on the
rural population to provide manpower for the security services. Also, the practice of
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paying territorial forces that was adopted after 1963 distorted local economies and
created an unsustainable system that crumbled after American aid was withdrawn.
Additionally, corruption and the desire to maintain regime stability created an
unaccountable system that was unresponsive the needs of the rural population. Reforms
after 1968 addressed some the issues creating this system, but were abandoned or diluted
in the interest of regime stability. This created a security force that demonstrated a
“mostly out degree” of membership with the principle of local sustainability and
accountability.
Under the Diem regime, the territorial forces, in particular the Popular Forces,
were designed to be a part time security force. The temporary stipends they received
while at initial or annual sustainment training was intended to supplement their existing
income while they were unable to work. As the security situation deteriorated in rural
South Vietnam, PF platoons were consolidated into village outposts, usually some
distance from their hamlets. By 1967 the Simulmatics survey of PF members found that
the majority lived in fortified camps near the village headquarters. This caused them to
move their families into the camps with them and their full-time security duties prevented
them from continuing their previous occupation (Worchel, et al. 1967, 23). The adoption
of the “Victory Program” and the integration of the territorial forces into the armed forces
addressed this problem by instituting pay scales for the territorial forces and turning them
into full time soldiers (Hoang 1980, 36-39).
The removal of large numbers of working age males from the rural economy and
into the security forces and the infusion of outside sources of money created runaway
inflation in rural South Vietnam. In the period between 1964 and 1971 the retail price
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index of rice in South Vietnam rose 833 index points (Dong 2010, 48-51). The modest
pay increases granted by the GVN never kept pace with inflation (Ngo 2010, 192). Living
on inadequate fixed salaries that their leaders often skimmed, faced with inflation and
supply shortages, territorial soldiers were presented with few options to service. Rand
Corporation researchers surveying territorial forces found this created a situation where
RF and PF members, who were concerned with the survival of their families and
physically removed from the villages in armed camps, often coerced or stole from
villagers to survive (Elliott 2010, 379). The extent of this behavior is supported by
interviews with villagers conducted by the Simulmatics Corporation in 1967 that reported
most villagers expressed “resentment of the poor behavior of the RF and PF” (Worchel,
et al. 1967, 13).
The sheer size of the territorial forces, which expanded to over 500,000 by 1971
and comprised over half of the South Vietnamese armed forces, created a force
unsustainable by the rural Vietnamese (Thayer 1985, 156-157). In addition to the size of
the force was the logistical support required to sustain the territorial forces. In a case of
“mirror imaging” the U.S. added capabilities such as organic artillery to the territorial
forces as they attempted to create a force that could assume the role of the ARVN as they
assumed the missions of withdrawing American units (Komer 1972, 41). This created a
force that was only sustainable with to U.S. support. As U.S. aid fell in 1971 and 1972
and the mission of the RF/PF grew, the effectiveness of the territorials began to decline
with increased desertions and equipment shortages (Hunt 1995, 261).
In addition to creating a force that was unsustainable by rural villages, the U.S.
and GVN also never instituted mechanisms to make the territorials accountable to the
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local population. Under the Diem regime, most provincial and district leadership and
administrative positions that controlled the territorial forces were filled with regime
loyalists who were from urban areas or had escaped North Vietnam. According to Hunt,
these officials did not understand or care about the needs of the rural population (1995,
12). In 1963, ARVN officers replace all Diem loyalist territorial units as well as in
district and province governments, but most ARVN officers were also from urban areas,
so the same problems remained (Jenkins 1971, 20).
Corruption also motivated province and district officials to use the territorial
forces for their own ends. Most officials gained their positions through bribes paid to
senior officials who expected continued bribes if officials wanted to keep their positions.
To keep this system of bribes functioning, officials used the widespread practice of filling
the territorial personnel rolls filled “ghost soldiers” or “potted-tree soldiers” who had
either died or deserted. These were men who had either died or paid a bribe for false
discharge papers so they could go home (Sheehan 1988, 514).
Coupled with the systemic corruption of the system, GVN instituted a leadership
selection system that prioritized regime loyalty over accountability to the people. This
was particularly acute with PF platoons, which had the closest proximity with the rural
population. Instead of allowing the population or local leadership, PF platoon leaders
were appointed by the province chief. Additionally, the province chief was the only
official authorized to discipline PF platoon leaders (Ngo 2010, 194). This created a
system where PF leaders were only responsive to district and province leaders and
primarily interested with continuing corrupt practices within the territorial forces.
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In 1969, the GVN, at the urging of CORDS, instituted reform of local governance
with the aim of improving the responsiveness of the GVN to the needs of the local
populace. The reforms included the election of village councils in all secure villages and
empowering village councils to develop and enact development projects without the
approval of district or province officials (Colby 1998, 264-265, 277). In practice, the
elections were heavily influenced by district and province officials and most village
councils were packed with people loyal to higher officials in a process that Lieutenant
General Tran Dinh Tho (1980, 156) called “wholesale appointment under the cover of a
ballot.”
Subsequent reforms included granting village chiefs control of the PF platoons in
their villages. As with the elections, this change was diluted by the GVN. While the
village chief could direct the employment of the PF platoon, district and province chiefs
retained the power to remove, reward or discipline PF platoon leaders (Race 2010, 274).
Even if the village chief could motivate the PF platoon leader to conduct operations, the
district and province chiefs controlled other levers of power. The most important power
the district and province chiefs held was the ability to request support from ARVN units.
As one village chief complained, “We have to notify the district in advance of an
operation; the district chief immediately radios back that we can go on the operation if we
want, but if we get into trouble, don’t expect reinforcement, artillery, or medical help for
the wounded” (Race 2010, 274). The denial of support remained a persuasive tool to
keep the PF platoon leader in line with the wishes of the district and province chiefs and
not the local population.
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In 1971 with the security situation in rural population, the small amount of control
gained by the population was curtailed. In an effort to ensure the loyalty of village
leadership, the GVN suspended Village elections and restored the power to appoint
village chiefs to province chiefs (Bergerud 1991, 318). Additionally, the government
assigned junior officers to villages as assistant chiefs with the responsibility for
coordinating security (Ngo 1981, 19). After these two changes were enacted, the rural
population lost any meaningful means to hold the territorial forces accountable.
In spite of the lack of sustainability and accountability demonstrated by the
territorial force program through most of its existence, the territorial force program
demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership with the principle of local
accountability and sustainability due to the temporary reforms in place between 1969 and
1971. The rapid expansion of the territorial force program, the decision to turn territorial
force members in to full time soldiers, and the evolution of the forces into a conventional
army created pressures on rural villages that were unsustainable with the reduction of
U.S. aid after 1972. Additionally, the GVN created a system that directed the loyalty of
the territorial forces to district and province chiefs instead of the population and denied
the population any mechanisms to ensure the accountability of the territorial forces.
Voluntary Participation by Local Elites
The territorial forces demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership with the
principle of voluntary elites. The method implemented for selecting leadership adopted
by the GVN ran against the traditional concept of collective defense practiced by the
Vietnamese. Leadership for PF platoons was drawn from within the platoon,
membership in program was usually not voluntary. Additionally, leadership within the
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province RF companies was not drawn internally or from existing leadership within the
province. In many cases informal leadership within the territorial units rested with
someone other than the official leadership.
The original concept of voluntary participation practiced by the territorial forces
until 1963 conformed to the Vietnamese tradition of village self-government with village
defense a shared responsibility. In the traditional practice of village self-defense, the
local population, at the request of the government, formed a small cadre of security
personnel through a process of popular consensus. This created a system without formal
leadership, but a collective force guided by popular will and consensus. Membership in
village security forces was voluntary and temporary. Additionally, consideration of
family circumstances were taken into consideration with families without the means to
supply manpower exempted from service (Dong Van Khuyen, 78).
The system enacted by the GVN did not adhere to any of the characteristics of the
traditional village defense system. The major departure from the traditional system
weakening and then jettisoning of the voluntary nature of service in the territorial forces.
As the program expanded in 1963, the government started to conscript men into RF and
PF units if there were not enough volunteers on an ad hoc basis (Crouch 1971, 25).
While the GVN still tried to man the RF and PF with volunteers, conscription of
territorial force members when quotas were not met was formalized in 1964 (Collins
1975, 42).
Even when members of the territorial forces enlisted, their participation was
usually not voluntary. The main motivations of most territorial force members for
joining the RF and PF were avoidance of the ARVN draft, being forced to join, and a
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desire to be near their family (Worchel, et al. 1967, 5). Most PF members joined the
territorial forces not to defend their villages, but to avoid fighting and to be left along by
both sides of the conflict (Worchel, et al. 1967, 7). Robert Komer, the head of CORDS
from 1968 to 1970, admitted that most members of the RF and PF were not volunteers,
but joined to escape being drafted into the ARVN (Komer 1970, 5). The perceptions of
most other American civilian and military officials echo this observation (Williams
1967).
In addition to the rank and file members of the territorial force not being
volunteers, most leaders were not the natural or existing local leaders. One of the chronic
problems of the territorial forces was they were weak and corrupt at all levels (Hunt
1995, 258-259). Due to the corruption of the GVN system, national leaders selected
province and district leaders that would support the regime and provide them with a
revenue stream. The district and province leaders in turn selected territorial force leaders
who would support and enrich them. This created territorial units that were ineffective
due to poor leadership (Bergerud 1991, 167, 310).
When surveyed, PF members indicated poor leadership as a major issue in their
units. PF members complained that they could not select their leader and indicated
favoritism as a common criterion used to select PL platoon leaders. They also
complained that there was no process for removing ineffective leaders (Worchel, et al.
1967, 10-11). Most interesting for this case study, most PF members indicated that they
favored someone else in the platoon or the village to be leader, which indicates that the
existing traditional leadership in villages was excluded from leading PF platoons
(Worchel, et al. 1967, 20).
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The RF forces also suffered from chronic leadership issues. The main issue that
faced the RF was they did not have enough leaders the GVN deemed to be qualified.
Instead of developing leaders from within the RF or seeking out existing leaders in the
community, the GVN decided to assign ARVN officers and sergeants to RF companies
starting in 1965. The number of ARVN officers increased from 878 in 1965 to 10,800 in
1970 when the majority of officers and sergeants in the RF were from the ARVN. In
addition to excluding local leadership, this practice caused resentment among ARVN
officers who considered the RF inferior to the ARVN and saw the assignment hurt their
opportunities for promotion and awards. (Ngo Quang Truong 2010, 194).
The territorial forces demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership with the
principle of voluntary participation. If they were not drafted into the PF, PF members
rarely joined PF platoons to protect their villages. They’re most common motivations
were to avoid the draft and to stay close to home. While the individuals selected to serve
as PF platoon leaders usually came from the village the platoon was defending, leaders in
the PF were typically not the natural or traditional leaders in villages, but men chosen for
their loyalty to district and province chiefs. RF companies also did not have leadership
drawn from within the units or from the community. To bolster the effectiveness of RF
companies, the GVN imported leadership from the ARVN instead of selecting local
leaders.
Conclusion
The territorial force program was an overall failure in that it failed to provide
effective security for the rural population of South Vietnam. The program evolved from
a volunteer, community-based security force into a quasi-conventional force designed to
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conduct offensive operations against the communist forces. During the critical early
phase of the conflict when the communist insurgency was gaining strength in the
countryside, American and South Vietnamese leaders ignored the program in favor of
building the ARVN into a conventional force designed to prevent a Korea War style
invasion from the North. When American and GVN leaders did recognize the potential
of the program and diverted resources to the program, the program continued to be beset
with problems because territorial units never received sustained oversight. After 1968,
the territorial forces enjoyed a year of improved performance under the Accelerated
Campaign Plan, but quickly evolved into a quasi-conventional force designed to fill the
security gaps created by the withdrawal of American forces. Coupled with inability of
the GVN to oversee the program, the rapid expansion of the program in the later stages of
the war caused the territorial forces to continue to be beset with corrupt and inadequate
leadership and ineffective units. All of these issues forced territorial force members to be
more interested in protecting themselves and not their communities.
The territorial forces demonstrated little or no adherence to the model presented in
this dissertation (see Table 8). The program highlighted the importance and
interconnection of external support. The U.S. and GVN starved the program of resources
in the early years of the conflict and provided little oversight. When they provided
resources later in the war, both governments failed to provide adequate oversight.
Also, this case demonstrated a little adherence to limits to territorial jurisdiction.
Although the intent of the territorial forces was to employ PF platoons to defend their
villages and the RF to conduct operations within their district, this was frequently ignored
by the ARVN officers who commanded both forces. PF platoons frequently defended
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infrastructure or headquarters outside their village and were typically stationed in camps
outside their villages. The RF companies also frequently operated outside their districts
for extended periods, practice that increased because of Vietnamization after 1969.
This case also demonstrated a “fully out” degree of membership with
incorporating traditional justice systems and “mostly out” with the principle of local
accountability and sustainability. The GVN gave village chiefs no power to apply
traditional Vietnamese governance or justice mechanisms and created a manpower and
resource intensive security force that was unsustainable by rural communities without
large amounts of external support. Additionally, district and province chiefs maintained
most of the power over territorial forces and installed leaders that were beholden to them
and not the local population. The lack of connection with their communities and
inadequate pay encouraged many RF and PF members to prey on the local population for
their survival.
The failure of the GVN to select the natural or traditional rural leadership in favor
of selecting individuals loyal to the regime caused the program to demonstrate a “fully
out” adherence to the principle of voluntary participation by local elites. Poor leadership
continued to be a major problem with the majority of territorial forces. Dissatisfaction
with their leadership and desiring others in the community to command PF platoons was
a reoccurring complaint made by PF members. In the case of the RF, ARVN discarded
any attempt to select leadership from within the RF and assigned ARVN soldiers to
almost all RF leadership positions. As a result, most analysts identified poor leadership
as one of the major reasons for the poor performance of territorial forces.
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The failure of the territorial force program was one of the major causes for the
U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War. The territorial forces were the only countrywide
security forces whose primary mission was to secure the rural population from the
communist insurgents. The territorial forces provide a fascinating case of how the
varying application of the different factors of the model being inconsistently influenced
the effectiveness of the program. While the U.S. addressed issues in training and
equipment, the U.S. and GVN were never able to overcome their institutional issues in
order to address the other structural problems of the program.
Table 8.
Membership of the Territorial Forces with Community-Based Security Variables.
Variable/Membership Fully In Mostly
More In
More Out
Mostly Out
In
Than Out Than In
External Support and
Oversight
Limits to territorial
jurisdiction
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System
Local sustainability
and accountability
Voluntary
participation by local
elites

Fully Out

X
X
X

X
X
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CHAPTER X - COUNTERINSURGENCY ON THE CHEAP BUT WITH A PRICE
The Kikuyu Home Guard
Introduction
This case study will explore the use of the community-based security force, the
Kikuyu Guard, by the British colonial government in Kenya during the Mau Mau
Rebellion from 1952 to 1960 and its adherence to the model presented in this dissertation.
The case study’s overview will include a discussion of its organization and the internal
and external factors that influenced the program’s development. Next, after the history of
the Kikuyu Guard has been presented, this case study will include a detailed discussion of
the degree of membership the case demonstrates for each factor presented in this
dissertation’s model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings
and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix. This case study
will demonstrate that the Kikuyu Guard diverged from the other successful case studies
in that the British colonial government provided little oversight and material support, but
demonstrated high degrees of membership for several other factors in the model and that
the program was ultimately successful in defeating the Mau Mau insurgency
The Kikuyu Guard were formed by the British colonial government around a
nucleus of Kikuyu tribal leaders in 1952 in response to the Mau Mau Rebellion that had
been building in Kenya in the period after World War II. The Mau Mau, a secret
organization that broke from the Kenyan African Union party in the late 1940s, sought to
eject the British from Kenya and regain lands lost by the Kikuyu tribe to European
settlers. The Mau Mau targeted white settlers as well as tribal chiefs loyal to the British
government and Kikuyu converts to Christianity. In self-defense the latter two groups
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formed community security organizations to repel Mau Mau. From these groups the
British formed the nucleus of the Kikuyu Guard. At the height of the program the
Kikuyu Guard numbered over 20,000 and secured the majority of the Kikuyu population
in fortified villages. The program prevented the Mau Mau access to their support
networks among the population and enabled the military and police forces to hunt the
Mau Mau in their jungle hideouts. Although the British officially ended the state of
emergency in response to the Mau Mau in 1960, the use of the Kikuyu Guard to secure
the population effectively ended the rebellion by 1955.
As will be discussed in the following sections of this case study, the British
consciously chose not to provide oversight and support to maintain the appearance of
Kikuyu ownership of the program. The British were also required to conduct an
economy of force effort in Kenya because they were simultaneously fighting insurgencies
in Malaya and Cyprus during the height of the Mau Mau Rebellion. This meant that the
British were not only fiscally constrained, but also constrained in manpower. This
resulted in very little oversight and a high reliance on local leadership and local
sustainability.
While the British did provide some arms and equipment to the Kikuyu Guard, the
majority of the support they provided the members of the force were intangible goods
such as promises for an increased role in post-conflict political system and access to
education and business opportunities. The British colonial government was able to do
this because the Mau Mau rebels did not have an external source of support, forcing them
to arm themselves with whatever weapons they could make or steal. This meant that that
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British did not have to provide many weapons to bring the Kikuyu Guard to a level of
parity with the Mau Mau.
The Kikuyu Guard program partially adhered to other elements of the model such
as incorporation of traditional justice systems. While the creation of tribal chiefs and
local tribal councils did not have a direct connection with traditional justice systems, this
case study will demonstrate that there were some parallels with the Kikuyu system of
governance and the externally imposed colonial system. This created a system that was
accepted by the population and placed the administration of governance and justice in the
hands of local leaders.
In addition to incorporating local governance and justice systems, the British also
used the Kikuyu Guard as a local security forces to secure the population and rarely used
them outside their traditional tribal boundaries. Due to the conscious decision of the
British to lightly arm the Kikuyu Guard, they were unable to conduct independent combat
missions. This meant the main role of the Kikuyu Guard was to guard fortified
consolidated villages and provide guides to the regular security forces, while the British
Army and Tribal Police were charged with pursuing the Mau Mau into their forest
hideouts.
Finally, the Kikuyu Guard relied heavily on local leadership and the cooption of
local elites. The program arose from self-defense groups organized by tribal chiefs to
defend themselves and their supporters. From these groups and similar groups formed by
Christian Kikuyu opposed to the traditional religious practices of the Mau Mau, the
British expanded the Kikuyu Guard by providing financial incentives such as waiving
certain taxes and promising future political rewards to other local leaders and their
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supporters. As this case study will show, while the lack of oversight and empowering
local leaders led to numerous abuses by the Kikuyu Guard, the combination created a
dynamic that meshed with the Kikuyu culturally accepted path to prosperity that
propelled many Kikuyu to join the Kikuyu Guard against the Mau Mau.
As this case study will show and as the majority of the Mau Mau Rebellion and
the major actors in the conflict agree, the Kikuyu Guard was the critical element
responsible for the British defeat of the Mau Mau. While the Kikuyu Guard were
responsible for numerous human rights violations during the rebellion, they were
successful in preventing the Mau Mau access to the population and in turning the
majority of the Kikuyu against the Mau Mau. These excesses, however caused the
British to disband or absorb the Kikuyu Guard into the Tribal Police in 1955 to avoid
negative publicity. The back of the Mau Mau insurgency had been broken by this point.
In the following section this case study will provide an overview of the evolution of the
Kikuyu Guard and the political and military factors that influenced the program.
Background
Prior to the arrival of the British in the late 19th century, the Kikuyu were a
sedentary, agricultural people who lived in disbursed collections of family compounds to
assist cattle grazing (Majdalany 1963, 137). The Kikuyu organized their society around
the kehiomwere or age groups. Members of the Kikuyu progressed with their age group
through riika or age-grades that divided life into stages from young adulthood to old age
(Kenyatta 1962, xiv, 4).
Within the age group system, the most important was arguably the Mbari or
senior age group comprised of land owning men who formed a senior council of elders
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and legislative body usually comprised of the largest land owners (Kershaw 1997, 13,
177). The Kikuyu did not have tribal chiefs and positions of leadership were not
inherited and could shift by consensus of the age group to different individuals as new
age groups ascended to Mbari status and land ownership, the main determinant of wealth
and self-worth, shifted among members of an extended family and clan (Kenyatta 1962,
22, 27 and Leakey 1953, 35-37).
The Kikuyu organized their political system through a system of hierarchical
councils comprised of representatives from the Mbari. Individual villages formed their
own councils and a number of villages formed a Mwaki or neighborhood administered by
a kiama kia mwaki or regional council comprised of the most respected members of the
Mwaki (Kenyatta 1962, 181). Above the regional council, the Rugongo or ridge council
managed the relations of several Mwaki (Barnett and Njama. 1966, 44-45). Through this
system the Kikuyu governed themselves up to the regional, but not national level.
Colonization of Kenya by the British did not start in earnest until the turn of the
20th century when British settlers occupied the land around Nairobi pushing the
inhabitants, the Kikuyu, into less productive areas (Anderson 2005, 10, 22) Due to
outbreaks of small pox and rinderpest outbreaks brought by the Europeans, the British
found the area around Nairobi sparsely populated as the majority of the surviving Kikuyu
moved out of the area and left caretakers on their land in expectation of returning after
the diseases had run their course (Kitson 1960, 6 and Leakey 1953, 9).
The British rapidly occupied the most fertile lands and divided the Kikuyu lands
into four districts: Kiambu, Fort Hall, Nyeri, and Embu (Kenyatta 1962, xv). Between
1902 and 1915, the British colonial government passed a series of ordinances allowing
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white settlers to obtain leases for 99 and then 999 years, establishing the “White
Highlands” area and tribal reserves (Maloba 1993, 26). This started friction with the
Kikuyu who believed they still owned the land through traditional practices of
inheritance. The British settlers also believed they owned the land because they bought
the land from the caretakers left on the land whom the Kikuyu believed had no right to
sell the land (Leakey 1953, 28-29). This dispute over land ownership formed the core
grievance of the Mau Rebellion.
While Maloba (1993, 27) estimates the Kikuyu only lost about four percent of
their land to British settlers, the land was the most productive in the traditional Kikuyu
homeland. Adding to the economic hardships caused by losing their most productive
land, the introduction of western medicine caused a population explosion among the
Kikuyu (Leakey 1953, 21). The loss of land and the increase in population caused
increasing conflict and competition among the Kikuyu as younger kehiomwere were
unable to move to new lands and land holdings were divided into smaller and
increasingly unsustainable plots.
The increasing pressures of population growth were exacerbated by changes to
the Kikuyu political institutions. To ease the difficulties of governing Kenya with a small
European colonial staff and not understanding or caring to understand the Kikuyu
governance system, the British chose to implement a system that adhered to their notions
of tribal political structures. The most important of these changes was the modification
of the age-based leadership succession to make chieftainship hereditary. While
kehiomwere continued to progress through levels of leadership as their cohort aged,
leadership stayed within the same families and chiefs were granted powers formerly
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exercised by Mwaki (Barnett and Njama. 1966, 50). This made the job of British
administrators easier as it reduced the number of Kikuyu they had to deal with and they
did not have to build consensus among the members of the Mwaki, but also
disenfranchised large portions of Kikuyu society.
In addition to population pressures and land alienation the British also created
further hardships for the Kikuyu to benefit white settlers. The most onerous was the
Kipande or pass card system. Under this system Kikuyu tenants on white lands were
required to provide free labor for white farmers as payment for the right to live on their
land. Each Kikuyu adult was required to wear a Kipande or pass around their neck and
could not move freely unless they had the permission of their white landlord. The British
continued this system until it was repealed in 1947 when mechanization of farms made
the system obsolete (Anderson 2005, 10 and Maloba 1993, 45).
Kikuyu political opposition to the colonial government formed within a few years
after the British appropriated the Kikuyu land and reorganized the tribal system. In 1919
the Kikuyu Association (KA), a reformist movement of tribal chiefs and landowners
formed to protest colonialist land seizures (Clough 1998, 27). Soon after the founding of
the organization, fissures within the KA formed between Kikuyu who wanted to protest
within the British system and those that sought more extreme measures to regain their
land, laying the foundation for the Mau.
In 1924, educated young radicals within the KA split off and formed the Kikuyu
Central Association (KCA) as a militant alternative to the KA. To seal their devotion to
the movement, KCA members took a secret oath, based on traditional Kikuyu religious
practices, promising to defend the Kikuyu lands on penalty of death (Clough 1998, 27).
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This practice of the administering of oaths would become a key component of the Mau
movement.
Resistance to British rule continued to grow from British land appropriation and
political alienation of the native population. The Kikuyu also resisted attempts by British
missionaries to ban the traditional practice of clitoridectomy that was a critical step in the
process of Kikuyu girls proceeding into the first adult riika or age group (Branch, 2007;
Anderson 2005, 18-20; and Leakey 1953, 88). These grievances continued to strengthen
Kikuyu opposition groups. Although the British banned the KAU in 1940 as a wartime
measure against subversion, the organization continued to operate underground and
rapidly expanded its membership after World War II as Kikuyu who had served overseas
with the British returned Kikuyu and expected expanded rights after their military service
(Clough 1998, 28-29 and Branch 2007).
As Kenya transitioned from a colony to a self-ruling member of British
Commonwealth after 1945, relations between the Kikuyu and British settlers continued to
deteriorate due to several compounding factors. Following the examples of South Africa
and Rhodesia, white settlers sought to manipulate the political system during the
transition period to self-rule to restrict African political and economic power and
entrench their own minority rule (Anderson 2005, 3).
In addition to this political grievance, the agricultural areas underwent a period of
reorganization and turmoil in the post war period. Two trends made the economic
situation of Kikuyu farmers increasingly tenuous. First, the population explosion that
occurred in the 1920s and 1930s and displacement of the Kikuyu into less productive
land caused widespread erosion and over farming. To counteract this and to make white
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owned land more productive, the British government implemented soil conservation
programs that prevented many Kikuyu from growing cash crops and further reduced the
amount of land available for cattle grazing, the main source of Kikuyu wealth (Branch,
2007 and Maloba 1993, 31).
During the same period, Sir Phillip Mitchell, the governor of Kenya from 1944 to
1952, choose to focus on economic expansion of the agricultural sector at the expense of
making land available to the growing Kikuyu population (Maloba 1993, 33). White
owned farms underwent a period of mechanization and land consolidation to meet post
war demand for agricultural goods and to capitalize on economies of scale. This made
the need Kikuyu tenant farmers and the Kipande system unnecessary. This resulted in
the large-scale ejection of Kikuyu tenant farmers from their lands and their movement to
the urban areas of Nairobi in search of work (Branch 2009, 6).
All of these economic, political, and social crises caused infighting within the
KCA, KAU, and the other major parties when it became apparent that peaceful political
means to address Kikuyu grievances would be closed by the white minority and over five
million African Kenyans would be ruled by approximately 29,000 whites (Anderson
2005, 9). The parties fractured in 1951 and radicals from the major parties coalesced into
the Mau movement.
The Mau promised the Kikuyu ithaka na withal or “Land and Freedom,” using the
existing KAU organization and communication networks to disseminate their message
and recruit followers (Branch, 2007 and Kitson 1960, 14). Starting in 1950, the Mau
Mau laid the groundwork for their violent struggle by recruiting a passive support wing
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within in Kikuyu villages and the slums of Nairobi to support the armed wing organizing
in the jungle on the borders of the Kikuyu lands (Kitson 1960, 15).
The Mau Mau movement was not a unified organization, but an umbrella
organization of numerous independent groups controlled by their own leaders (Clough
1998, 20). The common and unifying feature of the Mau Mau was the administering of
a tiered system of oaths. These oaths were tied to traditional Kikuyu religious and justice
systems. These systems ensured adherence to agreements and settled disputes through a
belief in spiritual impurity caused by breaking tribal rulings and social customs. Once an
oath was broken, an individual could be cleansed only after expensive public ceremonies
that brought their own amount of individual shame and social ostracism (Leakey 1953,
44-52).
The Mau Mau would force individuals to take different oaths depending on their
role in the insurgency. Passive or active supporters of the movement took the Muma wa
vigano oath that bound them to support of the movement. At a minimum, oath takers
ensured that the members and activities of the Mau Mau would remain secret by swearing
that, “If I do anything to give away this organization to the enemy, may I be killed by the
oath” (Leakey 1953, 98). At the height of the insurgency in 1953, the British estimated
90 percent of the Kikuyu population had taken this oath. Active Mau Mau fighters took
the second oath, the batuni or pledge to kill for the movement (Clough 1998, 109).
Although the Mau Mau had no political ideology, the cultural power of oath taking and
common grievances served as a potent unifying feature of the movement and allowed the
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Mau Mau to develop the support networks of a classic insurgency and the silence of a
majority of the population (Branch 2009, 38).79
As the Mau Mau Rebellion gained followers in 1951 and 1952 the Kikuyu
experienced a rapid fracturing of their society. The independently organized Mau Mau
groups attracted different mixtures of nationalists, opportunists, criminals, and those
forced into the movement by circumstance (Maloba 1993, 66). The opposing group, the
Loyalists or those loyal to the colonial government, divided into three groups. The first
and most powerful group was the chiefs who benefited from their allegiance to the
British. The other main groups were comprised of British educated moderate nationalists
educated who wanted to work within the political system to gain independence and
Kikuyu who converted to Christianity and were opposed to oath taking as blasphemous
(Anderson 2005, 11-19).
The formation of the Mau Mau in 1950 to 1952 largely escaped the notice of
British colonial officials and, as a result, the colonial government was unprepared for the
rebellion. This was partly due to the process of becoming a Commonwealth member and
the formation of an independent government that started in 1945 and was in an advanced
stage by 1951. As a result, security operations were divided between the colonial African
Affairs officer and local officials in the Law and Order office. This caused
miscommunication and gaps in security efforts (Clayton 1984, 3).
Additionally, Sir Phillip Mitchell, The Governor of Kenya, sought to downplay
the scope and threat of the Mau Mau movement in the first half of 1952 for internal
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political considerations (Clayton 1984, 4). Fearing that admitting there was a serious
security problem would delay the transition to Commonwealth status and not wishing to
upset the politically powerful white settlers, Mitchell sought to characterize the Mau Mau
as criminals and to ignore the grievances causing the uprising. However, in the fall of
1952, an increasing series of attacks by the Mau Mau against African Loyalists and
European farms along with increasing evidence of clandestine oath taking ceremonies
raised concerns among colonial officials and white settlers about true strength of the Mau
Mau (Clayton 1984, 3-5).
Two events caused the British to acknowledge the true scope of the Mau Mau
movement and its threat to the state. First, Sir Evelyn Baring replaced Sir Phillip
Mitchell as colonial governor. Baring was less sensitive to the influence of white settlers
and more shocked by the violence he witnessed his first week in office (Elkins 2005, 32).
The second event that spurred an increased British response against the Mau Mau
was the assassination of the influential Kikuyu chief, Waruhiu wa Kung’u. The
assassination and a series of attacks on white settlers following it shocked Baring and led
him to declare a state of emergency on October 9, 1952 (Clough 1998, 30).
The Declaration of a State of Emergency expanded government powers and
suspended many civil rights for the duration of the emergency. This allowed the
government the ability to arrest without charge and to forcibly relocate the population
(Clayton 1984, 13). General George Erskine, the General in Chief of the British East
Africa Command assessed that the Mau Mau were at most ten percent of the population
and the majority of the population sympathized with their goals, but did not provide
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material support to the movement (Clayton 1984, 7, 22).80 Based on this assessment and
little intelligence, the British military and colonial police forces staged a series of large
scale sweeps to arrest known radical KAU members and suspected Mau Mau members
(Maloba 1993, 82-83).
The first and largest of these initial sweep operations was Operation “Jock Scott”
conducted on 20-21 October 1952. During this operation the British detained moderate
political leaders aligned with the Mau Mau, such as Jemo Kenyatta the future first
President of Kenya (Clayton 1984, 21). Jock Scott not only arrested most of the known
moderates who were still open to non-violent negotiation with the British, but it also
pushed the Mau Mau out of the city of Nairobi and into rural areas the Kikuyu reserves,
where the majority of the Kikuyu lived. This allowed the Mau Mau easy access to their
support networks and the jungle areas around Mount Kenya that provided staging areas
for offensive operations (Clayton 1984, 21).
Confronted with manpower shortages in the army and police forces and an
inadequate knowledge of the extent of the Mau Mau movement, the British security
forces continued to conduct large scale sweeps of Kikuyu and random detention and
interrogation of suspected Mau Mau. These efforts failed to selectively target the Mau
Mau leadership and failed to isolate the insurgents from the population, (Maloba 1993,
82). After Jock Scott the Mau Mau took the offensive and increased the number of
attacks against unprotected European farms and African Loyalists. (Clayton 1984, 23).
They did this because they lacked the arms and ammunition needed to attack the better
equipped British Army and police forces. Also, attacking European settlers and Loyalist
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chiefs caused uncommitted Kikuyu to feel the security forces could not protect them,
forcing them into the Mau Mau movement for their own self-preservation (Edgerton
1989, 82-83). While the number and ferocity of attacks increased in early 1953, they
remained uncoordinated due to the decentralized nature of the Mau Mau movement,
further confusing British officials about the breadth and penetration of the Mau Mau in
the Kikuyu population.81
Early in the Emergency, British officials realized the “impossibility of providing
personal police protection to all informants” and sought alternate methods to protect
loyalist (Branch 2009, 55). In October 1952, the District Commissioner of Kiambu
province recommended to local chiefs that they form “self-protection” groups. The
chiefs rejected the advice reasoning that forming armed groups would invite attacks from
better armed Mau Mau forces.82
As the strength and membership base of the Mau Mau movement increased in
early 1953, Mau Mau groups increased their attacks against groups and individuals they
saw as representatives of the British system such as loyalist chiefs and Christian Kikuyu.
During the largest of these attacks, the so called “Lari Massacre” on March 26, 1953, the
Mau Mau killed the loyalist Chief Luka Mbugua Kahangara and his family and
supporters. The colonial government publicized these murders to maximize the message
of the brutality and savagery of the Mau Mau, accusing the Mau Mau of killing up to one
hundred innocent men, women, and children (Barnett and Njama. 1966, 137). Mau Mau
killings of loyalists in early 1953 such as the Lari massacre forced loyalists and those
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against the Mau Mau message to unite in self-defense against Mau Mau (Clough 1998,
169 and Majdalany 1963, 147).
The first Kikuyu Guard self-defense forces, renamed the Kikuyu Guard in March
1953, were formed by churches and Christian chiefs. Their purpose was to protect their
followers and to be a method to prevent forced oath administering by the Mau Mau
(Maloba 1993, 89).83 By November 1952 these church groups had 580 members in
Morang’s district and 817 in Nyeri district. (Anderson 2005, 240)
The Lari Massacre also persuaded General Hinde to issue the Kikuyu Guard
firearms and to appoint a colonel, Colonel Philip Morcombe, to manage the program and
special temporary district officers to train and oversee the Kikuyu Guard (Majdalany
1963, 151; Clayton 1984, 28; Bennett 2013, 247; and Elkins 2005, 71). After formal
recognition by the British, the Kikuyu Guard more than quadrupled in number by April
1953, totaling approximately 7600 in the Central Provinces (Anderson 2005, 124-125)
As will be discussed further in a following section, the British chose to limit the number
and quality of arms provided to the Kikuyu, equipping only 20 percent of the Kikuyu
Guard with shotguns while providing the entire force with uniforms or distinctive arm
bands and rations to make up for income lost while on Kikuyu Guard duty (Elkins 2005 ,
70-71).
The Kikuyu Guard were loosely organized in groups of thirty to fifty men with
the local chief as commander. Chiefs initially recruited members by requesting the local
mbari to provide a number of men dependent on the mbari’s size. The initial purpose of
these forces was to protect headmen or chiefs and their families from assassination by the
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Mau Mau (Kershaw 1997, 327). A survey of Kikuyu Guard members found that most
were between 26 and 40 and one third were illiterate. The majority were small land
owners and members of a mbari (Maloba 1993, 88).
The colonial government response to the Mau Mau was uncoordinated and
ineffective April 1953 when General George Erskine was appointed as commander of all
military forces in Kenya with operational control of the police and police auxiliary
(Clayton 1984, 6). The expansion of the Kikuyu Guard in 1953 to 15,000 and 25,000 in
1954 allowed Erskine to use the security forces to conduct large sweep operations and
pursue the Mau Mau into their jungle bases (Clayton 1984, 29; Anderson 2005, 241; and
Elkins 2005, 71).
With additional available security forces and a unified command, Erskine
launched Operation Anvil, a massive sweep of the slums of Nairobi on April 24, 1954.
The operation detained 75 percent (45,000) of the male population in Nairobi (Clough
1998, 162-163). Of the 45,000 detained, security forces moved more than 24,000 Kikuyu
to detention and rehabilitation camps with the remaining detainees sent to the tribal
reserves. According to Edgerton (1989, 91-92) this broke the Mau Mau urban support
network, but did not destroy the rural support network that existed among the 2 million
Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu living in the tribal reserves near the Mau Mau jungle hideouts.
Operation Anvil marked a shift in the purpose of the Kikuyu Guard. Instead of
protecting chiefs and their followers, the Kikuyu Guard became the principle method
used by the British to neutralize the support wing of the Mau Mau and isolate the Mau
Mau fighters from the population.84 The centerpiece of this effort was the protected
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village. After sweeping an area to clear active Mau Mau fighters, the British moved the
entire Kikuyu population from decentralized family compounds into consolidated,
protected villages. The purpose of this plan was to sever the link between the Mau Mau
fighters and their support network among the population. Each of the protected villages
was centered on a Kikuyu Guard outpost that defended the population and monitored
their movement. The villages were inexpensive, costing approximately 50 pounds each
with the use of free local labor provided by the inhabitants (Majdalany 1963, 210). In a
little over a year, the British were able to resettle over 1,000,000 Kikuyu in 800 villages
by the end of 1954 (Clayton 1984, 93 and Maloba 1993, 90).
The expansion of the Kikuyu Guard and the concentration population forced the
Mau Mau to consolidate into larger units in the Kikuyu Reserve to be able to attack the
protected villages (Edgerton 1989, 123). General Erskine initiated two measures to
separate these larger units from camps and to hinder their ability to move and supply
themselves. Erskine declared the depopulated areas of the Kikuyu reserve to be free fire
zones and off limits to the civilian population unless escorted by the Kikuyu Guard. He
authorized security forces to fire on anyone in these areas without provocation and the
death penalty was applied to anyone found to be illegally carrying firearms (Clayton
1984, 14-15).
The second project he authorized was the excavation of a “great ditch,” a ten-footdeep and sixteen-foot-wide ditch that stretched for fifty miles and separated the tribal
areas from the Mau Mau forests. The ditch was dug by local laborers who were
organized by local chiefs and overseen by Kikuyu Guards (Edgerton 1989, 92). Securing
the population with the Kikuyu Guard and containing the Mau Mau in a defined area with
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the great ditch and free fire zones freed the security forces to go on the offensive in the
forests in the summer of 1953 (Clough 1998, 154). By entering the jungle bases of the
Mau Mau, the security forces could break the back of the Mau Mau by capturing or
killing 4,064 fighters and detaining over 100,000 sympathizers between 1953 and 1955
(Edgerton 1989, 87). By the end of 1955, effective Mau Mau resistance was generally
over and operations focused on eliminating isolated insurgent groups.85
Improved intelligence provided by the Kikuyu Guard had enabled the British to
break the Mau Mau insurgency. Colonial officials could do this by creating the
perception they were committed to winning the conflict and incentivizing loyalty to the
government (Maloba 1993, 84, 89 and Elkins 2005, 68). The British provided nonmonetary incentives to Kikuyu Guard members such as scholarships for their children
and promises of a larger role in post-conflict politics (Anderson 2005, 271).
The British also provided material incentives to Kikuyu chiefs. For example,
chiefs were granted the authority to implement land development programs in such a way
that they were able to seize the property of suspected Mau Mau sympathizers and
consolidate and redistribute the land among themselves and their followers (Branch 2009,
32). The loss of land, the main source of Kikuyu wealth, life in the protected villages,
and the threat of indefinite detention if they were not definitely on the government side
swayed the population to believe the Mau Mau cause was lost. As one Kikuyu remarked
“If we are getting the opposite of what Mau Mau promised us when we were taking the
oath, why then shouldn’t we do the contrary of what we promised?” (Branch, 2007). This
feeling was echoed by Kalinga Wuchang, a Mau Mau leader, who felt the government
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incentives and the feeling that the tide was turning against the Mau Mau were the main
cause for the defeat of the movement (Clough 1998, 159).
In addition to the material and non-material incentives enticing uncommitted
Kikuyu, retaliation against Mau Mau supporters or relatives of fighters by the Kikuyu
Guard became a powerful disincentive to support the Mau Mau. Controlling the majority
of the population in protected villages and possessing the ability to detain anyone
suspected of Mau Mau support, tribal chiefs were able to exact swift revenge on those
who were not seen as stalwart government supporters. As one Mau Mau leader
remarked, “Whenever we kill or burn a Kikuyu Guard’s house, their revenge is between
ten and twenty times. We should fight our enemies in the forests, in the Special Areas, in
their camps and at any other place of contact, in order to safeguard the civilians.”
(Clough 1998, 147-148).
By the end of 1956 the military phase of the emergency ended. Security forces
and the Kikuyu Guard killed 10,527 Mau Mau fighters and captured 2,633. The Mau
Mau killed 1,826 Kikuyu Guard and loyalists and wounded 918. In contrast, losses to the
regular security forces were comparatively light. The British security forces suffered 63
killed and the Tribal Police lost 456 killed (Majdalany 1963, 221).
The Kikuyu Guard were a major contributing factor in the rapid and economical
British defeat of the Mau Mau (Clough 1998, 31). The Kikuyu Guard did the majority of
the fighting for the least amount of resources. According to the Meru District
Commissioner, “Without belittling the service of the Regular Forces, it is true to say that
the clear majority of the causalities inflicted on the Mau Mau during the year (1954) have
been caused by the Tribal Police and the Kikuyu Guard forces operating under their own
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District Officers.”86 This statement holds true throughout the areas affect by the Mau
Mau Rebellion. During the emergency, which cost approximately $55 million, the
Kikuyu Guard accounted for 42 percent or 4,686 of the Mau Mau killed (Majdalany
1963, 221 and Elkins 2005, 250).
Judging by the short duration of the emergency and the share of fighting
undertaken by the Kikuyu Guard, the program was a successful use of community-based
security forces in counterinsurgency. As will be discussed in the following sections,
there were significant human rights abuses committed by the Kikuyu Guard that caused
them to be disbanded or integrated into the Tribal Police in late 1955, but this occurred
after the bulk of the fighting had already occurred and the momentum of the conflict had
turned in the government’s favor (Anderson 2005, 271). Keeping the overall success and
the flaws of the program, the following sections will analyze the Kikuyu Guard’s
adherence to the factors of this dissertation’s model.
External Support and Oversight
The Kikuyu Guard in Kenya demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership
with the factor of External Support and Oversight. By design and out of necessity the
British consciously limited their external support and oversight of the Kikuyu Guards.
Colonial officials did this to maintain popular perception that the Kikuyu Guard were an
organic response to the Mau Mau and allowed them deniability of Kikuyu Guard wrongdoing to keep the Kikuyu Guard loyal to the government (Branch 2009, 68). While this
allowed the Kikuyu Guards to commit serious human rights violations and the chiefs to
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abuse their power for personal gain, it also fostered local ownership of the program as
well as a certain amount of legitimacy for the program among the population.
At the outset of the emergency and government recognition of the Kikuyu Guard
groups, the British colonial government was careful to support the Kikuyu Guard as little
as possible in 1951-1952. The purpose of this according to the Kenya colonial governor
Evelyn Baring was to keep the appearance that these groups were a response generated
by the Kikuyu against the Mau Mau and not a “government-engineered organization”
(Anderson 2005, 240-241). Accordingly, the office of the Officer of Director of
Operations directed all district commissioners that the organization of all Kikuyu Guard
units be “based on local customs and conditions and under local leadership” and not be
subjected to too great a degree of central regimentation” (Branch 2009, 81).
The British focus on limiting oversight manifested itself in two main ways. First,
the British assigned few personnel of European descent to oversee Kikuyu Guard daily
operations. After a power struggle between the colonial office and the British Army after
the declaration of emergency in 1952, the colonial office maintained control of the
Kikuyu Guard as a means to maintain a stake in the security operations in areas affected
by the emergency. Army personnel had no authority to discipline the Kikuyu Guard or
direct their operations except through coordination with District Commissioners.
Complete control of the Kikuyu guard rested with the District Officers. To alleviate the
burden of managing the Kikuyu Guard, the colonial office authorized District
Commissioners to hire temporary Assistant District Officers (ADO) (Elkins 2005, 71).
According to Clayton (1984, 18, 46) the ADOs were recruited from local settlers who had
no interest in the methods of the Kikuyu Guard.
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While incoming ADOs were reminded to closely supervise Kikuyu Guard units
and chiefs to prevent them from “chasing other lucrative ‘Loves’” or side vendettas not
related to the Mau Mau, this was a secondary concern to rooting out Mau Mau
sympathizers from the Kikuyu Guard and attacking Mau Mau fighters.87 In most cases
ADOs were concerned with operations while the chiefs “shouldered administrative
details” of disciplining their forces.88
If excesses were committed by the Kikuyu Guard, this was a regrettable, but
necessary risk involved in protecting European control of Kenya. As the Meru District
Officer remarked in his annual official report that “The African is very easily provoked,
at any rate, as Ibsen once said: - ‘Man does not put on his best trousers when he goes out
to battle for freedom and for truth’.”89 J.A. Rutherford, a district officer supervising the
Kikuyu Guard, echoes this sentiment in his assessment that the real role of district
officers was to maintain the loyalty and morale of the Kikuyu Guard rather than
concerning themselves with “paying off many old scores with the Mau Mau” (Elkins
2005 , 71).
In addition to appointing British settlers who had little concern about Kikuyu
Guard excesses and were more concerned with protecting their own farms, the British
also assigned few Europeans to oversee the program. While the oversight provided by
these officers was seen as “an essential factor in the struggle” they were too few to
provide adequate oversight.90 In each district one ADO was assigned to oversee four to
six Kikuyu Guard posts with informal assistance from local European farmers. In most
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cases the European farmers were of little help. As Captain Cooke, the Nakuru Assistant
District Officer (Kikuyu Guard) found because “in all too many cases it was found that
farmers knew little about their labor and even were unaware who was living on their
farms.”91 This resulted in each ADO supervising 200 to 300 Kikuyu Guard members
dispersed over a large area with little help. In the most extreme cases of the Central
Province and the Rift Valley Province each district had three to four temporary ADOs or
other district officers, who took on as an extra duty, the supervision of 20 to 30 Kikuyu
Guard posts.92 In several cases districts did not have ADOs in place to supervise all
Kikuyu Guard units until 1955.93

While initiative were undertaken to assign tribal

police to some Kikuyu Guard posts to train the Kikuyu Guard and provide them
leadership, but this was not possible in all Kikuyu Guard posts due to manpower
limitations.94
The low priority for supervision set by the British was also demonstrated
by the failure of British officials to investigate Kikuyu Guard abuses or punish those who
committed the acts. Most colonial administrators ignored Kikuyu Guard excesses as long
as they attacked the Mau Mau. This allowed the Kikuyu Guard to abuse their power by
detaining anyone without evidence and coercing confessions as the sole evidence for
prosecution (Edgerton 1989, 163). According to William W. Baldwin, an American
serving in the General Service Unit, the paramilitary wing of the National Police, “We
did not delve too deeply into some of the minor illegalities practiced by the Kikuyu

91

KNAC, Annual Report Nakuru District 1954, Film 2801, Reel 18, page 6
KNAC, Annual Report Central Province 1954, Film 2801, Reel 5, page 3, Handing Over Report Meru District, March 9, 1953,
KNAC, Film 2803, Reel 8, page 2, Handing Over Report Meru District, March 13, 1953, Film 2803, Reel 8, page 2-3. Annual Report
Rift Valley Province 1954, Film 2801, Reel 20, page 12 Handing Over Report Githunguri District, January 1955, Film 2801, Reel 15,
page 12, 28
93
KNAC, Annual Report Rift Valley Province 1955, Film 2801, Reel 21, page 9
94
KNAC, Annual Report Fort Hall District 1954, Film 2801, Reel 13, page 5-6
92

288

Guard. So long as we did not find one conniving with the Mau Mau, we left them pretty
much alone. The indiscretions of the Kikuyu Guard were a small price to pay for their
tremendous contribution toward quelling terrorism” (Maloba 1993, 94). This resulted in
Kikuyu Guard posts turning into what Elkins (2005, 69, 244) termed “epicenters of
torture” and allowed chiefs to use the screening and detention process as a means of
settling personal grievances and enriching themselves with confiscated property (Clayton
1984, 29) (Edgerton 1989, 100).
As the power of the Kikuyu Guard grew, the number of abuses and massacres
increased in 1954 and 1955 and the British made a concerted effort to overlook them
(Elkins 2005, 76-81). In the most publicized of these cases, six Kikuyu Guard were tried
for torture, forcing confessions, and murdering a Mau Mau suspect in Nyeri District. The
Judge trying the case described the chief’s Kikuyu Guard post as a “stronghold of a
robber baron,” and sentenced them to hard labor. In response, the Nyeri District Officer
wrote a letter to the judge denouncing the conviction and commented that if news of the
conviction spread, the Kikuyu Guard “may consider it better to join the Mau Mau and
reactivate the fighting war than stay in a post and be liable to serious charge.” (Elkins
2005, 81-82).
In another case ADO Brian Hayward and twenty-one Kikuyu Guard were tried for
systematically abusing prisoners. Governor Baring wrote to the judge trying to scuttle
the case stating, “it would be politically most inexpedient to prosecute a loyal Chief who
had taken a leading part in the fight against Mau Mau” (Branch 2009, 86). The judge
remained undeterred and sentenced Hayward one hundred pounds and three months hard
labor and the Kikuyu Guard members one hundred shillings and one day in prison.
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While the judge condemned their actions he still tried to mitigate their severity saying, “It
is easy to work oneself up into a state of pious horror over these offenses, but they must
be considered against their background. All the accused were engaged in seeking out
inhuman monsters and savages of the lowest order” (Elkins 2005, 82-83).
As the extent of the abuses committed by the Kikuyu Guard became known, the
East African Court of Appeals found in 1954 that “There exists a system of guard posts
manned by headmen and chiefs, and these are interrogation centers and prisons to which
the Queen’s subjects, whether innocent or guilty, are led by armed men without warrant
and detained – and as it seems tortured until they confess to alleged crimes and are then
led forth to trial on the sole evidence of these confessions” (Clayton 1984, 46). British
leaders believed that increased scrutiny of the program that might lead to the conviction
of loyalist chiefs endangering the entire effort to defeat the Mau Mau
General Erskine believed that the convictions had created a negative effect. He
said, “Depression and despair are setting in and morale is dropping” among the Kikuyu
Guard because of the convictions (Anderson 2005, 306). He believed that if the further
convictions occurred “the Kikuyu Guard would have collapsed and with their collapse the
whole structure of our fighting against the Mau Mau would have been undermined.
Without them it would have been impossible to withdraw the Army and the Reserves
such as those at Fort Hall which police and Kikuyu Guard are now taking over. Without
them we would have had no support among any members of the Kikuyu tribe” (Edgerton
1989, 165). In early 1955 in response to increased unrest within the Kikuyu Guard over
the convictions, General Erskine offered an amnesty to the Mau Mau with the ulterior
motive of also granting the Kikuyu Guard amnesty for any abuses they committed,
290

staving off the potential “disaster” of a mass Kikuyu Guard (Clayton 1984, 28). Fearing a
mass defection by the Kikuyu Guard with their weapons, Erskine offered amnesty to both
sides to stave off the “disaster” of such a Kikuyu Guard defection (Edgerton 1989, 99).
By 1955 the extent of Kikuyu Guard abuses had increased to a point that it
became apparent to British leaders that there could be severe public relations
consequences if they became known, leading the Nairobi District Commissioner to
comment that, “the prestige of Her Majesty’s Government is likely to be brought into
disrepute” (Branch 2009, 107). In January 1955 with the emergency winding down, the
colonial government responded with a plan to transfer 800 Kikuyu Guard into the Tribal
Police and 6400 into the Tribal Reserve Police on reduced pay.95 The remaining 14,000
Kikuyu Guard were placed into other employment with the security forces (Anderson
2005, 271). The demobilization took the remainder of 1955, ending the Kikuyu Guard
program and also ending the need to scrutinize the actions of the Kikuyu guard (Branch,
2007).
The officials in the colonial government also consciously provided few physical
resources to Kikuyu guard units, preferring to provide indirect incentives or promises for
future rewards. They did this for several reasons. As with the reasoning to limit
oversight, the British desired to maintain the appearance that Kikuyu Guard units were a
spontaneous, volunteer response by the Kikuyu against the Mau Mau. The second reason
was the British fear that weapons provided to the Kikuyu Guard would fall into the hands
of the Mau Mau through corruption, defection or capture. As the Mau Mau lacked an
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external sponsor and could only make, capture or purchase weapons, it made sense to
provide the Kikuyu Guard only enough weapons to defend themselves.
Throughout the Mau Mau Rebellion, the British paid the Kikuyu Guard as little as
possible and offered other methods to incentivize membership. According to James
Rutherford this, was done because “it was felt that (providing pay) would make them
mercenaries whereas they were in fact engaged in eradicating a disease which afflicted
the majority of their tribe” (Elkins 2005, 71). In the first two years of the emergency,
only Kikuyu Guard chiefs were entitled to stipend of 15 schillings a month to defray the
cost of leading their units (Anderson 2005, 240-241). The remainder of Kikuyu Guard
members were unpaid. Reward for participation came in form of rations, exemption from
taxes associated with the emergency, preferential treatment in business licensing, promise
of land, and education opportunities for the children of loyalists. As Branch (2007)
notes, “Loyalism was an investment in the future.”
The greatest incentive for Kikuyu Guard members, the chiefs in particular, was
the promise of greater political power in the post-colonial government. At a public
speech to a Kikuyu Guard unit in January 1955, Governor Baring told the gathering,
“You have earned the right to lead your people and you will be given privileges before
those who failed to take an active part in the fight” and that the loyalists would serve as
“the foundation on which the government would seek to build during the reconstruction”
(Branch, 2007).
In addition to promises of future political power, Kikuyu Guard members were
given preferential treatment in business, employment, and educational opportunities. The
colonial government provided Kikuyu Guard members exclusive rights to conduct
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business, and employment in the Tribal Police and local government (Branch, 2007 and
Kershaw 1997, 327). Additionally, Kikuyu Guard members were exempt from school
fees for their children and scholarships were given to the children of Kikuyu Guard
members to the top Kenyan boarding school, Alliance High School (Kershaw 1997, 327
and Anderson 2005, 271).
Finally, colonial officials provided Kikuyu Guard members the opportunity to
improve their land holdings through land redistribution or reentry into the agricultural
economy. The main mechanism used to implement land redistribution was the
Swynnerton Plan, a program unveiled in 1954 designed to consolidate land into
sustainable plots capable of subsistence and cash crop agriculture (Branch 2009, 122). In
practice, according to Daniel Branch (2007), the program became the means Governor
Baring could provide “a reward while the Emergency continues” to loyalists by
redistributing lands confiscated from Mau Mau supporters to loyalists. The Swynnerton
Plan became the most effective tool for promoting membership in the Kikuyu Guard and
deterring support of the Mau Mau with its accompanying risk of the loss of land (Branch
2009, 119, 121). For those Kikuyu Guard members with lower economic or social status,
colonial officials provided preferential treatment in access to employment as migrant
farm workers through the establishment of vetting processes, labor exchanges, and passes
to relocate to colonist’s farms (Branch, The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War
Against the Mau Mau in Kenya 2007).
Each of the incentives the British provided to Kikuyu Guard members provided a
method for ensuring continued loyalty and a stake in the defeat of the Mau Mau. The
incentives did not disrupt the local economy by introducing external funds or resources
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and deferred most benefits until the successful conclusion of the conflict. Finally, the
incentives cost the British little while targeting Kikuyu desire for land and improvement
through education and self-actualization.
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, the British provided only enough
weapons and equipment necessary to defend themselves and the fortified villages. This
was due to budget constraints and the colonial government’s wariness about the loyalty
of Kikuyu Guard members coupled with the inability to control weapons to a lack of
oversight. During the initial months of the emergency the first Kikuyu Guard units were
armed with machetes and spears they provided themselves and were unpaid (Branch
2007). After the Lari Massacre prompted the colonial government gave official
recognition for the Kikuyu Guard in March 1953, the government provided the first
Kikuyu Guard units with 50 rifles (Anderson 2005, 256). As the program matured in
1953 and 1953 the British reduced this number so that Kikuyu Guard units were given
enough weapons to arm approximately a quarter of their force.96 In practice this meant
that each Kikuyu Guard post was typically issued ten rifles. These would be given to the
chief and his most trusted mean with the rest armed with locally procured machetes and
spears (Bennett 2013, 16 and Branch 2009, 101). At the height of the emergency this
translated into the British issuing 500 rifles and 2,170 shotguns to the force of
approximately Kikuyu Guard 20,000 by December 1953 (Majdalany 1963, 188).97
As demonstrated by the evidence presented in this section, the Kikuyu Guard in
Kenya demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of membership with the factor of External
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Support and Oversight. The British consciously limited their external support and
oversight of the Kikuyu Guards. Colonial officials did this to maintain popular
perception that the Kikuyu Guard were an organic response to the Mau Mau and to
provide incentives for continued loyalty to the government. A lack of oversight resulted
in serious human rights abuses by the Kikuyu Guard, but the promise of material gain if
the Mau Mau were defeated created strong incentives to join the Kikuyu Guard and
remain loyal to the government.
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction
The Kikuyu Guard program demonstrated a “fully in” degree of membership with
the factor of Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction. By design the Kikuyu Guard were lightly
armed and only capable of self-defense. Although they did occasionally act as guides for
army and police units, their main purpose was to alert the security forces of Mau Mau
operating in their local area, guard the protected villages and loyal chiefs and their
families (Bennett 2013, 16). Legal restrictions and local recruiting were the factors that
influenced the limitations on territorial jurisdiction placed on the Kikuyu.
For the first months of their existence, the Kikuyu Guard had no legal law
enforcement authority other than the approval of the colonial government to defend
themselves. While this was changed in February 1953 when the colonial government
placed them under the Tribal Police as auxiliaries through the Tribal Police Ordinance of
1953, they could only operate outside their area of operations while augmenting the
Tribal Police (Anderson 2005, 256). In practice this meant that the Kikuyu Guard were
stationed in posts located within 500 yards of protected villages and each post guarded
two to three villages (Branch 2009, 108).
295

The other limit placed on the Kikuyu Guard was local recruitment. As mentioned
earlier, the Kikuyu Guard were unpaid and expected to continue their primary occupation
while participating in the program. This meant that Kikuyu Guard units could not
conduct sustained operations outside their Kikuyu areas without risking a reduction in the
morale of their members. The British did start paying the Kikuyu Guard in 1955 when
they transferred the Kikuyu Guard from the Tribal Police Auxiliary to Tribal Police
Reserve but the “fortified posts remained their focus.”98 The remainder of Kikuyu
Guard were reintegrated into village life and formed into informal watch and ward
committees.
The lack of pay and the necessity for Kikuyu Guard members to earn a living
outside of the program required the British to raise units from local areas. To simplify
and speed the process they allowed local chiefs to recruit and vet members and manage
the employment of the Kikuyu Guard (Anderson 2005, 241). As Anderson (2005, 243)
found, these restrictions to territorial jurisdiction improved the effectiveness of Kikuyu
Guard units because they knew the population and terrain, but it also allowed them to
settle old scores because the limited oversight provided by the British.
The Kikuyu Guard exhibited a “fully in” degree of membership with the factor of
limits to territorial jurisdiction. Legal limits to their ability to operate away from their
fortified posts coupled with their limited weaponry limited the Kikuyu Guard to
operations to defensive operations around the fortified villages. The lack of pay for most
members of the Kikuyu guard required its members to maintain a separate income,
necessitating chiefs to recruit from the local area and limited the ability for the Kikuyu
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Guard to conduct operations far away from their villages without causing hardship to
Kikuyu Guard members and endangering morale.
Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems
The Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a “more in than out” degree of membership with
the factor of Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems. In addition to being modelled
after 19th century Kikuyu self-defense groups formed to protect against Maasi raiding
parties, the Kikuyu guard were also connected to traditional justice systems through their
links to other organizations (Branch 2009, 67). During the colonization period in the first
decades of the twentieth century, the British reorganized the Kikuyu consensus-based
tribal governance system with one that was centered on a hereditary chieftainship system.
However, the British did translate several of the Kikuyu justice systems into
organizations based on western concepts and devolved power to these organizations as
the Mau Mau Emergency progressed. Additionally, the British used traditional Kikuyu
religious oath taking and de-oathing practices to undercut the Mau Mau base of support.
While these organizations and practices were not a formal part of the Kikuyu Guard, they
were linked to the program as part of the criminal justice process and the
counterinsurgency program against the Mau Mau.
As described in the overview, the traditional Kikuyu governance and justice
system was based on kiama ruling councils of Mbari age group leaders that controlled
land ownership and politics (Presley 1992, 29). The authority of these councils was
based on members’ progression through increasing levels of responsibility based on agegroups. The relative power of members was based on individual wealth and social
standing within the community and not on inherited titles (Presley 1992, 25).
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In 1908 the Kenyan Colonial Governor Sir Percy Girouard converted the kiama
into Local Native Councils (LNC) and installed hereditary chiefs as the overall leaders of
the councils (Presley 1992, 85). While the addition of hereditary chiefs was foreign to
the Kikuyu, members of the LNCs were members of the Mbari and progression of age
groups into leadership remained the same as the kiama system. The British withheld full
sovereignty from the LNCs in the areas of intertribal relations and judicial matters, they
granted the LNCs the authority for education, labor management, small public works
projects, and tax collection (Presley 1992, 95-96, 181).
In addition to the LNCs, the British also instituted Native Tribunals in 1944,
comprised of Mbari members selected by the British with jurisdiction over land
ownership and civil disputes.99

While the traditional Mbari system combined

governance and the judiciary in a single body, the combination of the LNCs and Native
Tribunals exercised most of the functions of the Mbari. The authority of the Native
Courts continued to expand after their creation and in 1950, they were given jurisdiction
over non-capital criminal cases in 1950.100

As the Mau Mau uprising escalated, the

British further empowered the tribal courts in 1953, not only to enforce customary law
and minor criminal offenses, but also to convict any person local courts found to have
Mau Mau affiliation and had committed an act “which in the opinion of the Chief might
cause a riot or a disturbance or breach of the peace.”101 Through the LNCs, headed by
chiefs who were also the leader of the Kikuyu Guard, and the Native Courts that tried
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suspected Mau Mau detained by the Kikuyu Guard; the Kikuyu Guard maintained a
connection with traditional justice systems.
The incorporation of Kikuyu oathing ceremonies, used traditionally to ensure
adherence to judicial rulings and negotiated settlements, provided the Kikuyu Guard
another connection to traditional justice systems. Starting in late 1952, the British
became aware of the scope of the Mau Mau use of oath taking to coerce support from the
population. As a counter to the cultural power of these oaths, loyalist chiefs
recommended to British officials the use of cleansing ceremonies to negate the power of
the oaths and counter-oathing to cement loyalty to the colonial governments (Luongo
2006).102 This led to the creation of “Her Majesties Witchdoctors” or “White
Witchdoctors” who would administer mass cleansings and counter-oaths to entire villages
(Clayton 1984, 16).103 While these cleansing ceremonies were often conducted by force
they proved effective in countering the mystical power of the Mau Mau (Kershaw 1997,
250-251).
To ensure the loyalty and added commitment of the Kikuyu Guard, chiefs
administered a kahungwa mahuri, or “lung cleaning” ritual. Administering this ritual
further ensured that they had no connection to the Mau Mau and held members of the
Kikuyu Guard to the same level of commitment as active Mau Mau fighters (Elkins 2005,
70). Through these rituals, the Kikuyu Guard incorporated traditional justice
mechanisms designed to ensure compliance and loyalty to the colonial government.
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While the modification of the traditional justice organizations by the British
prevents full membership with the factor of incorporation of traditional justice systems,
the links between the Kikuyu Guard and the tribal governance and justice organizations
provided a connection to traditional justice systems. Additionally, the incorporation of
cleansing rituals and counter-oaths negated the spiritual power of the Mau Mau and
provided a culturally acceptable mechanism for individuals to join the Kikuyu Guard.
Through the inclusion of these organizations and rituals, the Kikuyu Guard demonstrated
a “more in than out” degree of membership with traditional justice systems.
Local Sustainability and Accountability
The Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a “more out than in” degree of membership with
the factor of local sustainability and accountability. As discussed in the external
oversight and support section of this case study, the colonial government provided the
Kikuyu Guard with few resources and its members sustained themselves with monetary
rewards or preying on the population. Due to the limited external support, the Kikuyu
Guard had to be sustained by the local community; causing hardship among the
population that found it hard to maintain a living in the resettlement camps. Due to the
power entrusted to local chiefs and Local Native Councils (LNC) over the population that
the British distrusted, there were few mechanisms to promote local accountability and
abuses by local chiefs and Kikuyu Guard were frequent.
During the period between late 1952 and 1955, the British did not pay the Kikuyu
Guard salaries in order to keep the appearance they were spontaneous and local reactions
to the Mau Mau. However the British did provide the Kikuyu Guard members with food
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and clothing allowances and rewards in the form of cash or food.104 While this did
change in 1955, when the colonial government transitioned some the Kikuyu Guard into
the Tribal Police Reserves and placed them and chiefs and village headmen on salary in
1955, for the majority of the program’s existence most material and financial support
came from local sources.105 The main source of financial support came in the form of
monetary rewards given to the Kikuyu Guard members who captured or killed Mau Mau
members, but these funds were drawn from fines levied against local Mau Mau
supporters (Branch, The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War Against the Mau Mau in
Kenya 2007).106
The lack of pay for the Kikuyu Guard led to many abuses of power by guard
members in the pursuit of material gain. The main source of abuse and corruption
stemmed from the identification and detention of suspected Mau Mau members that was
left up to the discretion of chiefs and headmen. Kershaw (1997, 250) found that in many
cases Kikuyu were forced to appear before a screening committee by Kikuyu Guards and
selected for detention based on testimony from the screening committee who were also
members of the Kikuyu Guard. Because the Kikuyu Guard and their leaders were both
accusers and judges of guilt, this left the accused no recourse but to offer bribes in return
for their freedom. In the aftermath of the detentions resulting from Operation Anvil in
1954, Anderson uncovered numerous cases of individuals offering bribes of over 600
pounds to get out of detention and cases of the Kikuyu conducting nightly patrols to
collect a tax ensuring freedom from detention (Anderson 2005, 210). While these abuses
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are lamentable, it also formed a method of local sustainment of the program in lieu of
external support.
Another area where the sustainability of the Kikuyu Guard played an important
part was the creation in 1954 of the fortified villages that the guard used to secure the
population. The villages each cost approximately 50 pounds due to their method of
construction (Majdalany 1963, 210). Instead of using mechanized construction methods
and outside materials, colonial officials tasked the chiefs to build the villages using
communal labor under Kikuyu Guard supervision and utilizing as many local materials as
possible (Branch 2009, 69). This not only allowed the British to move 1,000,000 kikuyu
into villages in less than a year, but also for the cost of approximately 40,000 British
Pounds (Clayton 1984, 93 and Maloba 1993, 90). This sped the separation of the Mau
Mau from the population, but also created villages that could be easily maintained by the
local population.
While the Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a high degree of sustainability, the
program possessed few mechanisms for accountability. This was due to the authority
granted to the chiefs by the British to manage the Kikuyu Guard as well as most aspects
of village activities. Chiefs were responsible for the recruitment of members, enabling the
chiefs recruit from within their supporters (Anderson 2005, 241). Thus, a system was
created where Kikuyu Guard members were loyal to the chiefs and not the community.
While chiefs wielded power over most village activities and their rule was based
more on the power of the Kikuyu Guard than legitimacy, there were two governing
bodies that gained the community some measure of accountability over the Kikuyu Guard
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(Clough 1998, 158 and Branch 2009, 108).107 The first of these organizations were the
LNCs that were chaired by chiefs, but were comprised of other Mbari members who
derived their legitimacy from their membership in their age group. These councils were
charged with formulating and implementing local policy and possessed the ability to seek
recourse from colonial district officials to override the actions of chiefs (Branch 2009,
109).
In addition to LNCs, the British also formed village tribunals and councils
comprised of individuals selected by villagers (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966, 213).108
The tribal tribunal judges or athamaki were selected in a process similar to the traditional
tribal council system, providing a legislative and judicial body that was accountable to
the populace (Leakey 1953, 37, 80 and Kenyatta 1962, 211). These groups concerned
themselves mainly with providing recommendations for public works projects and the
allocation of resources, but could also regulate local religious, social, and trade
matters.109 These councils provided an avenue for villagers to address grievances against
the Kikuyu Guard and chiefs as they had some power to sanction malfeasance committed
by them (Luongo 2006).
The Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a “mostly in” degree of membership with the
factor of local sustainability and accountability. The colonial government designed the
program to be low cost by limiting Kikuyu Guard compensation and offering rewards
drawn from assets confiscated from the property of convicted Mau Mau members. Due
to the limited external support, the Kikuyu Guard had to be sustainable by the local
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community. However, due to the power entrusted to local chiefs and Local Native
Councils (LNC) over the population whom the British distrusted, there were few
mechanisms except for village councils to promote local accountability and abuses by
local chiefs and Kikuyu Guard were frequent.
Voluntary Participation by Local Elites
The Kikuyu Guard program demonstrated a “fully in” degree of membership with
the voluntary participation by local elites. As this section will show, the British drew
existing leaders into the Kikuyu Guard by leveraging existing grievances and using
incentives that appealed to the Kikuyu’s concepts of self-improvement. Once existing
leaders predisposed to opposing the Mau Mau were inducted into the program with the
promise of immediate and future rewards, the colonial government devolved power to
these individuals and allowed them high levels of discretion in the exercise of that power
to engender ownership in the success of the fight against the Mau Mau.
The initial leaders of the Kikuyu Guard were drawn from groups that had been
attacked by the Mau Mau because of their real or perceived ties to the colonial
government and western culture. One of the main groups targeted by the Mau Mau were
the Kikuyu elite that consisted of chiefs who derived their power from the colonial
government, landowners and moderate political leaders who advocated using peaceful
means to gain political power (Clayton 1984, 19) (Anderson 2005, 242).110

Individuals

in this category had either been attacked by the Mau Mau or disapproved of their
methods. The indiscriminate savagery of the Mau Mau repelled many with one Kikuyu
Guard leader saying he rejected the Mau Mau because, “they killed innocent women and
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children, sometimes pregnant women” (Branch 2009, 59). Branch (2009, 100) found that
the largest predictor of loyalism and membership in the Kikuyu Guards among this group
was being a victim of the Mau Mau.
Another group that joined the Kikuyu Guard in opposition to the Mau Mau were
traditionalists who felt the Mau Mau were upstarts who violated the traditional norms and
values of the Kikuyu (Maloba 1993, 88-89). These individuals saw the Mau Mau as
“greedy eaters” or those that wanted to gain land and political power without the hard
work the Kikuyu regarded as necessary to honestly achieving social status and wealth
(Branch 2009, 22). These individuals found that Loyalism was the most certain path,
especially as the tide began to turn against the Mau Mau, to what Branch (2007) calls
“the practice of self-mastery” and legitimate leadership in the Kikuyu.
Christian communities provided some of the first pockets of resistance against the
Mau Mau and like the traditionalists rejected the Mau Mau on cultural and religious
grounds. Having rejected the traditional Kikuyu religion, the Christian Kikuyu opposed
the “witchcraft” of the Mau Mau oaths (Branch 2007). Refusing to take the Mau Mau
oaths, Christians were punished and sometimes executed by the Mau Mau (Rosberg and
Nottingham 1966, 295). Colonial administrators found the Christians to be the most
reliable opposition to the Mau Mau and authorized them to form the earliest self-defense
groups in 1952 such as the “Torchbearers” group in the Rift Valley Province with the
encouragement of local church leaders.111
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While these groups also wanted self-rule, as did the Mau Mau, British officials
found a core of leaders with whom they could start the “reconstruction of the Kikuyu
people” and a core of support to combat the Mau Mau (Rosberg and Nottingham 1966,
295). To cement their loyalty, the British promised their greatest rewards would come
after the crisis ended with the Nyeri District Commissioner promising the Kikuyu Guard
in 1954 “after this, you will continue to work together as local committees, to assist the
government and to advise yourselves how best law and order can be maintained in your
areas, and farming and other progress restored and furthered” (Branch 2009, 69). In
addition to political power, economic rewards would also be bestowed upon the Kikuyu
Guard with its members receiving “preference in every possible way and be considered
before the masses who, by their oathing and obedience to Mau Mau ways would have to
work their passage back to recognition” (Elkins 2005, 71).
To fulfill this promise, the colonial government began enacting land reforms
designed in 1954, according to M. P. K. Sorrenson (1967, 217) to make the Kikuyu
Guard “the rich, the powerful, and the loyal.” The main mechanism used to benefit the
leaders of the Kikuyu Guard was the Swynnerton Plan, discussed earlier in this case
study. While the plan addressed the legitimate problem of unsustainable farms caused by
overcrowding and fragmentation of land through subdividing inherited plots, only
loyalists were eligible for the newly consolidated plots of land that were confiscated from
convicted Mau Mau members or sympathizers. Through land redistribution, the colonial
authorities created with little cost, tangible incentives for Kikuyu Guard membership and
penalties for Mau Mau membership.
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In addition to providing loyalists with financial rewards, the British also expanded
the power of the chiefs and established local councils in 1954 to tie local leaders to the
colonial government.112 With this new power loyalists were able to direct villager labor,
gain access to resources and external markets, and seek retribution against rivals (Branch
2009, 29-30 and Elkins 2005, 241-242). To ensure their loyalty by making local leaders
feel secure in their positions, the British provided few checks to their power. In general
District Officers let the chiefs “do as they please” (Clough 1998, 158). For example, the
District Commissioner of Nyeri instructed his subordinates that “nothing should be said
or done to take the authority of the administration over the Kikuyu Guard away from us
and the Chiefs” (Branch 2009, 71). This allowed the chiefs to “seize real control” of their
communities according to the Fort Hall District Officer.113 Through this bargain of
giving chiefs almost unlimited control over their communities, the British were able to
gain undivided loyalty of local leaders and impose severe costs on anyone with suspected
Mau Mau sympathies (Branch 2009, 61).
This led to the next major group of Kikuyu leaders, opportunists, to switch sides
to the Kikuyu Guard (Clough 1998, 66). The defection of this group was rapid and may
have been the change that turned the tide of the Mau Mau Rebellion. For example, in
Nyeri District, one of the areas of intense Mau Mau activity, local support shifted to the
government in the early part of 1955 with the District Officers estimating that at the
beginning of the year the majority of the population supported the Mau Mau and by the
end of the year over 90% supported the government.114 While not all those who joined
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the Kikuyu Guard were willing volunteers, membership became a necessity for their
current financial security and for future survival (Branch 2009, 76; Barnett and Njama.
1966, 139, 154; and Kershaw 1997, 250). Branch argues that the resistance of the first
three groups against Mau Mau played a part in the early struggle, but the dramatic loss of
support the Mau Mau experienced in 1954 was due to the perception of leaders and their
followers that the loyalists were on the winning side and their failure to join would
preclude them from future power sharing in post-conflict Kenya (Branch 2009, 11).
As demonstrated in this section, the Kikuyu Guard program demonstrated a “fully
in” degree of membership with the voluntary participation by local elites. The British
drew existing leaders into the Kikuyu Guard by leveraging existing grievances and using
incentives that appealed to the Kikuyu’s concepts of self-improvement. Once existing
leaders who were predisposed to oppose the Mau Mau were inducted into the program
with the promise of immediate and future rewards, the colonial government devolved
power to these individuals and allowed them high levels of discretion in the exercise of
that power to engender ownership in the success of the fight against the Mau Mau.
Conclusion
The Kikuyu Guard program was overall a successful program. Through its use
the British defeated the power of the Mau Mau in under three years with relatively low
costs. The program evolved from a spontaneous response to the Mau Mau into a program
that provided security for two-thirds of the Kikuyu population in less than a year. As
shown below (Table 9), the Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a “mostly out” degree of
membership with the external support and oversight factor. This was because the British
consciously chose not to provide oversight and support to maintain the appearance of
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Kikuyu ownership of the program. Also, the British were also forced to limit their assets
in Kenya because they were simultaneously fighting insurgencies in Malaya and Cyprus
during the height of the Mau Mau Rebellion. This resulted in very little oversight and a
high reliance on local leadership and local sustainability.
The Kikuyu Guard partially adhered to the incorporation of traditional justice
systems and demonstrated a “more in than out” degree of membership (Table 9). While
the creation of tribal chiefs, Local Native Councils, and local tribal councils did not
strictly adhere to the Kikuyu system of kiama ruling councils led by the Mbari or senior
age group, they did maintain some aspects of the age group system. This created a
system that was accepted by the population and placed the administration of limited
governance and justice in the hands of local leaders.
Due to the British use of the Kikuyu Guard as a local security forces to secure the
population and rarely used them outside their traditional tribal boundaries this led to a
“fully in” degree of membership with the factor of limits to territorial jurisdiction (Table
8). The Kikuyu Guard were also limited in their ability to conduct sustained operations
outside their villages because the British required guard members to maintain their
primary occupations due to their decision to limit payments and compensation to keep
costs low and maintain the perception of Kikuyu Guard autonomy.
Finally, the Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a “fully in” degree of
membership with the factor of voluntary participation of local elites (Table 9). The
British formed the Kikuyu Guard around a nucleus of groups who opposed the Mau Mau
on personal, political, cultural or religious grounds. To expand membership and maintain
loyalty, the British provided financial incentives such as increased political power,
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waiving certain taxes, and promising future political rewards to other local leaders and
their supporters. While the lack of oversight and empowering local leaders led to
numerous abuses by the Kikuyu Guard, the combination created a dynamic that meshed
with the Kikuyu culturally accepted path to prosperity that propelled many Kikuyu to join
the Kikuyu Guard against the Mau Mau.
As this case study has shown and as most experts in this Mau Mau Rebellion
agree, the Kikuyu Guard was the critical element responsible for the defeat of the Mau
Mau. The Kikuyu Guard were responsible for numerous human rights violations during
the rebellion due to limited oversight. However, the program was successful in
preventing the Mau Mau access to the population and turning the majority of the Kikuyu
against the Mau Mau.
Table 9.
Membership of the Kikuyu Guard with Community-Based Security Variables.
Variable/Membership Fully
Mostly More
More
Mostly
Fully
In
In
In Than Out
Out
Out
Out
Than In
External Support and
Oversight
Limits to territorial
jurisdiction
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System
Local sustainability
and accountability
Voluntary
participation by local
elites

X
X
X

X
X
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CHAPTER XI - “FREEDOM FROM FEAR”
The Home Guard in the Malayan Emergency
Introduction
This case study explores the use of the community-based security force, the Home
Guard, by the British during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 and its
adherence to the model presented in this dissertation. The case study’s overview includes
a discussion of the organization of the Home Guard and the internal and external factors
that influenced the program’s development. Next, after the history of the Home Guard
has been presented, this case study presents a detailed discussion of the degree of
membership the case demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s model.
Finally, this case study concludes with a summation of the findings and an application of
the findings into the degree of membership matrix. Most significantly, this case study
demonstrates that the successful case of the Malayan Home Guard possessed a high
degree of membership in the factor of external oversight and material support, as well as
several other factors in the model and that the program was ultimately a critical factor in
the defeat of the communist insurgency.
The Home Guard, which eventually grew to number over 240,000, was formed by
the British from several spontaneously generated self-defense programs that emerged in
response to the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) insurgency that erupted in the years
immediately following World War II. The MCP, predominately comprised of ethnic
Chinese and with connections to the Chinese Communist Party, sought to eject the British
from Malaya and establish a communist government. The MCP started its plan to take
over Malaya with a coordinated nation-wide attack by its armed wing, the Malayan Races
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Liberation Army (MRLA) against British rubber plantation and tin mine owners in an
attempt to disrupt the economy. The British responded with by declaring a state of
emergency and giving the security forces the ability to institute a national identification
system, control population movement, arrest without warrant, and deport any nonMalayan citizen. Over 90 percent of MCP members were Chinese and most Chinese in
Malaya were not citizens according to Malayan law. Therefore, in the first two years of
the Emergency, the British sought to defeat the insurgency by destroying MRLA
formations and base camps with large Army units and to identify, detain, and deport noncombatant MCP members operating among the population. The initial British response
was uncoordinated, heavy handed, and largely unsuccessful at separating the MCP from
its base of support among the Chinese population.
While the initial British response foundered, ethnic Malayans and plantation and
mine owners formed several self-defense groups to defend their villages and property.
Two events highlighted the potential of these self-defense groups as a potential tool to
defeat the communists. The first was the victory of the Chinese Communists in mainland
China that precluded the deportation of Chinese Malayans to China. The second event
was the appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs as the Director of
Operations for the British counterinsurgency effort in March 1950. Briggs realized the
key to defeating the communists was to separate them from their base of support, the
ethnic Chinese squatters who lived on the fringes of the Malayan jungles. Briggs
instituted a plan that bore his name and sought to relocate the majority of the Chinese
squatters into protected camps or New Villages, thereby denying the MRLA access to
food and driving them into the jungle where the Army could destroy them.
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Briggs was faced with the problem of securing over a million squatters and
Chinese workers on tin mines and rubber plantations. To do this he turned to the selfdefense groups, renamed the Home Guard in 1950 to provide security within the New
Villages and existing settlements. The program quickly expanded to over 240,000
members by 1951, providing security for over 400 New Villages and numerous existing
towns. The Home Guard not only provided security within settlements and denied the
MCP free access to the population, but also freed Army and police units to conduct
operations outside population centers and to conduct intelligence operations against the
MRLA and its support network the Min Yuen.
While the Briggs plan began to turn the tide against the communist insurgency,
this was not apparent as the MRLA increased its attacks against civilians and security
forces and succeeded in assassinating the British High Commissioner for Malaya, Sir
Henry Gurney in October 1951. Also during this period, Lt. Gen Briggs’ health began to
fail. He retired in December 1950 and died shortly after. The new conservative
government under Winston Churchill realized that a drastic change was needed to
reinvigorate the counterinsurgency effort. They appointed General Sir Gerald Templer,
“the Tiger of Malaya” as the replacement for both Gurney and Briggs, creating a unified
command of both the military and civilian elements of government. Templer expanded
the Home Guard into Chinese New Villages and made to the controversial decision to
arm the Chinese Home Guard units. In conjunction with pressuring the Malayan
Federation parliament to extend citizenship to the Chinese in Malaya and granting former
squatters title to their land around New Villages, Templer also motivated Chinese leaders
to support the New Villages through the Malayan Chinese Association. While the
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Emergency continued for another eight years, Templers actions with the Home Guard
and reinvigorating the counterinsurgency effort in 1952 continued and expanded the
progress gained in the 1951 and for all intents and purposes ended the threat of the
communist insurgency by 1953.
As will be discussed in the following sections of this case study, the British
provided a high degree of supervision and support to the Home Guard. Unlike Kenya,
Malaya provided a large source of revenue for the United Kingdom and after the
communist takeover of China, Malaya was seen as a next step in the communist takeover
of Asia. These considerations resulted in the British providing close oversight of the
Home Guard and focusing resources on the Home Guard and the New Villages they
guarded. While the British provided training and resources to the Home Guard, they did
not have to provide many weapons to the Home Guard. This was partly due to the
training program that did not give the Home Guard access to the weapons until they had
proven trustworthy and partly because the MRLA did not have an external source of
support to provide them with overwhelming firepower, relying on weapons left over from
their fight against the Japanese and weapons captured from the British.
The Home Guard program “more in than out” or partly adhered to incorporation
of traditional justice systems. The British maintained customary Malay court in parallel
to formal government courts, but did not allow them to try serious security cases
involving the communists. The British also informally relied on the Malayan Chinese
Association and other Chinese pseudo-secret societies to organize and discipline Chinese
in New Villages and to raise and vet Home Guard units. While the British allowed the
Malays and Chinese some freedom to enforce their own traditional justice systems, the
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British did not give complete control to them by interposing British civil servants and
security service personnel into the system to ensure British policies were enforced,
especially until local leaders had proven their loyalty. This created a system that was
accepted by the population and placed progressively more administration of governance
and justice in the hands of local leaders.
In addition to incorporating local governance and justice systems, the British
adhered mostly to limitations to territorial jurisdiction by keeping the Home Guard in a
defensive posture, providing security only within their own village perimeters. While the
British did create “operational” Home Guard units 1953 that would operate outside away
from their villages for up to 48 hours at a time and for no more than seven says total in a
thirty-day period. This limited the ability of these forces to operate more than a few
miles away from their villages and usually in support of security forces, effectively
placing limits on their territorial jurisdiction.
Operating under fiscal constraints in the immediate post-World War II period, the
British were also forced to mostly adhere to local sustainability and accountability.
Except for the three years of budget surpluses due to the increased demand for rubber and
tin during the Korean War, the British were forced to keep the Home Guard and the New
Villages they guarded as locally or regionally sustainable as possible. New Villages were
situated in economically viable locations and their inhabitants were required to provide
for themselves in a short period of time. In rubber or tin producing areas, the owners of
those plantations and mines were responsible for the funds necessary to raise and support
a Home Guard unit. This created a system that was highly sustainable as demonstrated
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by the fact that over 90 percent of New Villages continue to be vibrant communities
today.
Finally, the Home Guard demonstrated a high degree of membership with the
factor of voluntary participation of local elites. The British fostered the formation of the
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in 1948 by influential Chinese businessmen.

The

MCA served as a political party, mutual aid society and quasi-secret society. This
meshed with existing Chinese social norms and allowed the British a means to organize
the Chinese squatter population, integrate them into the Malayan political system, and
select leadership and members of the Home Guard. In addition to the MCA, the British
encouraged the formation of local councils that had oversight of the Home Guard,
starting in 1952 and selected existing local leaders to lead the Home Guard.
As this case study shows and most of the literature on the subject agrees, the
Home Guard was the critical element responsible for the British defeat of the communists
in Malaya. While the Home Guard killed the fewest number of communists compared to
the Army and Police, the Home Guard allowed the British security forces to go on the
offensive starting in 1952 by freeing them from static defense of the population. The
Home Guard also made possible the Briggs Plan’s strategy of separating the MRLA from
the population and denying the communists food by controlling food distribution and
preventing smuggling out of the New Villages. In the following section, this case study
will provide an overview of the Malayan Emergency, the evolution of the Home Guard
and the political and military factors that influenced the program.

316

Background
The British involvement in Malaya began in the period between 1771 and 1800,
during which the British negotiated with the Sultans of the nine Malayan states first to
establish trading posts and then to incorporate them into the Commonwealth as semiautonomous protectorates. The British allowed the Sultans to remain in power and
provided them an annual income in return for British occupation and indirect rule
(Brooke 2004, 17-18) From 1874 to 1888, as rubber became more important to the
British economy, the British increased their control of Malaya through a series of treaties
with the Sultans that established a British High Commissioner overseeing national affairs
of the Malayan Federation and British Residents in each state with the power to formulate
policy and manage state affairs, while maintaining the veneer of the Sultans’ sovereignty
(Jackson 2011, 3; Sunderland, Organizing Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1948-1960
1964, 4 and Barber 1981, 13).
In addition to the ethnic Malayans, the other major ethnic group and the one most
important during the Malayan Emergency were Chinese. The Chinese presence in
Malaya dates to 1349 when the first Chinese merchant settlements were established in
Singapore (Purcell 1956, 2). The major migration of Chinese occurred during the
beginning of the 20th century as the rubber and tin trade increased. The British, needing
additional labor and seeing the Chinese as harder workers than Malayans brought tens of
thousands of Chinese from the Chinese mainland (Peoples 2001, 2). While the Chinese
prospered in Malaya, they did not integrate into Malayan society and were not granted
citizenship so they were excluded from the political system (Bartlett 1954, 47 and Barber
1981, 15). The Chinese chose instead to rely on secret societies and mutual aid groups to
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meet their needs and organize their communities. This created parallel systems with
Malayans living in hamlets or “kampongs” linked together in mukims or village
complexes and the Chinese villages typically had a population of 1,000 clustered around
rubber plantations or tin mines or areas conducive to cultivating cash crops (Thompson
1966, 121).
The seeds of Malayan Emergency first appeared during the 1930s. The global
economic depression of the put thousands of Chinese out of work. This coincided with
the formation and expansion of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) that was formed in
1929, after six years of preparation by Chinese Communist Party agents from mainland
China (Postgate 1992, 1). As most Chinese in Malaya had not integrated into Malayan
culture and maintained strong times to mainland China, they became increasingly
radicalized due to the political struggles occurring in China. Both the Kuomintang
(KMT) and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) expanded their respective memberships in
Malaya as the decade progressed (Brooke 2004, 18-19)
When the Japanese invaded Malaya in 1941, the bulk of ethnic Malayans were
able to retreat to their rural farming and fishing villages and in many cases, did not
strongly object to the Japanese occupation. The Chinese, on the other hand, being
concentrated in business and trade, were unable to avoid contact with the Japanese
(Purcell 1956, 8). The Japanese saw the Chinese as potential agents of their foes on
mainland China and mercilessly persecuted them (Purcell 1956, 32). The Japanese also
used the Malayan Police force, dominated by ethnic Malayans to control the Chinese
population, further creating enmity between the two groups (Purcell 1956, 37).
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This left the Chinese in Malaya two options, flee or fight. Many chose to retreat
to the uninhabited edges of the Malayan jungles. The Chinese found uncultivated lands,
suitable for farming, and in most cases owned by the Sultans. In these areas, the Chinese
squatted on unclaimed land and began subsistence farming for the duration of World War
II. (Purcell 1956, 8 and Henniker 1955, 5). Along with the remnants of the British
military that retreated into the jungles after their defeat by the Japanese, other Chinese
chose to fight the Japanese occupation. The only group that possessed the organization
and support network capable of carrying out an insurgency against the Japanese was the
MCP. In 1942, approximately 200 members of the MCP retreated to the jungle with
members of Task Force 136 of the British Special Operations Executive to raise a
resistance force (Postgate 1992, 1). With British training and weapons, the MCP was
able to exploit the Malayan Chinese anger for the Japanese atrocities in mainland China
to form the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) in early 1942, a force that
expanded to over 7,000 by 1945. In addition, the MCP was also an underground support
network comprised of several thousand members (Jackson 2011, 8, 11).
At the time of the Japanese surrender in August 1945, 380 British personnel
remained in Malaya compared to the MPAJA’s 7,000 (Shennan 2000, 294). The British
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir George Henry Hall realized that after four years of
Japanese occupation, the British pre-war administrative infrastructure was dismantled and
they would have to “make an entirely new start” (Stockwell 1995, 243). In August and
September of 1945, the British did not have the forces available to reinstate their control
over Malaya.
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The MCP and MPAJA stepped into the vacuum created by the Japanese surrender
and, using the narrative that they had defeated the 130,000 Japanese in Malaya as the
liberators of Malaya, established local governments in the areas they controlled for the
month it took the British to move in troops from India to reassert control (Shennan 2000,
298). As sufficient British forces became available in October 1945, the British Military
Administration started demobilizing the MPAJA, recovering their weapons, and banned
the MCP under the reoccupation plan, Operation ZIPPER (Jackson 2011, 10 and Shennan
2000, 297) Unknown to the British, the MPAJA communist leaders cached hundreds of
tons of arms and ammunition they had been given by the British and captured from the
Japanese for a “rainy day” (Henniker 1955, 6).
Once the British believed the MPAJA had been demobilized, they sought to
reestablish the pre-war political and economic system. However, they did not address
systemic issues that created a divided society. The Malayan population in 1945 was 4.9
million, comprised of 2.1 million ethnic Malays, 1.8 million ethnic Chinese and the
remaining population comprised of Indians, Europeans and other ethnic minorities
(Clutterbuck 1973, 33 and Great Britain Colonial Office 1949, 1). In reestablishing the
federal system under the Sultans, approximately 40 percent of the population lacked
citizenship and access to the political system.
The Chinese prospered economically during the years immediately following war.
The Chinese reentered their traditional occupations in mining, rubber production, and
trade; earning on average three times the median income of Malays. The approximately
500,000 Chinese squatters also prospered growing cash crops and did not return to their
lives before the Japanese occupation. Although they did not own the land they
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cultivated, they prospered due to high food prices caused by war time disruptions in food
distribution networks in Malaya (Miller 1954, 142; McCuen 2005, 91 and Purcell 1954,
73). While the Chinese prospered in Malaya, they did not integrate into Malayan society
and were seen by the British as “independent and not as amenable to discipline as those
who live in accommodation supplied by estates” (Great Britain Colonial Office 1949, 7
and Clutterbuck 1973, 35). According to T.F.P McNeice, the Secretary for Social
Welfare, most Chinese had no desire to have a connection with the government,
considering it “something inevitable functioning on high without reference to their wellbeing.” Instead, secret societies, “the real movers of history” filled the void for the
Chinese (Stockwell 1995, 85).
As the dominant Chinese political party, the MCP hoped to influence the political
system by peaceful infiltration of trade unions and political agitation (Jackson 2011, 12).
MCP leaders were encouraged in October 1945, when the British announced that in 1946
Singapore would become its own colonial state and the remainder of the nine Malayan
states would form under the unitary government of the Malayan Union, with all ethnic
groups granted citizenship and political representation. This move outraged the Sultans
and ethnic Malayans who saw this move as a diminution of their political power
(Shennan 2000, 304).
Under pressure from the Sultans and their constituents, the Malayan Union lasted
until February 1, 1948 when the British replaced it with the Malayan Federation. It
retained the strong federal government under the British High Commissioner, but
returned the sovereignty of the state sultans (Hack 2015, 612) Under the Federation all
ethnic Malays were granted citizenship, but it only gave citizenship to Chinese
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individuals who had both parents born in Malaya. Only 375,000 of the 1.9 million
Chinese in Malaya gained citizenship under this system (Purcell 1956, 41). The MCP
leaders realized under this new system the 95 percent Chinese MCP had no hope of
taking power peacefully (Sunderland, Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya 1964, 5).
The formation of the Malayan Union coincided with orders from the Soviet Union
at the February 1948 Communist Youth Conference in Calcutta. The Soviets were
planning to a political offensive in Europe and wanted communist parties in colonial
states to divert the attention of European colonial powers (Jackson 2011, 12). Therefore,
in June 1948, the MCP unleashed a series of violent strikes and terrorist acts.
As part of their plan to seize control, the MCP sought to wreck the Malayan
economy and eject British business owners and civil servants from areas they sought as
staging bases (Peoples 2001, 9). The MCP launched its campaign on June 16, 1948 with
the murder of rubber planters Arthur Walker, John Allison, and Ian Christian in the
northern Malayan town of Sungei Siput in the State of Perak (Barber 1981, 17). The
murders shocked the British government, which, consequently, declared the MCP an
illegal organization and arrested more than a thousand suspected members (Deery 2007,
29). The MCP and the former members of the MPAJA who had not been arrested
retreated to the jungles to wage a Maoist guerrilla war (Henniker 1955, 7)
Under the leadership of Chin Peng, whom the British had awarded the Order of
the British Empire for his service in the MPAJA, reactivated the MPAJA units and
renamed the force the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-British Army (MPABA), later renamed the
Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in February 1949 (Jackson 2011, 13-14). He
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also reactivated the several thousand members of the wartime clandestine support
network, the Min Yuen or “Masses Movement” (Barber 1981, 29).
Chen Peng organized the MLRA into nine regiments, one for each state, and each
with 200 to 500 members. These regiments were further divided into companies and
platoons with regional responsibilities. In addition, each regiment was assigned a hunterkiller platoon of 60-70 personnel to spearhead attacks (Postgate 1992, 30) The MLRA
found ready recruits among the disaffected Chinese squatter population by 1951 after a
series of battlefield successes the MLRA organization expanded to its height of 12,500
members (Jackson 2011, 14). Additionally, the Min Yuen rapidly increased.
Researchers Vernon Bartlett (1954, 41) and O’Ballance (1966, 92) placed the number of
Min Yuen at four times the number of active MRLA fighters or somewhere between
thirty and forty thousand members. This growth of support for the MCP was assisted by
conflict between the ethnic Malaya dominated government and the Chinese squatters in
December 1948 due to economic and political issues when the state governments
attempted to reclaim the land used by squatters. The sultans chafed at ceding their
“Malaya reservations.” To the Chinese and the Chinese objected to being resettled and
losing their livelihoods (Miller 1954, 143).
Using the MRLA and Min Yuen, Chen Peng conducted a traditional Maoist
insurgency. First, the MLRA killed or displaced the British administrators, miners and
planters from the countryside (Henniker 1955, 7). Then the MCP established communist
controlled “liberated areas,” to be used as base areas and expanded until the MCP
controlled the entire country (Jackson 2011, 13). In the months leading up to the
Emergency, the British leadership in Malaya did not understand the full depth and scope
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of Chinese resentment of their treatment by the Federation government and their support
of the MCP. Two weeks before the communist attacks that started the Emergency,
Assistant Secretary of State for the Colonies J.B. Williams downplayed the impending
crisis by stating the growing number of communist attacks “gives an impression of
drama; almost melodrama. It conjures up pictures of hordes of people burrowing molelike in the interstices of Malayan society… I do not think that any information has
reached the Eastern Department during the last month would lead us to suppose that any
serious trouble is brewing in Malaya (Stockwell 1995, 15-16). Even as communist
attacks mounted, the British were unaware of the danger. In a telegram from M.J.
MacDonald, the High Commissioner for Malaya to Creech Jones, the Assistant Secretary
of State for the Colonies, stated, “We hope the worst of the Emergency can be behind us
by the end of September” (Stockwell 1995, 70). Instead the Emergency continued for
twelve more years.
This complacency meant the British were caught unprepared for the communist
insurgency. In 1948 there were 12,000 British citizens in Malaya, comprised of civil
servants, police, mine and rubber plantation owners and other businessmen (Barber 1981,
16). The British security forces at the start of the Emergency were woefully
understrength, consisting of 9,000 poorly trained Malay Police and ten infantry battalions
(Jackson 2011, 17)
In response to the MRLA assassinations and acts of terrorism, the British declared
a state of emergency in the State of Perak on June 16, 1948 and in the rest of the Malay
on June 18. The State of Emergency allowed the imposition of the death penalty for
carrying weapons, extended detention without charge, search and seizure without warrant
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and the ability to restrict the movements of entire communities (Stockwell 1995, 40). As
part of the declaration, the British enacted the Emergency Regulations. These measures
allowed the government to raise special security forces, register the population, and to
secretly try all crimes except capital crimes (Stubbs 2004, 70). Of importance for the
New Village program and the Home Guard were Special Regulations 17D, 17E, and 17F
allowed the government to control the movement of individuals and communities, evict
squatters and relocate them to “resettlement camps” (Tan 2009, 217). These regulations
would form the legal basis for the mass resettlement of almost a million people.
Initially, the British believed the insurgency was limited to a small population and
they could kill or capture the members of the MRLA and deport any communist
sympathizers so they enacted additional laws to facilitate this strategy. First, the British
implemented the National Registration and Identity Card program in July 1948. This
program required all persons over 12 years old to register with the government and carry
an identity card at all times. The purpose of this program was to identify outside MCP
organizers and was completed in March 1949, but was not effective due to a concerted
MRLA campaign to sabotage the program (Brooke 2004, 57).
The second part of the initial British strategy in 1948 and 1949 was the detention
and deportation of suspected MCP members. Article 18B authorized indefinite detention
and in the first two years of the emergency, allowing the British to detain as many as
11,000 people at any one time. (Bartlett 1954, 48) Additionally the Federation parliament
passed the Banishment Act that allowed the government to deport any non-Federation
citizen who was implicated in violent acts (Stockwell 1995, 17). The British used this
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law to deport 26,000 Chinese in 1948 and 1949 (Bartlett 1954, 48; Jackson 2011, 20 and
Colonial Office 1950, 210).
The initial British response did disrupt MRLA operations forcing the MCP to
reorganize after the flurry of attacks in the summer and fall of 1948. In 1948 618 MRLA
were killed and 337 captured along with 3,020 weapons making it impossible for the
MRLA to continue the sustained attacks (Colonial Office 1950, 138). Additionally, the
MCP miscalculated their level of support among the non-Chinese Malayans. In response
to the lack of a general uprising against the British, the MCP central committee issued a
directive in December 1948 that recognized that a popular uprising would not occur in
the near future. The MCP renamed its military arm the “Malayan Races Liberation Army
(MRLA) to bring in more non-Chinese supporters and directed that a decentralized
protracted war starting from secure jungle bases be conducted (Brooke 2004, 68). After
this directive, the MLRA renewed their campaign of terrorism and sabotage. They
damaged tin mines and the rubber trees on plantations or stole products to sell through
coopted Chinese business owners to generate revenue. As much as twenty percent of the
rubber produced in the period between 1948 and 1950 was diverted to fund the MRLA
(Bartlett 1954, 41).
Outraged by the government’s inability to protect their property European
businessmen and administrators lost confidence in the High Commissioner to Malaya, Sir
Gerald Gent and called for his replacement in June 1948. Gent recalled to London for
consultations and was killed in a plane crash on July 2, 1948 when he was recalled to
Britain for consultations. He was replaced by Sir Henry Gurney on October 6, 1948.
Gurney had served as Chief Secretary in Palestine from 1946 to 1948 and was familiar
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with counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations (Jackson 2011, 22 and Stockwell
1995, 36). This four-month gap in leadership caused a pause in operations that gave the
MRLA a chance to reorganize after the initial British response inflicted significant
damage on it (O'Ballance 1966, 86).
In addition to a change in leadership, the British responded to mounting MLRA
attacks in 1948 and 1949 by expanding the police from 9,000 to 20,000 to conduct
routine police duties in villages. Most of the new police officers were ethnic Malayans
and had little training before entering active service. These forces were led by equally
untrained Police Lieutenants drawn from England who M.C.A Henniker (1955, 32)
charitably said of their leadership ability that the lacked “the ‘touch’ with the soldiery. In
addition to the 20,000 regular police, the British fielded 30,000 Special Constables
formed into Jungle Companies. These paramilitary forces trained counterinsurgency and
infantry tasks to conduct offensive operations in the jungles bordering populated areas
(Corum 2006, 5). The British authorities also allowed planters and mine owners to raise
and equip Auxiliary Police, a force of Malays, Chinese and Indians; who were paid to
guard their land (Henniker 1955, 31 and Corum 2006, 6).
In addition to lacking adequate training, the police forces lacked ethnic Chinese
recruits or Chinese speakers. This exacerbated a general lack of understanding of the
motivations of the Chinese population. According to a memorandum dated December 8,
1948 by T.F.P. McNeice, the Secretary for Social Welfare commented, “there was no
doubt about the difficulty of knowing what the ordinary Chinese man or woman is
thinking. This is due to in very large measure to the fact that there is an insufficient
number of Chinese speaking officers in the administration. Out of 83 MCS (Malaya
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Civil Service (MCS) officers at present learning a first language, only 17 are learning
Chinese. 100% of all other officers engaged in administrative work speak no Chinese at
all” (Stockwell 1995, 85). The lack of Chinese speaking officers was a problem that
plagued the British throughout the Emergency.
In addition to a poorly trained police force and a lack of Chinese speakers, the
British also suffered from an uncoordinated war effort. According to Miller (1954, 137)
authority in large scale operations were divided with Army officers chaffing at the slow
and careful pace of police operations and police commanders resenting the heavy handed
and indiscriminate methods of the army. This allowed the MRLA to operate in the seams
between the security forces and benefit from a lack of information sharing between the
security services.
The British continued their strategy of mass deportation of Chinese until other
events in Asia made that impossible. The victory of the Chinese communists over the
Kuomintang in mainland china at the close of 1949 made deportation to China
impossible. If the Chinese could not be removed from Malaya, the only option left was
to control them. The first step the Federation Government took was to pass Emergency
Regulation 17D (Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya 1954, 133). The regulation
gave security forces the authority to relocate and detain entire populations if evidence
existed they had supported the communists. This move laid the legal ground work for the
New Village program and the Home Guard.
In 1950 the situation for the British continued to worsen. Not only were they
unable to deport suspected Chinese communists, the communist victory in mainland
China emboldened the MRLA. Miller (1954, 135) cites the takeover of mainland China
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by the communists and the British Labor Government’s recognition of the Chinese
Communist government as a turning point in the attitudes of the Malayan Chinese. The
MRLA increased its attacks 80 percent, to 221 in February 1950. The attacks continued
to increase to a high of 534 in May 1950 and the monthly average number of attacks
increased over 80 percent from 1949 (Miller 1954, 136) (McGrath 2006, 35). As the tide
seemed to be turning in favor of the communists in the region one government report
remarked the Malay Chinese in the first months of 1950 were “more disposed to insure
themselves with the other side, for they feared that if they openly sided with the
government in Malaya their relatives or their property, or both, in China, would suffer at
the hands of the Communist Government (Miller 1954, 135).
Sensing victory, the MRLA also increased its campaign of intimidation against
the Chinese squatters. By June 1950 the MLRA was killing on average over 100 mostly
Chinese civilians each month, five times the level in 1949 (Clutterbuck 1973, 175).
Thus, the Chinese squatters were forced to become the main source of support for the
MRLA and provided over 90 percent of its fighters and members of the Min Yuen,
allowing the MRLA to expand to almost 12,000 in 1950 (McCuen 2005, 92).
After Labor Government of Clement Atlee was replaced by the Conservative
Government under Winston Churchill, the British Government undertook a review of its
operations in Malaya. One of the major problems the review identified was the lack of
unity of effort among the security forces. In March 1950, the British Government
addressed this issue by appointing Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs as the Director
of Operations “to plan, co-ordinate, and direct the anti-bandit operations of the police and
fighting forces” (Miller 1954, 138 and Stockwell 1995, 194).
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Briggs assumed his position in April 1950 and made a rapid assessment of the
situation. He found that the insurgency could not be solved by killing or deporting the
communists since new replacements would be available from the disaffected Chinese
squatter population. Briggs determined that the only way to defeat the communists was
by destroying their morale and removing their source of supply of both personnel and
material. The solution lay in the Chinese squatter population (Purcell 1954, 76). Briggs
believed that “the whole key to the war lies in getting control of the squatter areas. The
people matter, they are vital, but you can’t expect any support from people you can’t
protect” (Barber 1981, 88-89). This was not a new concept. In December 1948, High
Commissioner Gurney had formed a committee to explore the issue of the Chinese
squatters that found the long-term problem was land reform and the short-term problem
was providing security from the communists (Purcell 1954, 75). The difference in 1950
was Briggs was able to unify the efforts of the security forces towards this goal under a
single plan.
The plan, titled the “Federation plan for the elimination of the communist
organization and armed forces in Malaya,” but popularly known as “The Briggs Plan”
was presented by Briggs to the Cabinet Malaya Committee on May 24, 1950 and enacted
on June 1, 1950 (Director of Operations, Malaya 1958, 5). The Briggs plan established a
committee command structure with executive committees comprised of commanders
from each branch of the security services and the civil government, forcing leaders to
share information and agree on operations. Each committee was headed by the senior
civil service representative who had veto authority over all operations (Director of
Operations, Malaya 1958, 4 and McCuen 2005, 184). The plan recognized that the
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communist MRLA relied on the Min Yuen support network for material support and
propaganda in areas predominately comprised of ethnic Chinese. Briggs proposed that to
defeat the communists, British civil and military authorities would have to work together
to not only destroy the communist forces, but also restore the peoples’ faith in the
government to protect them against “gangster Communist extortion and terrorism”
(Stockwell 1995, 217)
To accomplish these goals, the Briggs Plan directed that the government must
“demonstrate Britain’s firm intention to fulfill her obligations in defense of Malaya
against both external attack and internal disorder” and “extend effective administration
and control of all populated areas” (Stockwell 1995, 216). To accomplish this involved:
1. A large measure of squatter resettlement into compact groups.
2. A strengthening of local administration.
3. Provisioning of road communication in isolated populated areas.
4. Setting up of Police Posts in these areas.
The plan directed the police to continue normal police functions and collect intelligence
and directed the army to act as a striking force in areas adjacent to populated areas
suspected to be MLRA support areas (Stockwell 1995, 218).
The central pillar of the Briggs plan was resettlement. The resettlement plan
sought to separate the communists from their base of support, the Chinese squatters. To
do this, approximately 500,000 would be moved from the outskirts of the jungle to
defensible communal compounds, called “New Villages” (McCuen 2005, 156). By the
end of 1952, the New Village program relocated approximately 430,000 Chinese
squatters into 410 settlements and “regrouped” between 630,000 and 740,000 Chinese
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mine and rubber plantation workers into guarded compounds near their place of
employment. This was approximately half of the Chinese population (French 2011, 120;
Clutterbuck 1973, 176; and Jackson 2011, 20).
Even though the British Army had increased Army forces from nine battalions in
1948 to 21 or approximately 50,000 soldiers in 1950 and the police from 20,000 in to
40,000 in 1950, Briggs realized they were inadequate to secure a population of over 4
million (Deery 2007, 31; Ucko 2010, 21 and Stockwell 1995, 232). Briggs sought to
address this deficiency in two ways. First, the Briggs Plan called The Briggs Plan called
for the clearing of each state in sequence from the south to the north with cleared areas
declared “white areas” in the control of local forces (McGrath 2006, 36). This would
allow for the concentration of security forces, achieving local numerical superiority over
the communists.
This required the ability of the security forces to turn over white areas to local
security forces. This formed the second element of his plan, the formation of a Home
Guard. Ethnic Malayan Home Guard and Auxiliary Police units defending mines and
plantations had been formed as early as 1949 and number over 47,000 by December
1950, but in an uneven manner and typically did not include Chinese squatters (Barber
1981, 80; Postgate 1992, 5 and Jackson 2011, 18). The weak Chinese squatters’ response
was mainly because they were not given weapons to defend themselves, unlike the
Malayans. According to a statement from the Chinese Chung Shing Jit Pao Party, the
early Chinese Home Guard units were “but passive measures” and once there were
adequate security forces to clear the jungles of communists, the Chinese Malayans would
“no longer hesitate to come forward and join” (Stockwell 1995, 74).
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Briggs addressed this by successfully pressuring the Federation government to
pass the 1950 Home Guard Regulations and by combining all existing Home Guard and
auxiliary police into one organization with a strength of 300,000 by July 1951 (Postgate
1992, 5 and Jackson 2011, 18). These regulations allowed the Chief Minister and state
Resident Commissioners to raised Home Guard forces and made all men between 18 and
55 liable for service. The regulations also gave Home Guard members the authority to
carry weapons and the powers of arrest and detention. These regulations were later
amended in 1951 to allow Home Guard units in New Villages (Yaacob 2011, 26).
Starting in the fall of 1950, the British started to relocate the Chinese squatters
into 550 New Villages, completing the relocations by the end of 1952 for a cost of 11
million pounds (Bartlett 1954, 50). The overall cost of the program between 1950 and
1958 was approximately $41 million (Clutterbuck 1973, 175 and Jackson 2011, 20). The
British conducted the establishment of a New Village in phases. In the first phase, the
Army would converge on the selected population, conduct a sweep of the area to push out
communist forces and then provided the logistical support necessary to move villages to
the site selected for the New Village. While the regular police would provide security as
the New Villagers constructed their new homes and planted crops, the Army and Special
Police would conduct small unit, “distributed operations” in the areas within five hours
march around the village to prevent communist forces from approaching the village
(French 2011, 118 and Miller 1954, 140).
Once the village had proven that is was willing to cooperate in its defense, a
contingent of Special Police would begin the second phase by recruiting and training a
Home Guard (O'Ballance 1966, 109). The size of the Home Guard depended on the size
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of the population in the New Village. Their unpaid duties were limited to a rotating
guard duty at night within the perimeter of the New Village (McCuen 2005, 159). As the
Home Guard became more proficient and demonstrated loyalty to the government, the
police presence in the village would be reduced and then removed to another area to
repeat the process.115
Chinese leaders informed Briggs that the squatters would not participate in the
Home Guard willingly because they feared communist reprisals. To remove the
responsibility from them, he sought to make it look like they were forced to participate.
On September 8, 1950, he ordered every village to form a Home Guard (Sunderland
1964, 51).
As the bulk of the squatters were moved into New Villages during 1951, Briggs
moved on to the second part of the Briggs plan, Operation Starvation in June 1951 (Hack
1999, 105). This operation sought to deprive the MRLA access to food and medicine. In
“food restricted areas” all food had to be consumed at home and shop keepers had to
record all food sales. Food was cooked in communal kitchens and cans were opened at
the time of sale. In the tropical Malayan climate, this ensured all food had to be
consumed quickly to avoid spoilage (O'Ballance 1966, 122)
To increase the effectiveness of the operation, Briggs pushed for an expansion of
the Home Guard to force the population to assist in the effort. He pressured local
plantation and mine owners to assume some of the cost to field these new forces (Miller
1954, 188). In addition to the benefit of forcing Home Guard members to publicly

115

Extract from Malayan Federal Executive Committee Minutes, August 8, 1952, Reference CO 1022/35,
Record Group 1243765, UK National Archives

334

support the government, the Home Guard were critical in screening inhabitants in New
Villages as they entered and exited the perimeter and identifying individuals who were
Min Yuen members or vulnerable to MCP intimidation and possibly smuggling food
(Yaacob 2011, 30).
Operation Starvation, in conjunction with the operations of the Army, newly freed
from static defensive duties, forced the MRLA into the defensive. Being cut off from
their food supplies provided by the Chinese squatters forced the MRLA commanders to
divert approximately 25 percent of their force into food cultivation in the deep jungles
and security forces to guard the crops (Hack 1999, 108). Tan Guat, the MRLA
commander in Johore province, admitted during interrogation after surrendering that after
the establishment of the New Villages operating in large units became “extremely
difficult because of the problem of feeding a large gang. Before resettlement, bandits
could visit relatives and close friends at any time of the day and night to get information”
(Miller 1954, 152). The increased hardships of food scarcity lowered the morale of the
common MRLA fighter. Through an increase in fighters killed by the Army and
surrenders due to the hardships of the jungle, the MRLA force strength dropped from
12,000 in 1950 to approximately 7,200 by the end of 1951 (Sunderland 1964, 16)
Chin Peng, the leader of the MCP and MRLA, recognized the threat posed by the
New Villages and Operation Starvation. He also realized the MCP had not won the
popular support of the Chinese squatters through their campaign of terrorism and
intimidation, only their compliance built on fear (Ramakrishna 2001, 80). In October
1951, the MRLA Central Committee issued the “October Directives” that ordered MRLA
forces to conduct “seven urgent tasks” to build popular support (Hack 1999, 104). British
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intelligence succinctly summarized the directives as, “Don’t be beastly to the masses, lets
woo them instead” (Henniker 1955, 163-164)
While the directives ordered MRLA forces to “Stop destroying property and
harassing the population and to limit civilian casualties to win popular support, the
directives also indicated how effective the Home Guard and food control had been”
(Purcell 1956, 47 and Miller 1954, 213). Included in those tasks, the directives ordered
Min Yuen cells to infiltrate Home Guard units and Village Councils to undermine food
control measures and that, “food collection was to be the primary task of the selfprotection branches of the Min Yuen rather than sabotage and intimidation” (Miller 1954,
213 and Stubbs 2004, 192).
The MRLA was in its death throes by the end of 1952 because of the Briggs Plan,
but no one knew it. To disrupt the New Villages and stop food control, attacks rose from
380 in April 1950 to 571 in October of the same year (Miller 1954, 166). Attacks
continued to increase in 1951 until they were a third higher than 1950 at 6,100 total
attacks, but as Harry Miller, a veteran of Malaya and an expert on the Emergency, noted,
“Looking back, it seems to me that their vicious attacks and their atrocities (in 1951)
were also born of desperation” (Barber 1981, 103).
However, it felt to the British and Malayans that they were losing because of two
events. The first and most psychologically jarring to the British was the death of the
High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, who was killed in a random MRLA ambush on
October 6, 1951 (Jackson 2011, 23). Along with the increase in overall increase in
attacks, the death of Gurney seemed to be a symbolic death of the British effort in
Malaya. Gurney’s death was the event that spurred the British government to increase its
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effort and to appoint one man or “Supremo” that would have overall command
responsible for the military and civil elements of the counterinsurgency effort (Barber
1981, 122).
The second event was the sudden resignation of Harold Briggs in November
1951. Briggs left Malaya on December 1, 1951 after his health had been wrecked by
years of tropical service. He died a month later in his retirement home in Cyprus (Coates
1992, 99). In the space of two months, both the top civilian and military positions, were
vacant during increasing communist violence.
While their deaths were unfortunate, the timing was propitious for the British war
effort. Sir Oliver Lyttelton, the Undersecretary of State for Colonies who had been
named to the post in October 1951, had been formulating a new plan the Emergency. He
wanted to put the civil and military war efforts in the hands of one man, retrain the
police, and educate the Malaya population and the war effort (Barber 1981, 129), His
report on the Emergency, submitted to the Prime Minister on December 21, 1951, also
recommended an increased effort to create Chinese Home Guard units to offset the
predominance of Malays in the Special Constables as only 1860 of the 38,466 the force
were Chinese in 1951 (Nagl 2002, 77).
On January 4, 1952 Secretary of the Colonies Oliver Lyttelton endorsed General
Sir Gerald Templar as the Director of Operations to Winston Churchill and again
proposed a plan to expand the Home Guard by integrating more Chinese into the
organization (Stockwell 1995, 356). The British high command, including Field
Marshall Bernard Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, agreed that “they
had the plan, and the man” with Templer (Jackson 2011, 24). Templar assumed the role
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of “Supremo,” in command of the entire British counterinsurgency effort on February 5,
1952, assuming both the role of High Commissioner and Director of Operations (Jackson
2011, 24).
Templer, a man a great energy, quickly took charge. One of his first acts was to
issue a memorandum to all government officers to strip away any complacency and
highlight the requirement for all members of the government to assist in the effort to
defeat the communists. In the circular he said, “Any idea that the business of normal
civil Government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be
killed for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated. There
is not one person who has not a personal responsibility for contributing something to its
suppression” (Miller 1954, 204). Not only realized the civil and military forces needed
renewed vigor and to understand they all had a part in the struggle, he also reminded his
subordinates that, “the answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the
hearts and minds of the people,” especially the Chinese squatters (Clutterbuck 1973, 30).
Templer stated “no victory would be permanent unless the government won over many of
the Chinese” and “to gain their confidence, the government had to free them from the fear
of Communist violence” (Ramakrishna 2001, 86).
In the two years Templer was Supremo, two-thirds of the MRLA were killed or
surrendered, attacks fell from 500 to less than 100 a month, and civilian and security
force casualties fell from 200 to less than 40 and the key was the Chinese Guard
(Ramakrishna 2001, 79). According to Clutterbuck (1966, 87) 1952 was the decisive
year, “though this was not to become apparent until the middle of the following year
(1953).”
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Until Templer became Supremo, British officials had fought arming the Chinese
Home Guard adequately because they felt they could not be trusted (Ramakrishna 2001,
82). This left Tan Cheng Lock, the head of the Malayan Chinese Association to
comment that the Home Guard was a “half-hearted measure and a farce. Templer took
several measures to address this criticism.
First, he appointed a single entity to oversee the program by appointing Major
General E. B. de Fonblanque, as the Home Guard Inspector General in April 1952
(Stubbs 2004, 162). Fonblanque would oversee the recruitment, training and sustainment
of the Home Guard, while the operational control of the Home Guard lay with the civilian
District Officers (Brooke 2004, 111). He would also have a position on the National War
Council to address any systemic issues affecting the Home Guard.
The second measure Templer took in the spring was the risk of arming the
Chinese Home Guard (Stubbs 2004, 162). He felt that the Chinese Home Guard was the
key to defeating the communists on the “second front,” or the “Hearts and Minds” in the
battle between government forces and the Min Yuen. (Miller 1954, 220). He took this
gamble after the successful experiment in the fall of 1951 with the Kinta Valley Home
Guard, a Chinese full-time security force paid by the mine owners of the Chinese Perak
Ti Mining Association (Clutterbuck 1966, 85 and Comber 2011, 45).116 The force that
expanded by mid-1952 to 30,000 and guarded 323 tin mines did not suffer from the
conflicted loyalties the British feared they would have and were not just a source of
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weapons for the communists to take. In fact, between 1952 and 1954, the Kinta Valley
Home Guard lost nine weapons (Stubbs 2004, 162).
Templer moved improve the quality of the Home Guard and increase the
proportion of Chinese participation in the program. In March 1952, the first full month
of Templer’s command, there were 278,787 Home Guards with 71,041 Chinese.117 By
September 1952, Templer had reduced the Home Guards to 253,401 adjust the size to fit
the available budget, but the number of Chinese in the program increased to 87,032.118
Templer would continue to push for more Chinese participation in the program and
Chinese Home Guard units eventually reached 93,854 members in December 1953.119
Through General Fonblanque, Templer continued to improve the weaponry of the
Home Guard with the goal that the first Home Guard units would be operating
independently by June 1, 1952. He convinced the British government to purchase an
initial 10,000 shotguns, 2,000 semi-automatic carbines with the goal of eventually
providing one gun for every three men, roughly the proportion of Home Guard members
on duty at any given time.120 While the Templer was unable achieve this ratio, he was
able to provide approximately one weapon for every five Home Guard members by
December 1953.121
By the summer of 1952 all the elements of the Briggs plan were in place and the
New Village program had relocated most of the Chinese squatters. The concentration of
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the population in New Villages and the relief the Home Guard provided the regular
security forces from static defensive duties was a key to the defeat of the MRLA. As the
British implemented the New Village program and the Home Guard increased in size and
competence civilian casualties decreased from a high of 100 a month in the summer of
1950 to under 20 by the start of 1953. Attacks initiated by the MLRA also decreased
from a peak of over 500 per month in 1950 and 1951 to 428 in June 1952 and under 80 in
January 1953. Finally, the number of MLRA fighters killed or surrendered peaked at 140
a month in December 1952 and then precipitously declined as the MLRA lost strength
and effectiveness (Barber 1981, 168 and Clutterbuck 1973, 185). During the period from
the summer of 1952 to June 1954 when Templer stepped down as Supremo, the British
estimated the MLRA lost two-thirds of its fighting force (Barber 1981, 187 and
Clutterbuck 1973, 186). The reduction of MRLA activity in 1953 allowed the Army to
hand over all static security responsibilities to the police, allowing them the start a
country-wide sweep (Postgate 1992, 20). The Army expanded out from secure areas into
central Malaya where the MRLA was weakest, driving a wedge between the two wings
of the communist force (Jackson 2011, 47).
The British war effort suffered a budget shortfall starting in the summer of 1953
as economic recession caused by the collapse of the rubber and tin markets after Korean
War cease fire. This caused the British to reduce the Home Guard was reduced to and
end strength of 210,000 by the close of 1953, but the main strength of the MRLA had
been broken by this point.122 By 1955 the security situation had improved to the point
that national elections could be held with 85 percent of the electorate voting; electing
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Tunku Abdul Rahman of United Malays National Organization party as the first Chief
Minister of a multiethnic unity government. During the same year, Chen Peng put out his
first peace feelers, hoping to end the conflict while his organization still existed (Barber
1981, 206-207).
For all practical purposes, the Emergency ended on August 31, 1957 with the
British granting full Malayan independence (Hack 2012, 672). The MCP had been
pushed to the largely uninhabited border with Thailand and was comprised of fewer than
two thousand active members and less than 200 fighters (Markel 2006, 40). After
independence, the security plan remained the same with the British Army patrolling the
areas between villages and the jungle and the constables and Home Guard providing
security within the villages (Clutterbuck 1966, 147-148). While the MLRA continued to
operate on the Thailand border in limited numbers into the 1960s, the conflict officially
ended on July 30, 1960 when Malayan Federation President Tunku Abdul Rahman
signed an official declaration ending the Emergency (Miller 1972, 198).
The Home Guard program can be seen as an overall success and is generally
regarded as the most effective use of a community-based security force in modern
counterinsurgency history. While the Home Guard were the lease effective element of
the security forces in terms of killing MRLA fighter, their real value according to
Scheipers (2017, 20) and Markel (2006, 39) was their bolstering effect on the population
and their ability to force the Chinese to side with the government. In addition, the Home
Guard units were critical in defending the New Villages, freeing the army and police to
conduct offensive operations and implementing food control (Corum 2006, 23 and
McCuen 2005, 319). The burden of all the security measures to implement the Briggs
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Plan would have been too great for the Police and Army to carry out (Townshend 1986,
162).
The Home Guard also had a direct negative effect on the MRLA and the Min
Yuen. The Home Guard increased the precision of reward and punishment and decreased
MRLA morale because of the suspicion the Home Guard might be providing information
to the security forces and focused searches of all individuals entering and exiting the New
Villages (Hack 2012, 688 and Ucko 2010, 26). Although not present in much greater
numbers than in 1951, the security forces, freed from static security duties also caused the
majority of their damage on the MRLA after the creation of the Home Guard, inflicting
over 6500 casualties between 1948 and 1952 with the majority incurred in 1952 (Barber
1981, 172). Additionally, Sunderland (1964,56) notes, the ability of the MRLA to
conduct offensive operations drastically decreased after the expansion of the Home
Guard, peaking at 550 attacks in August 1951 and falling to just over 100 in July 1952.
The New Villages were the key to the successful British strategy and the Home
Guard was critical to the success of the New Villages. The New Villages were not the
concentration camps portrayed by the MCP, but lasting settlements that achieved lasting
integration of the Chinese into the Malayan national system (Hack 2012, 690). The New
Villages also provided the Chinese squatters with a better life. The improvement and
quality of life across the New Villages was not even or immediate, but according to
Frakking (2014, 395) New Villages and Home Guard programs provided a “credible
promise for a modern and better future” and an avenue for local agency separate from the
insurgents. King (1954, 36) found in a national survey that New Villages experienced a
lower rate of disease than Malayan urban areas and previous squatter settlements. The
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New Villages were so well planned and situated that 480 New Villages 450 still existed
in 2009 and more than 82 percent of the inhabitants were descendants of the original
Chinese squatters (Tan 2009, 216).
In addition to the resources supplied by the British, the Home Guard was a critical
element in the initial success of the New Villages. According to Herbert Andrew, a
Malayan Emergency veteran and researcher,
The first major breakthrough probably came when the size of the Home
Guard was increased and everyone who joined was issued a single barrel
shotgun. The Chinese joined in large numbers for at last they could
protect themselves and their families against any acts of vengeance by the
communists (Andrew 1995, 31).
Not only was the success of the New Villages, but the feasibility of the entire Briggs Plan
was only possible given the use of the Home Guard. Having established the key elements
and events in the history and the overall success of the Home Guard program, the
following sections will evaluate and measure the degree of membership with the model
that the Home Guard exhibited.
External Support and Oversight
The Home Guard program exhibited a “fully in” degree of membership with
external support and oversight with high levels of material support to and intensive
supervision by security force members. The British ensured that Home Guard units
underwent initial and periodic refresher training and were given responsibility to guard
their villages only after progressing through a three-phase process that tested their
competence and loyalty to the central government. The British also adequately armed
and equipped the Home Guard as part of a comprehensive program to make the New
Villages an attractive place to live and worth fighting for.
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As British security forces grew in size, the British provided the Home Guard with
increasing direct supervision before Home Guard units were given the responsibility of
defending their villages. This came most directly in the form of the police. At the end of
1947, there were approximately 11,500 personnel in the police force, with 9,422 serving
as uniformed police officers (Great Britain Colonial Office 1949, 93). This was a
shortage of over 2,000 officers compared to their authorized strength and was identified
by British officials as a major weakness in their counterinsurgency effort (McCuen 2005,
88). The British focused their efforts in the first four years of the Emergency in
expanding the police and by the end of 1952 the police had expanded to 26,154 regular
police officers, 99,000 auxiliaries, and 39,870 special constables (Coates 1992, 123).
Most of the auxiliary police and special constables were assigned to training and
supervising the Home Guard and securing New Villages until the Home Guard could
defend the village themselves.
While the British sought to recruit “suitably qualified members of the public” for
the special police, they often sacrificed quality for quantity and British efforts were often
according to Secretary for the Colonies Oliver Lyttelton described as “haphazard,”
sometimes bordering on “utter disorder;” the expansion gave the British the ability to
provide high levels of supervision to the Home Guard (Stockwell 1995, 140, 327 and
Miller 1954, 220). By 1952 when police expansion was complete, Home Guard units,
each with approximately 35 men in each New Village were supervised by a police post
with ten to twelve constables. The constables were supported by an undercover Chinese
Special Branch detective to collect intelligence. This allowed a ratio of one police officer
for seven Home Guards with the rest available as reinforcements as needed (Clutterbuck
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1966, 71). A typical duty rotation had the bulk of the police conducting the majority of
security duties during the day and rotating two to three officers at night to supervise the
five Home Guard members on night duty (Clutterbuck 1966, 114). This level of direct
supervision is provided to a community-based security program. The only other case
with a comparable level of external supervision is the U.S. Marine Combined Action
Program in Vietnam.
In addition to the direct supervision of the special police in the New Villages, the
British fielded 42,000 Special Constables trained in infantry tactics and organized into
Area Security Units (ASU) (Bartlett 1954, 77). These paramilitary units were formed by
in December 1952 by Colonel Arthur Young, the Malaya Commissioner of Police, on
loan from the London City Police initiated Operation Service. This units were designed to
patrol areas in the immediate vicinity around New Villages and existing villages to
provide a buffer between the communists and the population and to provide a quick
reaction force for the Home Guard (Bartlett 1954, 81). The ASUs provided the lightly
armed Home Guard and their Special Constable supervisors the confidence that
assistance would be provided if the communists attacked with a force too large for the
Home Guard to handle.
The British also provided a high degree of direct supervision in the areas of
logistics and training. As mentioned earlier the British organized the sub-national level
into states administered by Malay rules under the supervision of British advisors. Below
the states, the British assigned District Officers (DO) with administrative staffs to govern
the sub-state districts. Districts were further divided into sub-districts and administered
by Assistant District Officers (ADO) who also supervised five to ten villages or
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kampongs that were led by headmen selected by the ADOs and after 1951 elected
councils (McCuen 2005, 88). Under the Briggs Plan, the British tripled the number of
ADOs in 1950 and 1951 so they would be responsible for no more than five villages
(Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya 1954, 140). These administrators were
ultimately responsible for the fielding, equipping, and training of the Home Guard
In October 1951, to assist the DOs and ADOs, Gen. Briggs issued Directive No.
17 that established the organization of the Home Guard program and the phased process
to establish, arm, and eventually turn over security duties to Home Guard units (Short
1975, 293). As part of this directive, the British added a Home Guard Officer to the
national War Executive Committee and each DO and ADO staff (Director of Operations,
Malaya 1958, 16).123 While the Special Constables commanded the Home Guard,
responsible for raising, training and equipping the Home Guard units (Clutterbuck 1966,
59). To improve the effectiveness of the Home Guard Officers in June 1, 1952, Gen.
Templer increased the Home Guard administrative staff was increased to an Inspector
General at the national level, 14 State Home Guard Inspectors, 49 District Home Guard
Officers, and 200 Home Guard Inspectors.124 To acquire the necessary personnel, Briggs
closed the Ministries of Forestry, Game, Mines, and Surveys and reassigned all their
personnel to the Home Guard and New Village programs. Additionally, every Chinese
speaking administrator was assigned to the New Village program to assist in making
inroads into the Chinese population (McCuen 2005, 156).
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This system installed one individual who was responsible for the logistical
support for the Home Guard, but also provided a direct line of communication from the
New Village to the National level to address equipment deficiencies and a centralized
system to train Home Guard units (Director of Operations, Malaya 1958, 15 and Corum
2006, 22). By the end of 1952 all Home Guard units received two weeks of initial
training in firearms use and infantry squad tactics and existing units received annual
refresher training at a district training facility (Clutterbuck 1966, 71).
In spite of the extensive oversight instituted by the British, the Home Guard
remained controversial in late 1951 as Gen. Briggs’ tour in Malaya drew to a close. The
British were initially reluctant to arm the Chinese Home guard due to questions
concerning their loyalty. According to a Cabinet Malaya Meeting dated 17 June 1950,
senior army commanders felt, “the Malays are about 99% on our side” and “we could
arm the Malays pretty well indiscriminately,” but Chinese support for the government
depended on the area and in areas of communist support arms would “go straight through
to the bandits (communists)” (Stockwell 1995, 237). This led the British to arm the
initial Chinese Home Guard units with batons and arm bands and use them as a
neighborhood watch (Coates 1992, 120). In return the Chinese squatters also feared the
British security forces would not support them with the MRLA attacked in force
(Henniker 1955, 174).
Gen. Briggs realized the only way to allay the fears of both sides while achieving
the goal of turning over local security duties to the Home Guard was to institute a system
that progressively tested the loyalty and capability of the Home Guard while providing
the Chinese with examples of the security forces ability and willingness to support the
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Home Guard. As a solution, Briggs instituted a three-phased process to build the
capacity of the Home Guard and ultimately turn over security responsibility to them. In
Phase I, the British Army would concentrate forces in the area surrounding a proposed
New Village and clear the area to gain the space and time necessary to establish a New
Village (Clutterbuck 1966, 113). New Villages were not established until District
Officers determined enough police officers were available to provide 24-hour supervision
of the village Home Guard unit (Clutterbuck 1973, 274).
After the New Village was formed, the Home Guard were recruited and trained,
but had no security duties. An augmented police force was used to secure a New Village
during this phase (Henniker 1955, 241). In Phase II, the police were responsible for
security, but used the Home Guard as supplementary manpower. During this phase a
Home Guard squad would draw their weapons from the armory at dusk and patrol within
the New Village with one or two constables until dawn.
As the police gained trust in the Home Guard members, they transitioned to Phase
III. Weapons were not issued to the Home Guard until the District Officer certified their
loyalty. Until that time, the police would provide most of security in the village (Coates
1992, 95). During this phase, the Home Guard were responsible for village security and
the police gradually reduced oversight and then moved to another area to repeat the
process (Clutterbuck 1966, 120).
When Gen. Templer took command in February of 1952, he identified the benefit
of the phased approach and expanded the plan to turn over more security duties to the
Home Guard. After proving themselves trustworthy, Home Guard units would not only
take over static defense within the New Villages, but also all volunteer units of
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“Operational Home Guard” would receive additional training and take over security of
the areas immediately outside the New villages from the Area Security Units. These
operational Home Guard were divided into twelve-man patrols that would conduct
offensive operations for no more than 48 hours outside of their villages. (Coates 1992,
121 and Pauker 1962, 8).
The phased approach of giving intensive oversight to individual Home Guard
units and then moving on to new areas proved to be highly successful. By July 1953 the
first Chinese Home Guard units entered phase three (Brooke 2004, 111). The first
“white” or areas cleared of all communist influence and under the control of the Home
Guard declared in the southern state of Johore in September 1953 (McGrath 2006, 38).
By 1954, 150 New Villages had progressed to Phase III and had total responsibility for
their security (Coates 1992, 121). This process continued until August 1957 when the
security forces final states in Northern Malaya to the Home Guard (McGrath 2006, 38).
During this time, no Chinese Home Guard unit in Phase III surrendered to the MPRA or
turned over their weapons and the only losses of weapons or surrenders in Phase II was
largely due to police inattention (Henniker 1955, 242).
While the British were able to provide extensive oversight to the Home Guard
program by reallocating personnel from other government agencies and recruiting new
personnel from around the Empire, they were continually challenged to provide material
support due to limited post World War II national budgets. For example, in what Coates
(1992, 99) described as Britain’s “halfcocked war in Malaya,” less than half of the 2,156
tons of barbed wire ordered in the summer of 1951 to defend the New Villages had been
delivered by December 1951 when Briggs left Malaya. Fiscal constraints through 1951
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meant that the British issued only enough weapons to arm the Home Guard on duty or
approximately a quarter of the force and limited the expansion of the program (McCuen
2005, 160).
This changed with the installation of Gen. Templer as Supremo and the sweeping
powers afforded to him to reallocate funds and pressure the British government to
provide more supplies. After taking command in February 1952, Templer charged Major
General E.B. Fonblanque, his newly appointed Home Guard Inspector General to find the
weapons necessary arm the Home Guard. In an initial acquisition in June 1952
Fonblanque ordered 10,000 semi-automatic shotguns and 2,000 carbines from the United
States (Comber 2011, 52). The project was completed in 1953, when the Federation
Government spent one million pounds to arm one third of the Home Guard and in a few
cases armored cars for perimeter patrolling (Miller, The Communist Menace in Malaya
1954, 220). Within one year of Templer taking command, the British reached the goal of
providing weapons to over 45 percent of the Home Guard.125 While the British did not
lavish military supplies on the Home Guard, the evidence indicates that supplying the
Home Guard was a priority for the British and they received priority for arms and
equipment to bring units up to a common standard as they progressed through the phases
of their development.
In addition to the military aid provided by the British, they also expended a good
deal of resources to provide the New Villages the Home Guard with a standard of living
the Chinese squatters had not previously experienced. This meant the Home Guard not
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only had the tools to defend their villages, but also the motivation to protect the gains
they had made. As one district officer commented “The degree of co-operation we get in
the New Villages is in almost exact proportion to what we have put into it. In short,
where the amenities are good the people are good” (Miller, The Communist Menace in
Malaya 1954, 218). While the resources provided by the British were uneven to do
constrained budgets and the rapid execution of the program that resettled over 600,000
Chinese squatters in under two years, they made a concerted effort to improve the quality
of life in each New Village (Tan 2012, 85).
The efforts started in February 1951 when Gen. Briggs issued Directive No. 13.
This directive ordered District Officers to form Home Guard units when a New Village
population demonstrated loyalty. In addition, the directive ordered District Officers to
provide New Villages with Chinese language schools, medical facilities, and social
services such as community centers with communal radios and workshops (Short 1975,
293).
More critical to the success of the New Villages was the British focus on
addressing the core grievance of the Chinese squatters, ownership of profitable land.
Both Generals Briggs and Templer fought with the Sultans of the individual states and
the Malayan Federation parliament to provide the Chinese with permanent ownership of
land near economic centers. After 1950, the Malayan Federation government bought
land for $200 to $330 an acre and sold the land to squatters for $4-5 an acre, giving them
permanent title to an amount of land sustainable for the type of agriculture practiced in
the area (Sunderland, Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya 1964, 45 and McCuen
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2005, 157). In all, from 1950 to 1954 the government spent $3.4 million to buy land for
the new villages (Stubbs 2004, 179).
To ease the trauma of moving to a new area, the British provided generous initial
assistance to the Chinese squatters. To build their new houses, the British gave
approximately $100 in cash and building supplies provided (McCuen 2005, 157). To
ensure all New Villagers had equitable access to building materials the resettlement
officers supervised the allocation of building materials for the New Villages and provided
a £40 for between two weeks and six months depending on if the New Villagers had to
access to their old land or needed to plant new crops (Miller 1954, 146, 152 and Barber
1981, 97).
In addition to providing money and material to ease the transition to their new
homes, Gen. Templer also sought to bring medical and educational services up to a
functioning level as quickly as possible to show the Chinese immediate and tangible
benefits to moving to a New Village. To do this he petitioned Christian organizations to
send Chinese speaking missionaries displaced by the Chinese Revolution to Malaya to
provide social services to the New Villages. Templer convinced the organizations to
send the missionaries, not to proselytize, but to act as agents in the fight against
communism and he convinced the Malayan Federation to pay the missionaries half the
equivalent of a comparable civil servant. In total over 400 Chinese speaking missionaries
served 333 New Villages, providing education, medical, and other social service
programs between 1952 and 1954 (Lee 2013, 177-178). These efforts raised the
percentage of Chinese squatter children in New Villages receiving public education from
zero in 1951 to 39 percent in 1952 and 60 percent in 1954 (Stubbs 2004, 175). As Lee
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(2013) notes, Chinese language education was highly prized by the Malayan Chinese,
providing them a tangible benefit to fighting on the government side.
The Home Guard program demonstrated the highest level of membership with the
factor of External Support and Oversight of all the cases examined in this study.
Government police and civil servants provided constant oversight of the Home Guard.
Their phased system to develop the Home Guard provided checks to ensure the
competence and loyalty of the Home Guard while providing the Chinese squatters with
tangible evidence of government support. In addition to the military aid provided to the
Home Guard, the material support provided to the New Villages gave the squatters
tangible reasons to side with the government and defend their new homes.
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction
The Home Guard program demonstrated a “Fully In” degree of membership with
the factor of Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction. During the height of the communist
insurgency Home Guards were limited to providing security within the barbwire
perimeter of their villages, while the police and Army provided concentric rings of
security outside the village limits. This is the most restrictive limit placed on a security
force demonstrated by any of the cases examined in this study. While after 1954 the
British formed “Operational Sections” of Home Guard volunteers who were allowed to
conduct security operations outside of village perimeters, Operational sections comprised
a fraction of the Home Guard forces and were used after the back of the insurgency had
been broken and only in areas cleared of communist forces. Therefore, they formed the
exception to the norm and the bulk of the Home Guard demonstrated a high degree of
membership to this factor of the model.
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From the earliest plans to form a Home Guard, the British saw it as a purely
defensive force whose only mission was to protect New Villages from communist
incursions. Soon after assuming office in October 1951, Secretary for the Colonies
Oliver Lyttelton supported the expansion of the Chinese home Guard as a means to
attract Chinese support for the government. He expressed that Chinese support would
come not from using them in an offensive role, but using them for “the protection of
Chinese lives and property in the towns and of the Resettlement Areas (New Villages)
into which their countrymen have been concentrated outside the towns.” (Stockwell
1995, 328). This feeling was echoed by Gen. Templer before he took command in a
report to the Whitehall cabinet on December 21, where he expressed a desire to expand
Chinese participation in the Home Guard and felt they would if they were limited to
protecting Chinese property.126 Partly from the desire to win the support of the Chinese
by using them only to defend their own families and property and the early distrust of
Chinese loyalty, the use of the Home Guard to only defend within New Villages served a
guiding principle of the program.
Upon joining the Home Guards, new members were promised that their duties
would end at the village gates. In a welcome letter to new members of the Home Guard,
Home Guard Inspector General E.B. de Fonblanque stated that “Home Guard units were
responsible only for their own village and the approaches to the village” and “Home
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Guard members would never be sent away from their villages without their
permission.”127
After 1954 and the first states in Malaya were declared “White” or cleared of
communist forces, the British began moving the bulk of Army and police forces in white
areas to other states where communist forces remained. In these areas, the British formed
“Operational Sections” of Home Guards. These operational sections were formed from
paid volunteers from Existing Home Guard units.
Operational Sections operated in twelve-man sections and could conduct
operations for two days (McCuen 2005, 160). While the Operational Sections could
operate outside of village perimeters, they were always paired with an Army or police
unit to provide supervision. In addition to external supervision while operating on
extended patrols, the British strictly limited the employment of Operational Sections
(Corum 2006, 22-23). Operational Section members were expected to maintain primary
employment outside the Home Guard and could only be used for 48 hours at a time and
for a maximum of 72 days a year (Coates 1992, 121).
While the formation of Operational Sections would seem to be a departure from
the adherence to the factor of Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction, the small size of the force
as well as the tight controls placed on their employment limited their impact on the
overall program. McCuen (2005, 161) reports that there were approximately 400
Operational Sections formed in by 1957 and Postgate (1992, 5) estimates their total
membership at 8,500. Given that at the height of the program there were over 240,000
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Home Guard members, Operational Sections comprised less than four percent of overall
membership in the program.128
Given the small portion of the Home Guard that participated in Operational
Sections, the Home Guard program is the most restrictive of all the case studies presented
in this research. Regular Home Guard members were not allowed to operate outside the
perimeter of their village. The small portion of Home Guard members that did operate
with expanded territorial jurisdiction did so with strict limitations on their employment
and only with close supervision by regular security forces.
Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems
The Home Guard program demonstrated a “More in than Out” degree of
membership with the factor of Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems. The
elements of the program that facilitated this adherence were the continuation of existing
non-criminal judicial systems during the emergency and the control mechanisms that the
British instituted to link the Home Guard to these existing systems through local
governing councils. The determination to place the Home Guard is “More in than Out”
was made because while the British allowed customary law to continue, they retained
ultimate authority to try cases connected to the insurgency in British courts.
The British incorporation of traditional justice systems in Malaya started with
unique position Malaya experienced as a protectorate and not a colony of the British
Empire. While the British kept the Sultans in power at the state level and chiefs and
headmen or penghulus at the local level, they exercised real governance at the national
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and state levels through a parallel government of “advisors” (Sunderland, Organizing
Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1948-1960 1964, 12). Additionally, the British created a
parallel judicial system of Malay customary law or adat and formal British model judicial
system (McCuen 2005, 87). The British allowed the Malays to exercise authority over
non-criminal offenses and lesser criminal cases involving Malayan citizens, while trying
more serious criminal cases and those cases involving non-Malays, including Chinese
Malays in British courts.
At the start of the Emergency, the British were determined to maintain the
existing civil governance and judicial systems. On May 30, 1949 the High
Commissioner for Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney directed that
In the case of application of marital law to a part of a territory, there will
be courts which will remain open and will have such jurisdiction, e.g., to
hear habeas corpus applications. The closing of all civil courts is a serious
step that only arises for consideration if and when their continued
operation is obstructive (Stockwell 1995, 135).
This practice remained in place throughout the Emergency because the British believed
that instituting martial law would undercut the government’s legitimacy and give
combatant status to the insurgents (Stockwell 1995, 136).
As the New Village program developed the British transferred their dual judicial
system to the Chinese population. To keep existing social governance structures intact
the British moved entire communities to New Villages (Markel 2006, 38). Once in place,
the British maintained village headmen if they proved loyal and allowed them to rule and
administer justice as long as they collected taxes and followed British dictates. The
Chinese communities were ruled by “captains” who administered and enforced Chinese
customary laws with the oversight British courts and police (Purcell 1956, 10). Once a
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community had proven its loyalty the British allowed elections to appoint “town boards”
or village councils that had the same powers as the captains and were adapted from a
system of system of sanitary boards that the British had instituted in the 1920s (Hawkins
1953, 156).
The British recognized that the village councils had to have tangible authority in
governance and judicial matters. Sir Roger Thompson, a key member of the British staff
under Briggs and Templer stated, “It was no good electing village counselors without real
power. Otherwise the whole experiment would sooner or later slide into oblivion”
(Barber 1981, 100). Therefore, the British placed the Home Guard under the supervision
of the Village Councils, allowing them to discipline the force as well as adjudicate minor
infractions committed by the populace (Short 1975, 414 and Postgate 1992, 161).
While the Headmen or Village Councils did exercise some control over the Home
Guard and were allowed try less serious offenses, the real power in the lay with the
British civil servants. The Village Councils reported to Advanced Committees comprised
of British civil servants who in turn reported to District Officers or Assistant District
Officer who possessed the power to veto council decisions. It is also unclear how much
real power the councils possessed because in British organizational diagrams, the village
councils were depicted as having advisory or consultative authority over the Home
Guard, but not command authority.129
The British attempted to incorporate traditional justice systems or adapt existing
conflict resolution practices into the Home Guard. In theory, the Village Councils were
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given authority over the Home Guard and to adjudicate lesser offenses committed in the
New Villages. However, the Home Guard demonstrated a “Mostly In” degree of
membership with the factor of Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems because in
practice the British parallel system retained the real power to try cases in the British
judicial system.
Local Sustainability and Accountability
Faced with constrained debt and global commitments after World War II, the
British were challenged throughout the Malayan Emergency with constrained by limited
fiscal resources. Therefore, they had to design the Home Guard to be dependent on
external funding as possible. Additionally, both Generals Briggs and Templer determined
Chinese loyalty to the government was the key to defeating the MLRA and the only way
to win that loyalty was to provide them with a system that was accountable to them. Due
to these challenges, the Home Guard demonstrated a “Fully In” degree of membership
with the factor of Local Sustainability and Accountability. At both the national and local
level, the Home Guard program used existing resources to fund the majority of the
program and included systems for Chinese input into the system.
At the national level the Home Guard program was the most cost-effective
element of the British security strategy. Postgate (1992, 27) estimates the Emergency
cost approximately 700 million pounds from 1948 to 1961. The British bore
approximately two-thirds of this cost and funded the rest through direct taxation in
Malaya (Stockwell 1995, 253). Most of these funds were used to support security force
operations and expand the civil service. In contrast the New Village program cost the
nearly 4.8 million pounds to move approximately 600,000 Chinese squatters and one to
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million pounds a year to support (Peoples 2001, 14). The majority of the cost incurred by
the New Village and Home Guard program was paid not by the British, but by the group
most affected by the insurgency, the Chinese business class.
The Chinese business class owned a majority of the rubber and tin concerns in
Malaya and had been targeted by the communists to disrupt the economy of Malaya. Due
to the raw material demand caused by the Korean War, the Malayan tin and rubber
exports boomed (Miller 1954, 149). As part of the Kinta Valley Home Guard (KVHG)
experiment in 1950 and 1951, Chinese tin mine owners funded the KVGH by agreeing to
pay an 8$ per picul levy on all tin produced by their mines (Comber 2011, 57) (Director
of Operations, Malaya 1958, 16). After the success of the KVGH program, this method
of funding the New Villages and Home Guard was expanded nationally (Brooke 2004,
75).
In addition, General Templar also pressured the Malayan Chinese Association
(MCA), the main Chinese political party, to help fund the New Village program.
Templer secured low cost contracts with Chinese contractors to provide the infrastructure
construction for the New Villages and local Chinese business leaders would provide an
initial job stipend and job placement to New Village settlers (Peoples 2001, 16 and Tan
2012, 102, 104). He also allowed the MCA to run lotteries to fund welfare programs and
raise Home Guard units in the New Villages. To gain support in the New Villages, MCA
members on town and district councils “adopted” New Villages and assisted the villagers
in development projects using proceeds from the lotteries. In 1952, the MCA spent $4
million in development projects, including raising Home Guard units (Stubbs 2004, 217
and Purcell 1954, 107).
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Two events in 1953 diminished support from the Chinese business class, but the
initial support during the critical period between was crucial in establishing the New
Villages and Home Guard as viable programs. The first event in early 1953 was the
passage of law by the Malay dominated federal parliament banning political parties from
running lotteries. This was designed to diminish the growing influence of the MCA
(Purcell 1954, 108). The second event was the end of the Korean War 1953. This caused
a slump in tin and rubber prices and plunged Malaya into recession, causing a cutback in
funding to the Home Guard program (Stubbs 2004, 168). Despite these setbacks, the tide
had turned against the communists by 1953 and the British were able to reallocate
existing funds away from secured areas to those with worse security conditions.
At the local level the British also strove to make the Home Guard as sustainable
as possible. As a 1953 Malayan Christian Council study found, the key to making a New
Village and Home Guard unit stable and sustainable was the availability of regular
employment (Stubbs 2004, 181). To facilitate employment, the British located New
Villages in economically viable areas close to rubber plantations and agricultural areas.
The New Villages were also located near one of Malaya’s 6000 miles of roads to connect
them to markets (Miller 1954, 145). In areas near rubber plantations and tin mine,
owners paid for their workers to relocate to “dormitory” New Villages, but the most
critical element for most Chinese to earn a living was land (Barber 1981, 93).
British administrators starting in 1948 with Sir Henry Gurney, the High
Commissioner for Malaya accepted the wisdom of a Chinese proverb that stated, “a land
title is the hoop that holds the barrel together” and strove to gain land ownership for the
Chinese squatters (Barber 1981, 97). At the end of 1951, after 18 months of negotiations
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with the sultans, Gurney convinced them to provide Chinese squatters relocated to New
Villages with titles to agricultural land around the New Villages (Barber 1981, 92).
Squatters were given two acres of land per family within two miles of the village for
household consumption and an additional five or more acres for raising cash crops
(Miller 1954, 151). Once the New Villagers had their land, they were expected to earn a
living from it.
Although Home Guard members could receive compensation for performing
duties for 10 hours or more in a 24-hour period, they did not receive a salary from the
Home Guard (Director of Operations, Malaya 1958, 15).130

Since the Home Guard

members had to support themselves with employment outside the Home Guard, the
British designed the program to make the burden on the community and individuals as
little as possible, ensuring the long-term sustainability of the program. While all men
between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five could be conscripted into the Home Guard,
unit size was based on the ability of a community to sustain guard duties and all members
were volunteers capable of carrying out night time security duties (Short 1975, 412 and
O'Ballance 1966, 125) In most cases Home Guard members were only required to stand
duty one or two nights a week depending on the strength of the unit so they could
continue their daytime occupation (McCuen 2005, 160) Police officers supervising the
Home Guard would adjust the number of individuals on duty depending on the security
situation to balance security requirements with sustainability. In high threat areas as
many as a third of Home Guard members would be on duty at any one time, while in low
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threat areas as few as one in seven would be on duty (Miller 1954, 25). Even the Home
Guard Operational Sections, the units that were allowed to operate outside the New
Villages were designed to be sustainable. Operational Sections were organized into
platoons of three sections to facilitate the rotation of duties between the sections allow
members adequate time to carry on their regular employment (Director of Operations,
Malaya 1958, 15). The Home Guard system proved to be highly sustainable and allowed
the economic foundations of the New Villages by giving villagers the time to reestablish
their employment. This is evidenced by the fact that of the 480 New Villages established
between 1950 and 1960, 474 were still inhabited in 2001 (Brooke 2004, 75).
The British also designed the Home Guard program to incorporate increasing
accountability to the populace of the New Villages until as the population and Home
Guard demonstrated loyalty to the government. In the first phase of Home Guard
development, the British maintained total control over the Home Guard and there was
little direct accountability. Accountability was provided through the District War
Advisory Committees, comprised of important local political and economic leaders.
Home Guard officers were members of each of these committees and complaints could
be addressed at these meetings (McCuen 2005, 186).
Additionally, some accountability was possible because the Home Guard
commander was nominated by local leaders with the approval of the DO. This provided
some accountability in that the commander and members of the Home Guard had to live
among the people they protected (Coates 1992, 95). The level of accountability increased
in the second and third phases of development as the Home Guard demonstrated loyalty
and proficiency.
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In the second phase of development, the British added Village Councils whose
members were nominated by local leaders and appointed by the District Officers. As
mentioned earlier, Village Councils were expanded in May 1952 when the Federation
Government passed the Local Council Ordinance under pressure from Templar. This
ordinance directed that when District Officers felt an area had met required security and
development standards, Village Councils would by elected through a popular vote.
Village Councils were given control of village finances and statutory control over
education, medical facilities, community development and oversight in security
operations. Templar also instituted a civics course for Village Council members to
develop a grass roots ownership in the political process and security (Coates 1992, 120).
This provided a conduit for popular grievances about Home Guard members to reach the
District Officers and by May 1954, 209 of the 410 Chinese New Villages had Village
Councils (Clutterbuck 1973, 187 and Coates 1992, 120).
When a Home Guard unit graduated to Phase III, the Home Guard commander
was popularly elected and given complete responsibility for local security (Short 1975,
413). Usually in conjunction with a Home Guard unit transitioning to Phase III, the area
around the New Village would then be declared “White” or sufficiently clear of
communist activity. Security forces would be withdrawn to other areas, with the Home
Guards assuming all security duties and Village Councils assuming governance duties,
including control of the Home Guard (Miller 1954, 223). By the end of the phased
development of the Home Guard, the population had several avenues to hold the Home
Guard accountable. The head of the Home Guard and the Village Council members were
all popularly elected and could be voted out if they did not execute their duties
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adequately. Additionally, as members of the New Village community, these elected
leaders had to live with the people they were protecting and risked social ostracism if
they abused their power.
As demonstrated in the preceding section, the Home Guard demonstrated a “Fully
In” degree of membership with the factor of Local Sustainability and Accountability.
Faced with constrained budgets, the British were forced to design the Home Guard to be
low cost and sustainable at the regional and local level. When possible, they found local
funding sources and minimized the effects of supporting a Home Guard by communities
and individuals. Additionally, the British designed the Home Guard program to give
New Villagers increasing control over the Home Guard, increasing avenues for
accountability.
Voluntary Participation by Local Elites
The Home Guard program demonstrated a “Mostly In” degree of membership
with the factor of Voluntary Participation by Local Elites. While participation in the
Home Guards was mandatory, this measure was more to give New Villagers an excuse to
give to communist infiltrators. Most Home Guard members were volunteers and the
British relied heavily on local leadership to recruit Home Guard members.
When Gen. Briggs launched the Home Guard program in September 1950,
Chinese participation was low. He realized that until the security situation improved the
Chinese squatters were concerned about large MRLA units entering villages and killing
anyone who volunteered to support the government. He believed the Chinese would join
the Home Guard if they could rationalize it as mandatory service. (Sunderland,
Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya 1964, 36, 39). This belief was confirmed by
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one New Village leader who told Briggs, “If the communists come in with a gun and
demand food, we are killed if we refuse to help. Do something by law which the
communists know makes it impossible for us to help them” (Barber 1981, 101). While
all males between 18 and 55 were liable for mandatory service, the British made
considerable effort to attract volunteers and sought the support of national and local
Chinese leaders to create support for the Home Guard (Sunderland, Resettlement and
Food Control in Malaya 1964, 40).
At the national level, the British realized that they had to bring the Chinese into
the political process and coopt existing Chinese leaders to remove the grievances the
communists used to gain support among the Chinese population. In 1948, High
Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney persuaded the Malay states to expand citizenship and
enfranchise the Chinese, threatening that Malaya would turn into “another Palestine” if
they failed (Miller 1954, 143). Once the Malay Federation expanded citizenship, Gurney
sought to make inroads with the Chinese population. To coopt existing Chinese leaders,
he created Chinese Advisory Boards comprised of Chinese businessmen aligned with the
mainland Chinese anti-communist Kuomintang (KMT) party to coordinate all functions
of government that interacted with the Chinese (Stubbs 2004, 207-209 and Gullick 2014,
70).
Through the national Chinese Advisory Board, Gurney pushed Tan Cheng Lock,
a prominent Chinese businessman, to form a political party to bring the Chinese into the
political process. After months of negotiation among members of the Chinese Advisory
Board, Tan Cheng Lock formed the Malayan Chinese Association in February 1949 and
served as its first president (Purcell 1954, 67 and Postgate 1992, 12 and Stockwell 1995,
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89). The MCA was part political party and part mutual aid society with the goals of
safeguarding Chinese interests and providing an alternative to the Malayan Communist
Party (Ismail 2004) The MCA proved popular and by the close of 1949 there were over
100,000 members, but mostly in urban areas (Colonial Office 1950, 212).
To increase its membership prior to the December 1951 municipal elections, the
MCA assisted the British to form Community Liaison Committees in New Villages in
conjunction with membership drives (Colonial Office 1950, 212, King 1954, 36 and
Stubbs 2004, 214). This allowed the MCA to recruit members on the predecessors of the
Village Councils. It also gave the British a way to select local leaders who were deemed
loyal to the government by the MCA.
According to the private papers of Gurney found in the days after his death, he
believed the MCA provided an “alternative standard to which loyal Chinese could rally”
and the MCA was critical in “the whole vast scheme of resettlement” (Stockwell 1995,
300). He was correct in this assessment because by 1953, three quarters of MCA
members lived in rural areas and local leaders were typically middleclass shopkeepers
and school teachers (Brooke 2004, 62). In most cases Chinese squatters elected these
business or social leaders to serve on village councils (H. Miller 1954, 169).
By 1952, MCA branches were set up in almost every New Village (Tan 2009,
226). The Chinese valued education and the government made a priority establishing
Chinese language schools in the New Villages. The signature program of the MCA was
the donation of funds to build and run the schools and the government provided $1,400 to
build each school and $1,500 for each teacher’s house as well as $10 per student for
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books and equipment (Stubbs 2004, 174). This helped build support for the local MCA
leadership and increased the motivation of the Home Guard to defend New Villages.
Most experts agree that the MCA was a critical element in linking the New
Villages to the government, improving living conditions, providing an avenue for
legitimate political activity and providing a link with traditional communal organizations
(McCuen 2005, 161; Hack 1999, 121-124; Hack 2012, 679 and Purcell 1954, 81).
Additionally, and more important for this study, the British allowed the MCA to select
the first Chinese Home Guard and Yaacob (2011, 33) found that MCA Home Guard
recruiting drives were crucial in boosting Chinese joining the Home Guard (Barber 1981,
140). According to Karl Hack (1999, 118-119), the shift in Chinese allegiance from the
communists to the government was part the ability of the Chinese to defend themselves
against the communists with the Home Guard and in part a shift in the Chinese
community’s view of the insurgency as a struggle of Malay versus Chinese to an intracommunal conflict within the Chinese community between the MCP and MCA.
Therefore, the cooption of Chinese leaders at the local and national level was a critical
factor in the success of the Home Guard and the overall British counterinsurgency effort.
The British also turned to the MCA to recruit former KMT officers to join the
Special Constables in support of the Home Guard after they had performed successfully
in the Kinta Valley Home Guard experiment.131 These officers had been displaced from
mainland China due to the communist revolution, had military training, and were deeply
anti-communist In 1951, 2,300 auxiliary police who supported the Home Guard had
KMT connections (Comber 2011, 53, 55).
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In addition to the Special Constables in each New Village, the British also
assigned a British Resident Officer (RO) and Resident Assistant (RA) to each village to
assist in establishing a New Village and Home Guard. The RAs were typically educated
young Chinese men from the village and usually members of the MCA and therefore
strongly anti-communist (Sunderland, Resettlement and Food Control in Malaya 1964,
47-48). The ethnic Chinese assistant would act in that capacity until he was proficient in
RO duties. When that occurred, he would take over administration duties and the British
civil servant would move on to the next village to restart the process (Miller 1954, 146).
This allowed another avenue for a local leader to assume a position of authority in the
New Village and influence over the Home Guard.
While the MCA assisted in increasing Chinese participation in the Home Guard,
Chinese membership lagged behind that of ethnic Malays in 1951. The British struggled
with how to get the Chinese leaders to “come off the fence” (Stockwell 1995, 310).
According to a Cabinet Office memorandum dated 20 November 1951, the Malay
Chinese accounted for 1,200 of the total 1,700 civilians killed since the start of the
Emergency, causing a shift in support from Chinese leaders. The report indicated that
“certain Chinese leaders have also set on foot an organization working within the Chinese
community itself, whose object would be to stimulate a more positive reaction against
communism, and which will work in ways best suited to the Chinese mentality”
(Stockwell 1995, 312). This organization was the MCA that already existed, but still
struggled to appeal to the New Village Chinese because many were still disfranchised
from the political process because they weren’t citizens of Malaya.
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Gen. Templer realized this was the key problem that needed to be solved in order
to win over the Chinese. Templer’s first directive as High Commissioner in February
1952 proclaimed that “Malaya should in due course become a fully self-governing
nation” and “to achieve a united Malayan nation there must be a common form of
citizenship for all” and “truly local government.” (Purcell 1954, 86 and Townshend
1986, 160). Templer’s efforts came to fruition in September 1952, when the Federation
Agreement forming the Federation Government was amended to expand citizenship to
1,157,000 or approximately 60 percent of the estimated 2,155,000 Chinese in Malaya
(Barber 1981, 162). Any individual born in Malaya automatically became a citizen and
could now vote (Bartlett 1954, 98; Purcell 1954, 196; and Brooke 2004, 115). Both the
mounting violence caused by the communists against their constituents and the potential
for increased political power energized Chinese leaders, resulting in their success in
recruiting an additional 100,000 Chinese into the Home Guard between 1952 and 1954
(Bartlett 1954, 53).
At the local level, the British also sought to incorporate existing local leaders into
the Home Guard. When possible, the local headmen served as the leader of the Home
Guard. If one was not present, local leaders nominated someone among themselves to
serve as the Home Guard leader. This leader was responsible for recruiting his force and
conducting sustainment training.132 Below the Home Guard Commander, Home Guard
platoons were divided into sections, each with a sector of the village to defend. Each
section operated under the command of a headman (Sunderland, Organizing
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Counterinsurgency in Malaya, 1948-1960 1964, 58). Under the sections, the head of
each household was designated the “tenant-in-chief” who was responsible for monitoring
the movements all individuals in his portion of the village (Coates 1992, 95).
Under Gen. Templer the British focused on increasing not only security, but also
quality of life to increase support for the government and build the ownership of local
leaders in the New Village and Home Guard programs. As a government white paper
stated, the purpose was not only “freedom from fear,” but also “the growth of civic
sensibility and pride in communal and well as individual achievements” (Miller 1954,
218). To facilitate this, Templer convinced the Federation parliament to pass Local
Councils Ordinance 1952, designed to foster “self-government from the ground up.”
This ordinance allowed village councils to pass local ordinances, collect taxes and fees,
and manage the security forces when the Home Guard had reached stage III (Stubbs
2004, 219). Additionally, Templer sought to empower local leaders whenever possible
through frequent visits to New Villages. As one Malayan leader recalled, “I know this
for a fact, that leaders in the New Villages…would look forward to visits from the
Templer for they knew very well that if they asked for something valid, Templer would
not turn them down” (Ramakrishna 2001, 91). Templer not only sought to incorporate
existing leaders into the Home Guard program, but also worked to empower them and
make them want to participate in the program.
The Home Guard program demonstrated a “Mostly In” degree of membership
with the factor of Voluntary Participation by Local Elites. While participation in the
program was ostensibly mandatory, the British did this more to give individuals worried
about reprisals in the early stages an excuse to give communist agents to avoid reprisals.
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In fact, the British leveraged existing Chinese leadership through the MCA to boost
support for the Home Guard in New Villages. The British also used existing leadership
at the local level to fill leadership roles within the Home Guard and incentivized
participation by making life in New Villages an improvement over the Chinese squatters’
pervious lives.
Conclusion
The Home Guard program was possibly the most successful community-based
security program examined in this research. As an integral part of the Briggs Plan, the
Home Guard was a key element in the precipitous reduction of communist attacks in
1952 and the effective end of the insurgency by 1954 (Miller 1972, 107). The Home
Guard program enabled the British to cut off the communists from their sources of supply
and freed the regular security forces from static defensive duties, allowing them to hunt
the MRLA in the jungle. Although the Home Guard inflicted the lowest number of
casualties on the communist forces, that was not the Guard’s point. The Home Guard
protected the New Villages allowed the other security forces to keep the MRLA away
from the population, resulting in a drop in monthly attacks from a monthly average of
507 attacks in 1951 to an average of under 10 by the close of 1952 (Miller 1972, 104).
As shown below (Table 10), the Home Guard demonstrated a “Fully In” degree of
membership with the external support and oversight factor. Malaya was a key source of
revenue in the years following World War II, making the defeat of the communists a
critical national security issue for the British. The victory of the communists in mainland
China meant that the British had to abandon their original strategy of deporting suspected
communists. This led the British to adopt the Briggs plan and expend considerable
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manpower and resources to ensure the New Village and Home Guard programs
succeeded.
The Home Guard somewhat adhered to the incorporation of traditional justice
systems and demonstrated a “More in than Out” degree of membership (Table 10). The
British allowed Malay and Chinese customary law to regulate non-criminal crimes and
disputes, but retained authority over serious criminal offenses and activities relating to
the insurgency. Additionally, the British created village councils that had links to British
efforts to foster local governance, but these councils were not linked to Malay or Chinese
traditions.
Due to the British use of the Home Guard solely as a means to secure the
population within New Villages, the program demonstrated a “fully in” degree of
membership with the factor of limits to territorial jurisdiction (Table 10). The Home
Guard was not allowed to patrol outside the perimeter of their villages, except for
Operational Sections that comprised approximately eight percent of the total force of a
quarter million. Even the Operational Sections were highly restricted in the length of time
they could spend away from their villages and, even then, only under direct supervision
of the Army or police.
Due to budget constraints, the British were forced to design the Home Guard as
cost effective force, giving it a “Fully In” membership with the factor of Local
Sustainability and Accountability (Table 10). The British sought local funding to
construct and maintain the New Villages and to fund the Home Guard. At the national
level they used to MCA to reach out to wealthy Chinese businessmen to fund individual
Home Guard units. At the local level, the British designed the Home Guard so the
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members of force had to maintain outside employment and divided security duties among
the force to the extent that the burden on individuals was light. The continued existence
of the majority of New Villages today is evidence on the sustainability the program.
Additionally, the British gradually increased accountability of the Home Guard as the
force and the population demonstrated loyalty to the government. Elected headmen and
then Village Councils provided oversight and eventually controlled the Home Guard,
providing accountability of the Home Guard through elected officials.
Finally, the Home Guard demonstrated a “fully in” degree of membership with
the factor of Voluntary Participation of Local Elites (Table 10). The British formed
coopted the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) to form a core of support among
existing Chinese squatter leadership and to raise Home Guard forces. When possible the
British used existing leaders within the community to lead the Home Guard and required
heads of households to participate as section leaders.
The Home Guard did not win the Malayan Emergency, but the majority of experts
agree it was a critical success in the British victory. As part of the Briggs plan, the Home
Guard contributed to the end of organized fighting in about two years after the
implementation of the plan, although the Emergency continued until 1960. The Malayan
Home Guard is held up as the prime example of a successful community-based security
forces, so it is not surprising that it demonstrated a high degree of adherence to the
factors of the model.
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Table 10.
Membership of the Malayan Home Guard with Community-Based Security Variables
Variable/Membership

External Support and
Oversight
Limits to territorial
jurisdiction
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System
Local sustainability and
accountability
Voluntary participation
by local elites

Fully In

Mostly
In

More In
Than
Out

X
X
X

X
X
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More Out
Than In

Mostly Out

Fully Out

CHAPTER XII – CONCLUSION
Introduction
This research sought to develop a model for the successful application of bottomup, community-based security programs advocated by prominent Counterinsurgency
(COIN) theorists (Jones 2010 and Kilcullen 2013). The model for community based
security forces tested in this dissertation was based on prevailing bottom-up COIN theory
and community-based policing theory originally used in Africa. This research addresses
one of the gaps in existing COIN theory and doctrine advocated by bottom-up COIN
advocates. While the use of community-based security forces is touted as a component
of bottom-up COIN, in numerous cases the use of these irregular forces has led to human
rights abuses and other counterproductive effects. The model proposed in this
dissertation presents variables believed to influence the success or failure of communitybased security programs and mitigate the abuses committed by irregular security forces.
This research addressed the research question, “How do the variables associated
with the relevant literature on community-based policing influence the outcome of
bottom-up COIN operations using non-state local security forces?” From a review of the
relevant literature in the COIN, political science, and post-conflict community-based
policing fields, the following model was produced: security (s) = amount of sustained
external oversight and support (os) + limits to territorial jurisdiction (t) + level of
traditional justice systems incorporation (tj) + degree of local sustainability and
accountability (sa) + level of voluntary participation by local political local leaders (vp)
or s=os+t+tj+sa+vp. In addition to the hypothesis that these factors influenced the
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outcome of a community-based security program, it was further proposed that external
support and oversight would have the most influence on an outcome.
The method selected to test this hypothesis was a fuzzy set Qualitative
Comparative Analysis of eleven case studies. During the data collection and writing of
the case studies, it became apparent that three of the case studies were not viable or
suitable for the purposes of this research. The most important thing to note is the
exclusion of these did not unduly influence the results of this research. More cases than
needed were included in the case study sample to mitigate the risk that some of the case
studies would prove to be unsuitable. The remaining cases were sufficient to meet the
requirements of fuzzy set QCA outlined in the methodology section and strong examples
of successful and failed cases of community-based security programs.
As stated in the methodology section, fuzzy set QCA is applicable in this research
because the sample size is small- to medium-sized (over 6 cases and under 50 cases) and
the purpose of this dissertation is to test a modified existing theory rather than generate a
new theory (Ragin, Redesigning Social Inquiry: Sets and Beyond 2008). In review of
the fuzzy set QCA method, the method melds the intensive and integrative benefits of
historical context-based qualitative research with the logical and empirical rigor of larger
sample size, variable-based quantitative research. Through Boolean methods of logical
comparison each case is depicted as a combination of causal and outcome conditions. The
combination of conditions can be compared with other cases to produce causal
combinations.
The overrepresentation of successful cases due to the rejection of three failed
cases does not change the nature of the research or the importance of its findings. The
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research question guiding this dissertation ask, “How do the variables associated with the
relevant literature on community-based policing influence the outcome of bottom-up
COIN operations using non-state local security forces?” The findings of this research
indicate the combination of factors that produce a successful outcome. This is the more
important question for practitioners and researchers of COIN.
The cases dropped from the original sample were removed for the following
reasons. In the case of the Second District, Department of Southern Luzon, during the
Philippine Insurrection, a sufficient number of primary and secondary sources were not
available to adequately examine the case. In the case of the Cyprus Emergency, in depth
examination of the case revealed that the British used an indigenous uniformed police
force and not a community-based security forces. Therefore, the case did not meet the
case selection criteria. Finally, in the case of the French use of the Harkis militias in
Algeria, adequate primary and secondary sources are not available. The case is an
interesting comparison to the American and British cases that have a prodigious amount
of material available for researchers. In the case of the Harkis, the majority of
researchers have focused on the plight of the Harkis after the conflict and not their use
during the Algerian conflict. While it the inclusion of these cases would have increased
the sample size, the number and variety of cases that remained in the sample were more
than adequate to test the model.
Consideration of adding additional cases was given when the cases in question
were rejected. As mentioned in the introduction, several similar cases such as the Rondas
in during the Shining Path insurgency in Peru and the Maquis guerrillas in Indochina
during the French Indochina war were rejected because they did not fit the case selection
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criteria. In the two cases mentioned, the programs were instituted by a domestic
government or were designed as counter-guerrillas and not self-defense forces
respectively. This selection criteria strengthen the external validity of the research
(Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki 2008). Other recent cases of community-based security
programs such as the Sons of Iraq and the Afghan Public Protection Program were also
considered but as discussed in the introduction, available archival records and scholarly
research is not available. The availability of scholarly research is important for the fuzzy
set QCA method to mitigate researcher bias during the determination of the degree of
membership of cases with the factors of the model by relying on the consensus of other
researchers (Ragin, 2008).
The examination of the remaining case studies explored the adherence of eight
community-based security programs during major counterinsurgency operations to the
model presented in this dissertation. Table 11 presents the findings for the eight case
studies. This table allows for the comparison of the relationships among of all the cases
to the factors of the model and their respective outcomes. An initial visual observation
also allows for a determination of obvious trends among the sample set. It also provides
an initial analysis of the combinations of factors that may produce a similar outcome and
an opportunity to determine factors that are overrepresented across the cases and may
require “context-setting” calibration required for fuzzy set analysis.
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Table 11.
Summary of Adherence to Factors of Model
External
Limits to
Traditional Local
Local
Oversight territorial
Justice
sustainability Elites
and
jurisdiction System
and
Support
accountability

Success

1st District,
Department of
Northern Luzon
4th District,
Department of
Northern Luzon
3rd District,
Department of
Southern Luzon
Combined
Action Program

Mostly In

Mostly In

More In
than Out

More In than
Out

Mostly
In

Fully In

Fully In

Mostly
Out

Mostly
Out

More In than
Out

Fully In

Mostly
In

More In
Than Out

Mostly In

Fully In

Fully In

Fully In

Mostly
In

Fully In

Fully In

Mostly In

Mostly in

Mostly
In

Kikuyu Guard

More Out
Than In

Fully In

More In
Than Out

More Out
Than In

More In
Than
Out
Fully In

Fully In

Fully In

Fully In

Mostly
Out
Mostly
Out

Mostly
Out
Fully Out

More In
than Out
Fully Out

Malayan Home
Guard
Territorial
Forces Vietnam
Civilian
Irregular
Defense Group

Mostly
Out

Mostly Out
Fully Out

More In
than Out
Fully
Out
Fully
Out

More In
Than
Out
Fully In
Mostly
Out
Fully
Out

Successful Community-based Security Programs
Most successful programs demonstrate a general adherence to the factors of the
model and indicate the validity of the model. The exceptions to this observation indicate
a potential relationship between the factors of the model and combinations of factors and
a successful outcome. All of the successful cases except for the Third District, DSL and
the Kikuyu Guard demonstrated a Fully In or Mostly In degree of membership with the
factor of External Oversight and Support as predicted by the hypothesis. In the
successful cases that did not display a strong display of membership with this factor, they
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did appear to display a strong adherence to limits to territorial jurisdiction and voluntary
participation by local leaders. In addition to indicating that successful cases do not
necessarily adhere to all the principles of the model, these cases point to a relationship
between external oversight and voluntary participation by local leaders. Specifically, in
cases where external oversight and support is not as strong, committed participation by
local leaders can provide the oversight needed to make a program successful.
The other general observation from this initial review of the data is the
importance of external oversight and support to mitigate a low adherence to other factors
of the model. In the successful cases that did not adhere strongly to individual factors
such as the case of the First District DNL and Fourth District, DNL, early extensive
oversight and support, possibly coupled with the short duration of the conflicts,
counteracted the weak degree of membership with other factors. This result indicates the
reasonable assumption that early pervasive and sustained oversight and support is the
most critical factor in the model.
Among the successful programs, the cases demonstrated the weakest adherence to
the factor of Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems with one case of fully out
adherence, one of mostly out adherence, and two cases of more in than out adherence. Is
unclear if this factor is unimportant or in cases with strong adherence to Voluntary
Participation of Local Leadership, the populace have informal connections with
leadership that function as an undocumented justice system.
In addition to External Oversight and Support, most of the successful cases
exhibited a strong adherence to Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction. The one case of low
adherence to this factor, the 4th District, Department of Northern Luzon, exhibited a high
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degree of external oversight and support. The high degree of supervision provided by US
forces may have mitigated any issues experienced with employing a local force outside of
its home territory. The fuzzy set analysis later in this chapter should identify individual
factors and combinations of factors that offset low adherence in other factors and still
produce a successful result.
Failed Community-based Security Programs
The failed cases provide a stark contrast to the successful cases. Neither of the
cases demonstrated a strong adherence to any of the factors of the model. An interesting
note with these cases is they demonstrated strong adherence to different principles during
different periods of their existence, but still resulted in overall failure. In the case of the
CIDG, the program started with strong adherence to the model with great success and
abruptly demonstrated low adherence to all of the factors after a change in the agency in
charge of the program and the change of the mission of the CIDG during Operation
Switchback in 1963. The Territorial Forces demonstrated the opposite behavior and
demonstrated low adherence to all the factors early in the program and in spite of the
efforts of the U.S. that adhered to the model after 1968, the program could not overcome
the failures early in the program.
As with the successful cases, the lack of adherence to the factors of the model
does not imply causation. However, the failed cases do suggest a correlation between the
factors and the outcome of a community-based security program. As mentioned above,
the failed cases also suggest that community-based security programs should demonstrate
an early and consistent adherence to the factors of the model to be successful.
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Crisp Set
In the next step of analysis, the findings depicted in Table 11 were used to create
a crisp set (Table 12). As depicted in Table 10, the adherence of each principle was
assessed on a six-point Likert Scale of 0 to 1.0, with 0 representing a fully out degree of
adherence and 1.0 representing fully in degree of adherence to the individual factors with
four points in between depicting partial adherence. This allows for a crisp set and fuzzy
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the data.
Table 12. Crisp Set Adherence to Model

1st District,
Department
of Northern
Luzon
4th District,
Department
of Northern
Luzon
3rd District,
Department
of Southern
Luzon
Combined
Action
Program
Kikuyu
Guard
Malayan
Home
Guard
Territorial
Forces
Vietnam
Civilian
Irregular
Defense
Group

External
Oversight
and
Support

Limits to
territorial
jurisdiction

Incorporation
of Traditional
Justice System

Local
sustainability
and
accountability

Local
Elites

Success

.83

.83

.66

.66

.83

1

1

.16

.16

.66

1

.83

.33

.83

1

1

1

.83

1

1

.83

.83

.66

.83

.33

1

.66

.33

1

.66

1

1

.66

1

.66

1

.16

.16

0

.16

0

.16

.16

.0

.16

0

0

0
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Initial Model
Through a review of the relevant doctrine in the literature review, the author
predicted that the External Oversight and Support would be the most influential factor in
the model and did not propose a hierarchy for the other factors. While the author did not
predict a full hierarchy of factors, the examination of the case studies gives the
impression that Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction and Local Leadership are the next two
most influential factors in that order and the other factors appeared to be less important.
This placed the factors of the model into two categories. External Support, Limits to
Territorial Jurisdiction, and Voluntary Participation of Local Leadership form a group of
essential factors and Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems and Local
Accountability and Sustainability form a second less important group of factors. This
second group of factors was determined to be less important because all the successful
cases had some combination of the essential factors, but the results did not indicate that a
lack of these factors and some combination including the lesser factors determined
success.
The argument for the importance of External Support and Oversight is intuitive.
Effective support and oversight by the counterinsurgent force in successful cases gives
the community-based security force the tools necessary to fight against insurgents and the
leadership necessary to build the professionalism necessary to beat an insurgent force
while preventing abuses committed by the local security force and clandestine coercion
by the insurgents. Until this initial shield of security and framework for training a local
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security force is in place, little else can be accomplished. This is why External Oversight
and Support was determined to be the most important factor.
The connection between External Support and Oversight and Limits to Territorial
Jurisdiction and Local Leadership is also understandable. Limiting the ability of local
security forces to operate outside of their communities makes supervision easier if
conventional security force manpower is limited. Local leadership can also assist in
providing oversight by providing a trusted agent in communities who know the
population and potentially members of the insurgency. In cases where External Support
and Oversight is limited, Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction can also provide a check on the
temptation of local leadership to use a community-based security force to coerce or settle
scores with other communities.
Due to the long-term nature of counterinsurgency and the necessity to gain public
support for the government cause, Local Sustainability and Accountability is possibly the
most important of the second-tier factors. Drawing on local resources can alleviate
budgetary pressures on the counterinsurgent force national budget and build ownership
among the population for the population. Accountability increases the legitimacy of the
program by providing a method to prevent abuse of the population at the hands of local
security forces. Increasing the legitimacy of a program and public ownership in a
program is one potential path to create support for a program that creates the momentum
Seth Jones (2010, ix) contends is necessary for a COIN operation that makes insurgent
victory is impossible. In the cases where Local Sustainability and Accountability was
less present such as the First District of the Department of Northern Luzon, the rapid
defeat of insurgency forces or extensive and pervasive oversight by external security
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forces may have reduced the need to build sustainable local ownership of the program.
Local Leadership may also provide a proxy for accountability by providing leadership
that the population is familiar with and may have established informal accountability
mechanisms.
Incorporation of Traditional Justice Systems is also an important secondary factor
in fostering legitimacy and local ownership. Maintaining traditional justice systems
provide the population with a form of self-regulation, such that they know the rules and
penalties and meld community-based security forces into the existing social fabric. In the
cases of the 4th District of the Department of Northern Luzon, Kenya and Malaya, a
marginal or lack of adherence to this factor may have been mitigated by other factors in
the model and the duration of the conflict. The population may be willing to endure the
suspension of traditional justice systems for a short time. Also, as with the case of the
4th District of the Department of Northern Luzon, full adherence to incorporating local
leadership into the program may have mitigated the lack of adherence by providing
informal mechanisms to achieve justice.
Subset/Superset Analysis
To determine the coverage, consistency, and combined score of coverage and
consistency, the next step was to analyze the crisp set in Table 12 using the
superset/subset function of the fuzzy set QCA program. This procedure analyzes how
well the outcome or dependent variable “success” rate fits with the necessary conditions,
in this case the factors of the model that produced that outcome. As a necessary
condition should be a part of the superset of the outcome, consistency measures the
“degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions [factors of the
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model] agree in displaying the outcome in question” or “how closely a perfect subset
relation is approximated” (Ragin 2008, 44). Meanwhile, coverage measures how much
of the outcome is explained by a necessary condition or put in another way, coverage
“assesses the relevance of the necessary condition – the degree to which instances of the
condition are paired with the instances of the outcome” (Ragin 2008, 44-45). A high
consistency score, but a low coverage result could be an outcome of the factor being “a
necessary, but not sufficient condition” to cause the specified result (Ragin 2008, 72).
The overall subset/superset analysis shown in Figure 13 supports the validity of
the model as a planning and evaluation tool for community-based security programs.
One particularly revealing outcome of the subset/superset analysis is the fact that several
combinations of factors such as external support and oversight, along with local
sustainability and accountability, produced higher combined consistency/coverage scores
than all the factors collectively. This suggests that different factor “recipes” can produce
successful results even if several of the factors are absent. It also suggests that several of
the factors may be necessary, but not sufficient to produce an outcome, a potentiality to
be addressed in subsequent sections.
Table 13.
Subset/Superset Analysis
Factor
External Oversight and Support (extovspt)
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction (juris)

Consistency Coverage
0.931393
0.817518
0.929314
0.815693

Combined
0.895080
0.889507

Incorporation of Traditional Justice System
(tradjus)
Local accountability and Sustainability (lclsusact)

0.920097

0.693431

0.820139

0.963362

0.815693

0.898630

Local Elites (leader)

0.867961

0.815694

0.866278
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The subset/superset analysis of individual factors in Table 13 produces a slightly
different hierarchy of factors than the model, based on combined consistency and
coverage calculations. The hierarchy produced is external oversight and support,
followed by local accountability and sustainability, limits to territorial jurisdiction, local
leadership, and, last, incorporation of traditional justice systems. This confirms the
importance of external support and oversight and limits to territorial jurisdiction and their
ranking as top tier factors. The second rank of local accountability and sustainability was
unexpected. The factor did not exhibit a coverage score markedly higher than the other
factors and its consistency score was the highest of all the factors. This raises the
possibility of Ragin’s concept of “context-setting” (Ragin, 2008). This is a phenomenon
of a factor being influenced by other factors or other factors common to all cases with a
similar outcome. In this case all the counterinsurgent forces in all the successful cases
experienced constrained budgets and manpower. This may mean that local accountability
and sustainability was a logical result of these constraints. The potential for this problem
will be addressed in fuzzy set calibration.
Analysis of Necessary Conditions
An analysis of necessary conditions allows researchers with another tool to
measure consistency and coverage. In this case, “consistency assesses the degree to
which instances of the outcome agree in displaying the causal condition thought to be
necessary, while coverage assesses the relevance of the necessary condition – the degree
to which instances of the condition are paired with instances of the outcome” (Ragin
2008, 44-45). This analysis provides insight into potential interactions among factors in
the model and the influence of adherence to one factor on adherence to others.
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The analysis of necessary conditions among successful cases provided some
validation of the model and some differences. If the model is correct, external oversight
and support, limits to territorial jurisdiction, and voluntary participation of local
leadership should have the highest consistency scores. As shown in Table 14 this is the
case, but local leadership has the highest consistency score, followed by external
oversight, then a tie between limits to territorial jurisdiction and local accountability and
sustainability. Interestingly, local leadership has the lowest coverage score indicating
that it is a necessary condition, but not sufficient to produce a successful outcome on its
own.
The necessary condition analysis also produced other interesting coverage results.
The ranking among the factors was external oversight and support, local accountability
and sustainability, traditional justice systems, territorial jurisdiction, and voluntary
participation by local leaders. External oversight and support and local accountability
and sustainability scored almost identical coverage scores, 0.962138 and 0.962054
respectively. As predicted external support and oversight was the most important factor
in producing a successful outcome, but the other results require further analysis. The
high score of for local accountability and sustainability is possibly because the factor is
inherent to counterinsurgency operations due to the political-social element and long
duration of most counterinsurgency that requires buy in from the population. It is also
possible that this factor is dependent on the context of the majority of cases examined in
this study as mentioned earlier. All of the successful cases were conducted in situations
of constrained budgets and manpower, so by necessity all of the programs had to be
designed to be as self-sufficient as possible.
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Table 14. Analysis of Necessary Conditions among Successful Cases
Factor
External Oversight and Support (extovspt)
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction (juris)

Consistency
0.812030
0.810150

Coverage
0.962138
0.926882

Incorporation of Traditional Justice System (tradjus)

0.714286

0.957179

Local accountability and Sustainability (lclsusact)

0.810150

0.962054

Local Elites (elite)

0.840226

0.867961

Table 15 contains the results of the necessary condition analysis for the failed
cases in this study. As expected their low or non-existent levels of adherence to the
factors of the model produced low levels of success. External oversight and support
proved to be the most critical factor in producing failure. The other finding of note was
the lack of adherence to local leadership. This result again suggests that this factor is
necessary, but not sufficient condition.
Table 15.
Analysis of Necessary Conditions among Failed Cases
Factor
External Oversight and Support (extovspt)
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction (juris)

.173913
.086957

Consistency

1
1

Incorporation of Traditional Justice System (tradjus)

.086957

1

Local accountability and Sustainability (lclsusact)

.086957

1

Local Elites (elites)

0

0
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Coverage

Fuzzy Set Calibration
As identified in the previous section, local accountability and sustainability scored higher
than predicted in consistency and coverage. As mentioned earlier, this could possibly be
caused by the influence of other factors in the model or other environmental factors
common to all the cases. Fuzzy Set QCA allows for this phenomenon through a process
of “calibration” (Ragin 2008, 16-17 and 85-96). Informed by the available literature and
familiarity with the sample of cases, calibration allows for individual factors to be
weighted to account for their overall importance and influence on the other factors and to
mitigate overrepresented factors. In the calibration process, to structure the fuzzy set
each factor is assigned three qualitative breakpoints, full membership, cross-over point,
and threshold for non-membership. As shown in Table 16, each factor in the model was
assigned these values in accordance to the predicted hierarchical importance of each
factor.
Table 16. Fuzzy Set Analysis
Calibration
Full membership/Cross-over/
Non-membership

Factor

External Oversight and Support (extovspt)
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction (juris)

.9/.7/.5
.8/.6/.4

Incorporation of Traditional Justice System
(tradjus)
Local accountability and Sustainability
(lclsusact)
Local Elites (elite)

.5/.3/.2
.6/.4/.2
.7/.5/.3
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Fuzzy Set Analysis
Using the calibrated values, a fuzzy set analysis of necessary conditions was
conducted. The results shown in Table 17 supported the model’s prediction that external
oversight and support and limits to territorial jurisdiction are the two of the most
necessary and sufficient factors in determining a successful outcome. Interestingly,
incorporation of traditional justice systems ranked the third highest in coverage. This
could be because adherence to this factor in the cases was usually a conscious choice by
commanders and is less influenced by other factors in the model. The results also
indicate that local accountability and sustainability, along with local leadership are
influenced by the other factors and environmental conditions common to all the cases.
Table 17.
Fuzzy Set Analysis

Factor
External Oversight and Support
(extovspt)
Limits to Territorial Jurisdiction (juris)

Consistency
0.761278

Coverage
0.959716

0.868421

0.900585

Incorporation of Traditional Justice
System (tradjus)
Local accountability and Sustainability
(lclsusact)
Local Elites (elite)

0.855263

0.899210

1.000000

0.886667

1.000000

0.886667

Analysis and Comparison of Results
As shown in Table 18, the hierarchy predicted by the model and the crisp and
fuzzy set analyses were consistent in the finding that oversight and support by a
counterinsurgent force is the most critical factor in determining a successful outcome.
This finding is intuitive, but also informative for practitioners looking for an inexpensive
method to defeat an insurgency. While less costly than fielding large conventional
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military forces, community-based security programs are not inexpensive in manpower or
material. The other critical factors identified by the model, limits to territorial
jurisdiction and voluntary participation did not fare as well in crisp set analysis.
Interestingly, after calibration the scores for local accountability and sustainability and
voluntary participation by local leaders both experienced lower scores as it became
apparent that they were highly influenced by other factors in the model. This is not
surprising as most of the cases demonstrated that local accountability and sustainability
was influenced by resource constraints experienced by the counterinsurgent force. Also,
in the majority of cases, the “voluntary” participation by local elites was usually a
pragmatic decision taken when it became apparent that the counterinsurgent force was
committed to victory and there were negative consequences associated with participating
in the insurgency. The importance of the incorporation of traditional justice systems is an
interesting, but not unexpected outcome. In several of the cases, placing limited justice
systems that were familiar to the population proved to be an effective method to gain
popular support for the government and undercut the nativist claims of the insurgents.
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Table 18.
Comparison of Hierarchy of Factors from Model and Analysis Methods
Model
Subset/Superset
Necessary
Fuzzy Set
Necessary
Conditions
Conditions
External Oversight
and Support
Local Leadership

External Oversight
and Support
Local accountability
and Sustainability

Limits to Territorial Limits to Territorial
Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction
Local
accountability and
Sustainability
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System

Local Leadership

Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System

External Oversight
and Support
Local
accountability and
Sustainability
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System
Limits to Territorial
Jurisdiction
Local Leadership

External Oversight
and Support
Limits to Territorial
Jurisdiction
Incorporation of
Traditional Justice
System
Local
accountability and
Sustainability -Tie
Local Leadership Tie

Fuzzy Set Truth Table Analysis
The final analysis conducted was the fuzzy set truth table analysis. The function
of this analysis is to determine the connections between combinations of causal
conditions and an outcome (Ragin 2008, 109). The standard analysis provides three sets
of solutions; complex, parsimonious, and intermediate. The complex case provides a
solution that avoids counterfactual cases. The parsimonious case provides the simplest
case with the fewest casual conditions through the use of counterfactual cases. The
intermediate case allows for inclusion of the most reasonable counterfactual cases. The
strength of this analytical method is it determines multiple pathways to a similar
outcome.
The complex case solution provides two causal pathways: 1) limits to territorial
jurisdiction, incorporation of traditional justice systems, local sustainability and voluntary
395

participation and 2) external support and oversight, low adherence to limited jurisdiction
and traditional justice, local sustainability and accountability, and voluntary participation.
The overall coverage of these two combinations as 0.976277 and a consistency of
0.894649. See Annex two for a full presentation of the results. For the purposes of this
study, the complex solution is less informative because it takes into consideration
counterfactuals, making determine a make a positive statement on the optimal mix of
factors and making it harder to recommend to practitioners which causal factors should
be focused on to achieve a given result.
The parsimonious solution includes two causal pathways, local sustainability and
accountability and voluntary participation by local leaders. The overall solution was
calculated to have a coverage of 0.998175 and a consistency of 0.868254. In this
solution, each term is measured by their degree membership in each possible solution for
the outcome and the proportion each factor contributes to the explanatory value in each
potential solution. The importance of this finding to practitioners is that gaining local
support, either in the form of coopting local leadership or building popular ownership in a
program through accountability measures is an important consideration in designing a
community-based security program.
The intermediate solution provided to causal pathways leading to a successful
outcome. The first is voluntary participation, local sustainability and external support.
The second is voluntary participation, local sustainability and accountability,
incorporation of traditional justice systems, and limits to territorial jurisdiction. These
pathways provide an overall consistency of 0.875614 and an overall coverage of
0.976277. These two pathways are instructive in that they indicate two realistic sets of
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conditions that can produce a successful outcome. In cases where sufficient external
support and oversight is available, local ownership of the program by local leaders and
acceptance by the population is sufficient to produce a successful outcome. In cases
where external support and oversight is lacking, strong adherence to the other factors in
the model is necessary to achieve success. This again highlights the importance of
external oversight and support as well as another combination of factors that could
mitigate its absence.
Recommendations and Limitations
This study proposed a model for designing and evaluating community-based
security programs as part of COIN operations based on a synthesis of counterinsurgency
and community-based policing theory. The model correctly hypothesized that the most
important factor influencing the success of a program was the level of external oversight
and support provided by the counterinsurgent force. The model also shows that a
balanced adherence to the factors of the model correlates to a successful outcome.
The small-n nature of this research requires that additional investigation be
conducted. As three of the failed case studies were dropped because of a lack of evidence
or a failure to fit the case study selection criteria, more research needs to be conducted on
failed cases to confirm the findings of the two failed case studies examined in this study.
Specifically, it is important to confirm that a general lack of adherence to the factors of
this model consistently produce failure. Additional research could expand the data set or
focus on a new set of cases as data from more recent counterinsurgency operations
becomes available.
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The U.S. COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will provide fertile ground for
future research as records are declassified and the passage of time allows for a more
settled perspective on the cases. Both Iraq and Afghanistan can provide several
successful and failed cases to examine. Additional research could also be conducted on
the use of community-based security forces by domestic governments combating local
insurgencies and not those fought by external intervening forces. If the results continue
to confirm the findings of this study, the U.S. military should consider adopting the
factors of this model as part of their counterinsurgency doctrine.
Another avenue for research lies in a more granular examination of the individual
cases examined in this research. The more recent cases of community-based security
programs in the post-World War II cases provide a wealth of reporting data that can be
used for within-case analysis. The archival date on the monthly reporting for the
Territorial Forces and Combined Action Program in Vietnam provide cases in point.
Advisors to each RF/PF and CAP unit provided detailed monthly assessments to higher
headquarters that could be used to compare the development and effectiveness of
individual units to others in the same or across districts and provinces. While the data
provided by the Hamlet Evaluation System was prone to inflation and manipulation by
American and Vietnamese officials, controls may be possible that would mitigate such
misreporting. The result of this more granular examination within cases could reveal a
better understanding of how local conditions influenced the effectiveness of communitybased security programs.
A final area of future research is in the area of heterogeneous or displaced
communities where the bonds of community are weaker or disrupted. The majority of
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the case examined in this research were homogeneous societies and if they were
relocated, they were moved as community units to secure locations. To further test the
generalizability of this model, examination of mixed ethnic or religion communities or
refugee communities needs to be conducted.
Potentially the most rewarding, but risk-prone potential use for the findings of the
research would be to “travel” the theory. The model could be applied as the guiding
principles in the formation of community-based security programs in the ungoverned
spaces of fragile states. The danger of creating militias and warlords is real, but the
potential reward for the bottom-up creation of order and improving the lives of the people
living in these conflict-prone areas is great.
Another area outside of counterinsurgent field that this theory might be applied is
in the response to natural disasters that stress or cause the breakdown of existing security
systems. Given prior assessments of communities using this model, it might be possible
to establish stopgap community-based security forces after a hurricane, earthquake or
other natural disaster. In conditions where no armed threats occur, an armed security
force would not be needed, lessening the need for external support, but the other factors
of the model should maintain their importance.
The findings of this research concerning external support should also provide a
warning to counterinsurgency planners who often turn to the use of paramilitary forces as
a quick and inexpensive means to combat an insurgency. This research shows that to
work properly, community-based security forces must be supervised and equipped
adequately. The successful case of the Kikuyu Guard in Kenya demonstrate that an
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insurgency can be defeated with minimal oversight and support, but at the risk of the
lasting effects of human rights abuses and alienation of segments of the population.
The findings also indicate the importance of local ownership in these types of
programs. As the failed cases of Vietnam indicate, if the participants feel no ownership
in the program and do not feel they are protecting their communities, the program may
fail. Anecdotal evidence from the numerous failed community-based security programs
mentioned in the introduction indicate a lack of local support may have been a cause for
several of the programs, but further research is needed to support this assertion.
The most important implication for this research is as a planning tool for planners
and military and political leaders faced with conducting COIN operations with limited
resources. At the most basic level, the decision to initiate a community-based security
program should be informed by the presence or absence of the factors or conditions
presented in this model. If they are not present or cannot be created, the creation of a
community-based security program should be rejected. If they are present, planners can
use this model as a set of guiding principles when deciding on the organization of a
program and as a selection criterion to choose which areas provide a more fertile ground
to start and hopefully expand the program.
This study also shows that political leaders must make the hard decision to
provide early support the program with sufficient resources and oversight and to sustain
that commitment over a long period. The cases that occurred during the Philippine
Insurrection, Malaya, and Kenya show that an early adoption of a community-based
security program can significantly shorten the duration of an insurgency. On the inverse,
the failed cases in Vietnam demonstrate that an early failure to support a program of a
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deviation from early adherence to the model can lead to ultimate failure even with the
infusion of support and oversight later.
This dissertation research is not without its limitations, which must be considered
with interpreting and applying the findings of this research. One the most significant
limitations of this research is the geographic weighting of the sample cases toward
Southeast Asia. This may bias the findings due to cultural similarities between the
majorities of cases. While this is mitigated by the wide temporal and geographic
dispersal of the cases, this shortcoming must be noted. As mentioned earlier in the
dissertation, a promising avenue of research would be to test this model using a sample
including cases drawn from Africa, the Middle East, and South America. Current cases
in Iraq and Afghanistan will provide fertile ground for future testing of this model, as
more of their associated data, particularly presently classified material, becomes
available. Similar findings from such research would support the findings of this study
and indicate a lack of geographic or cultural bias.
Another limitation of this research is the potentially subjective measurement of
degrees of membership of the cases for the factors of the model. While this study
attempted to mitigate this by using guiding questions to frame the examination of the
cases and qualitative descriptions to demonstrate degrees of membership, it is possible
that the researcher made incorrect assessments. Two avenues of follow-on research
could be used to validate the findings of this study. First, another researcher or group of
researchers could use the same data and method to replicate the study. If the assessments
made in the subsequent study conform to the findings of the original study, this would
support the claim that there was little or no researcher bias.
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The second method to validate the findings of this study would be to conduct
research using a different methodology. As mentioned earlier, it may be possible to use
quantitative methods to exam programs such as the Territorial Forces in South Vietnam.
Although quantitative research methods serve different purposes than the qualitative
methods used in this research, statistical analysis could determine if the presence of the
factors in this model correlate to successful outcomes. This would lend strength to the
findings of this research that contend that the factors of this model are causative factors in
producing successful outcomes.
At the most basic level, this research has contributed to the understanding of an
understudied element of counterinsurgency operations. As mentioned in the introduction,
most foreign powers conducting counterinsurgency operations conduct or at least
experiment with community-based security programs during some phase of a
counterinsurgency. This research provided an examination of this phenomenon in several
counterinsurgencies over a seventy-year period. This examination and analysis supported
the model presented in this research and a qualitative examination of how local factors
during several periods and in diverse locations influenced the outcome of similar
programs. The results of this research confirm the assertion presented in the introduction
that the factors contained in this model should be included in current COIN doctrine and
added as an element to COIN theory.
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